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Abstract
For a long time, human language has been assumed to be genetically deter-
mined and therefore the product of biological evolution. It is only within the
last decade that researchers have begun to investigate more closely the domain-
general cognitive mechanisms of cultural evolution as an alternative explanation
for the origins of language. Most of this more recent work focuses on the role
of imperfect cultural transmission and abstracts away from the mechanisms of
communication. Specifically, models developed to study the cultural evolution
of language—both theoretical and computational—often tacitly assume that lin-
guistic signals fully specify the meaning they communicate. They imply that
ignoring the fact that this is not the case in actual language use is a justified ide-
alisation which can be made without significant consequences. In this thesis, I
show that by making this idealisation, we miss out on the extensive explanatory
potential of an empirically attested property of language: its pragmatic plasticity.
Themeaning that a signal comes to communicate in a specific context usually dif-
fers to a certain degree from its conventional meaning. This thesis (i) introduces
a model of the cultural evolution of language that acknowledges and incorpo-
rates the fact that communication exhibits pragmatic plasticity and (ii) explores
the explanatory potential of this fact with regard to language evolution.
The thesis falls into two parts. In the first part, I develop the model conceptu-
ally. I begin by analysing the components of extant models of general cultural
evolution and discuss how models of language change and linguistic evolution
map onto them. Innovative use is identified as the motor of cultural evolution.
I then conceptualise the cognitive mechanisms underlying innovative language
use and argue that they originate in pre-linguistic forms of ostensive-inferential
communication. In a next step, the identified mechanisms are employed to pro-
vide a unified account of the two main explananda of evolutionary linguistics,
the emergence of symbolism and the emergence of grammar. Finally, I discuss
iii
the implications of the presented analysis for the so-called proto-language de-
bate. In the second part of the thesis, I propose a computational implementation
of the developed conceptual model. This computational implementation allows
for the simulation of the cultural emergence and evolution of symbolic commu-
nication and provides a laboratory-like environment to study individual aspects
of this process. I employ such computer simulations to explore the role that prag-
matic plasticity plays in the development of the expressivity, signal economy and
ambiguity of emerging and evolving symbolic communication systems.
As its main contribution to the study of language evolution, this thesis shows
that a model of linguistic cultural evolution that incorporates the notion of prag-
matic plasticity has the potential to explain two crucial evolutionary puzzles,
namely (i) how language can emerge from no language, and (ii) how language
can come to exhibit the appearance of design for communication. The proposed
usage-based model of language evolution bridges the evolutionary gap between
no language and language by identifying ostensive-inferential communication as
the continual aspect present in both stages, and by demonstrating that the cogni-
tive mechanisms involved in ostensive-inferential communication are sufficient
for the transition from one stage to the other.
iv
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank my supervisors, Simon Kirby and Jim Hurford, for the academic
support and good advice they gave me during the preparation and completion
of this thesis. The Cogito Foundation deserves acknowledgement for their gen-
erous financial support: without it, this project could not have been realised.
For computing advice, my thanks go to Cedric Macmartin, Mike Bennett, Morag
Brown and Eddie Dubourg.
I am also grateful to my colleages at the Language Evolution and Computation
research unit and at the department of Linguistics, who, over the years, have
become so numerous that they cannot all be mentioned here by name; special
thanks for their helpful comments on various bits of the thesis go to Dan Dediu,
Dave Hawkey, Anna Kinsella, Andrew Smith and Monica Tamariz.
I would also like to thank Mirjam Oberholzer, for helping me to keep things in
perspective, and James Clawson, for sharing his invaluable LaTeX expertise.
Finally, I want to thank my parents and my grandparents, who worked hard to
make my education possible, who taught me the value of independent thinking,
and who never stopped encouraging and supporting me.
v

Contents
Declaration ii
Abstract iii
Acknowledgements v
List of Tables xiii
List of Figures xv
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Evolutionary linguistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Language as a biological entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Language as a cultural entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Pragmatic plasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Underspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Overspecification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Outline of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
vii
1.3.2 Methodological commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.3 Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Chapter 2 The cultural evolution of language 15
2.1 Cultural evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 What is culture? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.2 What is cultural evolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.1.3 Components of cultural evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Identifying the linguistic artefact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2.1 Linguistic competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.2.2 Associating form and meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.3 Models of linguistic competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.2.4 The case for a construction-based view of grammar . . . . . 42
2.3 Models of linguistic cultural evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3.1 Iterated learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.3.2 Three types of models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3.3 Which model to go for? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Chapter 3 The emergence puzzle 79
3.1 The cognitive basis of communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.1.1 Communication: its goal and challenges . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.1.2 Communication by coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.1.3 Ostensive-inferential communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
viii
3.1.4 Coding as an ostensive-inferential process . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2 The emergence of symbolism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2.1 How do forms become associated with meanings? . . . . . . 99
3.2.2 How do form-meaning associations become arbitrary? . . . 103
3.3 The emergence of grammatical structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.3.1 How do schematic constructions emerge? . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.3.2 How do meanings become more functional? . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4 The protolanguage debate from a usage-based perspective . . . . . 121
3.4.1 Synthetic vs. holistic protolanguage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.4.2 The complexity of proto-meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.4.3 The protolanguage assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Chapter 4 Computational implementation 133
4.1 Modelling iterated symbolic communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.1.1 Simulating cultural evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.1.2 Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.1.3 Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.2 Integrating non-symbolic communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.2.1 What are forms? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.2.2 Forms as signal meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
ix
Chapter 5 The design puzzle 185
5.1 Design for communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
5.1.1 What is design? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
5.1.2 What is design for communication? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
5.2 Expressivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
5.2.1 Pragmatic plasticity as an “expressivity-enhancement tool” 192
5.2.2 The development of expressivity in the model . . . . . . . . 194
5.3 Signal economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
5.3.1 Pragmatic plasticity as a “signal-reduction tool” . . . . . . . 221
5.3.2 The development of signal economy in the model . . . . . . 224
5.4 Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
5.4.1 Ambiguity as a functional feature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
5.4.2 The development of ambiguity in the model . . . . . . . . . 244
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Chapter 6 Conclusions 257
6.1 Key elements of the proposed model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
6.2 The explanatory potential of pragmatic plasticity . . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.1 Explaining the emergence puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.2.2 Explaining the design puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
6.3 Assessment and future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Appendix A Algorithms 265
A.1 Generating a meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
x
A.2 Calculating the probability of a meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
A.3 Generating a context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
A.4 Producing a signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Appendix B Measurements 271
B.1 Measuring expressivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
B.2 Measuring signal economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
B.3 Measuring ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Appendix C Publications 281
References 324
xi

List of Tables
2.1 Three types of models of the cultural evolution of language . . . . . 67
2.2 Comprehension- and production-driven models . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.1 Arbitrariness from iterated semantic change . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.2 The two competing approaches to protolangauge . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.1 Probability patterns of the semantic space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
5.2 The effect of specific probability combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
5.3 Ambiguous codes have a lower average codeword length . . . . . . 243
xiii

List of Figures
2.1 The ratchet effect in cumulative culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 The slippage effect in non-cumulative culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Two loci of innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4 The generative model of linguistic competence . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 The construction-based model of linguistic competence . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Iterated learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.7 Two types of “learning” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.8 Acquisition-driven models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.9 Comprehension-driven models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.10 Production-driven models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.11 Comprehension mirrors production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.1 Communication by coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2 Ostensive-inferential communication by producing direct evidence 90
3.3 Under- and overspecified ostensive-inferential communication . . . 92
3.4 Linguistic communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.5 Metaphor-based scenarios of grammaticalistion . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.6 Reanalyis-based scenarios of grammaticalistion . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
xv
4.1 Simulating cumulative cultural evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.2 The accumulation of linguistic innovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.3 First stage of an example iteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.4 Second stage of an example iteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.5 Third stage of an example iteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.6 Fourth stage of an example iteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.7 Modelling symbolic communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.8 Modelling non-symbolic communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.1 Expressivity under idealised conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
5.2 Communicative success under idealised conditions . . . . . . . . . 197
5.3 Expressivity with semantic spaces of different size . . . . . . . . . . 199
5.4 Expressivity with phonological spaces of different size . . . . . . . 201
5.5 Communicative success with phonological spaces of different size . 201
5.6 Expressivity with different maximal meaning complexities . . . . . 202
5.7 Expressivity with different context sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
5.8 Communicative success with different context sizes . . . . . . . . . 204
5.9 The opposite effects of meaning size and context size . . . . . . . . 205
5.10 Expressivity with and without loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
5.11 Expressivity with different loss rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
5.12 Expressivity with different loss rates over longer time . . . . . . . . 208
5.13 Expressivity with different selection strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5.14 Expressivity with different probability patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
xvi
5.15 Average signal length in an established grammar (synonym selec-
tion: random) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
5.16 Average signal length in an established grammar (synonym selec-
tion: most entrenched) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
5.17 Average signal length in an established grammar (synonym selec-
tion: most underspecified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
5.18 Average signal length in an established grammar (synonym selec-
tion: shortest) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
5.19 Average signal length in an emerging grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
5.20 Average signal length in an emerging grammar (synonym selec-
tion: most entrenched) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.21 Ambiguity under idealised conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
5.22 Expressivity and ambiguity under idealised conditions . . . . . . . 246
5.23 Ambiguity with different loss rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
5.24 Development of ambiguity with different synonym-selection
strategies and no loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
5.25 Ambiguity with different synonym-selection strategies and loss . . 249
5.26 Impact of the size of the semantic space on expressivity and ambi-
guity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
5.27 Impact of the meaning complexity on expressivity and ambiguity . 252
5.28 Impact of the context size on expressivity and ambiguity . . . . . . 254
5.29 Impact of the structure of the semantic space on expressivity and
ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
xvii

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“GoodMorning!” said Bilbo, and he meant it. The sun was shining, and the grass was very
green. But Gandalf looked at him from under long bushy eyebrows that stuck out further
than the brim of his shady hat. “What do you mean?” he said. “Do you wish me a good
morning, or mean that it is a good morning whether I want it or not; or that you feel good
this morning; or that it is a morning to be good on?” “All of them at once,” said Bilbo.
—J. R. R. Tolkien: The Hobbit.
Human language is the most expressive, most adaptive, and most efficient com-
munication system in the animal world. Its story is one of unprecedented suc-
cess, one that so far has not been repeated in any other species. The uniqueness of
human language and the pivotal role it plays in human civilisation—and in what
defines us as human in the first place—must almost inevitably evoke a desire to
investigate its origins.
The existence of human language gives rise to two evolutionary puzzles: a puz-
zle of emergence and a puzzle of design. The emergence puzzle concerns the sim-
ple fact that language must have emerged from no language, that is, from a stage
where our ancestors did not possess any form of linguistic or even just symbolic
communication yet. The study of language evolution investigates how this gap
between no language on the one side and human language as we have it today
on the other side can be bridged. The design puzzle refers to the fact that language
is not just some random communication system but that it appears to exhibit ac-
tual design for its function in communication: many of its features—though not
all of them—seem to be tailored specifically for the the transmission of propo-
sitional information via a serial channel (Pinker and Bloom 1990:713). How did
language come to be like this? Ultimately, any account of the origins of language
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must explain (at least) these two evolutionary puzzles: the emergence puzzle
and the design puzzle.
1.1 Evolutionary linguistics
The field commonly labelled as “evolutionary linguistics” in fact comprises two
quite different research enterprises. The reason for this division, which often
goes unnoticed and is the cause of much miscommunication, is the fact that lin-
guists do not agree on what language is in the first place. The disagreement
evolves around the so-called innateness hypothesis, introduced by Chomsky
(1959, 1965), which assumes that language, or at least some core part of it, is
a domain-specific, genetically encoded module of the mind. Proponents of the
innateness hypothesis view language as a component of human biology. In con-
trast, linguists who do not subscribe to the innateness hypothesis view language
as a skill or system of conventions that has been developed and learnt merely
on the basis of domain-specific cognitive capacities. The task that evolutionary
linguists face if they attempt to account for the origins of language consequently
depends on the conception of language they start from: depending on their posi-
tion on the innateness question, they have to explain the emergence of a biologi-
cal entity or the emergence of a cultural entity.
1.1.1 Language as a biological entity
The most seminal nativist approach to language evolution was proposed by
Pinker and Bloom (1990). Pinker and Bloom combine the innateness hypothesis
with the observation that language exhibits complex adaptive design for its func-
tion in communication. They conclude that human languagemust be the product
of natural selection since natural selection is the only process that is capable of
accommodating both premises. With their proposals, Pinker and Bloom (1990),
and later Jackendoff (2002) and Pinker (2003:21–27), respond to nativist accounts
of language evolution that do not consider language to be adaptive (specifically
Chomsky 1988; Piatelli-Palmarini 1989; Gould 1997), as well as to selectionist
theories which attempt to explain language as an adaptation to something other
than communication (Dunbar 1998; Miller 2000). The latter group represents ap-
proaches which are typically only marginally informed by linguistics. Such theo-
ries, which invoke putative selection pressures such as grooming (Dunbar 1998)
or courtship (Miller 2000), are flawed since, even though they refer to natural
selection, they cannot account for the particular design that language has.
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The cornerstone of all nativist theories of language evolution is the innateness
hypothesis, the claim that the core of language is genetically determined in a
language-specific cognitive module. The innateness assumption is mainly based
on three arguments: (i) the argument from the poverty of the stimulus, (ii) the
argument from the universality of language, and (iii) the argument from linguis-
tic universals. The argument from the poverty of the stimulus, as put forward
by Chomsky (e.g. 1959, 1965, 1981) and, more recently, Laurence and Mangolis
(2001), roughly states that the linguistic data that is available to children is in-
sufficient for them to acquire language by means of grammar induction, and
that it must therefore be concluded that children possess an innate blueprint
for language (usually referred to as “language acquisition device,” “Universal
Grammar,” or “narrow faculty of language”), which reduces the task of language
acquisition to a mere setting of culture-specific parameters within a genetically
determined computational system. The argument from the poverty of the stim-
ulus has been contested on various grounds. It has been claimed that there is
no poverty of the stimulus if one presupposes a model of learning that is more
realistic than the sort of isolated grammar induction that the argument is built on
(e.g. Tomasello 1995, 2003a). Others have pointed out that the input that children
receive is actually not as impoverished as the argument from the poverty of the
stimulus presupposes (e.g. Marcus 1993; Saxton 1997; Saxton et al. 2005; Tellier
1999, 2000; Chouinard and Clark 2003). Similar cases against the argument from
the poverty of the stimulus have been made by Arbib and Hill (1988) and Elman
et al. (1996). Zuidema (2003) finally turns the argument on its head and suggests
that children are able to learn language because language can only evolve struc-
tures that are learnable in the first place: “[t]he poverty of the stimulus solves the
poverty of the stimulus.”
While the argument from the poverty of the stimulus remains themain argument
for the innateness hypothesis—most of the arguments listed in Pinker (2003:22f.)
can be viewed as aspects of the poverty of the stimulus argument—two minor
additional arguments deserve some brief mentioning at this point. The first con-
cerns the universality of language. All human societies without exception pos-
sess language. Nativists take this fact as a point in favour of the innateness hy-
pothesis. Language, the claim goes, is different from “unambiguously culturally
acquired abilities” (Pinker 2003:22) such as agriculture, chess, mathematics, or
government. Its universality implies that it is rather on par with “instincts” such
as fear or sexual desire. This argument, of course, can easily be refuted. If one
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assumes that (i) all humans possess the same general cognitive and social capaci-
ties, and that (ii) all humans face the same basic communication tasks, it is hardly
surprising that they have all developed some sort of language—just like tool-
making is universal too. Another argument is that from linguistic universals.
All languages exhibit some general characteristics, sometimes called the design
features of language (Hockett 1960; Greenberg 1963; Comrie 1981). There are
two problems with invoking this fact to make a case for the innateness hypoth-
esis. Firstly, there is no reason, on the basis of the observation alone, to assume
that linguistic universals reflect a language-specific Universal Grammar rather
than properties of general cognitive capacities. Secondly, there is immense dis-
agreement within the nativist camp itself on what actually constitutes Universal
Grammar. Most recently, Hauser et al. (2002), in retreat from earlier, more exten-
sive claims, postulated that recursion is the only (and therefore last remaining)
component of Universal Grammar. Parker (2006), however, argues that recur-
sion is neither specific to humans nor specific to language and can therefore, by
definition, not constitute a part of Universal Grammar.
At the present stage, the question of whether some part of language must be re-
garded as a domain-specific biological entity remains unresolved: the innateness
hypothesis has neither been sufficiently corroborated nor disproved. Pullum and
Scholz (2002), and more recently Scholz and Pullum (2006), come to the conclu-
sion that the advocates of the poverty of the stimulus argument have, as yet, not
produced sufficient evidence to motivate the innateness assumption. Tomasello
(2004) even goes as far as to claim that the innateness assumption must be re-
jected as a scientific hypothesis altogether because it cannot be falsified. The
present thesis does not aim to make a case either for or against the innateness hy-
pothesis. It will, however, make a methodological decision. It is good scientific
practice to assume as few assumptions as possible and to make an assumption
only if some phenomenon could not have been explained without it. It seems to
me that the explanatory power of domain-general cognitive capacities with re-
gard to explaining language have so far not been exhaustively investigated. My
thesis a will thus, for methodological reasons, not make the innateness assump-
tion. That is, I will treat language as a cultural rather than a biological entity.
1.1.2 Language as a cultural entity
Non-nativist approaches to language and language evolution (e.g. Deacon 1997;
Tomasello 1999) do not entertain the idea that there is a domain-specific lan-
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guage “organ” but rather view language as a cultural entity that has been learnt
and developed purely on the basis of domain-general human cognitive capac-
ities. From this perspective, the study of language evolution has two aims: (i)
to identify the minimal set of general cognitive capacities that is necessary for
language to emerge, and (ii) to account for what Kirby (1999:20) calls “the prob-
lem of linkage,” namely to explain by means of what processes one gets from
this set of domain-general cognitive capacities to language as we know it today.
The mechanisms by which activities grounded in general human intelligence re-
sult in the emergence and further development of cultural entities (skills, tools,
social institutions) are commonly summarised under the label “cultural evolu-
tion.” The term has come to include the component of “evolution” because it
has been observed that, on a very abstract level, the processes it describes resem-
ble those involved in biological evolution (Hull 1988; Croft 2000). However, as
Pinker (2003:21) points out, for non-nativist explanations of language evolution
to be on par with biological explanations, it does not suffice to simply refer to
general intelligence and cultural evolution: what is needed is rather the devel-
opment of mechanistic models that describe the respective processes. In recent
years, this requirement has begun to be met by a growing body of conceptual,
mathematical and computational models of the cultural evolution of language
(e.g. Brighton et al. 2005; Christiansen et al. 2002; Hurford 2002; Kirby 2000; Kirby
and Hurford 2002; Smith 2006b).
Most of these models focus on the role that (potentially imperfect) learning plays
in the emergence of linguistic features (see Smith 2006b for an overview). How-
ever, this focus on learning as a driving-force in the cultural evolution of lan-
guage restricts the explanatory power of the respective models with regard to the
two evolutionary puzzles introduced at the beginning of this chapter: the emer-
gence puzzle and the design puzzle. First, the fact that such models typically
work with more or less language-specific learning algorithms entails that they
need to assume some sort of language as their starting point, usually a hypoth-
esised protolanguage that possesses symbolism but no or only very little gram-
matical structure. These models thus do not explain how language has emerged
from no language but only how a simple form of language can turn into a more
complex one.1 Second, while they account for why certain linguistic features
seem to be particularly well adapted to being learnt, they do not explain how
1Note that the fact that they deal with a qualitative and quantitative leap in the evolution of
language distinguishes such models from mere models of language change, which only describe
the transition from one state of language to another, equally complex state of language.
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language comes to exhibit the appearance of design for communication. This
thesis addresses these two shortcomings of existing models by complementing
them with a model that focuses on the role of language use rather than language
learning as a driving-force of linguistic cultural evolution.
1.2 Pragmatic plasticity
The aim of this thesis is to develop a mechanistic model of the cultural evolution
of language that focuses on the role of language use. In contrast, most existing
mechanistic models study the role of language learning. To isolate the effects of
language learning, they abstract away from the mechanisms of use. Specifically,
they assume that linguistic signals fully specify the meaning they communicate
and ignore the fact that this is simply not the case in real language use. The
basic distinction that models with such an idealised representation of language
use fail to incorporate is that between signal meaning and speaker meaning (e.g.
Grice 1957, 1968; Clark 1996). Speaker meaning refers to the information that
the speaker actually intends to communicate in a particular communicative act.
Signal meaning, on the other side, denotes the meaning that is conventionally
associated with the produced linguistic form in the user’s linguistic knowledge,
the meaning that is encoded in a linguistic signal.2 That the two are not identical
was first pointed out by Grice (1957). Language exhibits what I will call pragmatic
plasticity: the speaker meaning that a signal meaning develops into is determined
2There is some disagreement among pragmaticists over the nature of signal meaning and
speaker meaning, and over the question of whether an intermediate level of meaning needs to be
postulated and different inferential processes have to be distinguished (see e.g. Huang 2007:209–
244 and Carston 2002:94–221 for overviews). In this thesis, I will understand the two concepts in
the broad, relevance-theoretic sense outlined in Wedgwood (2007). Relevance Theory (Sperber
and Wilson 1995; Carston 2002) recognises “just two theoretically and psychologically levels of
meaning,” namely (i) “that which is communicated by a given linguistic form independently of
context,” and (ii) “that which is understood to be communicated in a particular context—which
is an indeterminate number of propositions, among which implicatures and any sense of ‘what
is said’ are derived by the same mechanisms” (Wedgwood 2007:678). Signal meaning therefore is
neither assumed to be truth-conditional nor fully propositional (in fact, in most of the following
examples, the signal meaning is sub-propositional), and no psychologically relevant distinction
between different types of inference from context is postulated. Like Relevance Theory, I start out
“from a much more basic position on what kinds of meaning (‘content’) there must be: simply
that some meaning is encoded in linguistic forms and some is inferred” (Wedgwood 2007:652).
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by its context of use. Signal meanings become speaker meanings when they are
interpreted in specific contexts. 3
1.2.1 Underspecification
During the process of interpretation in context, signal meanings are regularly
complemented with additional, pragmatically inferred information. In such
cases, the signal meaning underspecifies the speaker meaning: the meaning en-
coded in the signal contains less information, is less specific, than the actually
communicated meaning. The following examples illustrate the ubiquity of
underspecification in language use.
Pragmatically inferred information may be used for disambiguation in cases
where the produced linguistic signal is ambiguous, that is, where it is con-
ventionally associated with more than one meaning. Example (1) represents a
case of lexical ambiguity: the word port can stand for either fortified wine or
a harbour. The hearer therefore has to infer additional information from the
context, namely which of these two meanings the speaker refers to. Similarly,
the signal meaning also underspecifies the speaker meaning in cases of syntactic
ambiguity (2), scope ambiguity (3), or plural ambiguity (4).
(1) a. John and Bill passed the port.
b. John and Bill passed the port [wine].
(2) a. Only old men and women live in this building.
b. Only old men and [old] women live in this building.
(3) a. Every linguist speaks two foreign languages.
b. Every linguist speaks [the same] two foreign languages.
(4) a. Two men lift a table.
b. Two men lift a table [each].
The signal meaning also underspecifies the speaker meaning in the sense that it
is in need of reference resolution. Reference resolution subsumes anaphora resolu-
tion as well as symbol grounding. The interpretation of sentence (5), for instance,
3The term “pragmatic plasticity” bears a partly deliberate resemblance to the concept of “de-
velopmental plasticity” in biology. Just as the conventions of a linguistic code only partly specify
the meaning an utterance is going to convey (the remainder being influenced by the context, due
to pragmatic plasticity), the information in the genotype of an individual only partly specifies
the properties of its phenotype (the remainder being influenced by the environment, due to de-
velopmental plasticity). This, however, is as far as we should take the metaphor; and it must be
emphasised that it is just that: a metaphor.
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includes among other things working out which real persons the names Elizabeth
and Susan designate as well as which of the two the pronoun her refers to. A fur-
ther case where reference resolution needs to be performed is deictic expressions
like the one in example (6): the information that the demonstrative pronoun this
refers to a specific crack in the window has to be inferred from the context.
(5) a. Elizabeth asked Susan to pass her the salt.
b. Elizabeth[i][Elizabeth′] asked Susan[Susan′] to pass her[i] the salt.
(6) a. Look at this!
b. Look at this[crack′]!
Saturation has been described as the process whereby a variable or slot opened
up by the linguistically encoded meaning is filled (Recanati 1989, 2004a). Promi-
nent examples of saturation are the specification of elliptical constructions (7) or
of vague relations such as the one between possessor and possession in posses-
sive constructions (8) or between two compound nouns (9). Here too, the signal
meaning underspecifies the speaker meaning.
(7) a. Joan is cleverer.
b. Joan is cleverer [than Naomi].
(8) a. I enjoyed reading John’s book.
b. I enjoyed reading the book [written by] John.
(9) a. She now works for the Boston office.
b. She now works for the office [located in] Boston.
Free enrichment is similar to saturation.4 It describes situations where, “although
there does not seem to be either an overt indexical or a covert slot in the linguis-
tically decoded logical form of the sentence uttered, the logical form neverthe-
less needs to be conceptually enriched” (Huang 2007:191). Examples (10)–(12)
show such cases of signal meanings conceptually underspecifying their respec-
tive speaker meanings.
(10) a. John has a brain.
b. John has a [scientific] brain.
4The distinction between “saturation” and “free enrichment” is Recanati’s (e.g. 2004a; 2004b).
The relevance theorists subsume both under the notion of “enrichment” (e.g. Sperber andWilson
1995; Carston 1997).
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(11) a. The police moved in and the hostages were released.
b. The police moved in and [then, as a result] the hostages were
released.
(12) a. I have nothing to wear.
b. I have nothing [suitable] to wear [to John’s wedding].
1.2.2 Overspecification
The process of interpretation in context also often leads to some aspects of the
signal meaning being discarded. In such cases, the signal meaning overspecifies
the speaker meaning: the meaning encoded in the signal contains more informa-
tion, is more specific, than the actually communicated meaning.
Like underspecification, overspecification occurs in a vast variety of linguistic
phenomena. As, for instance, Sperber and Wilson (1995:233–37) and Langacker
(1987:70) point out, overspecification is particularly prominent in figurative lan-
guage use.5 Sperber and Wilson (1997:105) find fault in the fact that figurative
language use has traditionally been investigated in isolation from other prag-
matic phenomena, each having produced their own literature. “There is little
overlap between the two, as if it went without saying that these are two essen-
tially different aspects of language.” They locate the reason for this development
in the fact that “[i]n both cases, the literature is centrally concerned with prob-
lems of classification and offers little in the way of explanation” (Sperber and
Wilson 1997:105). They claim to offer a more integrated approach, which is fur-
ther elaborated especially by Carston (1997) and, recently, Wilson and Carston
(2007). These studies treat what Carston (1997) refers to as “enrichment” and
“loosening” in a largely symmetrical way, as two sides of the same coin: conse-
quences of underspecification and overspecification respectively. The following
examples illustrate some of the linguistic phenomena that are based on overspec-
ification.
The signal meaning overspecifies the speaker meaning in cases of approximation,
that is, where an expression is used to convey a speaker meaning that is less re-
strictive thanwhat the expression actually stands for (see e.g.Wilson andCarston
2007). In such examples, certain specifications contained in the signal meaning
are ignored. In example (13), for instance, France is described as a hexagon, even
though, strictly speaking, it is only vaguely similar to one. The notion of hyperbole
5Sperber and Wilson (1995:233ff.) refer to the use of overspecified expressions as “loose talk”;
Langacker (1987:69ff.) calls it “partial sanction.”
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or overstatement is closely related. It is exemplified in sentence (14). One aspect
of bankruptcy is the loss of a lot of one’s money. This part of the encoded mean-
ing is kept whereas the other elements of it, for instance the aspect of ending up
with no money anymore at all, are discarded.
(13) a. France is a hexagon.
b. France has roughly the shape of a hexagon.
(14) a. This policy will bankrupt the farmers.
b. This policy will make the farmers lose a lot of their money.
In both approximation and hyperbole, some aspect of the encoded meaning is
cancelled during utterance interpretation. Overspecification is evenmore promi-
nent in metaphors. In example (15), it is only very few of the various features that
make up a chameleon which are kept, namely the ones that chameleons and
Sally have in common. In this case, it is probably the property of easily adapting
to one’s environment or the property of frequently changing one’s appearance.
Other features of chameleons, for example their property of having a long tongue
or the fact that they are reptiles, are ignored because they evidently do not con-
tribute to what the speaker intends to communicate (unless, of course, Sally lived
in a zoo and were indeed a chameleon).
(15) a. Sally is a chameleon.
b. Sally frequently changes her appearance.
Overspecification is also present in cases of metonymy. Two prominent features
of the White House can be described as follows: the White House is (i) a build-
ing, and (ii) an entity related to the office of the president of the United States.
In example (16), the former aspect of the signal meaning of the White House is
ignored and only the latter contributes to the speaker meaning.
(16) a. The White House issued a statement.
b. (An entity related to) the office of the president of the United States
issued a statement.
These are just a couple of examples that illustrate the ubiquity of underspecifica-
tion and overspecification in language use. It goes without saying that the two
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aspects of pragmatic plasticity can, and in fact most often do, occur in combina-
tion: in most, if not all, instances of language use, the signal meaning is (i) com-
plemented with additional, pragmatically inferred meaning while, at the same
time, (ii) some of the information contained in the signal meaning itself is dis-
carded and does not contribute to the speaker meaning. The notion of pragmatic
plasticity—that is, the fact that signal meanings under- and/or overspecify the
speaker meaning into which they develop in specific contexts—and its explana-
tory potential with regard to language evolution will be the focus of this thesis.6
1.3 Outline of the thesis
In the last part of this introduction, I provide a thesis outline comprised of three
parts. I will first specify objectives and scope of the thesis. I will then briefly
mention the main methodological commitments that I make in order to address
the inherent lack of data that any study of language evolution naturally faces.
Finally, an overview over the organisation of the thesis and the content of its
individual chapters will be given.
1.3.1 Objectives
The aim of this thesis is (i) to develop a mechanistic model of the cultural evolu-
tion of language that acknowledges and incorporates the fact that language use
exhibits pragmatic plasticity and (ii) to explore the explanatory potential of this
fact with regard to the two evolutionary puzzles introduced at the beginning of
this chapter:
• The emergence puzzle
Language has emerged from no language.
• The design puzzle
Language exhibits the appearance of design for communication.
The model to be developed aims to explain the evolution of language on the ba-
sis of domain-general cognitive capacities and mechanisms and does not make
6I prefer the term “pragmatic plasticity” over the more common term “linguistic underde-
terminacy” because the former simply reflects the fact that speaker meanings can deviate from
signal meanings whereas the latter appears to emphasise one possible form of deviation (under-
specification) more than the other (overspecification).
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the innateness assumption. Some recent models of the cultural evolution of lan-
guage have started to look at the effects that the emergence of culture, and in
particular language, may have on the subsequent course of biological evolution,
and the interaction between biological and cultural evolution (e.g. Kirby et al.
2007). Such considerations are outside the scope of this thesis.
Finally, I aim to describe the model at a level of abstraction that allows for it
to be integrated with both models of general, non-linguistic cultural evolution
and models of historical language change. To maintain sufficient specificity and
formal rigour despite such a relatively high level of abstraction, I formulate the
model conceptually and also implement it computationally.
1.3.2 Methodological commitments
Evolutionary linguistics is a field that is known for its notorious lack of evidence
(Cangelosi and Parisi 2002a:4). Its object of study, the origin of language, is sim-
ply too far remote in the pre-historic past for any direct observation to be avail-
able. Under such circumstances, methodological considerations attain particular
significance. It is therefore appropriate at this point to state some broad method-
ological commitments underlying this thesis. The first commitment falls within
the range of what is known as Ockham’s razor: entia non sunt multiplicanda
praeter necessitatem. If multiple explanations for a phenomenon are possible
and all other aspects are equal, the explanation which introduces fewer assump-
tions and postulates fewer hypothetical entities is to be preferred. I am aware
that this principle has led to rather different interpretations, particularly within
linguistics, and has thus at the same time given rise to theories as diverse as,
for instance, the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995b) and Cognitive Grammar
(Langacker 1987). However, this fact does not diminish the general methodolog-
ical value of the principle.
The second commitment is that of uniformity of process. This principle too has
been subject to various different linguistic interpretations (see overviews e.g. in
Christy 1983; Newmeyer 2003). I take it to be applicable to evolutionary linguis-
tics in the following form: “the samemechanisms which operated to produce the
large-scale changes of the past may be observed operating in the current changes
taking place around us” (Labov 1982:161, cited in Trask 2000:354). The conse-
quence of this interpretation of the principle is that the processes invoked in a
model of language evolution must be attested either in present day language
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use, language change, or language acquisition. I will argue in chapter 2 that,
contrary to what is implied by current acquisition-oriented models of the cul-
tural evolution of language, it is the first two (language use and change) which
are of particular relevance to evolutionary linguistics. Wherever possible, as-
sumed processes must thus be corroborated by attested linguistic evidence.
1.3.3 Organisation
This thesis comprises two parts. In the first part (chapters 2 and 3), I develop the
model conceptually and work towards an account of the emergence puzzle. In
the second part (chapters 4 and 5), I propose a computational implementation of
the introduced conceptual model, and, with the help of this, I address the design
puzzle. The individual chapters are organised as follows:
Chapter 2. I begin by analysing the components of extant models of general
cultural evolution and discuss how models of language change and linguistic
evolution map onto them. I identify innovative use as the motor of cultural evo-
lution.
Chapter 3. I then conceptualise the cognitive mechanisms underlying inno-
vative use and argue that they originate in pre-linguistic forms of ostensive-
inferential communication. In order to account for the emergence puzzle, I use
the identified mechanisms to provide a unified explanation of the emergence of
symbolism and the emergence of grammar. Finally, I discuss the implications of
the presented analysis for the so-called proto-language debate.
Chapter 4. I then propose a computational implementation of the developed
conceptual model. This computational implementation allows for the simula-
tion of the cultural emergence and evolution of symbolic communication and
provides a laboratory-like environment to study individual aspects of this pro-
cess.
Chapter 5. I address the design puzzle by employing such computer simula-
tions to explore the role that pragmatic plasticity plays in the development of the
expressivity, signal economy and ambiguity of emerging and evolving symbolic
communication systems.
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Chapter 6. In the conclusion of the thesis, I re-assess the explanatory potential
that the introduced model—and in particular the fact that language use exhibits
pragmatic plasticity—has with regard to the study of the origins of language and
point to avenues of future research.
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CHAPTER 2
The cultural evolution of language
Nativists have frequently criticised non-nativist approaches by asserting that
there is a linkage problem between the properties of general intelligence and
the structure of language.1 Many linguistic peculiarities simply do not fall out
of what we know about human cognition or functional needs. Cognitive capac-
ities do not, for an overwhelming number of cases, directly map onto linguistic
features. If one intends to challenge the innateness hypothesis, one therefore has
to find a way of bridging this gap: how do we get from human cognition to the
structure of language?
The missing link, it has been suggested, is cumulative cultural evolution (e.g.
Hurford 1990; Kirby 1999; Tomasello 1999). Language is continuously learnt
and modified, and the innovations added by speakers from one generation build
upon those made by earlier generations. But cultural evolution is, of course, not
limited to language but can be applied to wide varieties of artefacts and social
practices. And while there seems to be some agreement that cultural evolution
has the capacities to bridge the described gap, a whole plethora of processes and
mechanisms has been suggested to describe the exact means by which cultural
1The criticism raised by nativists and the non-nativist response is reflected in the row that
arose over the publication of Newmeyer (1991). In this article, Newmeyer alleges that “in
the functionalist view, grammatical patterning mirrors discourse function in a direct way”
(Newmeyer 1991:4, emphasis added). This statement, and the article that contained it, has
consequently attracted a lot of negative reactions (among others Hopper 1991; Lakoff 1991;
Mu¨hlha¨usler 1991). A reaction to the particular statement above comes from Thompson
(1991:93):
[H]e claims that “... in the functionalist view, grammatical patterning mirrors dis-
course in a direct way.” It is noteworthy that Newmeyer does not cite any refer-
ences here, and indeed, I believe he would have a difficult time doing so, for I am
not aware of any functionalist who would take such a position.
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evolution in general and the cultural evolution of language in particular comes
about.
In the first part of this chapter, I introduce cultural evolution from a general,
anthropological point of view and discuss the main building-blocks of a model
of cultural evolution, and the controversies surrounding them (section 2.1). I
will then move on to ask how such a general model of cultural evolution can
be applied to language. Two of the questions that fall out of this enterprise will
be tackled in this chapter, namely (i) what the linguistic artefact is (section 2.2)
and (ii) where the main locus of linguistic innovation lies (section 2.3). A third
question, the one about the function and usage of the linguistic artefact, will be
addressed in the next chapter. The aim of this chapter is to show what aspects a
general model of the cultural evolution has, why existing models of the cultural
evolution of language neglect some substantial mechanisms, and how they can
be enhanced to provide a more complete picture of what is going on during the
evolution of language.
2.1 Cultural evolution
Cultural evolution is a concept which has mainly been developed and applied
in anthropology, archaeology and philosophy, and before I engage in explaining
its central ideas and concepts, a brief overview of the most influential studies
contributing to this new set of theories seems to be appropriate. Dawkins (1979)
suggested that the evolution of culture may function in ways which are funda-
mentally similar to those of biological evolution. In their seminal book, the an-
thropologists Boyd and Richerson (1985) take this idea up and show how human
culture can be described as an evolutionary system. They develop mathematical
models to study how processes of this system work and how they interact with
biological evolution. Another seminal paper in the recent history of the study of
cultural evolution is Tomasello et al. (1993), which points out the cumulative na-
ture of human culture (as opposed to cultures in other animals), that is, the fact
that “none of the most complex human artifacts or social practices—including
tool industries, symbolic communication, and social institutions—were invented
once and for all at a single moment by any one individual or group of individu-
als” (Tomasello 1999:5). Tomasello et al. (1993) coin the term “ratchet-effect” for
this phenomenon. Boyd and Richerson (1996) propose an explanation for why
cumulative culture is rare in animals other than humans. Tomasello (1999) spells
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out the ratchet-model of cultural evolution and applies it to human language ac-
quisition. Its main points are summarised in later papers such as, for example,
Tomasello (2002) and further elaborated with respect to language acquisition in
Tomasello (2003a). I provide a detailled description of Tomasello’s ratchet model
of cumulative cultural evolution later in this chapter.
The idea of cultural evolution has also entered theories of archaeology, especially
under the influence of the so-called processural archaeology, which aims at go-
ing beyond a mere cataloguing of excavated artifacts and at gaining insights into
the general processes at work in cultural change. While anthropologists tend to
refer to these processes as “cultural evolution,” the term “Darwinian archaeol-
ogy” is more commonly used in the field of archaeology. Strictly speaking how-
ever, as Shennan (2002:15) in reference to Smith (2000) points out, Darwinian
archaeology comprises “three styles in the evolutionary analysis of human be-
haviour” (evolutionary psychology, behavioural ecology, and dual inheritance
theory) only one of which (dual inheritance theory) is equivalent to cultural evo-
lution. O’Brien and Lyman (2000, 2002) discuss the applicability of theories of
cultural evolution to archaelogy from a methodological point of view and pro-
vide a concise overview of the current state of the field.
Other noteworthy work by philosophers, psychologists and biologists who ap-
ply typical concepts of biological evolution to cultural processes and thereby
attempt to establish similarities and differences between the two domains in-
cludes, for example, Hull (1988); Dennett (1995); Sperber (1996); Odling-Smee
et al. (2003); Sterelny (2006). This is just to mention some of the most impor-
tant and accessible studies of a fast growing interdisciplinary field. I will now
proceed to explaining the concept of cultural evolution in more detail.
2.1.1 What is culture?
Culture is usually defined as behaviour which is neither determined genetically
nor learnt individually but which is acquired through some form of social learn-
ing. It is therefore one of three possible ways for an individual to acquire knowl-
edge, and in order to understand its evolutionary role it is useful to look at the
relation of all three—genetic encoding, individual learning, and social learning (cul-
ture)—to each other. In the following paragraphs, I will therefore briefly outline
the differences between genes and individual learning, and between individual
learning and social learning respectively, and explain how culture combines the
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advantages of both other forms of knowledge acquisition to which evolution has
given rise.
2.1.1.1 Genes vs individual learning
The behaviour of an individual can be determined, as the result of natural selec-
tion, by its genes. Due to that behaviour, certain individuals, whose genes elicit
some novel behaviour, may have a greater chance to survive and pass on their ge-
netic information in some particular environment than their conspecifics whose
genes do not give rise to it. Individual learning, on the other hand, denotes be-
haviour which is not genetically encoded but acquired by one individual in a
specific environment via trial-and-error. A chimpanzee who figures out how to
fish for termites in a mound by using a small stick, for instance, does not exhibit
genetically encoded behaviour but individual learning.2 In this case, learning
can be described as the solving of a problem imposed on the chimpanzee by the
environment.
The advantage of the capacity for individual learning over exclusively geneti-
cally determined behaviour is an increased flexibility of behaviour, which brings
about better adaptability to the environment. Such behavioural plasticity, that
is, the flexibility with which an individual can react to and interact with its en-
vironment, is one way in which evolution can increase that individual’s fitness.
Individual learning can be especially advantageous in a rapidly changing en-
vironment. Evidently, the most impressive example in this context is provided
by humans. The extraordinary capacity for individual learning exhibited by hu-
mans has contributed to their spreading over the planet into environments as di-
verse as Greenland and the Sahara desert. It has to be noted at this point though
that, as we shall see below, individual learning can only do the job if its outcome
is transmitted faithfully among conspecifics.
2.1.1.2 Individual learning vs culture
Social learning, as opposed to individual learning, is usually defined as any form
of learning the outcome of which is due to the outcome of the learning of a con-
specific. Shennan (2002:37) exemplifies the distinction between individual learn-
ing and social learning by stating that
2Note, however, that the general disposition for individual learning is of course again deter-
mined genetically.
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[n]ot all information capable of affecting people’s phenotypes is cul-
tural, only that acquired from other members of the same species.
Thus, if I learn to make a stone tool by experimenting with strik-
ing pieces of stone together, what I learn does not count as cultural
information. Rather, it is the sort of learning from interacting with
the environment that is characteristic of many, if not most, animals.
However, if my daughter learns by watching me then the practices
she acquires in doing so count as cultural.
The advantage of social learning (culture) over individual learning is that inher-
iting information from conspecifics saves the cost (time, effort, risk) one would
have to invest if one had to make the discoveries by oneself through trial and er-
ror. Rat pups, for instance, avoid the unnecessary risk of consuming potentially
dangerous food by only eating substances which they can identify in the milk
of their mothers or in the odours of conspecifics (Galef 1996). Similarly, a chim-
panzee who is looking for food and accidentally finds some edible insects under
a log involuntarily allows conspecifics who were observing to access the food
source directly without having to search for it themselves. Probably the most
eminent example of saving time and effort through social learning is human in-
structive learning. It is much easier if somebody tells you how to decipher Morse
code or to drive a car, or simply how to peel an avocado, than if you had to figure
it out by yourself. Tomasello (1999:4) summarises this by stating that
[b]roadly speaking, cultural transmission is a moderately common
evolutionary process that enables individual organisms to save much
time and effort, not to mention risk, by exploiting the already existing
knowledge and skills of conspecifics.
Another advantage of some forms of social learning (e.g. the aforementioned
instructive learning) over individual learning is that they allow for cumulative
change—a concept to which I will turn soon.
2.1.1.3 Genes vs culture
Individuals can inherit information or behaviour from their conspecifics in two
ways, namely either through their genes or via cultural transmission (social
learning). Avital and Jablonka (2000:54, cited in Shennan 2002:36) define such
inheritance systems as “the regeneration of phenotypic traits and processes
through the direct or indirect transmission of information between entities,”
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and Shennan (2002:16) summarises the relation between culture and genes as
follows:
[V]ariation in human behaviour cannot be explained solely in terms
of criteria linked to reproductive success. Humans have a second in-
heritance system, culture, in addition to their genes. Cultural tradi-
tions are handed down from one generation, and indeed from one
day, to the next, by specifically cultural mechanisms.
The advantage of cultural inheritance over genetic inheritance is that culture
can react to a dynamic environment on much smaller time-scales than biolog-
ical evolution. This is due to two reasons. First, cultural innovations are, at
least to a certain extent, purposive whereas genetic mutation is not. Mutations
are random “copy errors” and, metaphorically speaking, this renders biological
evolution in the position of a blind person searching for the exit of a room. Cul-
tural innovations, on the other side, can be more target-oriented: innovations
through individual learning are usually produced as reactions to specific novel
situations that have been encountered. Second, innovation can happen more fre-
quently in culture than in biological evolution. Genetic mutation happens once
per generation, or rather from one generation to the next in biological evolution.
The equivalent cultural processes can occur with much shorter intervals, “from
one day to the next” (Shennan 2002:16). Cultural innovations are made not just
when knowledge is passed on to the next generation but can happen whenever
that knowledge is applied in some particular situation. This is a crucial point to
which I will return later in this section. Culture thus combines the advantages
of both learning and inheritance: it flexibly adapts to its environment through
learning but is also economical since it is inherited via social transmission.
2.1.2 What is cultural evolution?
The term “cultural evolution” is usually applied to the set of processes through
which cumulative culture (as opposed to non-cumulative culture) comes about.
Tomasello (e.g. 1999:5) tends to speak of “cumulative cultural evolution.” In this
thesis, I distinguish between the process (cultural evolution) and the product
(cumulative culture) where such a distinction is helpful, and use the two terms
interchangeably otherwise. The fact that “evolution” has been adopted as an
element of the term to describe the processes leading to cumulative culture
points to the assumption that these processes share some underlying properties
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with the ones at work in biological evolution (Shennan 2005:49). Thus, one has
to distinguish between cumulative culture and non-cumulative culture. This
differentiation has been introduced by Tomasello et al. (1993), who coined the
term “ratchet effect” for the main property that leads to cumulative culture, and
has been developed further in Boyd and Richerson (1985, 1996); Tomasello (1999,
2003a). In particular Boyd and Richerson (1996) and Tomasello (2002) discuss
what separates these two forms of culture. The nature of cumulative culture is
therefore best explained if it is considered in contrast to non-cumulative culture.
2.1.2.1 Non-cumulative culture
The main characteristic of non-cumulative culture is that cultural traits do not
reach a state where they could not be invented entirely by any one individual on
its own. “With few exceptions, social learning leads to the spread of behaviors
that individuals could have learned on their own” (Boyd and Richerson 1996:5).
Tomasello (1999) consequently distinguishes between weak and strong forms of
social learning and claims that only the latter can create cumulative culture. As
examples of weak forms of social learning, leading to non-cumulative culture, he
discusses local enhancement, emulation learning, and ontogenetic ritualisation.
Strong forms of social learning (that is, the “few exeptions” mentioned by Boyd
and Richerson above), on the other side, seem to be limited to imitative learning
(sometimes also called “observational learning”) and active instruction.
Tomasello et al. (1993) argued that cumulative evolution depends
on imitative learning, and perhaps active instruction on the parts of
adults, and cannot be brought about by means of “weaker” forms of
social learning such as local enhancement, emulation learning, onto-
genetic ritualisation, or any form of individual learning. (Tomasello
1999:39)
The fact that weaker forms of social learning cannot create cumulative culture
may be due to two reasons. In a first group of cases, the involved form of social
transmission does not actually replace individual learning but just facilitates and
triggers it. This becomes clear from the discussion of local enhancement, emula-
tion learning and ontogenetic ritualisation offered by Tomasello (1999:26–33).
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Local enhancement “occurs when the activity of older animals increases the chance
that younger animals will learn the behaviour on their own” (Boyd and Richer-
son 1996:7). As an example for local enhancement, Tomasello (1999:26–28) men-
tions the potato washing in some groups of Japanese macaques documented
by Kawamura (1959); Kawai (1965). The story goes like this. At some point,
a macaque figured out that the sweet potato it intended to eat could be freed
of the sand sticking to it if it was washed in water. The fact that the offspring
of the inventor followed their mother around—and therefore also to the nearby
water where she used to wash her potatoes—increased the likelihood that they
discovered the technique as well. Like this, the cultural trait spread in the whole
local population without any one macaque actually copying the behaviour of a
conspecific.
Emulation learning describes cases where an individual is given the prerequisites
for its own learning by the way the learning of another individual has changed
the environment. Emulation learning is given, for instance, when a chimpanzee
watches a conspecific who turns a log to get to some edible insects hidden un-
derneath (Tomasello 1999:29). While the observer will not imitate the observee, it
still knows, because of the observee’s behaviour, where the insects can be found
and will thus sooner or later start to figure out on its own that it can reach the
desired source of food by turning around the said log. Again, the individual
learning of the first chimpanzee has merely enhanced the individual learning of
the second, or of the whole group eventually.
“In ontogenetic ritualization a communicatory signal is created by two organisms
shaping each other’s behavior in repeated instances of a social interaction”
(Tomasello 1999:31, emphasis added). If a young chimpanzee wants to climb its
mother, it will start doing so by lifting its arms towards the adult’s body. If the
youngster’s arm-lifting repeatedly initiates its climbing the mother, the adult
will, at some point, predict the young chimpanzee’s intention just from that
first initiating gesture and lift it up herself. This behaviour of the mother will in
turn make the youngster realise that it is apparently enough to lift one’s arms
in order to be lifted by the mother. It will therefore not try to execute the whole
climbing procedure anymore but content itself with the initial gesture to signal
to the adult that it wants to be lifted up. Mother and child have thus created
some form of “private culture.” Their behaviour could not have been acquired
through individual learning by just one party, and neither is it encoded geneti-
cally. In all three cases, local enhancement, emulation learning, and ontogenetic
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ritualisation alike, the actual discovery has thus to be made by each individual
anew—none of them directly builds on the achievements of conspecifics.
In a second group of cases, the involved form of social transmission is encoded
genetically so that it is limited to very specific cases of learning and cannot be
extended flexibly to novel situations or learning tasks. Examples for this type
of culture can be found in ants and rats. Ants locate food by following the
pheromone trails of conspecifics, and thus save the time, energy and risk of
searching for it by themselves (Tomasello 1999:4, referring to Mundinger 1980;
Galef 1992). Rats only eat food they can identify in the milk of their mother or
the odour of conspecifics. The food preferences of one rat can thus spread in a
population via its offspring, as mentioned in Tomasello (1999:4) and Boyd and
Richerson (1996:5, referring to Galef 1988). In both cases, the rats’ and the ants’,
social transmission is limited to one very specific genetically encoded behaviour
and can thus not give rise to an accumulation of novel behavioural strategies on
a cultural rather than biological time-scale.
In all these cases, social transmission only enhances individual learning but does
not replace it. The output of the learning of conspecifics might trigger or fa-
cilitate the learning of an individual, but the individual usually still has to go
through the process of discovery by itself, or does at least not acquire any be-
haviour which it could not have “invented” on its own.
2.1.2.2 Cumulative culture
Traits of cumulative culture, on the other hand, are not the result of one single
incident of individual learning but rather represent the accumulation of many
modifications made to an original invention by a whole number of individuals
over time. Tomasello (1999, 2003a) has formulated an abstract model of cultural
evolution which explains how such cumulative culture emerges. He describes
the main idea of his model of cultural evolution as follows:
[S]ome individual or group of individuals first invented a primitive
version of [an] artifact or practice, and then some later user or users
made a modification, an “improvement,” that others then adopted
perhaps without change for many generations, at which point some
other individual or group of individuals made another modification,
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Figure 2.1: The ratchet effect in cumulative culture. In a given environment, individual A invents
an artefact to perform a desired function. The knowledge of how to make and use the artefact
is then passed on from individual A to individual B. Individual B modifies the artefact, maybe
to make it perform its function in a novel environment, before it passes its knowledge on to
individual C. Individual C uses the artefact but does not modify it. The artefact is thus passed
on to individual D in the state in which it had been inherited from individual B. Individual D
adds two modifications to the artefact.
which was then learned and used by others, and so on over histor-
ical time in what has sometimes been dubbed “the ratchet effect”
(Tomasello et al. 1993). (Tomasello 1999:5)
This process is depicted in Fig. 2.1. In a given environment, individual A invents
an artefact to perform a desired function. The knowledge of how to make and
use the artefact is then passed on from individual A to individual B. Individual
B modifies the artefact, maybe to make it perform its function in a novel envi-
ronment, before it passes its knowledge on to individual C. Individual C uses
the artefact but does not modify it. The artefact is thus passed on to individual D
in the state in which it had been inherited from individual B. Individual D adds
two modifications to the artefact, after which the knowledge is transmitted fur-
ther. Each individual thus builds on the achievements of previous generations,
and the point from which individual D starts might be one that it could not have
reached by itself.
There is a plethora of examples for this general process of cultural evolution.
Tomasello (1999:37, citation in original) mentions the evolution of hammer-like
tools:
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Some cultural traditions accumulate the modifications made by dif-
ferent individuals over time so that they become more complex, and
a wider range of adaptive functions are encompassed—what may be
called cumulative evolution or the “ratchet effect.” For example, the
way human beings have used objects as hammers has evolved signifi-
cantly over human history. This is evidenced in the artefactual record
by various hammer-like tools that gradually widened their functional
sphere as they were modified again and again to meet novel exi-
gencies, going from simple stones, to composite tools composed of
a stone tied to a stick, to various types of modern metal hammers
and even mechanical hammers (some with nail-removing functions
as well; Basalla 1988).
Similar accounts could be given not just for technological achievements but also
for social practices.
The question now arises why humans have cumulative culture and other animals
do not. Tomasello (1999:37), referring to Boesch and Tomasello (1998), argues
that “[t]here do not seem to be any behaviors of other animal species, including
chimpanzees, that show cumulative cultural evolution.” Boyd and Richerson
(1996:1) make a slightly weaker claim by saying that “cumulative cultural evo-
lution resulting in behaviors that no individual could invent on their own is lim-
ited to humans, song birds, and perhaps chimpanzees.” At any rate, no animal
species, even if it does exhibit traces of it, has evolved cumulative culture to a
degree anywhere close to that found in human civilisations.
The answer to the question about the uniquely human trait of cumulative cul-
ture has to be sought in the fact that the ratchet effect can only take place if the
employed form of cultural transmission is faithful enough to prevent backward
slippage. A newly invented artefact has to be preserved until further modifica-
tions can be made. This means (i) that it has to persist within an individual until
it is passed on to another individual, and (ii) that it has to be transmitted faith-
fully to that other individual. Weak forms of social transmission, like the ones
discussed above, do not provide such faithful transmission. In these forms of
culture, the ratchet constantly slips backward as illustrated in Fig. 2.2. Individ-
ual A innovates an artefact. By means of weak forms of social transmission such
as local enhancement, the discovery made by individual A leads to individual B
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Figure 2.2: The slippage effect in non-cumulative culture. Individual A innovates an artefact. By
means of weak forms of social transmission such as local enhancement, the discovery made by
individual A leads to individual B making that same or a similar discovery for itself, which in
turn triggers individual learning in individuals C and D respectively. This procedure is opposed
to the ratchet effect, which is at work in cumulative culture (Fig. 2.1).
making that same or a similar discovery for itself, which in turn triggers individ-
ual learning in individuals C and D respectively. Tomasello (1999:5, referring to
Kummer and Goodall 1985) emphasises the importance of faithful transmission
to cumulative cultural evolution:
[F]or many animal species it is not the creative component, but rather
the stabilizing ratchet component, that is the difficult feat. Thus,
many nonhuman primate individuals regularly produce intelligent
behavioral innovations and novelties, but then their groupmates do
not engage in the kinds of social learning that would enable, over
time, the cultural ratchet to do its work.
Two reasons have been given for why species other than humans do not suc-
ceed at maintaining the cultural ratchet. Tomasello et al. (1993) and Tomasello
(1999) provide a qualitative explanation: only humans possess strong forms of
social learning, namely imitative learning—Boyd and Richerson (1996) speak of
“observational learning”—and active instruction. Boyd and Richerson (1996),
however, put more emphasis on the quantitative difference: even though some
animals other than humans might in principle be capable of employing strong
forms of social learning, they do not engage in it frequently enough in order for
the ratchet to be prevented from slipping backward. The result however is the
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same whether a quantitative or a qualitative explanation is adopted: because
non-human animal species do not, or not frequently enough, engage in strong
forms of social learning, cultural traits cannot accumulate and cultural evolution
like it is known in humans cannot come about. Consequently, Boyd and Rich-
erson (1996:9) venture to conclude that “observational learning seems to require
special psychological mechanisms (Bandura 1986) ... shaped by natural selec-
tion because culture is beneficial.” Tomasello (1999, 2003a) identifies the capac-
ity to understand conspecifics as intentional agents, that is, a theory of mind in
the broad sense, as the psychological precondition for imitative or observational
learning and points out the inseparability of cultural artefacts from the function
they are supposed to fulfil in an environment:
[T]he understanding of others as intentional beings like the self is cru-
cial in human cultural learning because cultural artifacts and social
practices—exemplified prototypically by the use of tools and linguis-
tic symbols—invariably point beyond themselves to other outside en-
tities: tools point to the problems they are designed to solve and lin-
guistic symbols point to the communicative situations they are de-
signed to represent. (Tomasello 1999:6)
The crucial evolutionary step to obtaining cumulative culture is, in this view,
the moment where our ancestors began to interpret each other as intentional
beings. It is this capacity that enabled them to transmit knowledge with a degree
of fidelity which made the accumulation of innovations possible.
2.1.3 Components of cultural evolution
The introduced ratchet-model of cultural evolution comprises three main com-
ponents: (i) artefacts, (ii) the process of innovation (or individual learning), and
(iii) the process of cultural transmission (or social learning). Some further exami-
nation of each of them will be necessary if the components are to be identified in
the domain of language later on. The remainder of this section is thus dedicated
to a more thorough discussion of particular aspects of the introduced model of
cultural evolution.
2.1.3.1 Artefacts: function and usage
In the context of cultural evolution, the term “artefact” does not refer to individ-
ual man-made objects—this is the sense in which the term is predominantly used
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in archaeology—but rather to any skill acquired through some form of individ-
ual or social learning, that is, through invention or cultural transmission. The
most frequently mentioned, quasi-prototypical artefact, the stone axe, can serve
as an example here: the product of cultural evolution is not the physical object
as such but rather the knowledge of making and using stone axes. The artefact,
in this sense, is thus the learnt behaviour and the knowledge of its application.
What evolves is consequently not the individual stone axes themselves but the
technique of producing stone axes as well as the way in which they are used
to serve their function. This definition allows us to extend the notion of arte-
fact from mere technological achievements to social practices, and in fact any
acquired behaviour, including forms of communication and, as I will discuss be-
low, language.
To understand an artefact means to understand its function (the purpose which
it is supposed to fulfil in a given environment) as well as its usage (the way in
which it is used in a given environment to fulfil this purpose). The function of an
artefact is defined as the change in the environment which the use of that artefact
is supposed to bring about. The function of the macaque’s potato-washing is to
have the sand removed from them. The function of the young chimpanzee’s arm-
lifting is to get to ride its mother, and the function of turning logs is to reach the
insects hidden underneath. Sperber (1996:99) describes the function of linguistic
utterances involved in communication as “to ensure a similarity of content be-
tween one of their mental causes in the communicator and one of their mental
effects in the audience.” (I will provide a detailed discussion of this last, linguis-
tic example in chapter 3.) The usage of an artefact is defined by the way in which
its user applies it to interact with the environment in order to achieve a goal (the
artefact’s function).
While function and usage are two aspects that contribute to the form of an arte-
fact in a very obvious way, the constraints imposed by the environment must not
be underestimated. This can be illustrated by two cases of chimpanzees using
wooden sticks to get to termites in theirmounds. In easternAfrica, they use small
sticks to fish for the termites in the openings of the mounds, whereas in western
Africa, chimpanzees use large sticks to destroy the mound. This variation in
the use of wooden sticks to reach the termites is not the result of culture but is
simply due to environmental conditions: termite mounds in western Africa are
of softer consistency than their counterparts in the east of the continent because
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of the larger amount of rain they are exposed to (Tomasello 1999:28f.). Under-
standing an artefact thus means to be clear about who is going to use it how and
under what circumstances to achieve what: one has to consider function and us-
age, the latter denoting how the user achieves the goal set by the function in a
given environment.
2.1.3.2 Innovation
In this thesis, I take the term “innovation” to denote any process which initiates
a cultural change, that is, the alteration of an artefact. This includes the original
invention or discovery of the artefact as well as its later modification. In this
sense, innovation is a synonym of the term “individual learning,” as it has been
used at some places above. Where the distinction is relevant, “innovation” will
denote the process and not its product; the latter being referred to as a “(novel)
artefact.” A thorough conceptual study of innovation from an anthropological
perspective has been presented in Barnett (1953).
Innovation is usually characterised as the process of solving a novel task or prob-
lem imposed on an individual by its environment. Barnett (1953:97–180) assesses
the range of possible incentives for innovation. Kummer and Goodall (1985)
discuss the conditions of innovative behaviour in primates. They describe how
the environment can occasion innovations, either because it has changed sud-
denly or because its stability results in an excess of leisure and energy. The pre-
sented observations suggest that familiarity with the components of a situation
is a prerequisite for innovations of any kind, be they technical or social (Kum-
mer and Goodall 1985:26). This complies with a statement made by Kristiansen
(2005:153), who, from an archaeological perspective, argues that one precondi-
tion for an invention—which he views as an accumulation of innovations—to
take place is the availability of most of its components. Another such precondi-
tion he points out is the development of new needs. This observation, in turn,
is reflected in the way Tomasello (1999:41) describes the process of how an indi-
vidual innovates by modifying an artefact on the basis of its original function so
that it can meet the current problem situation:
An individual confronts an artifact or cultural practice that she has
inherited from others, along with a novel situation for which the arti-
fact does not seem fully suited. She then assesses the way the artifact
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is intended to work (the intentionality of the inventor), relates this to
the current situation, and then makes a modification to the artifact.
Innovations can thus be seen as adaptations to a changing environment.
But not just large-scale environmental changes elicit innovations: in principle,
each instance of use of an artefact constitutes an elementary innovation. Each
time an artefact is used, it is used in a slightly altered situation. Novel conditions
do not just arise as the result of large-scale environmental changes but occur in
principle with every new context of use which is minimally different from the
previous ones. While somebody knows, in general, how to drive a nail into
a wall, every time they do so, they are innovating on a very low, elementary
level. They might not be using the same nail, and definitely not the same spot
on the wall, probably not even the same wall. The course of the hammer blows
might necessitate different correction measures, and finally the person’s physical
condition might not be exactly the same that it was on previous days. Heraclitus
allegedly summarised this by stating that no man can ever cross the same river
twice: the river will not be the same anymore, and neither will the man. That
each application of an artefact to a novel situation—albeit that the ”novelty” of
this situation appears to be minute—yields an elementary low-level innovation
can also be concluded from the description that Barnett (1953:181) provides of
how innovations happen: “[w]hen innovation takes place, there is an intimate
linkage or fusion of two ormore elements that have not been previously joined in
just this fashion, so that the result is a qualitatively distinct whole.” This linkage,
of course, can happen in two ways: an existing artefact is used in a novel context,
or a novel artefact is designed to fulfil a certain function in a given environment.
In summary, innovation is a process that is closely related to the function of an
artefact because it presupposes the intention to solve of a task for which no ad-
equate artefact is available yet in a specific environment. However, the degree
to which innovation is purpose-driven and conscious has been debated at times.
Henrich et al. (in press), for instance, criticise Pinker (1997:209) for overestimat-
ing the importance of conscious innovation, and add that innovation can often
be the result not of the deliberate consideration of a problem but of accidental
discoveries. Innovation does not necessarily have to be brought about by some-
body racking their brain but can be due to much less conscious processes. On the
other hand, even in cases where accidents and happenstance lead to a discovery,
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the process of cultural change is still driven by a certain degree of intentional-
ity. Only if I plan to solve a problem do I apply an accidentally discovered fact
A to some pre-existing knowledge B to form a novel artefact C. A different is-
sue is touched on by those who assume that in cultural evolution, innovation is
basically a by-product of transmission, to which I will turn now.
2.1.3.3 Transmission
The important question about the process of transmission is how faithful it is.
Tomasello (1999:5, and later almost identically in 2002:331f.) emphasises that
faithful social transmission is vital to cumulative cultural evolution “so that
the newly invented artifact or practice preserves its new and improved form at
least somewhat faithfully until a further modification or improvement comes
along.” Boyd and Richerson (1996) agree with this general point—with the
already stated difference in how they explain the absence of cumulative culture
in most non-human species: while Tomasello assumes that they do not engage
in forms of social learning capable of faithful transmission, Boyd and Richerson
argue that even though they might do it, they do not do it frequently enough.
This slightly more differentiated view does not, of course, contradict Tomasello’s
more abstract statement; in fact, he explicitly acknowledges that the situation
might be more as described by Boyd and Richerson: “The argument is thus that
there is a quantitative difference in social learning skills that leads to a quali-
tative difference in the historical trajectory of the resulting cultural traditions”
(Tomasello 1999:40). By speaking of cultural transmission preserving an artefact
“at least somewhat faithfully,” Tomasello (1999:33) evidently acknowledges that
there might be minor variation during transmission. Nevertheless, the central
point of the ratchet model remains the fact that in general, transmission must be
faithful for cumulative culture to evolve:
The metaphor of the ratchet in this context is meant to capture the
fact that imitative learning (with or without active instruction) en-
ables the kind of faithful transmission that is necessary to hold the
novel variant in place in the group so to provide a platform for fur-
ther innovations. (Tomasello 1999:39)
Others, however, assign far greater significance to the fact that social transmis-
sion might be only “somewhat” faithful. Sperber (1996) argues that the main
difference between cultural inheritance and genetic inheritance is that cultural
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transmission is intrinsically transformational. He points out that cultural infor-
mation can only be transmitted from one individual to another via the mediation
of a “public representation,” that is, that an artefact can only be acquired by ob-
serving the physical realisation or behaviour to which it gives rise. The underly-
ing artefact cannot directly be inspected but must be inferred from its observable
public representation. Such inference leads, in Sperber’s view, almost necessar-
ily to a transformation of the transmitted information. This is what a number
of philosophers identify as the main difference between genetic and cultural in-
heritance: genetic inheritance can be described as a copy-process while cultural
inheritance relies on inferential transformation (see e.g. also Boyer 1999; Atran
2001) or so-called “reverse engineering” (Kirby et al. 2004). In this sense, faith-
ful transmission (or the replication of mental representations, as Sperber calls
it), “when it truly occurs, is best seen as a limiting case of zero transformation”
(Sperber 1996:101).
In conclusion, I identify two sub-models of cultural evolution, each of which has
a different locus of innovation. They are represented in Fig. 2.3. An artefact be-
comes modified either when it is inferred from the observed use of it by another
individual, as represented in Fig. 2.3(a), or the user modifies the artefact when
trying to apply it to a novel situation or environment, as illustrated in Fig. 2.3(b).
We have to consider two possible loci of innovation: use and transmission. In
the first case, the observer tries to imitate the original artefact but is not faithful
in doing so because he has to infer his knowledge about the artefact from its use
in a particular situation. Then, innovation comes about because transmission is
not entirely faithful. In the second case, the user modifies the artefact to adapt it
to a novel situation, and the observer acquires the already modified artefact. In
this latter case, the innovation thus spreads to both the observer (through social
learning) and the user (through individual learning), while in the former case,
innovation is a matter of the observer only.
If they are viewed separately, the two sub-models assign different roles to the
process of cultural transmission. If the fidelity of transmission is emphasised
and innovation primarily comes about through use, then the role of transmis-
sion is mainly to ensure the continuity of innovation beyond the individuals’
lifespans. A cumulation of innovations already happens within an individual’s
lifetime but it is faithful transmission that makes the cultural ratchet possible.
On the other side, if transmission is the prime locus of innovation, it becomes
itself the crucial motor of cultural evolution. Either type of cultural evolution
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Figure 2.3: Two loci of innovation. The locus of innovation is marked with a circle. The hor-
izontal axis symbolises individual learning; the vertical axis social learning. (a) Individual A
uses an artefact in a given environment. Individual B observes this behaviour and tries to imi-
tate it. However, the artefact acquired by observation of the behaviour’s “public representation”
has undergone some transformation during cultural transmission. The artefact that individual B
acquires is different from the one that individual A used. The artefact of individual A is not mod-
ified after the usage event: individual learning does not bring about a change in A. (b) Individual
A applies an artefact to a given environment. Because the environment differs from the one in
which the artefact was acquired, the artefact now needs to be modified to meet the novel situa-
tion. Individual B observes the behaviour, and faithfully acquires the modified artefact. At the
same time, the novel usage of the artefact also results in a modification in individual A through
individual learning.
would still be less time-consuming than biological evolution, for three reasons:
(i) individuals learn from each other not just once per generation (even though
ontogenetic development is certainly the most intensive phase of learning), (ii)
individuals do not just learn from one or two other individuals (the parents), and
(iii) the innovations themselves need not be random but can, as has been pointed
out above, be relatively purpose-oriented.
The two identified sub-models of cultural evolution are, of course, not mutually
exclusive. Cultural innovations can occur as the result of adapting an artefact so
that it fulfils its function in a novel environment as well as the product of infer-
ential transformation during the acquisition of it by another individual. Given
the fact that cumulative culture relies so substantially on faithful transmission
occurring frequently enough, it could be argued that the aspect of non-faithful
transmission can be neglected if one assumes a certain level of abstraction, but it
would appear to be peculiar if the case was the other way round and the aspect
of innovation for use were not considered. Yet an overwhelming proportion of
existing studies in the cultural evolution of language do just that: they focus on
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alterations brought about by inferential transformation. Later on in this chapter
(2.3.3), I will argue that the fact that they focus on this one, seemingly less impor-
tant aspect of cultural evolution has something to do with the assumptions they
make about the nature of grammar and about the locus of linguistic innovation.
The points to be remembered at this stage are these. Humans have cumula-
tive culture because they engage in forms of social learning that allow a faithful
transmission of cultural information. Cultural evolution accumulates modifi-
cations of artefacts (knowledge, skills, or social practices) which are used in a
certain way within a given environment to perform a specific function, that is, to
bring about some specific change of that environment. Because every situation of
use is minutely different from previous situations, every use of an artefact also
entails slight modifications to the artefact itself. To build a model of linguistic
cultural evolution, one has to identify these factors in the domain of language.
In particular, it has to be determined what the linguistic artefact, its function and
its usage is, and where the locus of linguistic innovation lies. The remainder of
this chapter is dedicated to these questions: I will map the introduced general
model of cultural evolution onto exisiting approaches to the cultural evolution
of language.
2.2 Identifying the linguistic artefact
As strange as it seems, it is not common at all for a study of the evolution of
language to begin with the question about the very nature of language. Every
now and then, a more linguistically-minded member of the language evolution
community complains about this fact (e.g. Bickerton 2003; Newmeyer 2003). The
assumptions about language itself are often among the most hastily and curso-
rily made assumptions within a model of language evolution. And more often
than not, it is just assumed that linguistics—which is probably viewed in such
cases as a unitary field that can be dealt with as a black box—has decided for
sure and unanimously what language is and how it is organised. This oddity
may be due to two reasons, namely (i) a general reluctance of linguists to en-
ter into speculation about the origins of language (for the historical motivations
of this phenomenon see Newmeyer 2003:59–64), and (ii) among those linguists
who have ventured to engage in the study of language evolution, the predom-
inance of one particular linguistic school of thought, namely that of generative
linguistics.
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To make clear one’s assumptions about the nature of language—that is, the lin-
guistic artefact, if we want to speak in terms of cultural evolution—is pivotal be-
cause a study of the evolution of some entity can only make sense if one knows
what that entity actually is. In her essay on what it means to study the transition
to language, Wray (2002:2, emphases in the original) puts it like this: “answering
the question of how and why a change occurred depends entirely on your posi-
tion regardingwhat changed intowhat.” Thus, what one has to be clear about, she
claims, if one aspires to account for an evolutionary transition is one’s assump-
tions about the “state before” and “the state after.” The assumptions one makes
with respect to these two states necessarily define and constrain the solution one
comes up with. Disagreements between competing theories of language evolu-
tion are often not so much due to differing views of what processes applied but
rather founded in the assumptions that are explicitly or implicitly made about
what language actually is. A theory of language evolution thus has to spec-
ify (i) what the evolutionary state without language is (this will be discussed in
chapter 3) and (ii) what language, as the evolved entity one intends to explain,
actually is. In this section, I will address the latter question by first discussing
the general nature of language and then introducing the views held by the two
predominant contemporary schools of linguistic thought: generative linguistics
and cognitive-functional linguistics.
2.2.1 Linguistic competence
To ask about the linguistic artefact is to ask about a cognitive entity. We have
seen in the general discussion of cultural evolution above that artefacts must be
viewed as the information or knowledge of how to achieve a specific change in a
certain environment. They have been described as skills or practices, and I have
illustrated that it is not, for example, the stone axe itself but rather the individ-
ual’s knowledge of how to make and use a stone axe that has to be considered
as the cultural artefact. Artefacts thus reside in what can be called the cognitive
environment of an individual, and they have been described, at an abstract level,
as mental representations (see e.g. Sperber 1996:32ff.).
Contemporary linguistic theory is in harmony with this claim.3 Taylor (2002:5)
summarises the basic point on which most contemporary branches of linguistics
seem to agree as follows:
3In fact, it must be assumed that the anthropological characterisation of artefacts has at least
partly been influenced by what has been described as “the cognitive turn” in linguistics.
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I think it is fair to say that most linguists, nowadays, would at least
pay lip-service to the idea that language knowledge resides in the
mind, and that what linguists are trying to do, as linguists, is to de-
scribe what is in the mind that enables people to create and under-
stand linguistic expressions.
This, of course, has not always been the case. In fact, Chomsky (1959), which
is usually seen as having initiated the cognitive turn in linguistics, is a reaction
against the earlier non-cognitive, behaviourist and structuralist paradigm.4 This
earlier approach to linguistics, which had been shaped significantly by Bloom-
field (1933), conceived linguistics as concerned with describing the observed be-
haviour of whole speech communities without any reference to what must be
going on in the minds of the individual language users. Chomsky (1965) shifted
the focus of interest towards the psychology of the individual speaker. While
Chomsky (1957) had introduced generative grammars as a formalism to describe
all and only the well-formed sentences of a language, he now claimed that gen-
erative grammars had to be seen as a theory of the linguistic competence of an
idealised speaker of that language.5 Consequently, the aim of linguistic theories,
whether they comply with Chomsky’s approach or not, has become to describe
linguistic competence, that is, as stated in the above quote, “to describe what is in
the mind that enables people to create and understand linguistic expressions.”
Modern linguistic theories use several terms related to linguistic competence
in an often not clearly distinct, loosely interchangeable way. Chomsky (1986b,
1991) introduces the term “Internalised (I-) language” as standing for the same
thing as competence, namely “the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language”
(Chomsky 1965:4). This notion of language as the internalised knowledge of
an individual speaker has to be contrasted with three other concepts. The first
is, as already mentioned, the idea of language as an abstraction over the lin-
guistic data observed in a community of speakers, “a language” in its everyday
sense, which Saussure (1916) calls “langue” and to which Chomsky (1986b, 1991)
refers as “Externalised (E-) language.” E-language research is characteristic for
purely descriptive, behaviourist approaches to language. The second concept is
language as the way in which a speaker uses linguistic expressions in concrete
4Unlike Chomsky (1965), Chomsky (1957)—published two years before the criticism of Skin-
ner in Chomsky (1959)—does not have a distinctively cognitive character yet but is more clearly
based on its structuralist precursors.
5It has to be noted that the fact that Chomsky assumes an ideal speaker of a particular language
in part still reflects the notion of linguistics as the study of a linguistic system as the abstraction
over the behaviour of a speech community.
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speech situations, sometimes including the mental processes involved in pro-
ducing and understanding actual utterances. This notion of language is what
Saussure refers to as “parole” and what Chomsky (1965) calls “performance” (as
opposed to “competence”). Occasionally, Chomsky uses the term “pragmatic
competence” (Hymes 1972 suggests the term “communicative competence” for
the same concept) when he speaks of the knowledge that “places language in the
institutional setting of its use, relating intentions and purposes to the linguistic
means at hand” (Chomsky 1980:225). However, we will see in chapter 3 that the
distinction between linguistic and pragmatic competence envisaged by Chom-
sky is not necessarily a useful one and that the borderline he draws turns out
to be rather artificial. Finally, what researchers mean when they speak of the
evolution of “language” pertains to a third notion of the term. It can be used
to denote the phenomenon of linguistic communication in general (Saussure’s
“langage”) and the cognitive equipment by which it is enabled, the “language
faculty.” A last term which deserves mentioning is “grammar.” We will see in
section 2.2.3 below, that depending on the linguistic theory, “grammar” is either
used as a synonym for linguistic competence or as one particular component of
it. In this context, we also have to be aware of the distinction between the gen-
eral psychological characteristics of human linguistic competence on the one side
(“grammar” as a mass noun) and the specific instantiation of this linguistic com-
petence possessed by a particular individual on the other side (“a grammar”).
Finally, it will pay to be aware that, depending on the linguistic convictions of
the observer, “grammar” can refer to an actual phenomenon with a psychologi-
cal reality of its own, or merely describe an emergent epiphenomenon in the eye
of the observer:
There is a constant danger of silently moving from [the] understand-
ing of “grammar” as an independent, discrete, mentally represented,
innate entity to a more fuzzy conception of grammar as a mass noun,
a cover term for a wide and heterogeneous spectrum of regularities
in speech as noticed by the linguist. (Hopper 1991:45)
2.2.2 Associating form and meaning
So, what does it mean to know language? What constitutes an individual’s lin-
guistic competence? I have pointed out in the general discussion of cultural evo-
lution above that to understand an artefact means to understand its function and
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usage, that is, how it is applied (its usage) to achieve what change in the envi-
ronment (its function). A cursory answer—which will be further specified in
chapter 3—to the question of what grammar is and does, on which most con-
temporary linguistic theories agree, is the following: language is first and fore-
most an association of (phonological) form andmeaning. Chomsky (1972:17), the
founder of generative linguistics, states that “each language can be regarded as a
particular relationship between sounds and meaning,” and Langacker (1987:11),
one of the pioneers of cognitive linguistics, asserts that “language is symbolic
in nature. It makes available to the speaker [...] an open-ended set of linguis-
tic signs or expressions, each of which associates a semantic representation of
some kind with a phonological representation.” When I know a language, then
I know what particular linguistic expressions in that language stand for, and I
know how to express particular meanings in the phonological forms provided
by that language.6 This is, however, about as far as the agreement between gen-
erative linguistics and cognitive-functional linguistics goes. The question that
the two approaches answer quite differently is how language achieves the map-
ping between form and meaning—and ultimately also why it maps the two onto
each other in the first place, i.e. whether the function of the mapping is commu-
nication or not.
2.2.3 Models of linguistic competence
To think that linguistics has determined one sole description of what language
is, and therefore to treat grammar as a black box in one’s theory of language
evolution, is making simplifying assumptions to a degree where they affect the
results. The two rather distinct conceptions of linguistic competence currently
dominating the field are generative grammars and construction grammars. The
distribution of these two views roughly corresponds to the two linguistic re-
search agendas of generative linguistics and cognitive-functional linguistics. In
the following paragraphs, I will, for each of the two interpretations of linguistic
competence, (i) provide a brief characterisation, (ii) discuss how it achieves the
mapping of form and meaning, and (iii) refer to the main theories that represent
it.
6NB that the term “phonological” has to be used in its broadest sense, pertaining to duality
of patterning and the definition of a phoneme as the smallest unit that distinguishes meaning
(without carrying meaning itself), and therefore without necessary reference to sound as such,
including sign language just as well as spoken language.
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2.2.3.1 Generative grammars
The main characteristic of generative grammars is that they divide linguistic
competence into two components: a lexicon containing symbolic units that com-
bine form and meaning, and a computational system of abstract rules that operate
on top of the symbolic units (Chomsky 1965:15–18). Chomsky (e.g. 1995b:130) re-
peatedly characterises this as one of the preliminary assumptions of his theories.
“The generative procedure that constitutes language consists of a lexicon and a
computational system” (Chomsky 1995b:33, almost identically e.g. in Chomsky
1995a:15). This view of grammar has consequently come to be referred to as the
“words and rules” approach (Pinker 1999). The function of the rules is to gen-
erate all and only the grammatical sentences of a language. Such rules operate
independently on various levels: phonological rules determine the arrangement
of sounds, syntactic rules organise words into sequences, and semantic rules con-
strain possible meanings. Each level has its own autonomous system of rules. At
the core of the linguistic competence is thus a computational system—the term
“grammar” is often applied to denote this computational system only—whose
rules are responsible for the building of the structure that can be observed in
language.
The mapping of form and meaning in generative grammars is thus an indirect
one. It is mediated by the computational system whose rules transduce meaning
into form rather than associate them with each other directly. The only direct
pairing of forms and meanings is contained in the lexicon, whose entries merely
serve as input material for the transduction algorithm. They are the symbols
manipulated by the abstract syntactic machinery of grammar. Cook andNewson
(1996:43) summarise the generative view on how linguistic competence maps
forms and meanings as follows:
If language could be dealt with as pure sounds and as pure mean-
ings, its description would be comparatively simple. The difficulty of
the task is due to the complex and often baffling links between them:
how do youmatch sounds with meanings? The answer is the ‘compu-
tational system’ (Chomsky 1993) present in the human mind that re-
lates meanings to sequences of sounds in one direction and sequences
of sounds to meanings in the other.
The generative model of linguistic competence is illustrated in Fig. 2.4.
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Lexicon
(“words”)
Computational system
(“rules”)
Form
(phonological structure)
Meaning
(semantic structure)
Figure 2.4: The generative model of linguistic competence. Meaning and form are only related to
each other in an indirect way. The rules of the computational system, which operate on top of the
entries in the lexicon, transduce one into the other. The only place where forms and meanings
are associated with each other directly are the words in the lexicon.
The generative view of linguistic competence was introduced in the works of
Chomsky (1957, 1965) and received further refinement in the development of his
theories such as Transformational Grammar (the Standard Theory, the Extended
Standard Theory, the Revised Extended Standard Theory), Principles and Pa-
rameters Theory (Chomsky 1981, 1986a,b), which is also known as Government
and Binding Theory, and, most recently, theMinimalist Program (Chomsky 1993,
1995b). Theories which adopt the generativist view of linguistic competence also
include Lexical-Functional Grammar (Bresnan 1982), Generalised Phrase Struc-
ture Grammar (Gazdar et al. 1985), Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pol-
lard and Sag 1993), and Categorial Grammar (Wood 1993).
2.2.3.2 Construction grammars
Construction grammars view linguistic competence as an inventory of form-
meaning pairings. This view was first formulated by Langacker (1987:57):
“[grammar] can be characterized as a structured inventory of conventional
linguistic units.” Langacker describes form-meaning pairings as conventional
linguistic units consisting solely of a phonological part (their perceptible form),
a semantic part (their meaning), and a symbolic relation between the two. With
the advent of other theories in the same tradition, the term “construction” has
become more common to denote such units (Fillmore et al. 1988; Goldberg 1995).
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Form
(phonological structure)
Meaning
(semantic structure)
Figure 2.5: The construction-based model of linguistic competence. According to the symbolic
thesis, grammar is exhaustively described as an inventory of constructions, that is, as an inven-
tory of individual form-meaning pairings.
Not everybody applies “construction” to all form-meaning pairings: some only
use it to refer to complex, abstract units, whereas others include atomic, concrete
ones such as morphemes and lexical items as well (see e.g. Taylor 2002:567 for
a comparison of his more idiosyncratic use of the term with the more common
definition employed by Goldberg 1995). In the remainder of this thesis, I will
use the term “construction” in accordance with Croft (2001) and Croft and Cruse
(2004:256) to denote any conventional linguistic unit in the sense of the above
definition, that is, for any conventional association of a form and a meaning. The
construction-based view of linguistic competence is thus that it can be described
exhaustively as an inventory of constructions. This is often referred to as the
symbolic thesis (e.g. Taylor 2002; Evans and Green 2006). Linguistic competence
as an inventory of constructions is represented in Fig. 2.5.
Constructions can be atomic and concrete (specific), or more complex and ab-
stract (schematic). Croft (2001:17) illustrates this with the following examples.
Atomic and specific constructions are lexical items such as, for example, [the] or
[jumper].7 Word classes such as [NOUN] or [VERB] are atomic too, but schematic.
Complex constructions can be morphological patterns such as [NOUN-s] or
[VERB-TENSE], idioms like [pull-TENSE NP’s leg], or syntactic patterns such as, for
example, the English passive construction [NP be VERB-ed by NP]. Note that com-
plex constructions can contain schematic as well as specific elements. Like this, it
7Square brackets signify constructions.
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is achieved that the whole linguistic competence of a speaker can be described in
terms of constructions. One consequence of this is that construction grammars
assume a lexicon-syntax continuum: grammatical knowledge is a continuum from
concrete/specific to abstract/schematic constructions, and from atomic to com-
plex ones, but it consists entirely of pairings of form and meaning. Complex and
schematic constructions are conceived as bearing meaning just like morphemes
and words. A seminal empirical study that shows this is Goldberg (1995). In all
cases, constructions are immediate associations of form and meaning.
Construction grammar has its origins in the work of Langacker, Fillmore (and
associates) and Goldberg. It has developed into a number of individual theories
such as Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991; Taylor 2002), Construction
Grammar (Fillmore et al. 1988; Kay and Fillmore 1999), the construction gram-
mars developed by Lakoff (1987) and by Goldberg (1995), Radical Construction
Grammar (Croft 2001), and, most recently, Embodied Construction Grammar
(Bergen et al. 2004; Bergen and Chang 2005) and Fluid Construction Grammar
(Steels 2004), two versions of construction grammar developed specifically for
computer simulations.
2.2.4 The case for a construction-based view of grammar
The question whether generative grammars or construction grammars provide
a more accurate description remains unresolved—a discussion of this would fill
a thesis of its own. However, in contrast to what still seems to be a majority of
studies into the evolution of language—both nativist and non-nativist, this thesis
will be clearly positionedwithin the construction grammar approach to linguistic
competence. In the following, I will briefly sketch the two main reasons for this
decision: theory consistence and psychological plausibility.
The generative view of grammar is closely related to the innateness assumption:
nativist theories of language usually equate the computational apparatus at the
core of the generative grammarwith the domain-specific, genetically determined
language faculty. This is not to say that a generative view of grammar logically
implies the innateness assumption. In fact, computational models of the cul-
tural evolution of language comparatively often resort to generative grammars
as an abstract representation of human linguistic competence. However, it seems
to me that if one does not want to make the innateness assumption but rather
attempts to explain the emergence of language on the basis of domain-general
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cognitive capacities, it makes sense to also adopt the construction-based view of
grammar which has been developed on the basis of the same premise.
The second reason to chose a construction-based over a generative view of gram-
mar is concerned with their respective psychological plausibility. There is a
growing body of studies that suggest that the generative view of grammar does
not accurately capture the psychological reality of speakers’ linguistic compe-
tence. One of the most seminal studies in this context is Goldberg (1995), which
provides evidence for the fact that, in contrast to what is assumed in the “words
and rules” conception of grammar, grammatical constructions carry meaning of
their own, independent of the meaning of the words they contain. The view
of grammar as an abstract symbol-manipulation system operating over sym-
bolic lexical units can thus not be maintained in the face of the data provided
by Goldberg. Other studies demonstrate how generative grammars cannot ad-
equately capture the linguistic phenomena of idioms (Fillmore et al. 1988; Nun-
berg et al. 1994, Croft and Cruse 2004:ch. 9, Taylor 2002:ch. 27, Evans and Green
2006:ch. 19), collocations (Barlow 2000) and any kind of figurative language. Lan-
gacker (1987:29) identifies what he calls the “rule/list fallacy” as one of the rea-
sons why these problems occur, namely “the [false] assumption, on grounds of
simplicity, that particular statements (i.e. lists) must be excised from the grammar
of a language if general statements (i.e. rules) that subsume them can be estab-
lished.” Such an assumptionwould imply that an idiom like cook somebody’s goose
has to be characterised as a semantically unanalysable atom. But simple psy-
cholinguistic experiments show that speakers access both the idiomatic meaning
of the whole as well as the literal meaning of its parts, as is exemplified in the
following dialogue fragment taken from Taylor (2002:551):
(1) A: Did they cook his goose?
B: He doesn’t have a goose to cook.
The consequences such evidence has for what is a psychologically plausible
view of linguistic competence are interpreted similarly by various proponents
of construction-based views of grammar (Lakoff 1987; Langacker 1987, 1991;
Fillmore et al. 1988; Goldberg 1995; Fillmore et al. 1988; Kay and Fillmore 1999;
Croft 2001). They all agree that psycholinguistic data suggests that I-language
can and must be described exhaustively as an inventory of form-meaning as-
sociations. The assumption that linguistic competence can be described as a
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generative grammar can only be maintained if a substantial amount of empirical
data is ignored; as a model of I-language, it thus lacks psychological plausibility.
[T]he requirement of generativity entails the exclusion from the gram-
mar (and hence omission from serious consideration) of both usage
and figurative language, which are pivotal to an understanding of
linguistic structure. (Langacker 1987:64)
Langacker’s statement reflects a fundamental disagreement between generative
and cognitive-functional linguistics on the nature of what counts as linguistic
evidence, and ultimately what linguistic enquiry is about. Generative linguists
typically argue on the basis of intuitive grammaticality judgements of sentences
deprived of any context, whereas functionalists maintain that the basis of the
study of language has to be actually occurring utterances within their specific
context. In his response to Newmeyer (1991), Hopper criticises the data base
used in generative linguistics :
[Newmeyer] unquestioningly assumes that “functional” linguistics
and formal linguistics work with the same data base. This data base is
to consist of fictitious sentences drawn from linguistic intuitions. [...]
The problem is that sentences obtained by consulting “intuitions” are
remote from real utterances; they lack a context, they are not socially
real, they are literally useless; there cannot be a functional explanation
for a non-functional sentence. (Hopper 1991:46)
In his seminal paper, Lakoff (1991) points out that the view that linguistic com-
petence can be described as a generative grammar is not the result of empirical
studies, that in fact, it is no result at all, but an a priori assumption of the gener-
ative enterprise. The differences in the two research programs have far-reaching
impacts, Lakoff argues, and he states that cognitive-functional linguistics is built
on “the commitment to characterize the general principles governing all aspects
of human language” (the “Generalisation Commitment”) and the “commitment
to make one’s account of human language accord with what is generally known
about the mind and brain from disciplines other than linguistics” (the “Cogni-
tive Commitment”), whereas generative linguistics is committed “to describe
language in terms of the mathematics of symbol manipulation systems” (the
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“Chomskyan Commitment,” Lakoff 1991:53f.). The identification of these com-
mitments leads him to the conclusion that the two research programs cannot
actually be compared because they have fundamentally different aims:
The Cognitive and Generalisation commitment are just commitments
to engage in scientific research, whereas the Chomskyan Commit-
ment is a commitment to a program of speculative philosophy: to see
what happens if you decide to study language given the metaphor
that a grammar of a human language is a symbol-manipulation sys-
tem in the technical sense. There are a great many linguists who, like
myself, were trained as generative grammarians and then moved on
to cognitive linguistics because we found that the Chomskyan Com-
mitment was not consistent with what we saw as the scientific study
of language. (Lakoff 1991:62)
Even if we do not link the generative model of grammar and language with
the innateness hypothesis, the Generalisation and Cognitive Commitment as ex-
pounded by Lakoff above appear to match the aim of a culture-based account of
the evolution of language much better than the Chomskyan Commitment which
underlies the generative enterprise. It thus seems to be more promising to apply
cognitive-functional conceptions of grammar in models of the cultural evolution
of language. And these converge all on one property: they describe language as
a redundant inventory of constructions.8
I will now explore how the developed model of general cultural evolution can
be mapped onto established models of the cultural evolution of the language.
2.3 Models of linguistic cultural evolution
Models of the cultural evolution of language can be viewed as generally formu-
lated models of how linguistic artefacts come into being (language evolution in
the narrow sense as the object of study of evolutionary linguistics) and how they
are modified (language change as the object of study of historical linguistics). A
model of the cultural evolution of language will thus have to subsume models
of language change but differ from them in two ways. First, it will have to be
able to account for qualitatively and quantitatively more substantial leaps than
8Some recent studies argue that even as biological entities, that is even if they were innate,
construction grammars would be evolutionarily more plausible than generative grammars (e.g.
Jackendoff and Pinker 2005; Kinsella in press).
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the ones described by historical linguistics. A model of the cultural evolution
of language will ultimately have to accommodate what I called the “emergence
puzzle” in the introduction to this thesis, namely the problem that the starting
point of a study of language evolution is not, as it is the case for a study of lan-
guage change, language but rather a pre-linguistic, that is, non-linguistic state.
Chapter 3 of this thesis will be dedicated to the emergence puzzle. However, the
maxim of the uniformity of process (cf. section 1.3.2) would demand that a model
of the cultural evolution of language be formulated so that the same processes
that lead to language change can also be employed to account for the emergence
of the linguistic artefact in the first place. This leads us to the second aspect in
which a model of the cultural evolution of language differs from a mere model
of language change. This second distinction is one of the degree of abstraction,
or rather generality. A model of the cultural evolution of language will strive
for an account of the minimal set of general cognitive mechanisms necessary to
account for how linguistic artefacts emerge and change. It will thus have to sub-
sume more specific processes of language change but will have to reach a greater
level of abstraction and find motivation for the processes it applies in general
cognition. Tomasello (2003b:103) calls for such models of the underlying cog-
nitive processes of individual phenomena of language change when he argues
that “[s]ystematic investigation into processes of grammaticalization and syn-
tacticization is still in its infancy”:
Exactly how grammaticalization and syntacticization happen in the
concrete interactions of individual human beings and groups of hu-
man beings, and how these processes might relate to the other pro-
cesses of sociogenesis by means of which human social interaction
ratchets up the complexity of cultural artefacts, requires more psy-
chologically based linguistic research into processes of linguistic com-
munication and language change.
There is thus a certain overlap between models of language change and models
of language evolution, and in the discussion below I will refer to examples of
both domains when explaining how existing models of the cultural evolution
of language map onto the general, not language-specific framework of cultural
evolution which I have introduced above.
Both models of cultural evolution as well as models of language change can
provide so-called micro-dynamic or macro-dynamic accounts—or, of course,
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any hybrid thereof. It is therefore appropriate to have, very briefly, a closer look
at this distinction and the terminology and concepts involved. Micro-dynamic
change refers to the emergence of an innovation in an individual. Macro-
dynamic change occurs when such an innovation spreads in a community
(Nerlich and Clarke 1992). Traugott and Dasher (2005:35, referring to Weinreich
et al. 1968 and Milroy 1993; but see also Milroy 1992:ch. 6) clarify the involved
terminology:
The distinction between individual “micro-dynamic” and commu-
nal “macro-dynamic” change is similar to that between “innovation”
(which occurs in the individual and may not spread to others) and
“change,” which involves spread across speakers, communities, and
registers.
This distinction is, of course, not restricted to language: any model of cultural
evolution can have its focus on innovation (micro-dynamic change) or the spread
of change (macro-dynamic change). Historical linguistics has seen a move from
system- or language-oriented tomore speaker-oriented frameworks, that is, from
macro-dynamic to micro-dynamic accounts. Rather than studying how a change
propagates in a linguistic community, and how the system abstracted over the
linguistic behaviour of that community changes, researchers investigate how in-
novations in individuals’ linguistic competence emerge in the first place, that is,
they study the origin or so-called actuation of language change. In the context of
grammaticalisation, Kuteva (2001:121) describes innovation—or locus of change,
as she labels it—as “the specific, local context in which an existing linguistic ex-
pression acquires a new interpretation.”9 An innovation, of course, might only
become “visible” to the observer if it persists in the innovator (i.e. if it is used
again) and if it is transmitted to other individuals. “An innovation made by
an individual speaker can initiate a change. But it will lead to change only if
it is adopted and used by a sufficient number of other speakers and is then ac-
quired and used by new cohorts of speakers” (Andersen 2006:67). But the way
an innovation spreads in a community does not tell us anything yet about how
the innovation emerged in the first place. Fig. 2.3 above, representing the gen-
eral model of cultural evolution introduced in this chapter, is thus very much
9Note that I use the term “locus” in a slightly more general sense than Kuteva, namely as the
locus within the model of cultural evolution where innovation happens rather than as the specific
usage event in which it occurs.
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concerned with just these micro-dynamics and the actual locus and nature of in-
novation, as opposed to spread of change. In the remainder of this section, I will
discuss how this general model can be interpreted for language, and how some
of the most predominant types of models of linguistic cultural evolution can be
mapped onto it.
2.3.1 Iterated learning
Contemporary models of linguistic cultural evolution are—in one way or
another—based on the fundamental distinction between I-language and E-
language introduced above. This is, as Kirby (2002a:175) puts it, the simple
fact that language exists in two domains: as linguistic competence in users’
minds (I-language), and as utterances in actual speech situations (E-language)
(Chomsky 1986b; Hurford 1987; Kirby 1999). This dichotomy is equivalent to
the one developed above for artefacts on the one side, and the event of putting
them into use (i.e. what Sperber 1996:99 calls “public representations”) on the
other side. It has to be noted at this point that Hurford and Kirby’s use of the
term “E-language” is slightly different from the one introduced by Chomsky
(1986b). As we have seen in section 2.2.1 above, Chomsky’s notion of it is related
to Saussure’s “langue,”, that is to language as the system abstracted over the
linguistic behaviour of a community of speakers (e.g. English, Greek, Korean). In
contrast, Hurford and Kirby’s use of the term is closer to Saussure’s “parole” and
Chomsky’s “performance,” the linguistic data produced in actual usage events.
In the remainder of this thesis, I will use “E-language” in this latter sense, as it is
the one more commonly applied in evolutionary models of language.
The central idea of any linguistic model of cultural evolution is the one that I-
language produces E-language, which in turn leads to I-language, and so on.
Speakers produce utterances on the basis of their linguistic competence. Such
utterances then serve as the basis for the linguistic competence of a language
learner. Andersen (1973:767) referred to this fact when he pointed out that gram-
mars are not transmitted immediately from one generation of speakers to the
next but via what he calls the “verbal output” of a speaker. Kirby and Hurford
(e.g. 2002) have taken this idea up and applied it to form a general framework of
the cultural evolution of language: the iterated learning model (ILM), where I-
language is “learnt” iteratively from the output (E-language) produced by some
other I-language. “For a language, or a pattern within a language, to persist
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Learning
E-language I-language
Use
Learning
Figure 2.6: Iterated learning. “For a language, or a pattern within a language, to persist from
one generation of language users to the next it must be mapped from I-language to E-language
(through use) and from E-language back to I-language again (through learning)” (Kirby and
Hurford 2002:123).
from one generation of language users to the next it must be mapped from I-
language to E-language (through use) and from E-language back to I-language
again (through learning)” (Kirby and Hurford 2002:123). This central idea of lin-
guistic models of cultural evolution is represented in Fig. 2.6.
Evidently, the iterated learning model of the cultural evolution of language can
easily be mapped onto the general model of cultural evolution introduced ear-
lier in this chapter: I-language is the linguistic equivalent of the artefact and
E-language pertains to the process of putting this artefact into use. Thus, if
we adapt Fig. 2.3 from above to language, we end up with a situation as rep-
resented in Fig. 2.7. First, individual A produces E-language on the basis of her
I-language. But then, the comparison with our general model of cultural evolu-
tion introduces a further differentiation into the general idea of iterated learning:
there are two ways in which E-language can be mapped “back” onto I-language,
that is, there are two places where “learning” can happen. Either a second in-
dividual constructs his own I-language on the basis of the E-language produced
by the speaker, or the first individual herself alters her I-language as a result of
the usage event. The former is social learning, the latter is individual learning.
At the end of section 2.1.3.3, I concluded that the introduced model of general
cultural evolution leaves room for two loci of innovation: use and cultural
transmission. Consequently, the model of linguistic cultural evolution shown in
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Figure 2.7: Two types of “learning.” If the idea of iterated learning, as represented in Fig. 2.6, is
mapped onto the general model of cultural evolution described in Fig. 2.3, “learning” must be
considered in a more differentiated manner: it is either the mapping of the E-language produced
by one individual onto the I-language of another individual, or it is the influence E-language has
on the I-language that produced it, that is, on the I-language of the same individual. The former
is social learning, the latter individual learning.
Fig. 2.7 also makes it possible for innovations to occur in different positions. I
suggest that existing models of language change and evolution can be grouped
into three classes, depending on which locus and cause of innovation they focus
on.
2.3.2 Three types of models
The three instantiations of the iterated learning model that I am going to identify
differ from each other in what locus and cause of innovation they emphasise, and
what role they assign to communication in this process. It is important to note
that these three sub-models of linguistic cultural evolution are not mutually ex-
clusive: it is easily conceivable that the processes described by them exist along-
side each other and have all made contributions to the evolution of language.
Consequently, some of the actual models that have been proposed contain ele-
ments from more than one of these classes of models. The three instantiations of
the iterated learningmodel that I am going to introduce (acquisition-driven models,
comprehension-driven models, and production-driven models) thus have to be seen as
idealised “prototypes” that shed light on different possible mechanisms of lin-
guistic cultural evolution rather than as mutually exclusive theories. Neverthe-
less, identifying their characteristics, in particular where they locate innovation
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and what causes they assume for it, will help to clarify the issues at stake. For
each type, I will provide (i) a brief description, (ii) references to related work in
historical linguistics (in particular theories of semantic change and grammatical-
isation) on the one side and in evolutionary linguistics on the other side, as well
as (iii) a summary of its most defining characteristics.
2.3.2.1 Acquisition-driven models
The notion which is at the core of acquisition-driven models of the cultural evo-
lution of language is the one that E-language only partially specifies I-language.
Grammars license an infinite set of sentences but have to be learnt on the basis
of a finite set of observed sentences. This finite set may not contain sufficient
information for the grammar which produced them to be induced correctly on
the basis of the samples alone. This is the idea of the poverty of the stimulus, and
has more recently been referred to as the learning bottleneck (e.g. Kirby 2002a).
The processes involved in such a model are thus the generation of a limited set
of sentences by a grammar and the induction of a grammar on the basis of these
linguistic samples. Innovations are introduced because of the variability of the
observed data set (and the variability of the order in which the individual sen-
tences are presented to the learner) and due to the fact that the learner has to
induce a grammar on the basis of a data set which only incompletely specifies
it (Fig. 2.8). This interpretation of linguistic cultural evolution thus evolves most
crucially around the notion of grammar induction (cf. Wolff 1982), and has conse-
quently been labelled “expression/induction model” (e.g. Hurford 2002).10 The
underlying assumption is that children acquiring language induce grammars in
the described way.
Historical linguistics. Acquisition-driven models are particularly popular in
generative approaches to language change. McMahon (1994:108) states that “[i]n
early Generative syntax, all syntactic change was analysed as simplificatory
grammar change” and that such explanations were based on the assumption
that “children could construct a different, simpler grammar from their parents’.”
Similarly, Haspelmath (1998:316) explains that “[s]ince Chomskyan linguistics is
primarily concerned with the problem of language acquisition [...], it is natural
that generative linguistics should have focused on those aspects of language
10Note that Hurford (2002) uses his term “expression/induction model” as a synonym for
“iterated learning model.” However, Hurford’s term seems to be less generally applicable as it
clearly specifies the process of learning as (grammar) induction. It must thus remain confined to
the described acquisition-driven models of linguistic cultural evolution.
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I-language'
Individual A
Individual B
E-language
I-language
Generation
Grammar induction
Poverty of stimulus
Figure 2.8: The acquisition-driven model of the cultural evolution of language. Individual A
uses its I-language to generate a set of linguistic data on the basis of which individual B infers
its own I-language. Because the observed data set only ever partially specifies the I-language
which generated it (the poverty of the stimulus) and because individual B strives for a concise
grammar, cultural transmission introduces innovation (marked with a circle) during grammar
induction as the result of imperfect inference.
change that seem to be due to the transmission of grammars to successive gen-
erations.” Probably the most prominent acquisition-driven model of language
change is the one developed by Lightfoot (1979). He argues that a major restruc-
turing of grammars happens in the language acquisition of one generation if
grammars have become too complex due to an accumulation of minor changes.
In such a situation, children, rather than inducing the fairly complex grammar
of their parents, would reconstruct a much simpler grammar on the basis of the
observed linguistic samples. Innovation is thus introduced from one generation
to the next because children aim at inducing a grammar as simple as possi-
ble, which will introduce new regularities where there were exceptions in the
consequently more complex grammars of the parents. McMahon (1994:116–37)
provides a comprehensive discussion of Lightfoot’s proposal, its critics, and
subsequent modifications as put forward in Lightfoot (1991). Croft (2000:44ff.)
traces the origins of what he calls “the child-based theory of language change”
back to 19th-century linguistic theory as described in Jespersen (1922:161–2)
and identifies Halle (1962) as its first major instantiation within the generative
framework. He also provides a discussion of the problems of this approach, to
which we will return in section 2.3.3.1 below.
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Evolutionary linguistics. Even though the acquisition-driven model to language
change is one developed within the primarily nativist framework of generative
linguistics, it has proven to be particularly popular with non-nativist, culture-
based approaches to language evolution. Hurford (2002) discusses four such
models implemented as computer simulations (Batali 1998, 2002; Kirby 2000,
2002a). Similar approaches can be found in Brighton (2002); Zuidema (2003);
Hoefler (2006b). An overview of the work being carried out in this line of re-
search, and of some of the issues involved, is given in Kirby and Hurford (2002).
Related to this work is Roberts et al. (2005), who present an acquisition-driven
model which, like the models in Brighton (2002) and Hoefler (2006b), makes
specific use of the notion of learners striving for grammar simplicity. Grammar
simplicity is modelled in the form of the so-called Minimal Description Length
principle (Rissanen and Ristad 1994). Niyogi and Berwick (1995, 1996, 1997) de-
velop mathematical studies based on an acquisition-driven model of the cultural
evolution of language. Here too, the core notion is that “[t]he problem of lan-
guage learning [...] is typically formulated as a search by a learning algorithm
for a grammar that is close to the one that generates the sentences the learner
is exposed to” (Niyogi 2002:231). Another researcher who emphasises the role
of acquisition in language evolution is Deacon (1997). He claims that “[t]he
structure of language is under intense selection because in its reproduction from
generation to generation, it must pass through a narrow bottleneck: children’s
minds” (Deacon 1997:110), and then states that “[c]hildren selectively hear some
structures and ignore others, and so provide a major selection force for language
structure that is ‘child-friendly’ ” (Deacon 1997:111).
A similar model has been proposed byWray (2000), who describes language evo-
lution as a process of segmentation of holistic protolanguage utterances (which
stand for whole propositions) along chance co-occurrences of components of
form (phonetic segments) with components of meaning: “[t]he result would be
the first stages of segmentation: the dividing up of unanalysed material into
meaningful subunits, something which has been observed in both first- and
second-language acquisition” (Wray 2000:296f.). This is more or less the scenario
typically applied in Kirby’s computer simulations (see e.g. Kirby 2000, 2002a;
Kirby and Hurford 2002). In these studies, compositional syntax is the result
of the induction of grammar rules on the basis of matches between segments
of form and aspects of meaning, as well as the subsequent merger of grammar
rules with the aim to make the grammar more concise (a detailed description
of the employed algorithm can be found in the appendix of Kirby 2002a). Note
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that even though such computer simulations are typically associated with the
term “iterated learning model,” they represent only one specific, acquisition-
driven interpretation of the general iterated learning framework of the cultural
evolution of language formulated by Kirby and Hurford (e.g. 2002).11
Characteristics. What are thus the characteristics of acquisition-driven models
of the cultural evolution of language? Acquisition-driven models are special in
(i) where they locate innovation and (ii) the way they assume innovation hap-
pens, and in (iii) the role they assign to communication. The locus of innovation
in these models is cultural transmission via language acquisition, and the emer-
gence of innovation itself is driven by two concepts: the poverty of the stimulus
and grammar simplicity. Not only do children have to infer their I-language from
sets of linguistic data which only partially specify the I-language from which
they were generated (the poverty of the stimulus) but they also attempt to come
up with concise grammars (grammar simplicity). Innovation can thus be the
result of generalisations made on the basis of the observed data, or due to gen-
eralisations made to compress the inferred grammar after the addition of a new
rule.
The type of explanation provided by acquisition-driven models does not refer to
the specifics of communication. Rosenbach and Ja¨ger (2008) point out that in a
typical acquisition-driven approach such as Kirby (1999), “language usage only
very indirectly plays a role, acting as a filter on the input children encounter
in first language acquisition, on the basis of which they construct their gram-
mars.” They further comment that in doing so, changes in linguistic competence
are relegated to first language acquisition (rather than being ascribed to perfor-
mance). In his overview of four computational models of the acquisition-driven
type, Hurford (2002:304) lists “no effect of communication” as one of the defin-
ing properties of these models, and elsewhere, Kirby and Hurford (2002:144) ar-
gue that their account of the cultural evolution of language “does not make any
reference to communication,” and that the benefits which emerging structures
may have for communication are “merely a fortunate side-effect.” While in these
models, it is relevant that communication takes place because language is trans-
mitted culturally and acquired by new generations on the basis of its externalised
11One may want to distinguish between the ILM in the broad sense (ILM-B) as the general
framework represented in Fig. 2.6 and the ILM in the narrow sense (ILM-N) as the class of
acquisition-driven instantiations discussed here.
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form (E-language), the innovations they describe are not based on how commu-
nication works, but on the selection of observed linguistic data from which I-
language (which it only ever partially specifies) is induced. This perspective on
the cultural evolution of language resembles, to some degree, the Chomskyan
stance that communication does not play an essential role in explaining language
(e.g. Chomsky 1980:230).
In summary, we can state that even though acquisition-based models of the cul-
tural evolution of language do not (or at least not necessarily) assume the innate-
ness hypothesis, they have adopted several concepts developed in and closely
related to the (nativist) framework of generative linguistics: (i) language acquisi-
tion (or, more specifically, grammar induction) as the locus of innovation, (ii) the
poverty of the stimulus and a bias for concise grammars as the causes of inno-
vation, and (iii) the fact that communication does not play a role in the provided
explanation of linguistic cultural evolution.
2.3.2.2 Comprehension-driven models
Comprehension-driven models of the cultural evolution of language place the
act of communication at the centre of their theory. They crucially depend on the
notion that meaning is not transferred from the speaker to the hearer directly but
that communication always also involves a fair amount of inference from context.
A hearer infers at least parts of the meaning of a linguistic signal from his cogni-
tive environment, that is, his general knowledge and perception of the world
and the conditions of the speech situation. The core idea of comprehension-
driven models is that the cognitive environment of the speaker and the hearer
will hardly ever be exactly the same. This phenomenon has been described as a
“mismatch between speaker’s and hearer’s discourse world knowledge” (Kuteva
2001:169ff., emphasis added). Because of such a mismatch of cognitive environ-
ments, a hearer may infer a meaning for a given signal which is slightly different
from the meaning intended by the speaker. This may go unnoticed if commu-
nication does not fail, and consequently lead to a misinterpretation of the signal
in the hearer. The signal is mapped onto a new or altered meaning—a process
which only becomes evident once the hearer re-uses the same signal in a new
way in which it could not have been used by the original speaker. This sec-
ond type of model of the cultural evolution of language thus evolves around the
fact that the comprehension of linguistic signals in successful communication
does not necessarily imply that what the hearer understands is exactly what the
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I-language'
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Figure 2.9: The comprehension-driven model of the cultural evolution of language. Within a
particular context, individual A expresses a linguistic signal to trigger the inference and con-
struction of the meaning to be communicated. However, because the context of individual B (the
hearer) differs from that of individual A (the speaker), the form-meaning mapping inferred by B
is different from the one that A had in mind. Innovation in I-language is thus introduced during
the cultural transmission because of imperfect inference due to a contextual mismatch between
speaker and hearer.
speaker had in mind. The comprehension-driven model of the cultural evolution
of language is represented in Fig. 2.9.
Historical linguistics. At first glance, the comprehension-driven model seems to
be closely related to the two processes of language change known as reinterpre-
tation and reanalysis. Reinterpretation refers to the process by which “the refer-
ent of a linguistic form is shifted from one thing to another which occurs in the
same context” (Trask 2000:279) or by which the categorial status of a linguistic
form is shifted as a result “from its occurrence in ambiguous positions” (Trask
2000:280). Similarly, reanalysis is defined as the process by which a morpho-
logical or syntactic structure “comes to be assigned a different structure from
the one it formerly had, with no change in its surface form and with little or no
change in interpretation” (Trask 2000:274). For a survey of the latter see e.g. Har-
ris and Campbell (1995). The term “reanalysis” has also been applied to refer to
acquisition-driven scenarios (e.g. Andersen 2006; Lightfoot sometimes uses the
term “radical reanalysis” in his approaches) and there are indeed some parallels
between the two models as I will point out in section 2.3.3.1 below.
Trask (2000:274 and 279) provides example (2) to illustrate reinterpretation and
(3–6) to illustrate reanalysis. In (2), the meaning of bead shifts from denoting
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‘prayer’ to standing for the small balls on a rosary (since prayers are sometimes
counted on a rosary) and then simply for any small ball. In (3), the single-
morpheme noun bikini is reanalysed as containing the element bi- ‘two’ and thus
consisting of the constituents bi- ‘two’ and kini ‘swimming costume’. The fact that
such a reanalysis happened would then become clear, once a new creation such
asmono-kini ‘one-piece swimsuit’ occurs (4). Similarly, the bracketing in sentence
(5) is reanalysed, which becomes visible once sentences such as (6) occur, which
would not have been possible without the reanalysis in (5).
(2) bead ‘prayer’ > ‘small ball on the rosary’> ‘small ball’
(3) bikini > bi-kini
(4) mono-kini
(5) It will be [easy for us] to do that. > It will be easy [for us to do that].
(6) [For us to do that] will be easy.
However, in this context, it is essential to point to the difference between reanal-
ysis or reinterpretation as the result of change, and reanalysis or reinterpretation
as a cognitive mechanism initiating it. Only if understood in the latter sense can
the two concepts be said to represent the comprehension-drivenmodel of the cul-
tural evolution of language; reanalysis or reinterpretation asmere descriptions of
the result of change are, as concepts, agnostic as to what sort of innovation they
are the result of. In order to emphasise this crucial distinction, Kuteva (2001:167f.)
issues the following words of warning:
[E]stablishing that a particular linguistic reinterpretation has taken
place does notmean that we have also understood how this reinterpre-
tation has taken place. Even when we speak of semantic “bleaching,”
generalization, metaphor, metonymy, etc. as mechanisms of change,
what we are actually talking about is the observable result that is
based on our comparison between distinct uses, the historically ear-
lier and the historically later. [...] What remains uninvestigated is the
unobservable aspect of the psychology of language use, i.e. the psy-
cholinguistic mechanism that triggers the process of semantic reinter-
pretation in natural discourse.
Within the domain of language change in general, and grammaticalisation
theory in particular, Kuteva (2001) offers probably the most clearly formulated
comprehension-driven model. She argues that new grammatical functions can
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result “from non-shared discourse world knowledge [...] and from a mismatch
between the speaker’s implicatures/communicative intentions and the hearer’s
inferences/assumptions” (Kuteva 2001:131) and emphasises the asymmetric
relationship between speaker and hearer in an act of communication. In this
approach, the focus is thus on knowledge that the hearer only assumes he shares
with the speaker but that in fact does not constitute part of the two interlocu-
tors’ common context. Even though her analysis is mainly concerned with
auxiliation, i.e. the grammaticalisation process by which full verbs assume the
function of auxiliaries, Kuteva proposes her comprehension-driven model as a
general framework for grammaticalisation initiated by mismatches of discourse
knowledge between speaker and hearer, and emphasises the central role of such
mismatches for everyday communication (Kuteva 2001:167ff.).
Evolutionary linguistics. One of the most comprehension-driven accounts of lan-
guage evolution is the one proposed by Burling (2000). Burling proclaims the
priority of comprehension over production, namely that comprehension is the
evolutionarily more basic and powerful mechanism. He bases this hypothesis
on the view that “comprehension runs consistently ahead of production” (Burl-
ing 2000:27), that is, that humans (and, as he claims, animals) can in any situation
understand more than they can express. Furthermore, he emphasises that some-
times, humans (and animals) interpret the behaviour of another individual as
a signal even if that individual did not intend to communicate. He infers from
this that comprehension came before communication was intended. First signals
thus would have evolved simply through individuals interpreting other individ-
uals’ behaviour as meaningful. In this account, the first word-like signs were
not produced with communicative intention; their communicative value came
from the comprehender, not from the producer. In this way, Burling attempts to
develop a scenario of the cultural evolution of language parallel to the biologi-
cal evolution of animal signalling (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003), where be-
haviour can attain the status of signalling simply through genetic codification of
reactions to that behaviour through natural selection. He contrasts this “phylo-
genetic ritualisation” in biological evolution with the “ontogenetic ritualisation”
through individual learning and conventionalisation in cultural evolution (Burl-
ing 2000:31). As it is typical for comprehension-driven models of the cultural
evolution of language, we can identify a mismatch between the discourse knowl-
edge of the producer, who, in this case, does not intend to communicate, and the
comprehender, who assumes that the producer did communicate. Innovation is
thus the result of a misinterpretation on the part of the hearer or comprehender.
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Another strand of language evolution research which is very explicitly based
on a comprehension-driven model can be found in Smith (e.g. 2003a, 2005a,b,
2006a). One of the crucial points Smith makes is that communication can be
successful even if the speaker and the hearer do not have exactly the same con-
ceptual structures: a certain mismatch in discourse knowledge will not prevent
communicative acts from functioning. Like Kuteva (2001) in her work on gram-
maticalisation, he too goes a step further and uses computer simulations not
only to corroborate this first claim but also to show that evolution of meaning
and complexification of language can arise from the dynamics caused by just
these differences between the knowledge of the speaker and the knowledge of
the hearer. In Smith (2006a), this approach is extended to account for phenom-
ena both in protolanguage theory and in grammaticalisation. In this study, Smith
(2006a:310) describes reanalysis as “the unconscious yet inevitable result of the
uncertainty involved in the hearer’s inferential reconstruction of meaning.”
Smith’s work has links to two other research programs that deserve mentioning.
First, Smith (2005b:380f.) points to the similarities of his computer simulations
to those developed by Steels (e.g. 1996b, 1997). These latter models are mainly
concerned with the emergent categorisation and the question of symbol ground-
ing in experiments where robots try to establish communication on the basis of
their visual perception of the environment. The second line of research to which
Smith (e.g. 2005a:322) explicitly refers is Origgi and Sperber’s (2000; 2004) ac-
count of language evolution. Their argument is also built on the observation that
communication does not necessarily fail just because the semantic representa-
tion of the two interlocutors are not identical. Origgi and Sperber (2000) apply
this fact to situations where, of two communicating individuals, one possesses
a more elaborate interpretation of the conveyed message due to some biologi-
cal mutation. Origgi and Sperber’s model thus contains a nativist component:
symbols evolve culturally, but grammar is the result of an additional biological
step. The transition from the first to the second stage is possible because inferen-
tial communication is “failsafe” even where the cognitive representations of two
interlocutors exhibit a mismatch. However, it is crucial to note here that Origgi
and Sperber’s scenario does not depend on the innateness assumption in order
to work; the differences in the interpretive capacities of speaker and hearer could
simply be empirical, that is, the result of different previous experience.
Characteristics. Like acquisition-driven models, comprehension-driven models
too have a particular, characteristic perspective on (i) the locus of innovation,
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(ii) the cause of innovation, (iii) the role of communication. Innovation, in
comprehension-driven models, is introduced as the result of imperfect inference
on the part of the hearer. Like in acquisition-driven models, the locus of inno-
vation is thus in cultural transmission. However, the fact that the recovery of
meaning in comprehension is not just a matter of decoding a linguistic signal
but also of inferring from context plays a crucial role. Inaccurate inferences
leading to novel form-meaning mappings in the hearer occur because there
may be a mismatch between the cognitive environment of the hearer and the
speaker. The fact that such mismatches occur, but do not necessarily bring down
communication completely, is the cause of innovation in comprehension-driven
models. The role of the actual communicative act and the impact of its context is
thus vital in these approaches.
2.3.2.3 Production-driven models
The notion that communication includes inference from context also plays a cen-
tral role in production-driven models of the cultural evolution of language. The
insight at the core of production-driven models is that language use is itself in-
trinsically innovative. Every event of putting bits of linguistic code into use in
a novel situation can be conceived as an innovative act. Bloomfield (1933:433)
comments on language use: “[s]ince every practical situation is in reality un-
precedented, the apt response of a good speaker may always border on semantic
innovation.” Innovation, in this view, is the product of the communicative strate-
gies employed by speakers in concrete usage events. Such strategies exploit the
fact that language exhibits what I refer to as pragmatic plasticity: even though
linguistic forms are conventionally associated with meanings (signal meaning),
they exhibit flexibility with regard to the meaning they actually come to com-
municate in a given context (speaker meaning). Croft (2000:99ff.) speaks of the
“openendedness and flexibility of meaning in use.” In production-driven mod-
els, innovation thus enters language not during learning but in use. It is the
product of the existing (conventional) meaning of linguistic signal interacting
with the context specific to a particular usage event. The process of use can be
conceived as the extension of existing form-meaning pairings to novel contexts.
Since production-driven models move the burden of innovation to use, relative
simple forms of learning suffice for these models, such as memorisation or en-
trenchment of occurred usages (cf. section 4.1.3). The production-driven model of
the cultural evolution of language is represented in Fig. 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: The production-driven model of cultural evolution of language. With respect to
future usage, constructions exhibit pragmatic plasticity. The process of language use is an exten-
sion of existing form-meaning pairings to novel contexts. Since the weight of reasoning and the
locus of innovation are in use, learning (in the hearer and the speaker) takes the relatively simple
form of entrenchment.
Historical linguistics. Studies in grammaticalisation such as, for example, Heine
et al. (1991); Hopper and Traugott (2003) have not always been clear about
whether they favour comprehension-driven or production-driven explanations.
This is mainly due to two facts I have already mentioned above: (i) the lack of a
clear distinction between process and result, and (ii) a focus on the description
of individual linguistic phenomena rather than on the underlying psychological
mechanisms. Hopper and Traugott (2003:71) acknowledge these two facts, yet
still take a middle position regarding their model of innovation. They emphasise
that grammaticalisation theorists are especially interested in the role of speakers
and hearers negotiating meaning in communicative situations (as opposed to
the role of language acquisition, as favoured by generative linguistics). This
means that they focus on comprehension- and production-driven models, rather
than on the acquisition-driven alternative. However, within these boundaries,
Hopper and Traugott (2003) do not take sides but rather present a hybrid view
that leaves room for comprehension- as well as production-driven explanations:
On this view, hearers play amajor role in change because they process
input in ways that may not match the speaker’s intention. But speak-
ers also play a major role in enabling change, because in producing
61
speech they have communication as their goal, and therefore are al-
ways in search of ways to guide the hearer in interpretation. (Hopper
and Traugott 2003:71)
On the other side, many models of language change developed within the func-
tionalist branch of linguistics seem to be production-driven, like, for example,
the seminal emergent grammar theory expounded in Hopper (1987), which claims
that grammatical structures originate from discourse-pragmatic strategies em-
ployed by the speaker.
Other recent studies are more explicit about the issue. Traugott and Dasher
(2005) present a seminal study which comes out in favour of a production-driven
approach. “The hypothesis is that innovation and change does not occur primar-
ily in the process of perception and acquisition, but rather in the process of strate-
gic choice-making on the part of SP/W [speaker/writer] and interactional nego-
tiation with AD/R [addressee/reader]” (Traugott and Dasher 2005:42). The label
Traugott and Dasher use for their approach is Invited Inference Theory of Semantic
Change (IITSC). They claim that speakers innovate in communicative situations
to bring their message across to the hearer. This view is based on Nerlich and
Clarke (1992:127) who relate processes of semantic innovation to the expressive
needs which arise in communicative activities. Traugott and Dasher (2005:34)
identify metaphorisation (i.e. the novel, ad hoc metaphorical use of lexemes)
and metonymisation (they include invited inferencing, subjectification, and in-
tersubjectification in this category) as the innovative mechanisms of language
use. They emphasise the speaker-orientedness of their approach by stating that
“[i]f SP/Ws innovate, and AD/Rs replicate this innovation, they do so in the role
of SP/Ws, i.e. as language producers, not as language perceivers” (Traugott and
Dasher 2005:38). In support of their claim that speakers are the prime initiators
of change, Traugott and Dasher (2005:19ff., 49) provide evidence for regularity in
semantic change towards greater subjectivity or grounding in speakers’ attitude
and perspective. This can be exemplified with the development of the English
phrase be going to, which regularly serves as one of the standard examples of
grammaticalisation (e.g. Heine et al. 1991; Kuteva 2001; Hopper and Traugott
2003). Subjectification occurs in the shift of the meaning of be going to from a
merely declarative, objective expression of spatial movement to an expression of
modality, that is, an indication of the speaker’s attitude and intention.
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At the core of Traugott and Dasher’s model of innovation is the concept of invited
inferences (usually called “conversational implicatures” in Gricean pragmatics):
speakers innovate by creatively exploiting invited inferences in the particular
contexts of speech situations. The term “invited inference” was chosen to stress
the speaker-oriented nature of the approach and is defined as follows:
In the present context it [the term “invited inferences”] is meant to
elide the complexities of communication in which the speaker/writer
(SP/W) evokes implicatures and invites the addressee/reader
(AD/R) to infer them. We prefer this term over, e.g. “context-
induced inferences” (Heine et al. 1991), since the latter term suggests
a focus on AD/Rs as interpreters and appears to downplay the
active role of SP/Ws in rhetorical strategizing, indeed indexing
and choreographing the communicative act. (Traugott and Dasher
2005:5)12
Traugott and Dasher thus establish a direct connection between the innovative
nature of production and the inferential nature of communication. I will explore
the underlying psychological mechanisms of this connection between innovative
use and inferential communication in detail in chapter 3 of this thesis. In a sum-
mary of their model of semantic change, Traugott and Dasher describe equiv-
alents of the processes of extension and entrenchment as depicted in Fig. 2.10
above, that is, the innovative production of E-language and how this process
later leads to an innovation in I-language, as follows:
Drawing on and exploiting, sometimes consciously, sometimes un-
consciously, pragmatic meanings, most especially those kinds of im-
plicatures that we have called “invited inferences,” SP/Wsmay inno-
vate new uses of extant lexemes. If these new uses spread to AD/Rs
and are replicated by them in their role as SP/Ws, then semanticiza-
tion will take place. (Traugott and Dasher 2005:279)13
Evolutionary linguistics. Given his general model of cultural evolution as in-
troduced above, Tomasello is the most obvious candidate for a proponent of
12Traugott and Dasher (2005:5) clarify, however, that despite the putative implications of their
terminology, Heine et al. (1991) also view speakers rather than hearers as the driving-force of
innovation.
13This particular quote refers to the entrenchment in the hearer, but the entrenchment in the
speaker, as also shown in Fig. 2.10, is acknowledged as well, for instance in Traugott and Dasher
(2005:35).
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the production-driven model within evolutionary linguistics. In his account of
language evolution, developed in Tomasello (1999, 2003a) and summarised in
Tomasello (2003b), he explains the origin of symbolism as the result of humans
understanding their conspecifics as intentional beings such as themselves, and
of them trying to manipulate their conspecifics’ mental states. It is the mech-
anisms of such interactions which eventually lead to the conventionalisation
of a set of communicative behaviours, one of them being symbolic or linguis-
tic communication. In his approach to the subsequent emergence of grammar,
Tomasello takes a position similar to that of Hopper (1987): grammatical con-
structions (Tomasello subscribes to a construction-based view of grammar as
promoted by Langacker 1987, 1991 and Goldberg 1995) emerge from discourse
patterns. However, the categorisation of Tomasello’s explanation of language
evolution as production-driven must remain based on the way he grounds it in
the specifics of his ratchet-model of general cultural evolution. This uncertainty
about the linguistic specifics of his account is due to two peculiarities of his ap-
proach. First, it is based on his studies of child language acquisition, and there-
fore draws its examples from situations different from that of language evolution
in the sense that language is already established in the environment. Second, and
Tomasello (2003b:103) points this out himself, the processes of grammaticalisa-
tion to which he refers to account for the emergence of grammar are still await-
ing a more detailed description of the underlying psychological mechanisms—
something which I will endeavour to do in chapter 3. These caveats notwith-
standing, Tomasello does provide clear evidence for the production-driven na-
ture of his model of linguistic cultural evolution when he describes that the pro-
cess of innovation is principally the same for material tools (in this case ham-
mers) as well as for linguistic artefacts:
The first form of sociogenesis is simply the form implied by the
ratchet effect as described above for such things as hammers and
linguistic symbols. An individual confronts an artifact or cultural
practice that she has inherited from others, along with a novel sit-
uation for which the artifact does not seem fully suited. She then
assesses the way the artifact is intended to work (the intentionality of
the inventor), relates this to the current situation, and then makes a
modification to the artifact. (Tomasello 1999:41)
Two experimental studies of emergent communication systems deserve brief
mentioning in this context too. Galantucci (2005) reports experiments in which
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subjects are forced to communicate via a graphic channel that prevents the use
of conventional symbols and drawing. Garrod et al. (2007) describe how subjects
who play repeated games of pictionary develop conventionalised graphical com-
munication systems. Both studies investigate how such systems emerge from a
need to communicate, that is, the pressure on the speaker or communicator to
bring a meaning across to the hearer or addressee in a situation in which no es-
tablished code is at hand. In both experiments, speakers innovate on the basis
of common ground with the hearers, and the emergent systems reflect proper-
ties of the specific environments as well as to the interactive behaviour of the
interlocutors. Both experiments also show a gradual shift from very iconic to
more arbitrary communication systems. I will come back to this latter point in
chapter 3 when I discuss the emergence of a linguistic code from non-linguistic
communication.
Characteristics. To analyse the characteristics exhibited by production-driven
model of the cultural evolution of language, we can again refer to its views on
(i) the locus of innovation, (ii) the cause of innovation, and (iii) the role of com-
munication. As opposed to their acquisition- and comprehension-driven coun-
terparts, production-driven models locate innovation in the process of language
use. Ultimately, innovation can occur because every instance of use is intrin-
sically innovative as it applies an extant linguistic artefact to a novel environ-
ment or context. The cause of innovation in production-driven models is thus
pragmatic plasticity, that is the fact that, in the specific context of an utterance,
linguistic forms take on meaning which goes beyond the meaning that has con-
ventionally come to be associated with them. Language use exhibits “context-
dependent deviation” (Kuteva 2001:178); it is an extension of previous usages of
a linguistic form to a novel situation.
Production-driven models of the cultural evolution of language can content
themselves with relatively simple notions of learning because innovation is
introduced elsewhere (in use). Of the three presented types of models, they are
thus the ones that come closest to the ratchet-model of general cultural evolution
introduced before since they also maintain the fidelity of social transmission.
The process of learning in production-driven models can be reduced to simple
memorisation of observed usages, or their gradual entrenchment if they occur
more often. Since innovation already happens in use, it is later realised in the
hearer (through social learning) as well as in the speaker (through individual
learning).
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Production-driven models are functional: communication plays a pivotal role.
Innovation is the product of a communicative intention. We have to be care-
ful, however, to distinguish between two uses of “function,” namely (i) the
discourse-pragmatic function in a context-dependent communicative interac-
tion from (ii) what might be called “systemic function,” that is, the “need” to fill
a gap in a grammatical system. Innovation in production-driven models of the
cultural evolution of language is not the invention of a code or the improvement
of a communication system as a whole but the innovative use of an extant bit
of code to fulfil a momentary communicative need. Comrie and Kuteva (2005)
make a case against the system-related type of “functional need” explanations.
Likewise, Hopper and Traugott (2003:74) comment on the misconception of
the goal-directedness of grammaticalisation through communicative strate-
gies employed in speaker-hearer interactions as being related to grammatical
systems:
Part of the problem with the concept of goal-directedness is that it
is often discussed in terms of “need” or set goals, in other words, in
“teleological” terms. Clearly, “communicative need” [in the system-
related sense] is not a plausible motivation in most cases of gram-
maticalization, since not all languages express the same grammati-
cal functions, and even less do they express the same grammatical
functions in the same way. [...] The position we take is that users
may be consciously or unconsciously goal-oriented (see Keller 1994
for a detailed account of goal-orientedness in language change that is
not teleological in the sense mentioned above). In speaking of com-
municative strategies and problem solving in the course of speaker-
hearer interaction, we refer not to filling gaps, but rather to strategies
used by speakers and hearers in producing and understanding the
flow of speech as it is created.
A last characteristic to be mentioned here is the relation between what is the de-
fault and what an exception in language use. The production-driven view of
language use assumes that “context-dependent deviations” are the normal case
of language use, that is, that any instance of use is intrinsically an extension of the
existing I-language. This is the inversion of the standard generative view of lan-
guage use, where deviations from the “norm” are the exception rather than the
default case. The conception of the default character of innovative use is shared
by Sperber and Wilson (1995). Within the framework of Relevance Theory, they
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acquisition-driven comprehension-driven production-driven
models models models
locus of cultural transmission cultural transmission use
innovation (acquisition) (comprehension) (production)
cause of imperfect inference imperfect inference extension in context
innovation (poverty of stimulus) (contextual mismatch) (pragmatic plasticity)
realisation of the hearer only the hearer only speaker and hearer
innovation in
Table 2.1: Comparison of the three types of models of the cultural evolution of language.
treat the non-deviating, literal case as the limiting case rather than the norm, and
state that “the hearer should take an utterance as fully literal only when noth-
ing less than full literality will confirm the presumption of relevance. In general,
looseness of expression is to be expected” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:234). I will
come back to the connection between loose talk and relevance in chapter 3. The
point to remember for the moment is that the key to understanding production-
driven models is their view of normal language use as the extension of extant bits
of code in concrete communicative contexts.
Table 2.1 summarises the differences between acquisition-driven, comprehension-
driven and production-driven models with regard to where they locate inno-
vation, what cause they assume for it and whether innovations are realised
in both interlocutors involved in a communicative act or just in one of them.
Acquisition-driven models and comprehension-driven models both refer to
some sort of imperfect cultural transmission as the source of innovation.
Consequently, innovations only happen in the hearer but not in the speaker.
Production-driven models, in contrast, identify use as the locus of innovation.
Consequently, innovations are realised in both interlocutors.
2.3.3 Which model to go for?
This is the point to return to the aims of this thesis. In chapter 1, I explained
that it is the goal of this thesis to develop a mechanistic model of the cultural
evolution of language that can account for (i) the emergence puzzle, that is, the
fact that language emerged from no language, and (ii) the design puzzle, the fact
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that language exhibits the appearance of design for communication. As opposed
to a nativist explanation, a culture-based approach to language evolution will
try to identify the minimal set of general, non-language specific cognitive mech-
anisms that are necessary for the emergence and complexification of language.
Since the discussed models are not mutually exclusive, it can easily be the case
that two or more of the described processes have been involved in the evolution
of language. Yet, some of the processes might characterise the cultural evolu-
tion of language—and the set of cognitive processes it minimally requires—more
distinctively, while others might describe mere side-effects that have not sub-
stantially contributed to the evolution of language and without which language
could still have evolved. We must thus judge which of the proposed models of
the cultural evolution of language proves to be most promising in the light of the
just mentioned aims. Here, the principles of Ockham’s razor and the uniformity of
process, as introduced in section 1.3.2, serve as evalution criteria. In the follow-
ing paragraphs, I will point to some problems acquisition- and comprehension-
driven models face in the light of the above requirements, and take the position
that the production-driven model provides a promising alternative, whose po-
tential has not yet been exploited enough in studies of the cultural evolution of
language.
2.3.3.1 Problems with acquisition-driven models
Aswe have seen above, the core idea of acquisition-driven models of the cultural
evolution of language has been adopted from the nativist generative framework
of linguistics. Some of the problems that arise with such models can be traced
back to this transfer of nativist conceptions to non-nativist explanations. Oth-
ers are of a more general conceptual and empirical nature. I will discuss the
following: (i) acquisition-driven models cannot account for the design puzzle,
(ii) they do not provide an account for the emergence puzzle, (iii) they violate
the principle of the uniformity of process, and (iv) some of these models make
tacit assumptions that are questionable on the basis of empirical evidence. These
are the assumptions that (i) there is a poverty of stimulus in language acquisi-
tion, and that (ii) grammars are non-redundant and language learners strive for
grammar simplicity. Finally, I will argue that acquisition-driven models can be
seen as a specific case of comprehension-driven models.
The design puzzle. One shortcoming of acquisition-driven models of the cultural
evolution of language, which I have already mentioned in the introduction to
68
this thesis, is that they fail to account for the design puzzle, that is, the appear-
ance of complex adaptive design for communication reported for language. Re-
searchers in the ILM-N framework in particular claim that their computer sim-
ulations corroborate the assumption that language adapts during the process of
cultural evolution, but that this adaptation is to the learning bottleneck and not
to the communicative function of language: language adapts to be learnable (see
e.g. Brighton et al. 2005). Even though such models consider some sort of “func-
tion,” and thus could be labelled as “functional” under certain circumstances
(namely if we were to understand “function” as the pressure to which language
adapts), they do not attribute much significance to the communicative function of
language. Language, in these simulations, is often best described as an abstract
system whose sole “function” is to be acquired through processes of grammar
induction. But because acquisition-driven models do not consider communica-
tion as an important process in the cultural evolution of language—apart from
its providing the public representations from which grammars are induced—
they only show that cultural evolution can lead to some complex adaptive design
(namely design for acquisition in their case—potential benefits for communica-
tion are seen as fortunate side-effects) but not how it leads to complex adaptive
design for communication.
The emergence puzzle. Another shortcoming of acquisition-driven models is
that they do not provide a story as to how linguistic communication emerged
from a non-linguistic state. Language can only be acquired on the basis of lan-
guage. Grammar induction alone cannot bridge the gap from an alingual state
to one where linguistic communication is in place. The typical starting point
for acquisition-driven accounts of language evolution is thus some sort of code,
that is, a symbolic communication system consisting of random mappings of
signals and meanings. But this means that the weight of explanation is moved
to the internal—albeit coincidental—structure of these assumed initial states,
as I have argued in Hoefler (2006b). At best, acquisition-driven models can
be models of a part of the cultural evolution of language, namely of a process
which kicked in once some primary symbolic system—some call such a system
a “protolanguage” (but see Smith 2006c:321f. for a critical discussion of the
usefulness of such a concept)—was already in place. Acquisition-driven models
are thus the wrong tool to account for the emergence puzzle, namely to explain
how language emerged from no language at all.
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The uniformity of process. Further issues have been raised on the basis of empir-
ical evidence from studies of both language acquisition and language change.
Croft (2000:44–53) reviews these arguments against what he calls the “child-
based theory of language change” in detail. He comes to the conclusion that the
acquisition-driven view of the cultural evolution of language cannot be right be-
cause it makes four false predictions. The first prediction is that the “mistakes”
that children make while they are acquiring language are of the same type as
language changes which have actually occurred. Croft (2000:46f.) lists a num-
ber of empirical studies that show that this is not the case, that the “types of
changes attested in historical language change are not identical to those found
in language acquisition (Dressler 1974; Drachman 1978; Vihman 1980; Hooper
1980, Slobin 1997:313–14, Bybee and Slobin 1982:36–37, Aitchison 1991:168–73).”
The second prediction an acquisition-driven model would make is that innova-
tions or “errors” in children’s grammars survive into adulthood. Croft (2000:47)
holds against this prediction that it has been shown that “children’s errors which
presumably manifest a grammar (or lexicon) different from that of their parents
tend to disappear in later phases of language acquisition.” A third prediction is
that language change would be abrupt since a previous generation would have
an old version of the grammar whereas a new generation would have a new
one. But Croft (2000:49–51) mentions that the propagation of innovations in a
population is a gradual, social process, rather than a matter of mere generation
turn-over. Finally, Croft (2000:51–53) points out that, as a fourth false predic-
tion, acquisition-driven innovation would entail that a speaker would always
ever have either the old or the new grammar at any one time. Change would be
discrete. However, the phenomenon of “layering,” the presence of an older and
a younger form in a speaker’s I-language as described, for example, by Hopper
and Traugott (2003:124–26), renders this last prediction untenable too. Similar
accounts of the arguments against child language acquisition as the locus of in-
novation are presented in Hopper and Traugott (2003:43–45) and in Traugott and
Dasher (2005:41). Now, the principle of the uniformity of process would demand
that if the acquisition-driven model is not valid as a model of language change,
there is little ground to assume that it is a valid model of language evolution.
Tacit assumptions. Apart from the described conceptual and methodological
problems which have been raised with regard to acquisition-driven models,
there is also a set of tacit assumptions some of these models make which have to
be met with certain reservations since they do not necessarily appear to comply
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with linguistic evidence. Most of these assumptions can be traced back to the
generative origins of the model in the first place.
One of these assumptions is that there is a poverty of the stimulus in human
language acquisition. This assumption provides one of the main arguments of
linguistic nativism but, in the form of the so-called learning bottleneck, also con-
stitutes a cornerstone of several acquisition-driven computer simulations. I refer
the reader to section 1.1.1, where I have already reviewed the objections that have
been raised against the assumption that there is a poverty of the stimulus.
Another tacit assumption often found in acquisition-driven models is that gram-
mars are non-redundant, and that language learners strive for grammar sim-
plicity. There is psycholinguistic evidence which suggests that this assumption
cannot be maintained. Collocations (Barlow 2000) and idiomatic expressions in-
dicate that linguistic knowledge is indeed stored redundantly: a concrete in-
stantiation of a phrase can be part of the grammar along with the general rule
that licences it. As any second language learner knows, it is often not enough
to know the general rules of a language in order to produce acceptable sen-
tences: there is also a large amount of usage-related conventionality involved.
Goldberg (1995:ch. 8) discusses this by means of English resultive constructions:
while shoot someone dead or beat someone unconscious are grammatical, *shoot some-
one wounded or *beat someone dead are not, even though there are no syntactic or
semantic constraints that would prevent them from being grammatical just as
well (see also Taylor 2002:554–58 for an overview).
Acquisition-driven models as comprehension-driven models. Acquisition-driven
models and comprehension-driven models agree in two fundamental points:
they both locate innovation in cultural transmission, and they both view the
imperfect inference of the cultural artefact on the basis of observed use as the
cause of innovation. Speaking in the terms of general cultural evolution, they
both emphasise the variability of cultural transmission rather than its fidelity.
We may thus ask if acquisition-driven models can be seen as a special case of
comprehension-driven models. I will answer this question with “yes.” The
crucial point is to realise that the mechanisms by which innovation is introduced
in the two models are essentially the same. In comprehension-driven models,
innovation occurs because what the hearer infers is different from what the
speaker had in mind due to a mismatch between the speaker’s and the hearer’s
knowledge. In the acquisition-driven model, innovation occurs because the
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set of sample sentences from which the hearer infers her grammar, and the
order in which he is exposed to them, is different from the set of sentences
from which the speaker had inferred his grammar, and the order in which they
had been presented to her. But such linguistic experience is just another sort of
knowledge the speaker and hearer have. If it were the case that both speaker
and hearer observe the same set of sample sentences in the same order, they
would both infer the same grammar and no innovation would be introduced.
The acquisition-driven model of the cultural evolution of language can thus be
interpreted as a very specific case of a comprehension-driven model.
The conclusion of our considerations must be that acquisition-driven models of
the cultural evolution of language do not seem to have the potential to meet the
requirements of our project. We have seen that this is for the following reasons:
(i) they cannot lead to complex adaptive design for communication, that is, they
fail to account for the design puzzle, (ii) they do not provide an account of the
emergence of language from no language, that is, they fail to explain the emer-
gence puzzle, (iii) they violate the principle of the uniformity of process since
empirical evidence discredits them as models of language change, (iv) they are
built on a number of tacit assumptions which prove not to be psychologically
plausible in the face of linguistic evidence, and finally (v) on a more abstract
level, there is no need to consider them a distinct type of model because they
are subsumed by the comprehension-driven model of the cultural evolution of
language.
2.3.3.2 Comprehension or production: which is prior?
Burling (2000) proclaims the priority of comprehension over production:
production-driven innovation would be a side-effect of comprehension-
driven innovation. I will argue for the opposite. Burling (2000:27) says that
“[c]omprehension runs consistently ahead of production” since we “are always
able to understand more than we can say.” The problem with this argument
is that it ignores the fact that inferences are not only made on the part of the
comprehender but also on the part of the communicator: speakers invite hearers
to make specific inferences in addition to the recovery of the meaning expressed
in the signal. Burling’s claim that comprehenders can always understand more
than communicators express must thus be complemented with the statement
that communicators can always mean more than they express. And while it
is true (a truism?) that for a communicator to complement what is expressed
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with inferences, she needs to assume that the comprehender is capable of un-
derstanding them, it is equally true that for a comprehender to complement
what was expressed with inferences, he needs to assume that the communicator
is capable of inviting them. Burling (2000) is right in stating that the capacity
for comprehension must be in place when production occurs, but from an evo-
lutionary perspective, the capacity for production must also be in place when
comprehension occurs. This line of argumentation can thus not lead to answer-
ing the question of whether comprehension-driven models or production-driven
models describe the more basic process—which is what we want to ask.
In many aspects, comprehension-driven models and production-driven models
are more similar than a cursory look at the comparison in Table 2.1 would sug-
gest. Both models are based on the observation that communicating does not
only mean to encode and decode a signal but also to draw inferences from con-
text. A communicatedmeaningM (the utterance or speakermeaning) is always a
unification of themeanings recovered through the processes of decoding the pro-
duced linguistic form δ(F) and of inferring from context ι(C).14 This is expressed
in equation (7). Learning is then in both models a simple matter of what Kuteva
(2001:6) refers to as “context-absorption”: the addition of a new form-meaning
pair 〈F,M〉 to one’s linguistic knowledge G. This is expressed in equation (8),
where t denotes the time before the learning event and t+ 1 the time after it.15
(7) Use: M = δ(F) ∪ ι(C)
(8) Learning: Gt+1 = Gt ∪ {〈F,M〉}
Comprehension mirrors production, and vice versa. Equation (7) applies to both
production and comprehension. In production, the speaker “invites” the hearer
to decode the signal and infer from context. And in comprehension, the hearer
does what he thinks the speaker has invited him to do: he decodes the signal and
infers from context. And in both the speaker and the hearer, the resulting usage
of the produced linguistic form gets entrenched. The reason why this is not im-
mediately evident from the descriptions given in Table 2.1 above lies in the way
the three processes of production, comprehension and entrenchment are mapped
onto the two processes of use and learning. This is visualised in Fig. 2.11. So far,
we have grouped comprehension and entrenchment in the hearer together as one
14I will show later in chapters 3 that inference from context actually subsumes decoding.
15Note that the grammar is here described as an inventory or set of constructions (form-
meaning pairs), and that learning is simply the incorporation of another construction, that is,
the unification of the grammar with another set of constructions.
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Individual A
Individual B
E-language
I-language I-language'I l
I-language
Cultural transmission
(comprehension & entrenchment)
Production
Use Learning
Entrenchment
(a) Comprehension as part of learning
Individual A
Individual B
E-language
I-language I-language'I l
I-language I-language
Use Learning
Comprehension
Production Entrenchment
Entrenchment
(b) Comprehension as part of use
Figure 2.11: Comprehension mirrors production. (a) Comprehension and entrenchment in the
hearer are conflated in the process of cultural learning. (b) Comprehension and entrenchment
in the hearer are differentiated: comprehension mirrors production, both are processes of use.
Learning in the form of entrenchment occurs in both the speaker (after production) and the hearer
(after comprehension).
process of cultural transmission, that is, one of our two types of learning. This is
represented in Fig. 2.11(a). However, just as we have split innovation (individual
learning) into production and entrenchment, we can split cultural transmission
(social learning) into comprehension and entrenchment. We thus get the more
precise picture given in Fig. 2.11(b), which reflects the fact that comprehension
mirrors production. Now we can map the two processes of the iterated learn-
ing model (see Fig. 2.6 above) more accurately: use can be either production or
comprehension, and learning happens in the form of entrenchment in both the
producer and the comprehender. This analysis is echoed in Croft’s statement
that “[e]ntrenchment is reinforced through use (comprehension as well as pro-
duction)” (Croft 2000:73).
But then, where does the difference between comprehension-driven and
production-driven models lie? While both are built on equations (7) and (8)
above, comprehension-driven models are further constrained: they only con-
sider cases where what the hearer infers is different from what the speaker
invited him to infer due to a mismatch between the hearer’s and the speaker’s
assumption about what constitutes context C. This additional constraint of
comprehension-driven models is expressed in equation (9).
(9) CSpeaker 6= CHearer (additional condition in comprehension-driven models)
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comprehension-driven production-driven
models models
use (production coding and coding and
and comprehension) inference inference
learning memorisation/entrenchment memorisation/entrenchment
(“context-absorption”) (“context-absorption”)
context non-shared shared or non-shared
(common ground assumed) (common ground assumed)
Table 2.2: Comprehension- and production-driven models. The two aspects of use, production
and comprehension, mirror each other: the speaker invites decoding and inference from context,
the hearer decodes and infers from context according to what he thinks the speaker has invited
him to do. The usage is memorised as a new form-meaningmapping, where themeaning is a uni-
fication of the decoded and the inferred meaning. The only difference between the two models
is that comprehension-driven models additionally assume that there is a contextual mismatch so
that the hearer’s innovation might differ from the speaker’s, whereas production-driven models
are concerned with speaker-innovation and do not consider (but also do not deny) the poten-
tial second locus of innovation in the hearer. In both cases, however, speaker as well as hearer
assume that there is shared context (common ground).
In this sense, comprehension-driven models are a specific case of production-
driven models where a mismatch of context opens up a second locus of innova-
tion. The process of innovation, however, is the same as for production-driven
models: coding enhanced with invited (or assumed invited) inference from con-
text and the subsequent process of context-absorption through entrenchment.
For production-driven innovation to occur, it is enough to assume conditions
(7) and (8) above. Invited inference and context-absorption are sufficient for
production-driven models. Whether what the hearer infers is the same as what
the speaker had in mind is not relevant as long as communication does not ev-
idently fail. Comprehension-driven models also build on invited-inference and
context-absorption—and thus on a situation which enables production-driven
innovation. But they assume an additional condition, namely the one where
speaker and hearer infer different things, and thus innovate differently. This
comparison of comprehension- and production-driven models is summarised in
Table 2.2.
To verify the assumption that production-driven models describe more basic
processes than comprehension-driven models, we can try to prevent production-
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driven innovation from happening, and see if comprehension-driven innovation
is still possible, and vice versa. To prevent comprehension-driven innovation
we simply have to make sure that speaker and hearer have the same context.
Production-driven innovation is not affected by this measure. On the other hand,
if we try to prevent production-driven innovation, we have three possibilities.
First, we can rule out invited inference. But if speakers did not invite inferences,
hearers would have no reason to complement decoding with inference from con-
text: even misinterpretations are based on the assumption that what is inferred
is what the speaker meant. A second possibility to prevent production-driven
innovation is to disallow context-absorption. But if we rule out this sort of learn-
ing, then the inferences made by the hearer, whether they are the same as the
ones invited by the speaker or not, would not be able to enter the grammar. No
innovationwould happen at all. Thirdly, we could assume that the context is con-
stant. This would also stop production-driven innovation from happening. But it
would also mean that comprehension-driven reinterpretations would never be-
come visible. Thus, comprehension-driven innovation can only occur under con-
ditions that also allow for production-driven innovation, whereas production-
driven innovations can occur whether comprehension-driven innovations are
possible or not.
The bottom line is this. Both comprehension-driven and production-driven in-
novations are attested in language use and change. But the production-driven
model describes the default case, whereas the comprehension-driven model de-
scribes an additional special case that can only occur under specific circum-
stances. In this case, it seems to me that before we resort to the exceptional
case for explanations we should fully exploit the explanatory power of the de-
fault case. In the remainder of this thesis, I will thus develop and work with a
production-driven model of the cultural evolution of language.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have made a first step towards the development of a model of
the cultural evolution of language which is capable of accommodating the puz-
zles of emergence and design. The starting point was a discussion of cultural
evolution in general. In the course of this discussion, we have seen that human
culture is special because it is cumulative. Humans engage in particularly faith-
ful forms of social learning which allow them to accumulate modifications of
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artefacts (knowledge, skills, or social practice) beyond single individuals’ life-
times. However, the discussion has also shown that the driving force of cul-
tural evolution, innovation, has been located at two different positions: in use
or in transmission. The first view describes the process by which an individ-
ual “invents” or “improves” an artefact to make it fulfil a certain function in a
given environment. The second view emphasises that, because social learning
implies that an individual infers an artefact on the basis of an observed usage
event (rather than acquiring it directly), alterations can be introduced during the
process of cultural transmission. The first position thus conceives use as the driv-
ing force of cultural evolution: transmission merely ensures that innovations can
accumulate beyond an individual’s lifetime. For the second position, transmis-
sion itself is the innovative motor of cultural evolution.
These two perspectives of general cultural evolution are reflected in the
production-driven and comprehension-driven models which have been pro-
posed as explanations for the evolution and change of language. I have argued
that, for conceptual and empirical reasons, these two types of models must be
preferred to a third type, acquisition-driven models. A comparison of the two
has shown that comprehension-driven models can be seen as an exceptional case
of production-driven models: one in which the speaker and the hearer “mis-
understand” each other. What both models assume (the comprehension-driven
model tacitly, the production-driven model explicitly) is that speakers innovate
in production by inviting hearers to complement the process of decoding with
inference from context. Language use is intrinsically innovative because it
exhibits pragmatic plasticity: the meaning linguistic forms come to convey in
specific contexts go beyond the conventional meanings with which they have
previously been associated.
When linguistic cultural evolution is described in terms of iterated learning,
in fact, it includes two processes: learning (the mapping of E-language onto
I-language) and use (the mapping of I-language onto E-language). Tradition-
ally, studies in evolutionary linguistics have emphasised the innovative role of
learning (hence, I guess, the term “iterated learning model”). But the process
of comprehension, which, as I have suggested, mirrors production, has to be
distinguished from the subsequent updating of the hearer’s knowledge. In
both production- and comprehension-driven models, innovation thus happens
in use (production or comprehension) and not in learning (memorisation or
entrenchment)—although such an innovation would, of course, be lost without
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its subsequent addition to the innovator’s knowledge through learning. Maybe
they ought to be called iterated usage models rather than iterated learning
models?
What speaks against the employment of comprehension-driven models to study
the origins of language is simply this: it seems to make sense to exploit the full
explanatory potential of the default before one turns to the exceptional case in
search of explanations. I claim that this has as yet not been done. The remainder
of this thesis will therefore be dedicated to the development of a production-
driven model of the cultural evolution of language to account for the evolution-
ary puzzles set out in the introduction. In the next chapter, I will work out the de-
tails of how pragmatic plasticity leads to linguistic innovation, what general cog-
nitive mechanisms this involves, and how these mechanisms can be employed
to address the emergence puzzle.
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CHAPTER 3
The emergence puzzle
One of the puzzles that evolutionary linguistics has to explain is that of emer-
gence: how can language have emerged from no language?1 It is the question
about the transition from a non-/pre-linguistic state to a state where linguistic
communication is in place. This much seems to be agreed on by nativists and
non-nativists: that any attempt to bridge this evolutionary gap must be able to
account for at least the emergence of symbolism and the emergence of gram-
matical structure. Bickerton (2003:80), for instance, states that “language as we
know it today involves the coming together of three things: modality, symbolism
and structure.” Even though he adds a third feature to the list, namely modal-
ity or the mode of transition (speech or signing), he then only mentions it very
briefly, while he dwells much longer on the emergence of symbolism and struc-
ture. The central role he ascribes to these two is also reflected in the title of this
essay: “Symbol and Structure: A Comprehensive Framework for Language Evo-
lution.” In the same volume (Christiansen and Kirby 2003), Tomasello, who, in
contrast to Bickerton, is an outspoken opponent of the innateness assumption
(see e.g. Tomasello 1995, 2004), makes the following statement:
Human communication is most clearly distinguished from the com-
munication of other primate species by its use of (1) symbols and (2)
grammar. This means that progress on questions of language origins
and evolution depends crucially on a proper understanding of these
two phenomena. (Tomasello 2003b:94)
1Individual sections of this chapter appear in Hoefler and Smith (2008), Hoefler and Smith (in
press). All material presented here is my own work.
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However, the common assumption goes further than this. The emergence of
symbolism and the emergence of grammar are generally viewed as two distinct
explananda, phenomena with different origins.2 Tomasello (2003b:109) sum-
marises this common assumption when he argues that “different aspects of
language—for example, symbols and grammar—may have involved different
processes at different evolutionary times” and titles the corresponding essay
“On the different origins of symbols and grammar.” While both Tomasello and
Bickerton agree that “[t]he most crucial thing to grasp about the emergence of
symbolic representation is that it must have been primarily a cultural rather than
a biological event” (Bickerton 2003:82) and that “there was no specific adaptation
‘for’ symbolic [...] communication” (Tomasello 2003b:109), they disagree over
the emergence of grammar: Tomasello views it as the result of different cultural
processes, syntacticisation and grammaticalisation, but Bickerton assumes an
additional biological step. Like this, we can theoretically find any combination
of biological and cultural explanations for the emergence of symbolism and
the emergence of grammar: Bickerton’s explanation is cultural for symbolism
but biological for grammar, Tomasello invokes two separate cultural processes,
Pinker (2003) seems to favour biological explanations for both.
The distinction of the emergence of symbolism and the emergence of grammar
has also given rise to one of the field’s most prominent debates: the dispute be-
tween advocates of a synthetic protolanguage (e.g. Bickerton 2000) and those
who think that protolanguage was holistic (e.g. Wray 2000). The assumption un-
derlying this debate—and at the same time the one point on which both sides
agree—is that, in a first evolutionary step, symbolic communication emerged
and was used as some sort of “protolanguage,” and that only later, and in a dif-
ferent process, protolanguage developed into language through the emergence
of grammar. What the two sides cannot agree on is the nature of protolanguage
symbols and the process that led to the emergence of grammatical structure.
In this chapter, I question this common assumption that the emergence of sym-
bolism and the emergence of grammatical structure are two distinct explananda,
with different origins. I agree with Tomasello that both can be explained through
processes of cultural evolution on the basis of general cognitive mechanisms. But
while he identifies the cognitive processes that underlie the emergence of sym-
bolism, he remains more or less agnostic as to the ones that lead to the emergence
2This is with the possible exception of Pinker (e.g. 2003), who uniformly ascribes the emer-
gence of all features of language to natural selection for the transmission of propositional infor-
mation.
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of grammar. He merely points out that they lead to grammaticalisation and syn-
tacticisation but that they have not been investigated enough. The following
statement, which I have already cited in section 2.3, summarises the research that
Tomasello thinks needs to be done:
Exactly how grammaticalization and syntacticization happen in the
concrete interactions of individual human beings and groups of hu-
man beings, and how these processes might relate to the other pro-
cesses of sociogenesis by means of which human social interaction
ratchets up the complexity of cultural artefacts, requires more psy-
chologically based linguistic research into processes of linguistic com-
munication and language change. (Tomasello 2003b:103)
I suggest in this chapter that if one follows Tomasello’s call for more cognition-
based research into processes of linguistic communication and language change,
one comes to the conclusion that the same cognitive mechanisms that lead to
the emergence of symbolism also lead to the emergence of grammatical struc-
ture, and that there is little ground to treat the two as distinct evolutionary ex-
plananda. I propose that these cognitive mechanisms, which form the common
cognitive origin of symbolism and grammar, are the ones underlying human lin-
guistic as well as non-linguistic communication to the present day. The remain-
der of this chapter is divided into four main parts. I begin with a discussion of
the cognitive basis of communication (section 3.1) and then apply the identified
psychological mechanisms to account for the emergence of symbolism (section
3.2) as well as to explain the emergence of grammatical structure (section 3.3).
Finally, I discuss the consequences of the presented approach for the protolan-
guage debate (section 3.4) before I present my conclusions (section 3.5).
3.1 The cognitive basis of communication
Why should one study communication in order to explain the emergence of sym-
bolism and grammar? In the last chapter, I have shown that cultural artefacts
are shaped by the “ratchet effect” of cumulative cultural evolution. Cumulative
cultural evolution is made possible because faithful transmission allows for the
preservation of innovations; but the motor of cultural evolution is the process
of innovation itself. I have argued that the type of innovation with the great-
est explanatory potential is the one that comes about through use. Use becomes
innovative when extant artefacts are applied in novel environments. Cultural
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artefacts are thus shaped in cumulative cultural evolution through iterated us-
age in ever new environments.
The way an artefact is used (its usage) is defined by (i) what it is used for (its
function), and (ii) the conditions of the environment in which it is used. The
usage of an artefact is thus the way in which it is applied to interact with the
environment to achieve a goal, namely that artefact’s function. And the function
of an artefact can in turn be described by the change in the environment which
the artefact is intended to bring about when used. In order to understand an
artefact and how it emerged and evolved through cumulative cultural evolution,
it is therefore essential to study its function and usage.
The artefact in question, the emergence of whose defining properties is to be
studied, is language. The function of language is communication: language is
used for communication. One therefore needs to ask what change in the envi-
ronment communication brings about and how it can be achieved in individ-
ual usage situations. An understanding of the cultural evolution of language
through iterated usage and its cumulative effects is thus inseparably linked to an
understanding of what communication is and how language is used to achieve it.
I will first discuss the general requirements that a model of communication has
to fulfil, and then introduce the two currently predominant models of commu-
nication: the code model and the ostensive-inferential model of communication.
I will conclude by arguing that these two do not represent two different modes
of communication, but that the former is subsumed by the latter—a point which
will prove to be an important key to explaining the emergence of symbols and
grammar.
3.1.1 Communication: its goal and challenges
The aim of communication is (i) to inform a conspecific of some state of affairs,
and (ii) to elicit a response to that newly gained information in that conspecific,
to elicit a “perlocutionary effect” (Austin 1962). The function of language is thus
ultimately a social one: to manipulate the behaviour of a conspecific. Commu-
nication is a way of achieving this by making some information available to the
addressee which has not been manifest to him before, and which is assumed to
trigger the desired response in him. The change in the environment that commu-
nication is intended to bring about is therefore first and foremost a cognitive one:
a change in the cognitive state of the addressee. Communication can thus be said
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to involve a transfer of information from one individual’s cognitive environment
to another individual’s cognitive environment.
But there is an obvious obstacle: humans are not telepathic. They cannot transmit
information from one mind to another directly. Smith (e.g. 2003a) emphasises
the relevance of this simple fact for our understanding of language evolution.
He criticises models of language evolution that assume direct transfer. If hu-
mans were able to transfer information from one mind to another directly, they
would not need to resort to signals, and their existence—for example in the form
of language—would not make sense. We must conclude that a communication
system like language is first and foremost a tool to tackle this problem: how can
information be transmitted, and a conspecific’s mental state be altered, if indi-
viduals do not have direct access to each other’s mind?
The obvious—and sole conceivable—solution to this problem is for the commu-
nicator to modify the physical environment shared with the addressee in a way
that (i) prompts and (ii) enables the addressee to recover the communicated in-
formation. Sperber and Wilson (1995) respectively speak of the communicator
having to make manifest to the addressee (i) her communicative intention and
(ii) her informative intention. Modifications in the physical environment can,
for instance, be acoustic, as in the case of speech, or they can be visual, like in
gestural communication, drawing or writing. Accordingly, Sperber and Wilson
(1995:1) incorporate the modification of the physical environment and its role as
an intermediary into their definition of communication:
Communication is a process involving two information-processing
devices. One device modifies the physical environment of the other.
As a result, the second device constructs representations similar to
representations already stored in the first device. Oral communica-
tion, for instance, is a modification by the speaker of the hearer’s
acoustic environment, as a result of which the hearer entertains
thoughts similar to the speaker’s own.
However, the question that still needs to be answered is how, by means of mod-
ifications of the physical environment, communication is actually achieved. I
will therefore briefly introduce the twomost commonly invoked accounts, which
are generally referred to as the code model of communication and the inferential (or
ostensive-inferential) model of communication. For each of the two models, I will (i)
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outline its core concept and then (ii) discuss how communication is achieved in
that model.
3.1.2 Communication by coding
Especially in technical domains, the code model has proved to be an extremely
successful interpretation of what is going on in communication. While it can
be traced back to the thinking of Aristotle, the model has probably found its
most seminal formulation in Shannon and Weaver (1949), which, at its time, laid
the foundations of a whole new field, information theory3, and continues to ex-
ert considerable influence on the development of linguistics. Despite some ex-
plicit field-internal criticism (e.g. Origgi and Sperber 2000; Smith 2005a; Hoefler
2006a), it is still widely applied in evolutionary linguistics.
The core element of the code model of communication is the code. A code is a
predefined algorithm or system which is part of the interlocutors’ knowledge
and maps individual types of modifications of the physical environment (sig-
nals) onto meanings, and vice versa. It is a set of instructions that describe how
meanings can be translated into signals and how signals can be translated into
meanings. For communication to be established successfully, both the commu-
nicator and the addressee must have the same code at their disposal.
Communication is achieved by coding. The communicator uses her code to en-
code the information to be transferred into a signal, which she then produces.4
By producing the signal she modifies the physical environment of the addressee.
The addressee, upon perceiving this modification of his physical environment,
uses his code in turn to decode the signal into the transferred information. “Com-
munication is achieved by encoding a message, which cannot travel, into a sig-
nal, which can, and by decoding this signal at the receiving end” (Sperber and
Wilson 1995:4). In the framework of the code model of communication, the type
of physical environment chosen to transport the signal is usually referred to as
the “channel.” Communication by coding is summarised in Fig. 3.1. The commu-
nicator5 intends to conveymeaningA. She uses her code, whichmapsmeaningA
3It needs to be pointed out, however, that with the advent of lossy data compression algo-
rithms (cf. section 5.3.1), information theory has actually transcended the limitations of the code
model of communication.
4It has become custom to refer to the communicator with feminine and to the addressee with
masculine forms.
5In the context of the code model, the communicator is often referred to as the “sender,” and
the addressee as the “receiver.”
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Figure 3.1: Communication by coding.
onto form 0, to do so, and produces form 0 as a signal. The addressee perceives
the signal and decodes it by using his own code to recover the communicated
meaning A. Communication is thus achieved with the help of the code each in-
terlocutor has, which is used to link meanings to specific modifications of the
physical environments, the signal.
In coded communication, the signal fully specifies the communicated meaning,
and a code ideally consists of one-to-one mappings of forms onto meanings.
While synonymy, the case where one and the same meaning can be expressed by
more than one form, is not so much a problem for successful communication—
the communicator can simply choose one of them at random—the opposite case,
ambiguity, represents a serious obstacle. If one and the same form can stand for
more than one meaning, how can the addressee know which of these meanings
the communicator had encoded when she produced the form? Without any ad-
ditional mechanisms, that is to say, without transcending the code model, the
addressee cannot solve the disambiguation problem.
But there are also two more general problems with the code model of communi-
cation. One of its shortcomings with respect to the study of language evolution is
that it is symbolic. Symbolic association, namely the (relatively arbitrary) map-
ping of forms and meanings in a code, is its core element. It can therefore not
offer any help if one attempts to explain how symbolism has come about in the
first place. Adopting the code model of communication in studies of the origins
of language may even lead to the misconception that, in order to get to language,
humans needed to have a “symbolic capacity” as a cognitive prerequisite—a spe-
cific, innate module of the mind that associates forms with meaning. In constrast,
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I will argue in this chapter that symbolism is an emergent property, a by-product
of iterated communicative interactions that is based on general cognitive capac-
ities and cumulative cultural evolution. Another problem with the code model
is, as has been pointed out frequently, that it does not accurately capture what
is going on in linguistic communication: language users do not just encode and
decode signals. Successful linguistic communication also heavily depends on in-
ference from context. This fact is taken into account in the other major model of
communication: the inferential model of communication.
3.1.3 Ostensive-inferential communication
The first articulation of the inferential model of communication is usually as-
cribed to Grice (1957, 1975). Just as Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) discussion of
the mathematical underpinnings of the code model of communication marked
the birth of information theory, Grice’s formulation of the inferential model stood
at the beginning of a new field: pragmatics. And even though in recent years
something of a division over certain linguistic specifics seems to have appeared
between so-called neo-Gricean approaches on the one side (e.g. Levinson 2000;
Horn 2004) and the relevance theorists on the other side (Sperber and Wilson
1995; Carston 2002), the inferential model of communication, in one form or an-
other, is applied by all. Sperber andWilson’s (1995) investigation of the model—
which they call the “ostensive-inferential model”—is maybe of most interest to
evolutionary linguists since it attempts to abstract away from linguistic descrip-
tion to the underlying cognitive mechanisms.
I prefer Sperber and Wilson’s name for the model because it mentions both pro-
cesses which are involved in communication according to it: ostension and in-
ference. In the ostensive-inferential model, “communication is achieved by pro-
ducing and interpreting evidence” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:2). The former is
ostension, the latter inference; the former is the communicator’s part, the lat-
ter the addressee’s. However, the concept at the core of the ostensive-inferential
model, which is a prerequisite for establishing communication by producing and
interpreting evidence, is that of context. The notion of context thus needs to be
introduced and discussed before one is able to describe how communication is
achieved in the ostensive-inferential model.
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3.1.3.1 What is context?
The context of a communicative situation is the knowledge (or cognitive environ-
ment) which the interlocutors recognise as common ground in that situation. The
first point to emphasise about context is therefore that it is cognitive. Often, the
physical environment of a communicative situation is mentioned as an example
of what context is. This is, however, misleading. Not the physical environment
itself is part of the context of that communicative situation, but the communi-
cator’s and addressee’s perception of it, or rather the knowledge that is derived
from that perception. Context is always a part of the cognitive environment of
the interlocutors at the time of the usage event.
However, context only comprises those parts of the interlocutors’ cognitive
environment which they recognise as common ground in the given situation.
This means that context is knowledge which the interlocutors recognise as being
shared in that situation. But the notion of common ground does not just imply (i)
that they recognise the said knowledge as shared but also (ii) that they are aware
that their counterpart recognises it as shared too—and (iii) that they realise that
their counterpart also knows that they are aware of this. Sperber and Wilson
(1995:88) refer to this as a “mutual cognitive environment.” The concept of com-
mon ground has been addressed, for example, by Lewis (1969); Schiffer (1972);
Stalnaker (1978); McCarthy (1990), but probably the most extensive discussion is
provided by Clark (1996:92ff.).
Clark distinguishes between two categories of common-ground knowledge.
Communal common ground is knowledge that an individual recognises as com-
mon ground because of the community to which its counterpart belongs. The
two individuals assume that they share that knowledge because they are both
members of, for instance, the same family, group, profession, nationality, or
simply because they both belong to the same species and thus perceive the
world in similar ways and share some basic experiences. Personal common
ground, on the other side, is knowledge which two individuals recognise as
being shared because it originates from a joint experience (present or past). This
can, for instance, be their memory of events in the past at which they were both
present, memories of their past interactions, or simply the awareness that they
are currently in the same physical setting.
In any communicative situation, contextual knowledge draws from communal
common ground as well as from personal common ground. The knowledge that
87
we currently experience the same physical environment because we stand next to
each other is part of our personal common ground. It has nothing to do with
what communities we belong to. But the assumption that your perception of
this physical environment is similar to mine originates from communal common
ground: namely from the fact that we belong to the same species and therefore
have similar perceptual and cognitive functions. The same is the case with the
knowledge of the social dynamics of the situation we are attending to. That we
both know what the goal of our present interaction is partly originates from our
personal common ground: it depends on our joint experience of the conditions
or events that led to it. However, to establish shared expectations with regard to
the goal of our interaction, we must not only be aware of the specifics of the cur-
rent situation but also of the general behavioural patterns of our species and the
social conventions of our group. This latter knowledge stems from our commu-
nal common ground. These are just two examples of how contextual information
about the immediate physical or social environment can build on a combination
of personal and communal common ground.
Common ground knowledge can amount to a shared understanding of the goal
of a given interaction, or at least to an agreement of what plausible goals for it are.
Two individuals can only establish and recognise common ground on the goal
of an interaction if they also share a relatively detailed understanding of each
other’s intentions (cf. Tomasello 2003a). Grice (1975) describes this cooperative
goal-directedness of interactions for the case of talk:6
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of discon-
nected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are char-
acteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or
set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. The purpose
or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of
a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it
6One of the differences between Gricean pragmatics and Relevance Theory is that the former
puts more emphasis on cooperation whereas the latter focuses more on the self-interest of the
individual. Sperber and Wilson (1995:161) distinguish Grice’s approach from theirs in the fol-
lowing way: “Grice assumes that communication involves a greater degree of cooperation than
we do. For us, the only purpose that a genuine communicator and a willing audience have in
common is to achieve uptake: that is, to have the communicator’s informative intention recog-
nised by the audience.” However, at the level of abstraction that I assume here, the intricacies of
this distinction do not come to bear.
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may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very con-
siderable latitude to the participants (as casual conversation). But at
each stage, some possible conversational moves would be excluded
as conversationally unsuitable. (Grice 1975:45, emphases added)
From such shared understanding of the interactional goal also falls common-
ground knowledge of what is relevant in the context of a specific interaction. We
can define relevant information as information that (i) is not accessible to the
addressee yet, and that (ii) would contribute to achieving a goal that appears
plausible in the given interaction if it was transferred to him. Information is rel-
evant if communicating it would elicit an effect in the addressee that matches
an interactional goal which makes sense in the given situation. The notion of
relevance is at the center of the cognitive approach to communication developed
by Sperber and Wilson (1995). However, they work with a somewhat idiosyn-
cratic definition of relevance (see e.g. Bach 2006:7 for some criticism). For the
present purpose, it will suffice to state that two individuals who engage in com-
municative interaction discern relevant from irrelevant information on the basis
of knowledge which they recognise as common ground.7
3.1.3.2 How is communication achieved?
In the ostensive-inferential model, communication is achieved by producing and
interpreting evidence. By modifying the immediate physical environment, the
communicator (i) adds another fact to the common ground, which, in the given
context, (ii) triggers the inference of the communicated information in the ad-
dressee. Communication is thus established through an ostensive act performed
by the communicator (the modification of the physical environment by means of
which she enhances the common ground) and an inferential act performed by the
addressee but predicted and invited by the communicator (the inference of some
new information on the basis of the now altered context). If, for instance, I want
you to know that I have a one pound coin in my pocket, I can simply take the
coin out, show it to you and make sure that you see how I put it back into my
pocket. This is the ostensive part of communication. You will then infer from
7Note that both the knowledge of common ground in general and the knowledge of what
constitutes relevant information in particular are themselves inferred from more basic knowl-
edge about the world, one’s conspecics and the current situation: “[f]or the speaker [the com-
municative context] includes information that could reasonably be inferred about the addressee,
which gives rise to expectations about how the addressee will react to certain kinds of linguistic
stimulus and certain bits of information” (Wedgwood 2007:651).
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Figure 3.2: Ostensive-inferential communication by producing direct evidence.
what you have just seen that I have a one pound coin in my pocket. This is the
inferential part of communication.
In the simplest case, the communicator provides direct evidence for the informa-
tion she wants to transfer. This is a maximisation of the ostensive part and a
minimisation of the inferential part: I show you the coin in my hand (the os-
tensive part), and therefore you know that there is a coin in my hand (the infer-
ential part). Ostensive-inferential communication by means of direct evidence
is represented schematically in Fig. 3.2. A communicator wants to transfer in-
formation C (e.g. that there is a coin). He produces direct evidence for C, such
that C becomes part of the addressee’s cognitive environment too. Because the
addressee perceives the communicator’s ostensive act, he acquires information
C and, since C consitutes relevant information in the given context, infers that
this is the information that the communicator wanted to convey. In this simplest
case of ostensive-inferential communication, the produced evidence itself is the
transferred information.8
8With regard to the introduced schematic representation, remember that the item that signi-
fies knowledge of what constitutes relevant information in the given situation is itself a shortcut
for a range of inferences drawn by the interlocutors. On a similar note, it needs to be mentioned
that one thing that is always to be inferred from the context is the communicator’s communica-
tive intention: the fact that the behaviour she exhibits is communicative and therefore comes
with the presumption of relevance. The communicative character of an observed behaviour, its
“signalhood,” can be inferred if that behaviour does not otherwise make sense in light of the
expectations one has about the other individual’s motives and intentions in the given situation.
Even though it is not represented explicitly, the inference of the communicative character of the
produced behaviour, and the recognition of this fact as common ground, is presupposed in all
examples.
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The common ground of two interlocutors often contains background knowledge
related to the evidence produced. But as long as this knowledge does not allow
the inference of some relevant additional information, it will be ignored. We
might, for instance, both know that one pound coins are issued by the Bank of
England, that all one pound coins issued in the same year have the same design,
or that having several of them can make one’s purse annoyingly heavy. But as
long as none of this knowledge allows you to infer information that is relevant
to our current interaction, you will ignore it.
On the other hand, provision of full evidence is often not feasible. In such situa-
tions, communicators can rely on shared contextual knowledge related to some
producible evidence. The production of the evidence then functions as a cue to
trigger the inference of additional information from the given context. If, for in-
stance, I want to let you know that I have the one pound coin I need for my bus,
I can show this to you by means of direct evidence when we both enter the bus
at the same time and you observe how I pay my ticket with that coin. However,
if we are nowhere near the bus yet (but on our way there), the production of di-
rect evidence is not an option. In this case, I can still produce the coin as a cue
and rely on our common ground: (i) that we have the same assumption of what
information is relevant in the current situation, and (ii) that we both know that
one pound coins are used to pay for the bus. Thus, if I produce a one pound
coin while we are on our way to the bus station, and show it to you, you will not
only infer the direct information contained in the cue, namely that I have a one
pound coin, but, since this information alone would not be relevant in the given
situation, you also infer additionally that this coin is for the bus.
Hence, whereas in communication by means of producing direct evidence, the
cue fully specifies the conveyed information, in other situations, cues underspecify
what is being communicated and trigger the inference of additional information
relevant in the given context. Underspecification in ostensive-inferential com-
munication is represented in Fig. 3.3(a). A communicator wants to transfer infor-
mation CB (e.g. that he has a coin, and that this coin is for the bus). Her ostensive
act adds C to the addressee’s cognitive environment. And they are both aware
that the knowledge that C is associated with B (that one pound coins are used
to pay for the bus) is part of their recognised common ground. Because the new
information only becomes relevant if B is added, the addressee infers that what
the communicator means to convey is information CB. The produced cue C thus
only underspecifies the intended meaning CB but can still be used to convey the
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Figure 3.3: Under- and overspecified ostensive-inferential communication.
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full meaning because its addition to the given context triggers the inference of the
remainder of the intended meaning. The addressee will follow the associations
he recognises as common ground until he arrives at a relevant interpretation.
Carston (2004:822) describes the procedure employed by the addressee accord-
ingly: “[c]heck interpretive hypotheses in order of their accessibility—that is,
follow the path of least effort until an interpretation that satisfies the expectation
of relevance is found; then stop.”
Conversely, not all information contained in a cue is necessarily relevant: a cue
overspecifies the actually communicated information if it has aspects which are
ignored because they are irrelevant in the given context. The coin that I show
you to let you know that I have a one pound coin for instance also has the prop-
erty of carrying an effigy of the Queen. However, as long as this information
is not relevant in the current situation, you will not consider it as part of what
I mean to tell you. Overspecification in ostensive-inferential communication is
represented schematically in Fig. 3.3(b). The communicator produces a cue CQ
(e.g. a one-pound coin carrying an effigy of the Queen) to convey information C
alone. The produced cue is thus more specified than the intended meaning: it
overspecifies the actually communicated meaning. The communicator assumes
that the addressee will infer from the context that he can ignore the aspect Q of
the cue (e.g. the information that the coin carries an effigy of the Queen) because
Q is irrelevant in the given situation.
In most cases of ostensive-inferential communication, underspecification and
overspecification occur together. If, for instance, I show you my one pound coin
to let you know that I have my coin for the bus, then the produced cue under-
specifies and overspecifies the communicated meaning: in addition to the infor-
mation that I have a coin, you infer from the context that this coin is for the bus
(underspecification). But at the same time, you ignore certain properties of the
produced cue because they are irrelevant: that the coin carries an effigy of the
Queen, maybe, or that I hold it in my right rather than my left hand (overspec-
ification). To some degree, every case of ostensive-inferential communication
contains elements of under- and overspecification: the addressee always at least
infers that the communicator wants to let him know something (i.e. the commu-
nicator’s communicative intention), and always ignores certain specific features
of the produced cue.
In the limiting case, a cue can bemaximally under- and overspecified: when none
of the information contained in the cue is part of the communicated meaning
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(maximal overspecification), and thus all relevant information is inferred from
the context once the cue has been produced (maximal underspecification). If you
ask me if I am going to town by bus or by bike, and I produce a coin in response,
then I use a cue in such away. Youwill infer that I intend to go by bus on the basis
of our common ground knowledge that one pound coins are used to pay for the
bus, and because they are not associated in anywaywith bikes. At the same time,
the fact that I have a coin as such is not relevant in the present situation: all I want
to communicate (and all you want to know) is that I am going by bus—whether
or not I have the money to pay for it does not matter in this interaction. This
situation of maximal under- and overspecification is represented schematically
in Fig. 3.3(c).
Cues in ostensive-inferential communication thus exhibit pragmatic plasticity be-
cause they can under- and/or overspecify the conveyed meaning. Like this, the
information that is actually transferred in a particular communicative situation
can deviate from the information that the communicator immediately adds to
the common ground by producing a cue. I conclude that pragmatic plasticity—
comprising both under- as well as overspecification—is a fundamental property
of human ostensive-inferential communication and not specific to language.
3.1.4 Coding as an ostensive-inferential process
It has been argued, for example by Sperber and Wilson (1995), that the code
model of communication and the ostensive-inferential model of communica-
tion simply describe two modes of communication applied by humans, and
that while, for instance, human ad-hoc gestural communication is ostensive-
inferential, linguistic communication makes use of both communication by
coding and ostensive-inferential communication. Language use, in this view,
has a coding aspect and an inferential aspect.
In such a model of linguistic communication, the output of a coding process
serves as the input to an inferential process. A speaker encodes a meaning into
a linguistic signal, and the hearer decodes that signal to recover the encoded
meaning. The meaning encoded in the linguistic signal then additionally serves
as a cue to trigger further inferences from the context. This view of linguistic
communication as a combination of the code model and the ostensive-inferential
model is represented in Fig. 3.4(a). A speaker intends to express meaning AB.
She uses her linguistic code to translate A into a linguistic form 0, which she then
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Figure 3.4: Linguistic communication. (a) The output of the coding process as the input to the
inferential process. (b) Coding as an ostensive-inferential process.
produces. The hearer decodes the linguistic signal he has perceived and thus
recovers A as the meaning encoded in the signal. Like this, the coding process
has added new information, A, to the context. Once A is added to this particular
context, it triggers the additional inference of B and thus allows the hearer to
recover the full meaning intended by the speaker, AB.
While this description of linguistic communicationmay be useful for certain pur-
poses and at a certain level of abstraction, it creates the illusion that there are two
cognitively different processes involved: coding and inference. Sperber andWil-
son (1995), for instance, conclude that linguistic communication has to be seen
as having two aspects, coding and inference, because the processes employed
in coding are fundamentally different from those used in ostensive-inferential
communication:
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Inferential and decoding processes are quite different. An inferential
process starts from a set of premises and results in a set of conclusions
which follow logically, or are at least warranted by, the premises. A
decoding process starts from a signal and results in the recovery of a
message which is associated to the signal by an underlying code. In
general, conclusions are not associated to their premises by a code,
and signals do not warrant the messages they convey. (Sperber and
Wilson 1995:12f., emphases in the original)
I argue that it becomes evident that this dichotomy is not warranted once one
dissolves the borderline between code and context. A linguistic code, at least ac-
cording to the view held in Cognitive Linguistics, consists of a set of individual
linguistic conventions (constructions, each associating a form with a meaning)
which can be paraphrased as the knowledge that “conventionally, form f is pro-
duced to communicate meaning m” and that therefore “when f is produced, m is
meant.” But then, there is no reason to assume that the knowledge of an individ-
ual that a linguistic form f is used to convey a meaning m is in principle different
from the knowledge of that same individual that a one pound coin is used to pay
for the bus.
Like other knowledge too, linguistic conventions can be part of the personal or
communal common ground that two individuals share. And while linguistic
conventions are part of two individuals’ communal common ground, it is not
the case that the only reason why two individuals share linguistic conventions
is that they belong to the same language community. Individuals share linguis-
tic conventions because of their membership to all kinds of communities, for
instance because they have the same profession, or are of similar age. While
two Koreans, being part of the same language community, share to a large extent
the particular set of grammatical constructions generally identified as the Korean
language, they might not share all lexical constructions if one of the two is fifteen
years old and the other is eighty, or if one is an ophthalmologist and the other
is not. A Korean ophthalmologist and an English ophthalmologist, on the other
hand, might share a fair number of words but might not share any of their gram-
matical constructions, unless the Korean also has knowledge of English—or vice-
versa. Clark (1996:116), citing Hopper et al. (1981), shows how very idiosyncratic
linguistic conventions can even be maintained as personal common ground by
giving examples from personal idioms that couples use among themselves.
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If linguistic conventions are recognised as common ground knowledge and thus
as part of the context of a communicative situation like any other knowledge
too, then coding appears as a normal ostensive-inferential process, namely one
where linguistic forms are used as cues to trigger the inference of the meanings
conventionally associated with them. Fig. 3.4(b) exemplifies this. The speaker in-
tends to convey informationAB. Both interlocutors recognise as common ground
the linguistic convention that form 0 is used to express meaning A, and further-
more that A can entail B. By producing the signal 0, the speaker adds a new fact
to this common ground which then in turn triggers the inference of first A and
then B in the given context. At the same time, the hearer realises that the fact
that 0 was produced itself does not contain any relevant information. Commu-
nication by coding is thus a special case of ostensive-inferential communication
with maximally under- and overspecified cues that trigger inferences against the
background of linguistic conventions contained in the context.
The argument that Sperber and Wilson (1995:27) use against the interpretation
of coding as an ostensive-inferential process is that “[a] variety of species, from
bees to humans have codes which are to a greater or lesser extent genetically
determined.” This, of course, is the innateness assumption which this thesis
exactly does not want to make, as explained in the introduction. Sperber and
Wilson (1995:173f.) advocate a Chomskyan version of it. If we drop the innate-
ness assumption, no reason remains why human coding should not be seen as a
case of ostensive-inferential communication. Sperber andWilson (1995:26) them-
selves concede that the use of non-innate codes—which they refer to as “artificial
codes” to distinguish them from their innate cousins—is an ostensive-inferential
process:
Regard a code as a set of conventions (in the sense of Lewis 1969)
shared by all participants in the communication process. Members
of the audience use their knowledge of these conventions on the one
hand, and their knowledge of the signal and of the context on the
other, to infer the message. This is a reasonably good description of
what often happens when artificial codes are devised and used.
My preliminary conclusions are therefore these. Linguistic communication is
ostensive-inferential. Like any sort of ostensive-inferential communication, it
is achieved by producing and interpreting evidence against the background of
recognised common groundwhich, among other things, includes the shared idea
97
of what is relevant in the given situation. And like in all forms of ostensive-
inferential communication, its cues can under- and overspecify the actually con-
veyed information. This is consistent with the view of linguistic communication
advocated in Cognitive Linguistics, as expressed in the already mentioned state-
ment by Kemmer and Barlow (2000:xxi, emphasis in the original):
The context-dependent nature of linguistic production and under-
standing entails, among other things, the inevitable underspecifica-
tion of linguistic forms. Language does not hold or “convey” mean-
ing per se, but simply provides cues for meaning construction in con-
text.
What distinguishes linguistic communication from other types of ostensive-
inferential communication is simply an additional kind of common-ground
knowledge it makes use of: conventional associations between linguistic forms
and meanings. The conclusion must therefore be that the ostensive-inferential
model not only describes instances of human ad hoc non-linguistic communica-
tion but is also sufficient to account for linguistic communication. It is a model
of all human intentional communication.
We are thus now in a position where we can further specify the evolutionary step
from no language to language as a step from non-linguistic ostensive-inferential
communication to linguistic ostensive-inferential communication. The question
that needs to be answered is then where the form-meaning mappings used in
linguistic ostensive-inferential communication come from. This is ultimately the
question about the emergence of symbolism.
3.2 The emergence of symbolism
Symbolism is a phenomenon so definitive of human language that it lends itself
to be viewed as the result of one evolutionary step: the biological emergence
of a “symbolic capacity” from a pre-symbolic state (which is often not specified
any further). I have chosen a different avenue. I will argue that symbolism can
emerge gradually from ostensive-inferential communication without any further
biological modification, and that the set of general cognitive capacities required
for ostensive-inferential communication is sufficient to explain its emergence. I
thus agree with, for instance, Tomasello (2003b) or Bickerton (2003), who also
assume that symbolism is the product of cultural evolution.
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The key to explaining the emergence of symbolism, in my opinion, is to break the
phenomenon down into more elementary components, and then to explain the
emergence of each of these components individually. To account for the emer-
gence of symbolism then means to answer these two questions: (i) how do forms
become associated with meanings, and (ii) how do form-meaning associations
become arbitrary?
3.2.1 How do forms become associated with meanings?
The knowledge of a linguistic convention, which associates a form with a mean-
ing, is not in principle different from any other sort of knowledge. To stick to our
example, the knowledge that a form f is conventionally used to convey a mean-
ing m is not fundamentally different from the knowledge that one pound coins
are used to pay for the bus. The first question to answer, if one intends to explain
the emergence of symbolism, is thus how such knowledge is acquired—how it is
learned.
Learning is a cognitive change based on experience. Somebody learns that one
pound coins are used for the bus either because another person tells them, or
because they experience it themselves when they have to pay for the bus for
the first time—or when they observe someone else doing it. Knowledge, in this
latter case, comes about through usage. Similarly, an association of a form with
a meaning can be described as the experience of what that form was used for in
the past: that when form f was produced as a cue, it was used to communicate
meaning m. The knowledge of a form-meaning association is thus ultimately
also experience-based.
Forms become associated with meaning through the memorisation of their usage.
When a communicator successfully uses a form f as a cue to convey a meaning
m, both the communicator and the addressee will remember this usage event:
they will remember that the production of f was used to trigger the inference of
meaning m—similarly to the way in which our passengers will remember that
they used a one pound coin to pay for the bus. At a very basic level, form-
meaning associations can thus be interpreted as the memory of previous usage
events.9
9The type of learning, which I here describe as memorisation of usage events is refered to as
“exemplar-based learning” or “instance-based learning” in the machine learning literature (e.g.
Mitchell 1997). I will explain how the usage-based model of language evolution introduced in
this chapter maps onto these approaches to learning in chapter 4.
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The memorisation of previous usage can have two effects: (i) entrenchment and
(ii) the establishment of new common-ground knowledge between the two in-
terlocutors and their consecutive ability to refer to it in future usage events. En-
trenchment is the term used in the context of usage-based approaches to language
(e.g Langacker 1987, 2000; Barlow 2000; Tomasello 2003a) to refer to the process
of automatisation or routinisation that occurs when a form is repeatedly used in
the same way. Entrenchment as such is not specific to communicative behaviour
alone: “[e]ntrenchment simply refers to the fact that when an organism does
something in the same way successfully enough times, that way of doing it be-
comes habitual....” (Tomasello 2003a:300). Langacker (1987:57–60) describes how
composite forms and composite meanings which are sufficiently entrenched be-
come psychological units, and how, in the same way, form-meaning associations
gain unit-status.
A sufficiently entrenched association between a form and a meaning can thus be
accessed without the complicated reasoning that was involved when the asso-
ciation was not established yet. As an example, one can think of charades-like
games, where one person has to communicate a concept to a group of other peo-
ple only by means of pantomimic gestures. When the presenter has to convey a
particular concept for the first time, she may have to do a fair amount of reason-
ing to come upwith a gestural description that would allow her audience to infer
the right meaning. And likewise, the audience would have to invest some rea-
soning to figure out what the presenter’s gestures are meant to denote. But when
the same presenter, or another person from the same group of people, faces the
task of conveying the same concept for the second time, she does not need to do
all the reasoning again but can simply re-use the gestures which were successful
the previous time. And the audience, upon her re-using the said gestures, will
not have to do all the guesswork that is involved in figuring out the meaning of
a new gesture, but will be able to understand more readily what the presenter
means on the basis of their memory of the previous usage event for those ges-
tures. Such re-usage under the (implicit or unconscious) assumption that what
worked before will work again leads to automatisation.
Usage-based studies of language (e.g. Barlow and Kemmer 2000) often stress the
relation between entrenchment and frequency of use: the more frequently a form f
is used to express a meaningm, the more deeply the association between the two
will be entrenched. And the deeper a form-meaning association is entrenched,
the more readily it is accessible. Each usage of f to express m thus increases the
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depth of entrenchment of the respective form-meaning association in the knowl-
edge of both the communicator and the addressee. To repeat Croft’s comment,
“[e]ntrenchment is reinforced through use (comprehension as well as produc-
tion), and decays through lack of use (as any rusty second language learner can
attest)” (Croft 2000:73).
Once the association between a form f and a meaning m is sufficiently en-
trenched, form f can be used to convey meaningm independently of any situation-
specific context. The inference of m will now be triggered immediately by the
production of f and will not have to be constructed on the basis of additional
situation-specific common-ground knowledge anymore. Through automatisa-
tion, forms can thus get to express meanings independent of the original context:
pragmatically inferred meaning becomes conventional (“semantic”) meaning.
But the conventionalisation of form-meaning associations is also due to another
consequence of the memorisation of the form being used to convey the meaning:
every usage event creates new common ground between the involved individu-
als. When two individuals communicate, they establish shared experience. After
two individuals have used a form f to communicate a meaning m for the first
time, the association of f with m through that usage event becomes part of their
personal common ground. But once the experience of a new co-occurrence of a
form and a meaning has become part of common ground knowledge of two in-
dividuals, this experience can be referred to in future communicative situations
and thus itself serve as a context from which novel meanings are inferred.
The more entrenched the association between a form and a meaning is, the more
easily it can be used as part of the context of future usage situations: invoking
the memory of a shared one-time usage event involves more explicit reasoning
than employing an established association between a form and a meaning. Con-
ventionalisation is thus the result of a combination of both entrenchment, on the
one side, and the creation of new common ground which can be referred to in
future situations, on the other side. Conventionalisation is a matter of degree:
an association becomes more conventionalised the more frequently it is referred
to, and also the more individuals are involved. However, what is minimally re-
quired for a form-meaning association to become a convention is only (i) that the
form has been used to convey the meaning in at least one usage event, and (ii)
that this usage event has become part of the personal common ground of at least
two individuals.
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The cognitive prerequisites for the conventionalisation of form-meaning associa-
tions are thus the same as the ones for ostensive-inferential communication. Like
ostensive-inferential communication, conventionalisation is based on the recon-
gition of common ground, in particular on the recognition of personal common
ground knowledge of shared previous experience. The additional requirement
for conventionalisation is rather a social one: two individuals have to communi-
cate the same meaning to each other more than once—otherwise conventionali-
sation cannot be brought to bear.
The described processes, which ultimately lead to the establishment of a new
convention, can be observed, for instance, in the experiments documented in
Garrod et al. (2007). In these experiments, “pictionary” tasks are used to study
the evolution of graphical signs. Pairs of participants are asked to repeatedly
communicate a limited set of concepts to each other by means of graphical rep-
resentations. Garrod et al.’s main finding, and its information-theoretic interpre-
tation, is that conventionalisation happens as a “shift in the locus of information
from the sign to the users’ memory of the sign’s usage” (Garrod et al. 2007:961).
While in the beginning, the burden of reasoning is on the produced cue and its
interaction with the situation-specific context, later on it moves to the cue and the
memory of its previous usages. The first time the participants have to commu-
nicate a certain concept, they use iconic representations to do so. These same
representations are re-used later when they have to convey the same concept
again. In these later rounds of the experiment, the meaning of the drawing is
then identified more quickly because not only the original context (the set of
all occurring concepts plus general cultural knowledge) but also the history of
earlier usages of the signs is available. This “shortcut” is also reflected in the
evolution of the form of the re-used signs: the drawings used in later phases of
the experiment do not have to resemble the concept anymore but simply need to
identify a previous usage of that sign and can therefore be much more abstract
than their original. That the participants refer to their shared memory of previ-
ous usages can be recognised in situations where the meaning of some drawing
is identified before the drawing is completed—in a way in which the audience
could not have identified the meaning without memory of previous drawings
and the recognition that one of them is being repeated.
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3.2.2 How do form-meaning associations become arbitrary?
Symbols are often distinguished from other types of form-meaning associations
by the arbitrariness of the relationship between their forms and their meanings.
Saussure (1916) views this arbitrariness between what he calls the signifier and
the signified as the defining characteristic of (linguistic) signs. Peirce (1932) dis-
tinguishes three types of relationships between forms and meanings. The rela-
tionship between form and meaning is iconic if the form resembles the meaning
perceptually or structurally. This is the case, for instance, for the pictograms
used at train stations or airports: a schematic representation of a telephone re-
ceiver points to a public phone. The relationship between form and meaning is
indexical if it is causal: smoke is an indexical sign for fire. In symbols, finally, the
relationship between form and meaning is arbitrary.10 Hockett (1960) lists the
arbitrariness of linguistic signs as one of the design features of human language.
Hurford (2003:48) also mentions the arbitrariness of linguistic form-meaning as-
sociations as a defining characteristic of human language and concludes that
there must be a connection between the fact that linguistic form-meaning as-
sociations are arbitrary and the fact that the associations are learnt rather than
genetically inherited.
Therefore, if one attempts to account for the origin of symbols, it is neces-
sary that one asks how arbitrary form-meaning associations can emerge. So
far, I have shown how non-arbitrary form-meaning associations originate in
ostensive-inferential communication. But the relation between a cue and the
information whose inference it triggers in a given context cannot be arbitrary.11
The question about the emergence of arbitrary form-meaning associations
can now be approached in two ways. Either one assumes that arbitrary and
non-arbitrary form-meaning associations emerge independently of each other:
ostensive-inferential communication leads to the emergence of non-arbitrary
form-meaning associations, and another process, cultural or biological, has to
be found to account for the emergence of arbitrary form-meaning assoications;
or, and this is the avenue that I will take, one can ask how non-arbitrary form
meaning associations become arbitrary.
10Peirce (1932) also points out the conventionality of symbols. But this does not clearly distin-
guish symbols from icons: which icon is used for a specific meaning can be a matter of conven-
tion.
11An arguable exception is situations where the addressee is capable of inferring what the
communicator wants to say by virtue of the fact alone that the communicator has tried to catch
the addressee’s attention. In such cases, the cue employed to catch the addressee’s attention need
not be related to the communicated meaning.
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There are two general ways in which the relation between a form and the
meaning associated with it can become arbitrary: either the features of the
form change, or the features of the meaning change. Even though in reality
both occur, it is theoretically sufficient to have only one of these two types of
changes to get from non-arbitrary to arbitrary form-meaning associations, and
thus to be able to account for the emergence of symbolism. Examples of the
former can be found, for instance, in the abovementioned experiments carried
out by Garrod et al. (2007), where the form of originally iconic signs become
more abstract in the course of iterated use, which finally leads to a situation
where the original iconicity of the form is not recognisable anymore. Sound
changes as described by historical linguistics, or the graphical change in the
characters of writing systems can have the same effect. In this thesis, however,
I will focus on the second option: semantic change. I will show that semantic
change can be explained by the same set of cognitive mechanisms that I have
applied so far to account for the emergence of form-meaning associations from
ostensive-inferential communication. Of all the mentioned avenues to explain
the emergence of arbitrary form-meaning mappings, this is therefore the most
parsimonious one since it does not employ separate cognitive processes.12
Semantic change occurs when an extant form-meaning association exhibits prag-
matic plasticity in use, that is, when it is used as a cue in an under- or overspeci-
fied way so that the actually communicated meaning deviates from the meaning
conventionally associated with the produced form. When this novel usage of
the said form enters common ground and is conventionalised, polysemy results:
the interlocutors’ linguistic knowledge now contains two mappings for the same
form, one that associates it with the old meaning, and another one, which asso-
ciates it with the new one. This situation is equivalent to what historical linguis-
tics calls layering. If the newmapping is reinforced through frequent use whereas
the entrenchment of the old one decays because it is hardly used anymore (and
maybe eventually even drops out of use), the result is that the form involved has
effectively changed the meaning associated with it.
The conventionalisation of underspecified and overspecified use have opposite
effects. In the case of underspecification, entrenchment leads to a new form-
meaning association with the same form but a more specific meaning, because
the actually communicated meaning contains not only the meaning previously
12In fact, as I suggest in section 5.3.1, changes of form may be explained by means of the very
same cognitive processes too.
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conventionally associated with the form but also additonal meaning which was
inferred from the context. In the case of overspecification, on the other hand,
entrenchment leads to a new form-meaning association with the same form but
a less specific meaning. Since some information contained in the meaning that
is conventionally associated with the form is irrelevant in the given context, the
actually communicated meaning contains less information than the form’s orig-
inal conventional meaning. The entrenchment of underspecified use thus brings
about semantic narrowing and specialisation, whereas the entrenchment of over-
specified use results in semantic broadening and generalisation.
The different effects of conventionalised under- and overspecified usages, and
how they can result in the emergence of arbitrary form-meaning associations,
can be illustrated with the following artificial example, which is summarised in
Table 3.1. Imagine a situation where an individual intends to inform her con-
specifics that a lion is around. This individual could do so by imitating a lion’s
roar. The addressees would infer from the context that the communicator’s roar-
ing only makes sense if it is interpreted as a communicative cue. They also recog-
nise as common ground that lions roar and thus conclude that the communicator
intends to convey information about a lion by means of the produced cue. The
convention which can emerge from this under- and overspecified use of roaring
is one which captures that roaring is used to convey information about a lion.
The relationship between its form and its meaning is at the same time indexical
and iconic: roaring is caused by lions, but roaring also perceptually resembles li-
ons, or at least their acoustically perceivable side. In Table 3.1, this is represented
as usage event 1.
Once it has emerged, the new convention might then be used in a context, where
it is not only relevant that a lion is around but also that that lion poses a danger
in this situation (for instance, because it is obviously hungry, or because it is a
mother accompanied by cubs). After such a usage, the convention will become
entrenched with an additional semantic aspect, that of danger, and sooner or
later, roaring will only be imitated when a dangerous lion is around. This is rep-
resented as usage event 2. In some usage situations, the fact that there is a lion
might not be considered terribly relevant by the addressees: what is relevant
is that there is danger. After usage event 3, the convention’s aspect of danger
will thus be enforced while its lion aspect becomes less salient and eventually
disappears (usage event 3). Once the group has moved away from lion terri-
tory, they may start to use roaring to warn of new dangers, for example snakes,
105
usage communicated situational produced type of emerging
event meaning context cue use convention
1 L R → L R underspecified R → L
relevant(L) (overspecified)
2 DL R → L R underspecified R → DL
L → D
relevant(DL)
3 D R → DL R overspecified R → D
relevant(D)
4 DS R → D R underspecified R → DS
D → S
relevant(DS)
5 S R → DS R overspecified R → S
relevant(S)
6 BS R → S R underspecified R → BS
S → B
relevant(BS)
7 B R → BS R overspecified R → B
relevant(B)
Table 3.1: Arbitrariness emerges through iterated usage-induced semantic change. Each row
represents a usage event in the example scenario which introduces a minimal semantic change
because a cue is used (and entrenched) in an under- or overspecified way. Legend (refer to the
description of the chain of events in the text): R = roaring, L = lion, D = danger, S = snake, B =
belt.
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and the convention might acquire a new ‘snake’ aspect. This is shown as usage
event 4. However, if the group moves to a region with harmless snakes only,
the ‘snake’ aspect of the convention might be strenghened while the ‘danger’ as-
pect is deemed irrelevant, as shown in usage event 5. Finally, snake skin might
be manufactured into belts by this group of humans, so that the form used to
denote snakes might also be used in an underspecified way to denote snake
belts (usage event 6). And if the group moves on once more, to areas where
snakes are rare, and the term for ‘snake’ is only ever used to denote belts any-
more, the convention might again lose one of its aspects and come to denote any
sort of belt, whether made of snake skin or not. This last step is represented as
usage event 7 in the table. After many communicative situations in which ex-
tant conventions were used as cues in an underspecified or overspecified way,
the relationship between the form and its meaning has eventually become ar-
bitrary: there is no obvious connection between roaring and a belt. However,
form-meaning associations are arbitrary only from a synchronic perspective; if
considered from a diachronic perspective, they can theoretically be traced back to
initial non-arbitrary13 associations which have emerged from non-conventional
ostensive-inferential communciation (Keller 1998).14
We can conclude that the emergence of symbolism is based on the same cognitive
capacities that underlie ostensive-inferential communication. Form-meaning as-
sociations emerge when individuals memorise that a specific form was used to
communicate a specific meaning. Form-meaning associations become conven-
tional when this memory enters the common ground of at least two individuals.
Once this has happened, the new associations can themselves be used as part of
a context in a novel usage situation. Their forms can be used to communicate
meanings that are more specific than the conventional meanings associated with
them (underspecified use), or more general (overspecified use). The entrench-
ment and conventionalisation of these novel usages leads to semantic narrowing
in the case of underspecification and semantic broadening in the case of over-
specification. The relationship between forms and meanings becomes arbitrary
13By “non-arbitrary,” I mean here that, in a specific situation, the meaning of a produced cue
can be inferred on the basis of the properties of the cue and general common-ground knowledge
only, i.e. without the knowledge of a conventional form-meaning association.
14Note that this is not to say that all such chains of change need to start with an iconic form-
meaning pair as their starting point. The presented example has only been chosen to illustrate
the processes at work.
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in the course of the cultural evolution of conventions due to such iterated usage-
induced semantic change. The emergence of symbolism can therefore be ac-
counted for by virtue of only (i) the cognitive mechanisms involved in ostensive-
inferential communication, and (ii) the ability to remember usage events and to
recognise and use them as common ground in later usage situations. For this last
point, a minimum of two individuals is required that repeatedly indulges in com-
munication. But do these general cognitive prerequisites also suffice to explain
the emergence of grammatical structure?
3.3 The emergence of grammatical structure
Cognitive Linguistics has brought forward (or rather revived) a fundamental
tenet which, I think, must at least cast some doubt on the common assumption
that the emergence of symbolism and the emergence of grammar are two dis-
tinct evolutionary explananda: the so-called symbolic thesis. The symbolic thesis
says that the linguistic competence of an individual can be described exhaus-
tively as an inventory of form-meaning associations (e.g. Langacker 1987; Taylor
2002; Evans and Green 2006). I have already introduced this view of grammar in
2.2.3.2 above. The term “construction” is commonly employed to refer to linguis-
tic form-meaning associations—or “conventional linguistic units,” as Langacker
(1987:57) calls them—and grammatical theories based on the symbolic thesis are
thus generally referred to as construction grammars.
So why does the symbolic thesis pose a potential problem to the common as-
sumption that symbolism and grammar are different explananda? It is because
of one of its consequences, namely that one must assume that lexicon and syn-
tax form a continuum. As opposed to generative grammar, where meaningful
lexical items are organised by inherently meaningless syntactic rules, construc-
tion grammars hold that syntactic schemata are meaning-bearing constructions
too (e.g. Goldberg 1995). The symbolic thesis and the lexicon-syntax continuum
that falls out of it therefore lead to the following preliminary hypothesis: since,
like lexical items, syntactic constructions are symbolic, they have emerged like
all other symbols too. If this hypothesis is right, then it would seem that the cog-
nitive capacities employed so far to explain the emergence of symbolism would
be sufficient to account for the emergence of grammar too.
Syntactic constructions have two properties: they are abstract schematic patterns
and they express very general, so-called “functional” meanings. Consider, as an
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example, the English passive construction: the pattern [X be VERB-ed by Y] sig-
nifies that X is affected by Y in a manner specified by the VERB. This construc-
tion is an abstract pattern (represented by the order in which its components
are arranged) and has a very broad and general meaning (that one entity is af-
fected by another entity). One thus has to answer two questions with respect
to the emergence of syntactic constructions: (i) how do schematic constructions
emerge, and (ii) how do extant constructions, whether schematic or specific, ac-
quire the sort of broad, general meaning that has traditionally—and somewhat
unfortunately since the terms are ambiguous—been referred to as “grammatical”
or “functional”?
Both phenomena are usually described as processes of grammaticalisation—some
(e.g. Tomasello 2003b) distinguish between syntacticisation and grammaticalisa-
tion, where the former describes the emergence of schematic constructions and
the latter how meanings become more functional. However, it is important to
note that grammaticalisation is just that: a linguistic description or classification
rather than an explanation. It describes what changed into what, rather then
why and how this change has occurred. The term “grammaticalisation” merely
subsumes a particular set of phenomena of linguistic change where linguistic
material loses its independence of use and becomes more functional. In order to
explain phenomena of grammaticalisation, the underlying cognitive mechanisms
need to be studied, as has been pointed out, for instance, by Heine (1997); Kuteva
(2001); Tomasello (2003b).
Grammaticalisation is often accompanied by both semantic and phonological
change; for the purposes of this chapter, however, only the semantic change
involved is relevant. Phonological change is a mere result of grammaticalisa-
tion, but neither its prerequisite nor its cause. There is rather a causal chain
that leads from semantic change to phonological change. The type of semantic
change found in grammaticalisation leads to a change in the frequency and in-
dependence of use, and this change in the frequency and independence of use
in turn brings about phonological change. This interpretation of grammatical-
isation is supported by linguistic evidence, which shows that (i) in the process
of grammaticalisation, phonological change occurs after semantic change, and
that (ii) grammaticalisation can occur without phonological change. The En-
glish phrase gonna, for example, must have developed from going to only after
going to had changed its meaning from expressing physical motion to express-
ing future and intention. This is evident because, like the contracted form, the
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non-contracted form going to can also be used with a future sense, but (in most
English dialects) the contracted form gonna cannot be used to express physical
motion (Trask 2000:141). This fact is illustrated in examples (1) and (2):
(1) a. I am going to be in trouble.
b. I am gonna be in trouble.
(2) a. I am going to the beach.
b. ∗ She is gonna the beach.
The initial hypothesis, that syntactic constructions emerge like all other symbols
too, can now be refined. The cognitive mechanisms underlying the emergence
of symbols, and also responsible for the semantic change symbols undergo sub-
sequently, are those involved in ostensive-inferential communication. We can
thus hypothesise that these same mechanisms account for (i) syntacticisation,
that is, the emergence of schematic constructions, and for (ii) grammaticalisa-
tion, namely the process through which constructions become more functional.
In the following sections, I will sketch the general properties of an approach to
the emergence of grammar that is based on these hypotheses.
3.3.1 How do schematic constructions emerge?
The emergence of schematic constructions is not any different from the emer-
gence of other form-meaning associations if one views form as what it is: infor-
mation. Depending on the number of dimensions of the chosen physical channel,
the information contained in a produced cue can be of various forms. It can, for
instance, be the information that a specific sound or gesture was produced. But it
can equally well be the information that two sounds or gestures—or two whole
cues—have been produced in a specific order. The fact that one cue was pro-
duced after another cue can itself serve as a cue in a given context and trigger the
inference of additional meaning. Such cues, and the information they communi-
cate, can become entrenched and conventionalised, like any other form-meaning
pair too.
Some basic word order can, for instance, emerge as follows. Imagine a situation
where an individual intends to communicate to a conspecific some information
Y about some state of affairs X. One discourse strategy the communicator can
choose in this situation is to draw the addressee’s attention to X first and there-
fore to let him know what the current exchange will be about. Once this is done,
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the cue for Y can be added. The addressee will thus not only infer X and Y but
also that Y in some way concerns X. In this hypothetical case, the order in which
X and Y are produced serves as a cue to communicate the theme and the rheme
of the exchange.
This new form-meaning association may be used frequently in situations where
the communicator says about an agent what action they perform. The theme-
rheme aspect might be less relevant in such situations than the information that
X is the agent and Y is the action performed by this agent. This new usage may
become entrenched and conventionalised itself and, after more generalisation
through usage-induced semantic change, lead to a syntactic construction which
expresses a subject-predicate relation.
This view of the emergence of schematic constructions is compatible with other
accounts of the emergence of syntactic patterns from discourse strategies. One
of the most seminal foundational studies in this respect is presented by Givo´n
(1979), who suggests a path of grammaticalisation not only from discourse to
syntax but also from syntax to morphology, from morphology to morphophone-
mics and from there to zero. His famous quote that “[t]oday’s morphology is
yesterday’s syntax” (Givo´n 1971:413) can easily be reformulated to announce
that “today’s syntax is yesterday’s discourse.” A similarly prominent case for the
emergence of grammatical structure from discourse has been made by Hopper
(1987). Tomasello (2003a) shows how children acquire schematic constructions
from discourse, and concludes that something similar must have happened in
language evolution. Accounts of the emergence of syntactic patterns from dis-
course strategies are frequent in the functionalist linguistics and grammatical-
isation theory literature. These approaches view more complex syntactic phe-
nomena such as long-distance dependencies or constraints on “movement” as
emergent properties, that is, as patterns that arise during the cumulative cultural
evolution of langauge out of the accretion of conventionalised schematic con-
strutions and the way their forms and meanings interact. I agree with this view
but also acknowledge that proof of concept, for instance in the form of a com-
putational model that simulates the emergence of such more complex syntactic
properties, has not been provided so far.
For the current purposes, the crucial thing to note is that the emergence of syn-
tactic patterns from discourse strategies can be conceived as a special case of the
emergence of a convention that associates a cue, which was produced in a spe-
cific context, with the meaning whose inference it triggered in that context. As
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is the case for other form-meaning associations, schematic constructions too can
become arbitrary after their meaning has changed sufficiently because of iterated
under- and overspecified use. The emergence of schematic constructions too is
thus the result of ostensive-inferential communication and the memorisation of
previous usages. Syntacticisation is based on the same cognitive capacities as the
emergence of symbolism.
3.3.2 How do meanings become more functional?
Broadly speaking, two types of approaches to grammaticalisation can be identi-
fied, corresponding to speaker-driven models and hearer-driven models of lan-
guage change respectively (see 2.3). The former type of explanation emphasises
the role of metaphor and metonymy in grammaticalisation (e.g. Heine et al.
1991), the latter views reanalysis as its core aspect (e.g. Hopper and Traugott
2003). I present a unified perspective, which can be reached if one abstracts away
from linguistic description to the underlying cognitive mechanisms. I will argue
(i) that both what I will call the “metaphor-based scenario” and the “reanalysis-
based scenario” can have occurred, but also (ii) that the two are not fundamen-
tally different but simply represent variants of normal usage-induced semantic
change that merely differ due to the specific conditions of the usage event in
which they were introduced.
The example I use to illustrate the common psychological underpinnings of the
two scenarios is that of the aforementioned grammaticalisation of the English
construction be going to, which is one of (if not the) most cited and best docu-
mented examples in the grammaticalisation literature (see e.g. Heine et al. 1991;
Kuteva 2001; Hopper and Traugott 2003), and also represents a particular in-
stance of grammaticalisation which is very common, both historically and cross-
linguistically (Heine and Kuteva 2002). The construction be going to has under-
gone a development from a state where it simply denoted spatial motion to one
where it came to express intentionality and future even in situations where phys-
ical motion is not implied. These two meanings of be going to are illustrated in
sentences (3) and (4):
(3) Where are you travelling to? I am going to London.
(spatial motion)
(4) What are your plans for tonight? I am going to stay at home.
(intention/futurewithout spatial motion)
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3.3.2.1 Metaphor-based scenarios
Metaphors15 overspecify the meaning they communicate in a usage situation:
they come to stand for another concept with which they conventionally share
some but not all properties. In this sense, metaphors are at one end of a contin-
uum representing the various ways in which conventional meanings can over-
specify utterance meanings. In metaphors, the difference between the conven-
tional meaning and the utterancemeaning is strikingly big—or, to use Lakoff and
Johnson’s (1980) terminology, the distance between the source and the target do-
main is particularly large. The view that metaphors, along with other tropes,
simply represent points on a continuum of “normal” overspecified language
use is consistent with the approach to figurative language advocated by Sper-
ber and Wilson (1995:231–37) and later refined in Carston (1997), and in Wilson
and Carston (2007). The relevance theorists refer to overspecification as “loose”
language use, and claim that literal use and metaphorical use form a continuum
and only differ in their degree of looseness, with various other types of figura-
tive language ranging somewhere in between. This perspective of metaphor is
also consistent with the accounts of figurative language given e.g by Langacker
(1987:68–71) or Croft (2000:99–114).
In what I call the metaphor-based scenario, the process of the grammaticalisation
is thus initiated in a communicative situation where the speaker uses the linguis-
tic convention which associates be going to with spatial motion in an overspeci-
fied, metaphorical way to express intention. This is only possible in situations
where both interlocutors recognise as common ground (i) that spatial motion
usually involves intention, and that (ii) in the given context, information about
spatial motion itself is irrelevant. This scenario is illustrated in Fig. 3.5(a), and
the speaker’s and the hearer’s reasoning is detailed in example (5).16
(5) Speaker’s reasoning:
a. I want to express ‘intention’.
b. I have a construction which expresses ‘spatial motion’, and the hearer
shares this convention.
c. ‘Spatial motion’ is associated with ‘intention’.
15It needs to be emphasised that I am referring to novel ad hoc metaphorical language use
here, and not to established and conventionalised metaphors.
16Note that I have explicated the interlocutors’ reasoning for explanatory reasons. I do not
claim that these are very conscious processes; in fact, it must be assumed that the degree to which
such reasoning is conscious depends on the degree of entrenchment of the involved associations:
more explicit reasoning is involved in less familiar situations.
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Figure 3.5: Metaphor-based scenarios of grammaticalisation of be going to. Legend: I = ‘intention’,
M = ‘spatial motion’, bgt = be going to. (a) The metaphor-based scenario in one step. (b)–(c) The
metaphor-based scenario in two steps.
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d. ‘Spatial motion’ is not relevant in the given context.
e. Because we share common ground, the hearer will be aware of
(b)–(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
f. Because of (e), I can use the construction for ‘spatial motion’
metaphorically to convey ‘intention’.
Hearer’s reasoning:
h. The speaker has expressed ‘spatial motion’.
i. ‘Spatial motion’ is not relevant in the given context.
j. ‘Spatial motion’ often implies ‘intention’.
k. ‘Intention’ would be relevant in the given context.
l. I must assume that the speaker is cooperative.
m. I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I know (h)–(l), and
that I know of his being aware of it.
n. From (h)–(m), I conclude that the speaker intends to convey
‘intention’.
The metaphor-based scenario can also be thought of as having an intermediate
step. In the scenario as it is represented in Fig. 3.5(a), a new association that
maps be going to onto the meaning ‘intention’ is created after only one usage
event: after the described interaction, both speaker and hearer will remember
that be going to was used to communicate intention. However, a similar scenario
can be thought of that leads to the same result in two steps, as illustrated in
Figs. 3.5(b) and 3.5(c). The starting point is also a state where be going to is only
associated with spatial motion. In a first usage event, shown in Fig. 3.5(b), it is
used in an underspecified way to express spatial motion but at the same time
also intention. This is possible if the two interlocutors recognise as common
ground that (i) spatial motion can imply intention, and that (ii) both are relevant
in the present situation: the information that spatial motion happens and the
information that intention is implied. After this usage event, be going to will
newly be associatedwith a combinedmeaning of ‘spatial motion’ and ‘intention’.
In a second usage event, shown in Fig. 3.5(c), this new form-meaning association
is then in turn itself re-used as contextual information. Now, the speaker wants
to express intention in a context where spatial motion is clearly not relevant. She
can thus produce be going to in an overspecified way, correctly assuming that the
hearer will ignore its aspect of ‘spatial motion’. Now, the two interlocutors will
entrench a new form-meaning association that pairs be going towith the meaning
‘intention’ alone. The same result as in the first scenario has thus been reached,
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the only difference being that it was initiated by two rather than just one usage
event.
What distinguishes the one-step scenario from the two-step scenario is not so
much the cognitive mechanisms at work—both are based on underspecified and
overspecified usage—but the degree of metaphoricity involved. The two-step
scenario assumes two usage events where the difference between the meaning
conventionally associated with the cue and the meaning actually communicated
is only small, whereas the one-step scenario is based on a situation with a much
more conspicuously metaphorical usage, where the conventional meaning and
the communicated meaning do not overlap at all. Both scenarios are possible,
and which of them really has occurred is not relevant for our purposes since, in
terms of the cognitive processes they describe, they are essentially identical.
3.3.2.2 Reanalysis-based scenarios
The concept of reanalysis has been defined in a variety of ways in the differ-
ent contexts of syntactic change, semantic change, and grammaticalisation (e.g.
Timberlake 1977; Langacker 1977; Heine et al. 1991; Harris and Campbell 1995;
Haspelmath 1998; Croft 2000; Campbell 2001; Detges and Waltereit 2002; Mc-
Daniels 2003; Hopper and Traugott 2003). Based on Langacker (1977:58), reanal-
ysis has often been defined as a change in the underlying structure without any
visible change in the surface structure. Such a general formulation, of course,
is purely descriptive: it merely states the product of a change by comparing the
state before and the state after the change. Depending on how the notion of
“underlying structure” was interpreted, the definition has been applied to shifts
in morpheme boundaries (e.g. Langacker 1977), changes in syntactic structures
(e.g. Harris and Campbell 1995; but see Detges and Waltereit 2002 for an ar-
gument that reanalysis is not primarily syntactic but semantic), and generally
to the reinterpreation of a pragmatically inferred meaning as a semantically en-
coded meaning—and, possibly, vice-versa. This last sense, of course, merely de-
scribes the result of conventionalisation, as can be seen in Traugott and Dasher
(2005:35), who account for “the conventionalizing of pragmatic meanings and
their reanalysis as semantic meanings.” By this descriptive definition alone, any
conventionalisation of under- or overspecified usages can be seen as an instance
of reanalysis.
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Often, however, reanalysis as a process is further constrained: it is described as
happening under the condition of a mismatch between what the speaker as-
sumes to be common ground in a given situation, and what the hearer assumes
to be common ground in that situation (e.g. Croft 2000; Kuteva 2001; Detges and
Waltereit 2002; Smith 2006a). Reanalysis-based scenarios of the grammaticalisa-
tion of be going to build on conditions where some of the speaker’s and hearer’s
assumptions about the context differ. Two interlocutors may, for instance, dis-
agree in what is relevant in the given situation without noticing this mismatch
in their cognitive environments: the speaker may assume that ‘spatial motion’
is relevant in the given situation, and that ‘intention’ is not, while the hearer
may think that the opposite is the case. The speaker then uses be going to in its
conventional sense to communicate spatial motion. She thus only relies on the
putative common ground knowledge that (i) the expression of motion is relevant
in the given context, and (ii) that the hearer shares her convention which maps
the meaning ‘spatial motion’ onto the form be going to. Whether or not she also
considers the knowledge that spatial motion often implies intention to be com-
mon ground in that situation is not important, since, from her perspective, this
knowledge would not lead to the inference of additional relevant information.
The hearer, on the other side, just as in the metaphor-based scenario, will think
that the speaker has used be going tometaphorically: he will reason that informa-
tion about spatial motion is not relevant in the given context, but that the relevant
information that intention is implied can be inferred. This scenario is illustrated
in Fig. 3.6(a), and the speaker’s and the hearer’s reasoning is detailed in (6).
(6) Speaker’s reasoning:
a. I want to express ‘spatial motion’.
b. I have a construction for the expression of ‘spatial motion’ in my
linguistic code, and the hearer shares this convention.
c. ‘Spatial motion’ is relevant in the given context.
d. (‘Spatial motion’ is associated with ‘intention’, but this does not
matter because of (e).)
e. (‘Intention’ is irrelevant in the given context.)
f. Because we share common ground, the hearer will be aware of (b)–(e)
and realise that I am aware of it too.
g. Because of (f), I can use the construction to communicate ‘spatial
motion’.
The hearer’s reasoning is the same as in (5h)–(5n) above:
h. The speaker has expressed ‘spatial motion’.
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Figure 3.6: Reanalysis-based scenarios of grammaticalisation of be going to. Legend: I = ‘inten-
tion’,M = ‘spatial motion’, bgt = be going to. (a) The reanalysis-based scenario in one step. (b)–(c)
The reanalysis-based scenario in two steps.
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i. ‘Spatial motion’ is not relevant in the given context.
j. ‘Spatial motion’ often implies ‘intention’.
k. ‘Intention’ would be relevant in the given context.
l. I must assume that the speaker is cooperative.
m. I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I know (h)–(l), and
that I know of his being aware of it.
n. From (h)–(m), I conclude that the speaker intends to convey
‘intention’.
Like the metaphor-based scenario, the reanalysis-based scenario too can be in-
terpreted as a matter of two rather than just one usage event initiating change.
After the interaction described above, the speaker will only further entrench the
convention for be going to she already possessed before the usage event. The
hearer, however, will remember that be going to has been used to convey in-
tention, and thus entrench a new form-meaning association. How one can get
to this result via two usage events with contextual mismatches is illustrated in
Figs. 3.6(b) and 3.6(c). In a first communicative situation, the speaker does not
think that intention is relevant but the hearer does. Both agree that informa-
tion about spatial motion is relevant. In this situation, when the speaker uses be
going to in its conventional sense to express spatial motion, the hearer will ad-
ditionally infer ‘intention’ as relevant information that is being conveyed. He
will thus entrench the usage of be going to to communicate a combination of spa-
tial motion and intention. This usage event is represented in Fig. 3.6(b). In a
later usage event, shown in Fig. 3.6(c), the hearer may himself have become the
speaker. He will use the new convention for be going to to express spatial motion
in combination with intention. The new hearer, however, may deem the aspect
of spatial motion irrelevant in the given context, and thus only memorise the
use of be going to to communicate intention. Again, both the one-step and the
two-step scenario are based on the same cognitive mechanisms and can—under
specific conditions—eventually lead to the same result. In the two-step scenario,
the hearer mistakenly assumes underspecified use in the first usage event, and
mistakenly assumes overspecified use in the second. In the one-step scenario,
these two usages are combined in one and the same interaction.
A contextual mismatch also occurs if the hearer does not possess the knowledge
of a linguistic convention that the speaker has, but the speaker assumes that the
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respective linguistic convention is common ground. Even in such a case, com-
munication can theoretically be achieved if the hearer is able to infer the mean-
ing from the context anyway. If the speaker uses the convention in an under- or
overspecified way, the hearer will end up with that new form-meaning associ-
ation but not with the original convention. And, of course, any combination of
such a mismatch in the knowledge of conventions and a mismatch in the inter-
locutors’ judgement of what is relevant can theoretically occur. Cases where the
hearer lacks assumed knowledge of linguistic conventions typically occur in lan-
guage acquisition. In these cases, naturally, there is no layering (the polysemous
co-existence of an old and a new mapping) in the linguistic knowledge of the
hearer after the usage event.
3.3.2.3 A unified approach to grammaticalisation
The crucial point to note is that the hearer does exactly the same reasoning in
both what I have called the metaphor-based scenario and the reanalysis-based
scenario. One could say that from the hearer’s perspective both scenarios are
metaphor-based, only the speaker uses be going to innovatively in the metaphor-
based scenario but conventionally in the reanalysis-based scenario. Once more
(see also 2.3.3.2), the comprehension-driven model of the cultural evolution
therefore appears as a special case of the production-driven model: as soon as
one accepts the reanalysis-based scenario, one also accepts the possibility for
the metaphor-based scenario to happen because a hearer will only infer what a
speaker could, at least theoretically, invite him to infer.
The only difference between the two approaches is whether, in the given situ-
ation, speaker and hearer make the same assumptions about what is common
ground. At first glance, one might conclude that scenarios that emphasise con-
textual mismatch do not require the capacity to establish and recognise com-
mon ground. This conclusion, however, is not warranted because even in the
reanalysis-based scenarios, the speaker and the hearer invite and draw their in-
ference on the basis of what they assume to be common ground. The recognition
of common ground, and especially of what is relevant in a given situation, is thus
pivotal to both accounts of grammaticalisation. Neither of the two scenarios can
therefore be elevated to the status of the “right” scenario: they are merely dif-
ferent situation-dependent combinations of the same set of cognitive processes.
In this sense, the analysis presented here represents a unified approach to gram-
maticalisation.
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In summary, I have sketched an approach to the emergence of grammar in which
the type of semantic change found in grammaticalisation is introduced by over-
and underspecified use. Grammatical constructions emerge like all other sym-
bols too as the result of the same usage-induced semantic change that is also
responsible for the emergence of symbolism. I havemade this visible by abstract-
ing away from linguistic description to the psychological underpinnings of the
processes of syntacticisation and grammaticalisation. I have shown how both
processes can be analysed as the product of iterated ostensive-inferential com-
munication. The sketched approach to the emergence of grammar is thus consis-
tent with the initial hypothesis, namely that (i) the emergence of schematic con-
structions and (ii) the process through which constructions become more func-
tional originate from the same cognitive mechanisms as symbolism.
3.4 The protolanguage debate from a usage-based perspective
In recent years, the notion of “protolanguage” has become one of the most hotly
debated issues in evolutionary linguistics. The two camps in the dispute are the
proponents of a synthetic protolanguage (e.g. Bickerton 1990, 1995, 2003; Jack-
endoff 1999; Hurford 2003; Gil 2006; Tallerman 2007) and those who advocate
a holistic protolanguage (e.g. Carstairs-McCarthy 1999, 2000; Wray 2000; Kirby
2000; Arbib 2005). Common to both approaches is that they distinguish two steps
in the evolution of language: (i) the emergence of symbolism, and (ii) the emer-
gence of grammar. The term “protolanguage” denotes the communication sys-
tem that they assume was in place between the two steps, that is, after the emer-
gence of symbolism but before the emergence of grammar. Protolanguage can
thus be described as a system of symbols (“proto-symbols”) without syntactic
structure.
The protolanguage debate revolves around two questions. The first asks about
the nature of protolanguage symbols. The two camps disagree on the phonolog-
ical complexity of their forms, but above all on the semantic complexity of the
meanings of these proto-symbols. The second question follows from the first:
how do we get from protolanguage symbols to human language as we know it
today? The answer to this second question is constrained by the answer given to
the first. Depending on what the assumed nature of protolanguage symbols is,
different processes must be postulated to explain the emergence of grammar on
top of these symbols.
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It seems appropriate to discuss this issue, which is at the center of so many dis-
cussions in the field, in the light of the usage-based perspective on the emergence
of symbolism and grammar presented in this chapter. I will mainly address two
questions. The first deals with the main point of disagreement between the two
competing approaches: the nature of protolanguage symbols. What does the
usage-based account developed in this chapter say about the semantic complex-
ity of the first symbols? The second question concerns a more fundamental is-
sue: the one assumption both sides of the dispute agree on—and which actually
creates the ground for the whole debate—is that symbolism and grammar have
emerged in two distinct evolutionary steps: symbolism first, grammar later. But
what are the consequences for the protolanguage debate if, as I have argued in
this chapter, this strict distinction between the emergence of symbolism and the
emergence of grammatical structure cannot be maintained? These two questions
will be addressed after a brief introduction to the two competing theories within
the dispute, the synthetic and the holistic account of protolanguage.
3.4.1 Synthetic vs. holistic protolanguage
The main difference between the synthetic approach and the holistic approach to
protolanguage is what they assume the meanings of protolanguage symbols to
have been like. Those who advocate the synthetic view think that early symbols
had simple, word-like meanings, that is, that they stood for individual concepts.
The symbols of a synthetic protolanguage are thus very much like modern-day
content words: they refer to concepts like, for instance, ‘bear’, ‘fire’, ‘cave’, ‘axe’
or ‘hunt’, ‘eat’, ‘give’. The proponents of the holistic approach, on the other side,
assume that protolanguage symbols had complex, sentence-like meanings, that
is, that they stood for whole propositions. The symbols of holistic protolanguage
thus contain meanings which are more similar to modern-day sentences rather
than to individual words, like, for instance, ‘give that to me’ or ‘stay away from
my territory’. The protolanguage dispute is therefore, at its core, a dispute over
whether protolanguage symbols had simple, word-like meanings representing
general concepts, or whether they had complex, sentence-like meanings repre-
senting specific propositions.
The remaining differences between the synthetic and the holistic approach to
protolanguage ultimately result from the opposing views that the two accounts
have on the nature of protolanguage symbols. Because they make different as-
sumptions about the nature of protolanguage, the two competing approaches
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also have to choose different pathways to explain how protolanguage could have
turned into language as we know it today. Smith (2008:101) points out that their
respective challenges can roughly be summarised as follows: the synthetic ap-
proach faces the problem of composing word-like units into sentences whereas
the holistic approach needs to break sentence-like units apart into words.
The symbols of a synthetic protolanguage can be used in two ways: either in an
isolated way, that is, to draw the addressee’s attention to a particular object in the
environment, a situation or event, or they can be concatenated in an ad hoc fashion
to express more complex meanings—hence the term “synthetic.” However, such
ad hoc concatenation must not be confused with syntactic structure. Synthetic
protolanguage is “a lexicon without syntax” (Bickerton 1995:51) and concate-
nation, as described by Bickerton, is merely a “slow, clumsy, ad hoc stringing
together of symbols” (Bickerton 1995:65). Hurford (2003:53) also characterises
synthetic protolanguage as a “a crude pidgin-like form of communication with
no function words or grammatical morphemes.”
Proponents of a synthetic protolanguage have come up with different accounts
of the emergence of grammatical structure, at least partly influenced by whether
they assume linguistic innateness or not. Some (e.g. Hurford 2003; Tomasello
2003b) invoke cultural processes, particularly grammaticalisation, to explain
how protolanguage could have brought about grammar. For these researchers,
the concatenation of individual symbols really is the crucial momentum that
initiates the emergence of syntactic structure. Not so for Bickerton, who was
among the first to propose a synthetic protolanguage on the basis of his study of
pidgins (e.g. Bickerton 1984, 1990). Because he believes that syntactic structure is
determined genetically, he must assume an additional biological step. For Bick-
erton, the fact that protolanguage users began to concatenate symbols to express
more complex meaning is therefore not directly involved in the emergence of
syntax.
The process invoked to account for the emergence of syntactic structure by those
who advocate a holistic protolanguage is analytical segmentation. Grammatical
patterns and word-like symbols emerge because users begin to generalise when,
by chance, elements of form and elements of meaning coincide in two or more
symbols. Wray (2000) provides the example of a hypothetical protolanguage that
contains the symbols tebima, meaning ‘give that to her’, and kumapi, meaning
‘share this with her’. She then assumes that users would detect the chance co-
occurrence of the element of formma and the element of meaning ‘(to/with) her’.
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Theywould infer a new symbolmawhich denotes a female beneficiary. Likewise,
they would also create a grammatical construction tebi-X, meaning ‘give that to
X’, and a construction ku-X-pi, meaning ‘share this with X’. Wray’s example is
summarised below: (7) gives the protolanguage situation, and (8) renders the
result of the segmentation process.
(7) a. tebima
‘give that to her’
b. kumapi
‘share this with her’
(8) a. tebi-X
‘give that to X’
b. ku-X-pi
‘share this with X’
c. ma
‘(to/with) her’
Both camps, those who favour the synthetic approach and those who favour
the holistic approach, claim that traces of protolanguage can still be found in
present-day language. Wray (2000:286f.) refers to the fact that language contains
“prestored multiword units for quick retrieval, with no need to apply grammar
rules” and concludes from this that such formulaic sequences, as she calls them,
show that present-day language still functions in part holistically. Bickerton, on
the other side, not only thinks that protolanguage can be observed in pidgins
(Bickerton 1984, 1990) but also points to the relationship between synthetic pro-
tolanguage and early child language:
Until quite recently, it was generally assumed that ontogeny and phy-
logeny, though far from indissolubly wedded, were at least alike to
this extent: the earliest units of pre-human utterances were pretty
similar the earliest units of contemporary infants. That is to say, they
were basically single units with ostensibly definable referents, per-
haps somewhat broader in meaning than the units of an adult vocab-
ulary. (Bickerton 2003:84)
The main characteristics of the synthetic and the analytic approach to protolan-
guage are summarised in Table 3.2. We can now discuss how the usage-based
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synthetic holistic
protolanguage protolanguage
meanings word-like, sentence-like,
simple, general, complex, specific,
individual concepts whole propositions
usage concatenated isolated
or isolated
present-day pidgins, formulaic
equivalents child language language
emergence grammaticalisation segmentation
of grammar or
biological mutation
Table 3.2: The main characteristics of the two competing approaches to protolangauge.
approach presented in this chapter fits in, and what consequences its implica-
tions bear for the protolanguage debate in general.
My assessment of the debate is that not enough attention has been given to
the distinction between signal meaning and speaker meaning. Remember that
speaker meaning refers to the information that the speaker actually intends to
communicate in a particular communicative act. Signal meaning, on the other
side, denotes the meaning that is conventionally associated with the produced
linguistic form in the user’s linguistic knowledge, the meaning that is encoded
in a linguistic signal. The two approaches to protolanguage mainly differ in the
extent to which they assume that protolanguage signal meaning was identical
with protolanguage speaker meaning. Synthetic protolanguage encodes little
and implies much, while holistic protolanguage encodes much and implies lit-
tle. This is expressed in examples (9) and (10), which show how the same speaker
meaning would be communicated bymeans of a synthetic protolanguage (9) and
a holistic protolanguage (10) respectively.
(9) Synthetic protolanguage:
a. Signal: ugluk!
b. Signal meaning: ‘apple!’
c. Speaker meaning: ‘Give me that apple!’
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(10) Holistic protolanguage:
a. Signal: ugluk!
b. Signal meaning: ‘Give me that apple!’
c. Speaker meaning: ‘Give me that apple!’
Confusion may arise when proponents of the two competing theories do not
make clear which sort of meaning they are talking about at a specific point. It
is important to note that both approaches make the same assumptions about the
complexity of protolanguage speaker meanings, they only differ in what they
assume about the complexity of protolanguage signal meanings. Holistic ap-
proaches are maybe a bit more prone to confusing the two types of meaning
because there is much less of a difference between the speaker meaning and the
signal meaning in a holistic protolanguage than between the speaker meaning
and the signal meaning in a synthetic protolanguage.17 The dispute, however,
evolves not around what protolanguage users were able to communicate but
about what protolanguage symbols conventionally stood for.
3.4.2 The complexity of proto-meanings
One thing that a usage-based approach like the one developed in this chapter
shows is that conventionality is a matter of degree. A convention emerges when
the usage of a cue is remembered by two individuals and when these two in-
dividuals recognise that memory as common ground in later situations. For a
meaning to be conventional, it thus has to have been communicated by virtue of
the respective form at least once, and the memory of this usage event needs to
be shared by at least two individuals. I doubt, however, that this is the sort of
linguistic convention protolanguage theorists talk of. But if conventionalisation
is a matter of degree, where do we draw the dividing line? After how many in-
stances of re-use does a form-meaning association become part of the assumed
protolanguage? Or howmany individuals have to recognise a form-meaning as-
sociation as common ground for that association to count as an element of the
respective protolanguage?
17It needs to be noted, however, that contrary to the impression that may be created by the
example, even the signal meanings of a holistic protolanguage can never fully specify the speaker
meaning they communicate: at least reference resolution (symbol grounding) in the given context
needs to be performed by the interlocutors. In the example, the mentioned apple needs to be
identified in the specific physical environment of the interlocutors.
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From a usage-based perspective, the question about the nature of protolanguage
symbolsmust be reformulated along two of its aspects. First, conventional mean-
ings are “fossilised” speaker meanings: conventions arise when usage situations
are memorised. The first conventions must have arisen from usage situations
where no convention was in place yet, that is, where the speaker meaning was
inferred from the context without the support of a conventional meaning associ-
ated with the produced cue. One question that one can ask is thus what type of
meanings could have been communicated when no conventions had been estab-
lished yet, that is to say, how complex the information is that two individuals can
exchange when they share no form-meaning associations. Second, in order to be
considered part of some language by a hypothetical observer, form-meaning as-
sociations need to be used with a certain, albeit indeterminable, frequency and
be shared by a certain number of people. A second question to be asked is thus
how complex the meaning in a form-meaning association must or can be in order
for the association to “catch on” and become what an observer might perceive as
a relatively established part of a community’s linguistic knowledge.
What can be said about the nature of speaker meanings that are conveyed in
ostensive-inferential communication without the help of extant conventions?
From a usage-based perspective, it is evident that first and foremost they must
fulfil two conditions: (i) they must be relevant in the given situation, and (ii) they
must be inferable from the context. The latter in turn implies that, in the given
situation, there must be a cue available which allows the respective speaker
meaning to be inferred. The complexity of ostensive-inferentially communicated
meanings is thus situation-specific. As long as they are relevant and inferable,
they can be simple or complex. However, what can be said about such meanings
is that they are always fully grounded: these speaker meanings are always situ-
ated in the context of use. They do not convey concepts and categories but draw
the addressee’s attention to particular objects or events. A freshly entrenched
form-meaning association will thus contain a very situated meaning, specific to
the particular usage event of which it is a memory.
Whether or not such a new form-meaning association will “catch on” in a com-
munity depends on its re-usability. If, for instance, when a particular cue was
used for the first time, it referred to a particular individual, and it is later re-used
as a proper name for that individual, a simple and very specific meaning has
become a convention. On the other side, if form-meaning associations are later
re-used in an overspecified way, they become less specific. The first times, ugluk
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is used to express ‘give me that apple’, it is used in a situation where it refers to a
specific apple, a specific “me,” and so on. Later, it may be re-used in an overspec-
ified way—if the memorised usage event exhibits a sufficiently salient similarity
to the respective situation. The specifics of the original situation may then be
ignored, and ugluk may come to mean ‘give me that apple’, independently of
the context. Through further overspecified use, it may again change into ‘give
me that’ or into ‘apple’, depending on what is relevant in the respective usage
events.
The bottom line is therefore this. From a usage-based perspective, “proto-
meanings” could have been either simple or complex—there is no reason to
assume that only the one or the other could have existed at any one time. The
condition a meaning has to fulfil in order to become conventionalised is that
it is relevant and inferable in an initial usage situation, and that it is re-usable
(and re-used) sufficiently often in later usage situations. Any form-meaning
association initially represents a situation-specific memory and only gradually
becomes more general through overspecified use, for which it needs to bear
recognisable similarity to later usage situations. But after how many re-usages a
particular form-meaning association is considered a convention is ultimately an
arbitrary decision.
3.4.3 The protolanguage assumption
While no sides can be taken from a usage-based perspective regarding the com-
plexity of protolanguage meanings—other than that both simple and complex
meanings can be present at the same time—in terms of the processes employed,
the account presented in this chapter seems to be closer to the view held by pro-
ponents of a synthetic protolanguage: it also emphasises that symbols can be
concatenated. There are, however, some differences. One is with the Bicker-
tonian account: while Bickerton recognises that the concatenation of protolan-
guage symbols must have been possible for protolanguage to be useful, he does
not consider that concatenations can be conventionalised too. He assumes that
syntactic structure is innate and must thus have been the product of a later bi-
ological mutation. In contrast, the ostensive-inferential model of communica-
tion suggests that concatenation itself serves as a cue to trigger the inference of
meaning from context too, and can thus also become associated with that mean-
ing like any other cue. The other point which thus deserves emphasising is that
since the use of concatenations as cues is not different from the use of other cues,
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and since the conventionalisation of concatenations and the meanings they have
been used to convey is not different from the conventionalisation of other cues
and the meanings they have been used to convey, there is no reason to speak of
a two-step or two-process scenario of language evolution.
The assumption of a protolanguage stage where all forms were associated with
either simple or complex meanings does not make sense from a usage-based
perspective of language evolution, and neither does one where no concatena-
tions have become conventionalised. At any one stage, an individual’s linguistic
knowledge can contain simple and complex, specific and general, and more or
less grammatical constructions, with different degrees of entrenchment. To as-
sume an intermediate step in language evolution, protolanguage, appears futile
if one considers the various possible scenarios of ostensive-inferential communi-
cation. Coming from a different angle, Smith (2006c:322) makes a similar call for
a “more pluralistic conception of the evolution of language” than is assumed by
the two-step protolanguage scenarios.
From the usage-based perspective introduced in this chapter, the protolanguage
debate is thus flawed for three reasons. First, it fails to acknowledge that con-
ventionality is a matter of degree. Second, it assumes an implausibly uniform
intermediate stage in language evolution, “protolanguage.” And third, it takes
for granted the view that the mechanisms at the origin of grammatical structure
are different from those eliciting symbolism.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with the emergence puzzle: language has arisen from no
language. By identifying linguistic communication as a special case of ostensive-
inferential communication, I have been able to link the “state before” with the
“state after.” The continuous element which is present in both is ostensive-
inferential communication, which is possible with or without the application of
conventionalised linguistic cues. This facilitates significantly the task of account-
ing for the evolutionary gap between no language and language: in essence, it
is a matter of how linguistic conventions can emerge from ostensive-inferential
communication.
I have suggested that forms become associated with meanings when particular
usages of cues employed in ostensive-inferential communication are memorised.
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Such form-meaning associations are conventionalised if they become part of at
least two individuals’ common ground and are used themselves as contextual in-
formation to support the inference of meanings in later usage situations. Further-
more, through frequent use, form-meaning associations are entrenched, turn into
psychological units and can thus be accessed more automatically with much less
(or no) situation-specific reasoning being necessary. The core property involved
is pragmatic plasticity: cues can under- and/or overspecify the meanings they
communicate in particular usage situations. The conventionalisation of under-
and overspecified usages of extant form-meaning associations leads to semantic
change: narrowing or broadening respectively. This is also how non-arbitrary
form-meaning associations become arbitrary, and thus how symbolism emerges.
I have suggested that this can also include syntactic constructions: that they are
symbolic too, and therefore also emerge like any other symbols too. Syntacticisa-
tion can be conceived as a normal process of conventionalisation of the concate-
nation of symbols—where concatenation is itself employed as a cue that conveys
meaning. Grammaticalisation can then be described as a special type of seman-
tic change by means of which conventional meanings become more general until
they can be viewed as “functional.” Such semantic change is also usage-induced:
it too comes about through under- and overspecified use and subsequent con-
ventionalisation.
At the beginning of this chapter, I hypothesised that the common assumption
made in evolutionary linguistics that symbolism and grammar have different
origins may not be warranted. This hypothesis would suggest that not only
can both the emergence of symbols and the emergence of grammatical struc-
ture be explained as products of cultural evolution but they are also not two dis-
tinct phenomena: both symbolism and grammar would emerge from ostensive-
inferential communication. The cognitive capacities required for this to happen
are (i) the ability to recognise common ground, and in particular (ii) the ability
to recognise what is relevant in a particular interactive situation, as well as (iii)
the ability to remember shared experience and to later refer to it. The approach
sketched is compatible with the account for the emergence of symbolism given
by Tomasello (1999, 2003a,b). It also agrees with Tomasello’s view that gram-
mar has emerged through processes of syntacticisation and grammaticalisation.
However, I take this account a step further by arguing that these two processes,
syntacticisation and grammaticalisation, could well be based on the same cogni-
tive mechanisms that also lead to the emergence of symbolism.
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In this chapter, I have refined the production-driven model of the cultural evolu-
tion of language introduced in the previous chapter. In particular, I have further
specified how innovation comes about as the result of use. The presented ac-
count has the characteristics that Kemmer and Barlow (2000) list for usage-based
models of language: (i) there is an intimate relation between linguistic structures
and instances of use; (ii) frequency plays an important role; (iii) comprehension
and production are integral, rather than peripheral, to the linguistic system; (iv)
language learning focuses on experience; (v) linguistic representations are emer-
gent, rather than stored as fixed entities; (vi) the observation of usage is impor-
tant for the construction of the model; (vii) there is an intimate relation between
usage, synchronic variation, and diachronic change; (viii) the linguistic system
is interconnected with non-linguistic cognitive systems; and (ix) context plays a
crucial role in the operation of the linguistic system.
One consequence of this usage-based perspective on language evolution is that
it leaves little reason to assume a distinct intermediate step between no lan-
guage and language, a protolanguage. Rather, language continually emerges
and changes. In order to study how, in the course of this process, language comes
to exhibit the appearance of design for communication, I will devise computer
simulations that are based on the usage-based model introduced here. In the
next chapter, I will therefore propose a computational implementation of this
conceptual framework.
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CHAPTER 4
Computational implementation
The study of language evolution has often been supported by computational
models and simulations. Computer simulations have been used to enhance the
study of phenomena as diverse as the evolution of sound systems (De Boer 2002,
2005), the evolution of linguistic structure (Brighton 2002; Batali 2002; Chris-
tiansen et al. 2002; Kirby 2002a; Kirby and Hurford 2002; Smith et al. 2003), the
evolution of linguistic diversity (Livingstone 2002; Solan et al. 2005), how lan-
guage adapts to be learnable (Brighton et al. 2005), symbol grounding and the
creation of meaning (Cangelosi et al. 2002; Steels 2002; Steels and Kaplan 2002;
Smith 2005a), and the co-evolution of language and the language faculty (Briscoe
2002a, 2005). But why does it make sense to complement conceptual models of
language evolution with computer simulations?
Computational modelling has proved able to serve three main purposes: (i) the-
ory refinement, (ii) hypothesis testing, and (iii) laboratory-like experimenting
(cf. Cangelosi and Parisi 2002a:8–12 for a similar analysis). First, computational
models can lead to theory refinement because they cannot but be fully specified.
A computational model forces its developer to think of every case or state of af-
fairs that can possibly occur, and to specify what their theory has to say about
that case. To transform a developed theory into a computational model thus
helps researchers to discover and fill holes and inconsistencies in their conceptual
thinking. Second, a computational model allows for the testing of predictions
made by a theory. If they are formulated specifically enough, such hypotheses
can be put to test by running computer simulations. At best, if the simulation
behaves in the predicted way, a hypothesis can be corroborated; at worst, it must
be refuted, or previously unconsidered factors must be taken into account. The
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latter case points to the third function of computational models, namely to pro-
vide a laboratory-like experimental environment. In the process of attempting to
find a configuration inwhich the simulations yield the expected result by a some-
what directed technique of trial-and-error, the experimenter may become aware
of previously overlooked parameters that have an impact on the behaviour of
the modelled system.
Because they provide the opportunity for hypothesis testing and laboratory-like
experimenting, computational models are particularly helpful in cases where
(i) the phenomenon to be investigated cannot be observed directly, and/or (ii)
where complex adaptive systems are involved in the said phenomenon. Lan-
guage evolution exhibits both these conditions. First, the origins of language are
simply too remote in the past for any direct observation of the process to be avail-
able. And even though some present-day processes of language use and change
may provide insights into how language could have emerged in the first place,
the actual emergence of linguistic communication from a fully non-linguistic en-
vironment cannot be observed anymore. Computational models and simulations
thus provide a way of dealing with the notorious data problem of evolutionary
linguistics (cf. Cangelosi and Parisi 2002a:4). Second, language—particularly in
its diachronic aspects—has frequently been described as a complex adaptive sys-
tem (e.g. Gell-Mann 1992; Kirby 1999, 2002b; Hashimoto 2002; Holland 2005).
Complex adaptive systems involve multiple local interactions which, in their
sum, lead to emergent structure on a global level. They change over time, and
earlier states influence later states. These properties—the interaction of multiple
local processes and the accumulation of effects over time—make it difficult to
predict the behaviour of complex adaptive systems. The behaviour of an indi-
vidual termite, for instance, does not allow one to infer the shape of the mound
that results from the continuous interactions of a whole colony of these insects.
Similar examples can be found in the flocking of birds, the behaviour of the stock
market or the occurrence of traffic jams. Likewise, the shape of a language is hard
to predict from the specifics of individual human communicative interactions,
and this is where computer simulations can be of help.
Computational models necessarily include simplifications and idealisations. If
the effect of a particular phenomenon is to be studied with the help of a simula-
tion, that phenomenon has to be modelled in isolation: other phenomena must
be simplified and abstracted away from so that they cannot interfere with the
outcome of the simulation and obscure the conclusions that can be drawn about
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the effect the phenomenon in question has. Only if other possible causes are ex-
cluded from a simulation can one be sure that the observed effect really is caused
by that phenomenon. Suppose we hypothesise that a phenomenon A can cause
an effect X. To test this hypothesis by means of simulations, we have to exclude
any phenomenon B that could also cause X. Only then can we be sure that if
X emerges in the course of the simulation, it was caused by A. Kirby (1999:44,
emphasis in the original) explains this reason for why computational models
necessarily include simplifications and idealisations with an example:
The purpose of the simulation is not to be a complete analogue of
the real world. Rather, it should be a reification of a theory. It should
involve all the idealizations that a model of that theory would involve
and only those idealizations. If we were to build a simulation of some
theory of the flocking of birds, let us say, and we built in a detailed
description of wind direction which the theory did not mention, then
the results of the simulation tell us nothing about the validity of our
original theory. Of course, the process of building and testing the
simulation might lead us to conclude that the original theory does
not work without taking into account wind direction, but this simply
serves to underscore the importance of simulation.
As I have pointed out before, most computational models in the field have been
designed to study the effect of imperfect cultural transmission (learning) on the evo-
lution of language. Consequently, communication (use) has been modelled in an
idealised and simplified way. However, because they abstract away from the
mechanisms of communication, these models depend on (i) presupposing the
existence of symbolism and (ii) assuming an artificial process of random inven-
tion (Hurford 2002). The first condition renders these models unable to account
for the emergence of symbolism from a non-symbolic state. The second condi-
tion forces them to include what can be seen as something of a deus-ex-machina
solution to linguistic creativity: random invention is very rare in real language-
use (see e.g. Trask 2000:369).
In this chapter, I devise a computational model that focuses on the effect of
communication (use)—and specifically the fact that signals exhibit pragmatic
plasticity—on the cultural evolution of language. I will propose ways in which
such a model can (i) simulate the emergence of a symbolic communication sys-
tem from an initial non-symbolic (and hence pre-linguistic) state and (ii) avoid
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having to include a process of random invention. The computational model to
be introduced will be based on the conceptual considerations made in chapters 2
and 3, and it will be put to use to investigate questions relating to the design
puzzle later in chapter 5. The remainder of this chapter falls into two parts. I will
first describe the general architecture of the computational model as a model of
iterated symbolic communication (section 4.1). I will then show how we can use
exactly the same model—without any modifications—to simulate non-symbolic
communication, and the emergence of symbolism (section 4.2).
4.1 Modelling iterated symbolic communication
I begin by describing the general architecture of a computational model that
simulates the iterated use of symbolic conventions. I will thereby understand
symbolic communication in the broad sense as any form of communication that
makes use of conventional associations between forms and meanings, be they ar-
bitrary (i.e. “symbolic” in the narrow sense) or not. Later, in section 4.2, I will
show that the same model is also capable of simulating non-symbolic communi-
cation, and that symbolism does therefore not need to be presupposed. But for
the moment, I will discuss the model’s architecture under the assumption that
the existence of conventional form-meaning associations is given. In particular, I
will look at what aspects of cultural evolution the model simulates, and describe
how it realises the two main process of cultural evolution: use and learning.
4.1.1 Simulating cultural evolution
In section 2.3.1, I explained that the cultural evolution of language can be
modelled as a process of iterated use and learning: I-language is mapped to
E-language through use and E-language is mapped back to I-language through
learning (Kirby and Hurford 2002:123). This is the central idea of the iterated
learning model (ILM) in the broad sense. I have argued that there are two
possible loci for the introduction of innovation in this model: innovation can
come about in the course of use or in the course of learning. If, in a simulation,
we want to study the effect of innovation in one of these processes, we have to
model the other in an idealised form as a faithful process. It must be understood,
however, that the two schemata that follow from this consideration, faithful use
/ innovative learning and innovative use / faithful learning, are merely designed to
study the effects of each respective type of innovation in isolation. In reality,
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neither use nor learning can be assumed to be completely faithful. Most exist-
ing computational implementations of the ILM study the effect of innovation
through imperfect learning and thus represent use as faithful. This setup maps
the idea of the ILM onto Sperber’s (1996) general model of cultural evolution,
which also emphasises the role of imperfect cultural transmission. In contrast,
the computational model to be introduced in this chapter is intended to study
the effect of innovative use and will therefore represent learning as faithful.
This setup, in turn, maps the idea of the ILM onto Tomasello’s (1999) ratchet
model of cultural evolution, which emphasises the relative fidelity of cultural
transmission (cf. section 2.1.3.3).
The assumption of innovation in use and faithful learning allows for two fur-
ther simplifications in the design of a computational model of linguistic cultural
evolution. One is based on the fact that if learning is faithful, the role of so-
cial transmission in the process of cultural evolution is reduced to ensuring the
preservation of innovations beyond a single individual’s lifespan. An individ-
ual with a long (potentially unlimited) lifespan can theoretically accumulate the
same innovations that a number of short-lived individuals do with the help of
social transmission. This effect is visualised in Fig. 4.1: the innovations accumu-
lated by the long-lived individual X alone are a projection of those accumulated
by the short-lived individuals A–D together. Thus, if learning is assumed to be
faithful, nothing can be gained from modelling social transmission—unless one
wants to study the spread of an innovation in a population, which is not the
purpose of this model (cf. the discussion of micro-dynamic change vs. macro-
dynamic change presented in section 2.3 and the caption to Fig. 4.1). Because the
present computational model assumes learning to be faithful, the cumulative ef-
fect of iterated social transmission can thus be simulated by projecting it onto an
idealised individual with an unlimited lifespan as illustrated in Fig. 4.1.
A second simplification the assumption of innovative use and faithful learning
makes possible is that only one of the two individuals involved in every act of
language use, the speaker, needs to be modelled explicitly. Why is it that more
than one individual is involved in the use of linguistic artefacts in the first place?
For many cultural artefacts, only one individual is required to create a chain of
use/learning-iterations as depicted in Fig. 4.1 above. An individual might for in-
stance have knowledge of the use of a certain tool. To meet the requirements of
a specific environment, he may apply this technique in a novel way (innovative
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Figure 4.1: Simulating cumulative cultural evolution. The x-axis represents spread (macro-
dynamic change), the y-axis change over time (micro-dynamic change). Faithful social transmis-
sion ensures the continuity of a chain of innovations beyond an individual’s lifespan. Like this,
a sequence of short-lived individuals can accumulate change that could only have been brought
about by an extremely long-lived individual otherwise. In the present computational model, the
cumulative effect of iterated faithful social transmission is thus simulated by projecting it onto
an individual with an unlimited lifespan (as shown inside the dashed box).
use) and then memorise this modification of the original technique (faithful indi-
vidual learning). In the same way, a language user can be seen to bring about a
linguistic innovation. The difference however is that language is—as explained
in section 3.1—a cultural artefact that is used to communicate some information
to a second individual. Language use therefore always implies the presence of
at least two individuals: a communicator (who, in our case, is also the innova-
tor) and an addressee. In chapter 3, I have argued that linguistic communication
is ostensive-inferential and therefore based on two interlocutors recognising (or
at least assuming to recognise) common ground. I have also pointed out that
the minimal setup for symbolic communication to evolve consists of two indi-
viduals repeatedly communicating with each other. This scenario is depicted
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Figure 4.2: The accumulation of linguistic innovations through iterated language use and learn-
ing. The computational model simulates (i) the communicator iteratively producing E-language
on the basis of his I-language and a given context (use) and updating his I-language on the basis
of E-language (learning), and (ii) for each usage situation the contextual information the com-
municator assumes to be common ground shared with the addressee. The addressee is not rep-
resented explicitly but his presence is implied in each usage situation through the simulation of
context.
in Fig. 4.2. Linguistic change comes about in both the communicator and the
addressee through innovative use in context (production as well as comprehen-
sion) and subsequent updating of their I-language (i.e. individual learning in
the communicator and social learning in the addressee). Fig. 4.2 shows that the
computational model simulates (i) the communicator, and (ii) for each usage sit-
uation, the contextual information the communicator assumes to be common-
ground knowledge shared with the addressee. The addressee is not modelled
explicitly—note, however, that the presence of an addressee is implied in each
usage situation by the fact that common-ground knowledge is available to the
communicator.
The decision not to model the addressee explicitly has been made on the basis
of the following considerations. The addressee will evolve an I-language that is
different from the communicator’s under one (or both) of two conditions. First,
variation is introduced when the interlocutors’ assumptions about what consti-
tutes common ground differ in a usage situation. I have argued in section 2.3.3.2
that this scenario merely constitutes a complication of the default case, and that
we should only resort to it once the explanatory power of that default case has
been fully exploited. Second, even if we assume that the interlocutors always
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successfully recognise their common ground, they may end up with different I-
languages if they start with different initial states. However, such a scenario runs
counter to our aim to model the emergence of language from a non-linguistic
state where neither of the interlocutors possesses any language yet. Under the
given conditions, the I-language evolved by the addressee would thus always be
identical to the communicator’s, and we would not gain anything by modelling
the addressee explicitly.
The general architecture of the computational model can now be described as fol-
lows. The model is designed to study the effect of innovative use on the cultural
evolution of language. It simulates how the I-language of an individual evolves
through iterated engagement of that individual (as speaker) in communicative
acts. The implementation is composed of the following components:
• The individual and its I-language are modelled as an agent possessing a set
of form-meaning mappings.1
A simulation run consists of a series of iterations.
• Each iteration represents a communicative situation, in which the agent is
presented with (i) a context and (ii) a meaning he needs to communicate in
this context.
(Both context and meaning are generated randomly for each iteration.)
In each iteration, the agent then performs the following two acts:
• Use (potentially innovative): on the basis of (i) his I-language and (ii) the
given context, the agent produces a signal for the meaning he needs to
communicate.
• Learning (faithful): the agent then updates his I-language by adding or en-
trenching the association between the used signal and the communicated
meaning.
I will now describe how the two processes of use and learning are modelled in
more detail.
1For the moment, it will suffice to note that forms are represented as sets of phonological units
and meanings are represented as sets of semantic units. Both phonological units and semantic
units are indicated by upper-case characters in the model. As an example, XY→ ABC stands for
a symbolic association that maps a form XY onto a meaning ABC. A more extensive discussion
of the representation of forms and meanings is provided in section 4.2.1 below.)
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4.1.2 Use
The core aspect of the present computational model is that it allows use to be
innovative. But what is innovative use and how can we simulate it? In order
to answer this question, the fundamental distinction between signal meaning
and speaker meaning has to be taken into account. Signal meaning is the mean-
ing conventionally associated with a linguistic signal, and speaker meaning is the
meaning a signal actually communicates in a specific context. Use is therefore
conventional (i.e. non-innovative) if, in a specific usage situation, the speaker
meaning is the same as the signal meaning. It follows that use is innovative (i.e.
non-conventional) if the speaker meaning (at least partly) differs from the sig-
nal meaning, that is, if the actually communicated meaning deviates from the
conventional meaning of the produced linguistic signal.
Innovative use is thus the product of pragmatic plasticity. In section 3.1, I have
argued that language exhibits pragmatic plasticity because linguistic communi-
cation is ostensive-inferential: linguistic signals and their conventional meanings
serve as clues (ostensive stimuli) that guide the inference of speaker meaning
on the basis of common-ground knowledge recognised by speaker and hearer.
I have also shown that a signal meaning can deviate from the actually commu-
nicated speaker meaning in two ways: it can underspecify the speaker meaning
and/or it can overspecify the speaker meaning. The simulation of innovative
use therefore requires the process of use to be modelled in a way that allows for
underspecification and overspecification.
4.1.2.1 Simulating under- and overspecification
The signal underspecifies the speaker meaning if it constitutes only a part of the
speaker meaning (and additional information needs to be inferred.) Sentence (1)
provides an example of underspecification: (1a) represents the encoded signal
meaning, (1b) the actually communicated speaker meaning. The relationship
between John and his book is not made explicit in the signal meaning but needs
to be inferred from the context: the expression John’s book could refer not only to
a book written by John but also to a book owned by John or even to a book about
John.
(1) a. I enjoyed reading John’s book.
b. [I enjoyed reading the book written by John.]
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In the computational model, I devise an abstract set-theoretic representation of
meanings and forms: meanings are conceived as combinations (sets) of semantic
units and forms as sets of phonological units. Both semantic and phonological
units are symbolised by upper-case characters. The model does not specify what
individual characters stand for: they are kept abstract and are only meant to rep-
resent the fact that there are different semantic units available to language users.
But we can easily interpret them in terms of specific linguistic examples. The
example of underspecification given in (1) can be expressed in the model’s rep-
resentation as shown in (2). The list in (2a) breaks the speaker meaning occurring
in the example down into semantic units, and (2b) shows how the fact that the
signal meaning underspecifies the speaker meaning can be modelled with this
representation: signal meaning JRB constitutes only a part of the speaker mean-
ing JRWB and the additional informationW is inferred.
(2) a. J = john(x)
B = book(y)
R = relation(x,y)
W = written by(y,x)
b. Signal meaning: JRB
Inferred meaning: W
Speaker meaning: JRWB
In contrast, the signal overspecifies the speaker meaning if only a part of it occurs
in the speaker meaning (and the rest of it is ignored because it is irrelevant.) An
example of this phenomenon can be found in the metaphorical use of the word
chameleon in sentence (3). Again, (3a) illustrates the signal meaning and (3b)
the actually communicated speaker meaning. Only one aspect of ‘chameleon’
contributes to the speaker meaning here: the fact that chameleons frequently
change their appearance. Other aspects of it, for instance that chameleons are
reptiles or that they have long tongues, are ignored because they are irrelevant
in the given context.
(3) a. Sally is a chameleon.
b. [Sally frequently changes her appearance.]
Example (4) provides the respective abstract set-theoretic representation em-
ployed in the computational model. We can think of ‘chameleon’ as a complex
semantic unit (C) that in turn consists of semantic units such as ‘long tongue’
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(T), ‘reptile’ (R), ‘changes appearance’ (A).2 The signal meaning overspecifies
the speaker meaning because some of its components (R, T, ...) are ignored and
do not form part of the speaker meaning.
(4) a. S = sally(x)
C = chameleon(x)
A = changes appearance(x)
R = reptile(x)
T = has long tongue(x)
b. Signal meaning: SCwhere C = {A, R, T, ...}
Ignored meaning: R, T, ...
Speaker meaning: SA
What the above analyses of underspecification and overspecification imply for
the task of simulating innovative use is this: in order to use a signal innovatively,
that is, in order to be able to under- and/or overspecify the intended speaker
meaning, a speaker needs to know what constitutes
• inferable meaning,
namely which components of the speaker meaning the hearer can infer
from the context,
and she needs to know what constitutes
• ignorable meaning,
namely what meaning will be ignored by the hearer because it is irrelevant
in the present context.
The former needs to be known to determine if underspecification is possible,
the latter to determine if overspecification is possible. If, for instance, a speaker
knows that (i) he needs to convey a meaning AB, and he also knows that (ii) B
can be inferred from the context (once A is given), and that (iii) C will be ig-
nored in the present context because it is irrelevant, then he can infer that he can
use signals with the signal meanings A, AB, AC or ABC to convey the speaker
2While this interpretation is a useful simplification for the sake of the computational model,
it must be kept in mind that it is only an abstract way of representing the encyclopedic, network-
like nature of meaning (e.g. Fillmore 1975; Haiman 1980a; Langacker 1987; Evans and Green
2006).
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meaning in the current context. (Signal meaning A would underspecify the in-
tended speaker meaning AB, signal meaning ABCwould overspecify it, and sig-
nal meaning ACwould both under- and overspecify the intended speaker mean-
ing. Signal meaning ABwould provide an exact specification.)
One can therefore conclude that in each iteration—remember that an iteration
simulates an individual usage event—the agent needs to be provided with:
• a (randomly generated) speaker meaning that he needs to communicate
• a (randomly generated) context
From this information, the agent can then infer:
• what constitutes inferable meaning
• what constitutes ignorable meaning
I propose the following way of modelling this process of inferring what consti-
tutes inferable and ignorable information in a given situation:
I have explained in section 3.1.3.1 of this thesis that one precondition of
ostensive-inferential communication is for individuals to recognise what con-
stitutes relevant information in the given situation. I have stated that relevant
information is information that, if it was transferred from the communicator to
the addressee, would elicit a reaction in the addressee, a perlocutionary effect,
that could plausibly be intended by the communicator in this situation.
The fact that an individual knows what is relevant in a given situation can be
modelled abstractly by, in each iteration, equipping the agent with a set of mean-
ings that represents the set of all meanings that he recognises as being relevant
in the situation simulated by that iteration. The agent may, for example, “know”
that both (and only) the meanings AB and BD constitute relevant information in
a given situation.
The agent’s task is then to provide a clue that contains sufficient information to
identify unequivocally the intended speaker meaning from among the meanings
in this set.3 Imagine again that that set consists of the meanings AB and BD and
3The fact that, in order for communication to succeed, the provided clue must contain suf-
ficient information for the addressee to be able to identify the intended speaker meaning is
captured in the so-called Q-principles formulated by Gricean pragmaticists (e.g. Levinson 2000;
Horn 2004), which call on the speaker to “be sufficient.” I provide a brief discussion of how
pragmatic principles are realised in the computational model in section 4.1.2.3 below.
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the speaker meaning that the agent needs to bring across is AB. What minimal
information does the agent need to provide as a clue to unequivocally identify
AB in the set {AB, BD}?4
• Obviously, B alone does not constitute sufficient information: it could point
to either of the two meanings.
• In contrast, A alone provides sufficient information to identify the intended
meaning unequivocally, as it does not occur in any other meaning in the set.
• Furthermore, once A has been specified, B is not needed anymore: it can
be inferred once A is given. In the given context, B therefore constitutes
inferable information.
• What if the clue that the agent provides is AC? This clue also provides suf-
ficient information (A) to identify the intended meaning AB unequivocally.
Its component C does not contribute to this process but it also does not hin-
der it as it does not point to any other relevant meaning either. In the given
context, C constitutes ignorable information.
• The situation would be different if the agent provided AD as a clue. In this
case, Awould point to one of the possible meanings, D to another one. The
intended meaning could not be identified unequivocally. As opposed to
C above, D does therefore not constitute ignorable meaning in the given
context: while, like C, it does not occur in the intended meaning, it does
occur in another, not intended relevant meaning.
In summary, it can be stated that if there is (i) an intended speaker meaning and
(ii) a set of relevant meanings in which the intended speaker meaning has to be
identified unequivocally, we are able to infer deterministically what constitutes
inferable and ignorable information:
• inferable information
is any information that is contained in the intended meaning but is not apt
(or not necessary) to identify that meaning unequivocally
• ignorable information
is any information that does not occur in the intended meaning but also
does not occur in any other relevant meaning.
4Note that it is always presupposed here that the addressee recognises the provided clue as
a clue, that is, that he recognises the communicator’s communicative intention and thus makes
the presumption of relevance.
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However, in our computational model, we can make a further simplification to
the above scenario: instead of randomly generating a context which yields (de-
terministically) the required information (i.e. the information about what consti-
tutes inferable and ignorable meaning), we can directly generate this information
itself: in each iteration, we can provide the agent with a randomly generated set
of inferable and ignorable semantic units. (With regard to the discussed exam-
ple, this would mean that the agent would be provided with the knowledge that,
in the given context, B constitutes inferable meaning and C constitutes ignorable
meaning.)
We are now in a position where we can further detail the individual stages of an
iteration in the simulation as shown in Figs. 4.3–4.6:
1. I-language (Fig. 4.3). The input to each iteration is the I-language that the
agent has evolved in the process of the preceding iterations. In the exam-
ple, the agent’s I-language contains only a single construction, which maps
a form X onto a meaning AC. The asterisk signifies that, from a theoretical
perspective, the I-language too must be considered as part of the context of
use even though it is implemented separately in the computational model
(refer to section 3.1.4 for a detailed account of this theoretical point).
2. Speaker meaning and context (Fig. 4.4). At the beginning of each iteration, the
model randomly generates (i) a speaker meaning for the agent to commu-
nicate (AB in the example), and two sets of semantic units that designate
what constitutes (ii) inferable meaning and (iii) ignorable meaning.5 In
the figure, inferable meaning (B) is marked with a plus sign, ignorable
meaning (C) with a minus sign.
3. Use (Fig. 4.5). The agent then uses this information to produce an appro-
priate signal.6 In the example, the agent’s use of the signal X is innovative:
the conventional signal meaning (AC) is different from the communicated
speaker meaning (AB).
4. Learning (Fig. 4.6). The agent then updates his I-language by adding a new
construction that associates the used signal (X) to the communicatedmean-
ing (AB) and further entrenches the construction(s) he used to produce the
5Appendix A provides a detailled description of the algorithms that generate speaker mean-
ing and context.
6Appendix A provides a detailled description of the employed signal production algorithm.
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Context
(*)
+B
–C
Change
!
Agent
I-language*
X ! AC
Figure 4.3: First stage of an example iteration (I-language). The output of the previous iteration
(the agent’s I-language) serves as input to the next iteration. The asterisk indicates that, theoreti-
cally, I-language too has to be conceived as part of the context of a usage event.
Context
(*)
+B
–C
Meaning
AB
randomly generated
Change
! "
Agent
I-language*
X ! AC
Figure 4.4: Second stage of an example iteration (speaker meaning and context). A speaker mean-
ing, inferable meaning and ignorable meaning are randomly generated. (Inferable meaning is
marked by a plus sign, ignorable meaning by a minus sign.)
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Context
(*)
+B
–C
E-language
X
Meaning
AB
Use
randomly generated
Change
!
"
#
Agent
I-language*
X ! AC
Figure 4.5: Third stage of an example iteration (use). The agent produces a signal that is appro-
priate to communicate the intended speaker meaning in the given context. The signal meaning
can under- and/or overspecify the speaker meaning within the boundaries determined by the
inferable meaning and the ignorable meaning.
I-language
X ! AB
X ! AC
Context
(*)
+B
–C
E-language
X
Meaning
AB
Use Learning
randomly generated
Change
!
" #
$
Agent
I-language*
X ! AC
Figure 4.6: Fourth stage of an example iteration (learning). The agent updates his I-language by
adding a new construction that associates the used signal with the communicated meaning.
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signal (X → AC). The process of learning will be explained in more detail
in section 4.1.3 below.
4.1.2.2 Forms of conventional and innovative use
In order to illustrate the mechanisms of use employed in the computational
model, I will now describe the basic forms of conventional and innovative use
that can occur in the simulations. To this aim, I will present a series of examples
and discuss for each of them (i) the conditions the agent meets in the respective
interaction, (ii) how he decides on a signal on the basis of these conditions, and
(iii) whether the resulting instance of use is conventional or innovative. The first
example is given in (5) and illustrates the conventional use of a single symbol.
(5) Conventional use of a single symbol
Input: I-language: X→ AB
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: C
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: AB, ABC
Expressible signal meaning: AB
Output: Signal: X
This example shows a situation where the agent’s I-language contains just one
construction, mapping form X onto meaning AB. The agent needs to express
speaker meaning AB, and he knows that no part of that meaning can be inferred
and that C, if it was part of the signal meaning, would be ignored. In this context,
both AB and ABC constitute signal meanings that contain sufficient information
for the hearer to be able to infer the intended speaker meaning. However, only
signal meaning AB can also be expressed with the help of the agent’s I-language.
The agent thus produces a signal X to communicate the intended speaker mean-
ing AB. Because signal meaning and speaker meaning are equal, this example
constitutes a case of conventional use.
The model also allows for symbols to be combined. This is shown in example
(6):
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(6) Combination of symbols
Input: I-language: X→ A
Y→ B
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: C
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: AB, ABC
Expressible signal meaning: AB
Output: Signal: XY
The situation depicted in (6) is the same as in example (5) except for the fact that
the agent’s I-language this time makes it necessary for two symbols to be com-
bined to express the required signal meaning. It is debatable whether this exam-
ple should be seen as a case of conventional or innovative use. What speaks for
a classification of it as conventional use is the fact that, like in the previous ex-
ample, signal meaning and speaker meaning are the same. What speaks against
it, however, is that the association between the used signal (XY) and the com-
municated meaning (AB) is not part of the speaker’s I-language before the usage
event: it is only added in the process of learning that follows the production of
the signal. The two symbols are obviously being combined for the first time,
which may itself be viewed as an instance of innovative use.
Example (7), in contrast, shows a clear case of innovative use: one in which un-
derspecification is employed.
(7) Underspecification
Input: I-language: X→ A
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: B
Ignorable meaning: –
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AB
Expressible signal meaning: A
Output: Signal: X
This example shows a situationwhere the agent needs to convey a speakermean-
ing AB in a context where B can be inferred once A is given. A sufficient signal
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meaning must therefore at least express A but can optionally also specify B. Both
A and AB are thus possible signal meanings in the depicted situation. Since the
agent’s I-language only allows for A to be expressed, the agent produces signal X
to communicate speaker meaning AB. Signal X is used innovatively because the
speaker meaning it conveys in this situation (AB) deviates from its conventional
meaning (A).
The situation shown in (8) exemplifies the other aspect of pragmatic plasticity:
innovative use through overspecification.
(8) Overspecification
Input: I-language: X→ AC
Speaker meaning: A
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: C
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AC
Expressible signal meaning: AC
Output: Signal: X
In this example, the agent needs to convey a speaker meaning A but his I-
language only contains a construction for the more specific meaning AC. The
agent can use this construction nonetheless as he knows that the meaning
component C will be ignored in the present context. Like underspecification,
overspecification constitutes innovative use because signal meaning (AC) and
speaker meaning (A) differ from each other.
More complex communicative acts can, of course, combine all of the above forms
of use. Consider example (9).
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(9) Various forms of use combined
Input: I-language: X→ AC
Y→ D
Speaker meaning: ABD
Inferable meaning: B
Ignorable meaning: C
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: AD, ACD, ABD, ABCD
Expressible signal meaning: ACD
Output: Signal: XY
In the situation shown in (9), the agent needs to convey a speaker meaning ABD.
Of the three semantic units contained in the speaker meaning, two necessarily
need to be specified (A and D) whereas one (B) can be left underspecified be-
cause it can be inferred from the context. Any signal meaning must therefore
at least contain A and D. Furthermore, the agent knows that meaning C will
be ignored in the present context because it is irrelevant. It can thus be added
to a potential signal meaning without being an impediment to utterance inter-
pretation. The only potential signal meaning that the agent can express with his
I-language is ACD. He therefore produces the signal XY. The produced signal
combines two symbols: X → AC and Y → D. One of them, Y, is used conven-
tionally, the other one, X, exhibits overspecification: only one of its two semantic
units actually contributes to the speaker meaning. Finally, the signal meaning
as a whole underspecifies the speaker meaning because it does not express B but
rather leaves it to be inferred from the context.
There may be iterations in a simulation in which no signal is available to convey
the intended meaning. An example of such a case is given in (10). In the de-
picted situation, the agent’s I-language cannot express any of the possible signal
meanings. Communication is thus not possible.
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(10) No signal available
Input: I-language: X→ AB
Y→ D
Speaker meaning: A
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: C
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AC
Expressible signal meaning: –
Output: Signal: –
Other models employ a process of random invention in situations where the I-
language of their agents is not capable of expressing the desired meaning (cf.
Hurford 2002 for an overview). In contrast to the models discussed in Hur-
ford (2002), the model introduced here does not presuppose that speakers al-
ways manage to get their message across. It seems more plausible to assume
that sometimes, humans do not have an appropriate expression to convey the
concept they are thinking of, and that in such situations they do not invent a
random new form for that concept. Therefore, the simulation simply moves on
to the next iteration and provides the agent with a new speaker meaning and a
new context if such a situation occurs.7
4.1.2.3 Cases of synonymy
In all examples that I have discussed so far, only one signal was available that
could communicate the intended signal meaning in the given context. In many
contexts, however, the agent has more than one option. We can distinguish
between cases of what I will call grammar-related synonymy and cases of context-
related synonymy. Grammar-related synonymy occurs if the agent’s I-language,
his grammar, provides more than one way of expressing a certain signal mean-
ing. Context-related synonymy denotes situations where, in the given context,
more than one expressible signal meaning can convey the intended speaker
meaning.
Example (11) shows a case of grammar-related synonymy.
7In section 5.2.2, I will show how the success rate of an I-language changes over time.
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(11) Grammar-related synonymy
Input: I-language: X→ A
Y→ B
Z→ AB
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: –
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: AB
Expressible signal meaning: AB
Output: Signal: XY or Z?
The described situation shows grammar-related synonymy because, even
though only one signal meaning (AB) is possible, this signal meaning can be
expressed in two different ways: either by producing XY or by producing Z.
In contrast, examples (12) and (14) depict situations that exhibit context-related
synonymy. The first example shows a situation where underspecification is pos-
sible but not necessary:
(12) Context-related synonymy: optional underspecification
Input: I-language: X→ A
Y→ B
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: B
Ignorable meaning: –
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AB
Expressible signal meaning: A, AB
Output: Signal: X or XY?
In example (12), the agent can but does not need to underspecify the intended
speaker meaning AB: he can either convey it by employing signal X, whose sig-
nal meaning Awould underspecify the speaker meaning, or by producing signal
XY, whose signal meaning AB would fully specify the speaker meaning. This is
a situation that is not uncommon in every-day language use. Consider, for in-
stance, sentence (13). We can easily think of situations where it would not be
necessary to repeat the adjective old but where it could be done anyway.
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(13) Fifty old men and [old] women live in this residence.
A similar situation arises if overspecification is possible but not necessary, as
shown in the following example:
(14) Context-related synonymy: optional overspecification
Input: I-language: X→ AC
Y→ A
Speaker meaning: A
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: C
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AC
Expressible signal meaning: A, AC
Output: Signal: X or Y?
In example (14), the agent has the option to overspecify the speaker meaning
but again is not confined to doing so: he can either convey the intended speaker
meaning A by using signal X, which expresses the speaker meaning “literally,”
or he can employ signal Y, whose signal meaning contains the irrelevant com-
ponent C, which will be ignored in the present context. Such a case occurs, for
instance, when we have to decide whether we shall call Sally a chameleon, as
in example (3) above, knowing that the irrelevant semantic components of the
concept ‘chameleon’ will be ignored, or whether we shall be precise and simply
state that she frequently changes her appearance.
In either case, grammar-related synonymy as well as context-related synonymy,
more than one signal is available to convey the intended speaker meaning, and
the agent needs to choose one of them. In reality, this choice may be highly
situation-specific and depend on the social context of the communicative event:
a poet, for instance, may choose a highly metaphorical signal that grossly over-
specifies the intended speaker meaning, a firefighter who needs to communicate
quickly will go for the shortest signal, and a scientist may try to be as explicit
as possible.8 These are just extreme cases of a more general tendency: signals
are chosen for a whole range of reasons. Overall, the users’ choices thus appear
8It may be argued, however, that extra meaning is conveyed thereby.
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random and do not follow a clear-cut, consistent strategy. A neutral way of mod-
elling the way users behave when they face a case of synonymy is therefore to
have the agent choose a signal at random.
In contrast, if we were to assume a bias, we would introduce a bottleneck that
would affect the outcome of the simulation (cf. Hurford 2002). In the follow-
ing paragraphs, I will show that the two main contemporary pragmatic theories,
neo-Gricean pragmatics and Relevance Theory, imply that there are indeed ten-
dencies in speakers’ behaviour that are more basic than the socially influenced
decisions mentioned above. I will show how these biases can be included in the
model. (Later, in chapter 5, I will analyse how the introduction of such a bias—as
opposed to choosing a signal at random—influences the course of the simulation
and what this can tell us about the cultural evolution of language.)
The first possible bias I want to discuss is based on neo-Gricean pragmatics. Horn
(2004) introduces two principles that describe human communicative behaviour:
the so-called Q-principle and R-principle. He argues that these two principles
capture Grice’s (1975) conversational maxims as well as Levinson’s (2000) tripar-
tite system.
(15) a. Horn’s Q-principle
Make your contribution sufficient;
Say as much as you can (given the R-principle).
b. Horn’s R-principle
Make your contribution necessary;
Say no more than you must (given the Q-principle).
In themodel, Horn’s Q-principle corresponds to the reasoning bywhich an agent
determines what constitutes a possible signal meaning in a given context: a sig-
nal meaning has to provide sufficient information for the hearer to infer the
speaker meaning. Given the Q-principle, the R-principle would then suggest
that, if more than one possible signal meaning is expressible, the agent should
choose the one that underspecifies the speaker meaning most: only what is ab-
solutely necessary should be said explicitly.
The other major contemporary theory of pragmatics, Sperber andWilson’s (1995)
Relevance Theory, describes the cognitive processes underlying communication in
terms of the following two principles:
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(16) a. The communicative principle of relevance
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption
of its own relevance.
b. The cognitive principle of relevance
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance
(that is, to achieving the greatest cognitive effect for the smallest
possible processing effort.)
While the communicative principle of relevance describes the basic fact that sig-
nals are assumed to transfer information that is relevant, the cognitive principle
of relevance deals with the actual interpretation of signals. It implies that if more
than one possible signal meaning is expressible, the agent should choose the one
that involves the smallest effort. (We can ignore the aspect of cognitive effect here
because all possible signal meanings achieve the same cognitive effect, namely
the inference of the intended speaker meaning.) The Relevance Theory literature
deals with the goal of minimising the involved effort in two ways.
The first is based on the assertion that inference is cheaper than coding.9 Carston
(2002:289) states that “it follows from the processing effort side of the definition
[...] that speakers should not be, and are not expected to be, as explicit as possi-
ble.” From this observation, she concludes that “[t]hey should encode only what
they cannot rely on their addressees to infer easily.” This strategy corresponds to
Horns R-principle. In terms of our computational model, it means that the agent
should express the most underspecified signal meaning.
Another approach commonly found in the Relevance Theory literature describes
processing effort in terms of accessibility: what is easier to access takes less ef-
fort. Carston (2004:822), as we have already seen, explains the process of utter-
ance interpretation as follows: “[c]heck interpretive hypotheses in order of their
accessibility—that is, follow a path of least effort until an interpretation that sat-
isfies the expectation of relevance is found; then stop.” In the same way, produc-
tion can be viewed as a process by which the first accessible signal meaning is
9Note that there is an apparent contradiction: in chapter 3, I have shown that coding is simply
a special case of inference; but if coding is inference, how can the former take more effort than
the latter? The answer is that it is not the cognitive process of coding but rather the process
of articulation, the process of actually producing the signal in the physical world, that takes
more effort. Levinson (1995:95f.), for instance, identifies articulation as a “relatively slow and
inefficient process, which acts as a bottleneck in the entire communicative procedure.” Humans
can think faster and with less effort than they can articulate or gesture. I will come back to this
point later, in section 5.3.
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expressed. This account is particularly plausible from a psychological point of
view because it does not imply that the speaker first constructs all possible signal
meanings and then selects one from among them: he simply produces whatever
signal “comes to his mind first.” In terms of the model, this means that the agent
should choose the signal where the constructions involved in the production are
most entrenched.
To summarise the discussion of how language use is implemented in the model,
the following points can be made. The model’s setup allows for use to be in-
novative because it makes the distinction between speaker meaning and signal
meaning explicit and gives the agent the possibility to employ signals whose
signal meanings under- and/or overspecify the speaker meaning he needs to
communicate. In cases of synonymy, that is, where more than one signal is pos-
sible, the agents behaviour can be simulated in three ways: either (i) the agent is
unbiased and chooses a signal meaning at random (this solution does not make
any assumptions and its result therefore provides us with a NULL-hypothesis),
or (ii) he is biased towards maximising underspecification, or (iii) he is biased
towards maximising entrenchment. How entrenchment is realised in the model
will be explained now.
4.1.3 Learning
An extant convention is used in an innovative way when it comes to exhibit
pragmatic plasticity in a specific context, that is, when it is used in an under-
and/or overspecified way: its form communicates a novel meaning. However,
innovative use can only turn into an actual innovation if it is followed by a sec-
ond process: learning. Without learning, the innovative usage of a linguistic
form cannot persist beyond the instance of use in which it was created. Learning
describes the process by which a usage event results in a change in the agent’s I-
language. In this section, I discuss how learning is realised in the computational
model.
4.1.3.1 Entrenchment
As discussed in section 4.1.1, the present computational model assumes learn-
ing to be a faithful process. Consequently, the learning mechanism it employs
is a simple one. It simulates the process of entrenchment: each form-meaning
association activated in a usage event is entrenched further through that usage
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event. Activated form-meaning associations are (i) the constructions involved
in the production of the signal, and (ii) the association between the produced
form and the communicatedmeaning. Concretely, entrenchment is implemented
as follows. Each construction in an agent’s I-language is stored together with
some usage-related information, namely (i) the number of times the construction
has been used, and (ii) the number of the usage event in which the construction
was last used. This information is updated after each usage event by (i) increas-
ing the first value by one and by (ii) setting the second value to the number of
the respective usage event. The former captures frequency, the latter recency of
use. If a form-meaning association is not stored in the agent’s I-language yet—
alternatively, we may think of both of its values as being 0—it is added to the
I-language with its number of use set to 1. Example (17) illustrates how the pro-
cess of entrenchment is realised in the computational model.
(17) I-language: X→ A (1, 12)
Y→ B (3, 10)
Usage event no. 14:
Speaker meaning: ABC
Inferable meaning: C
Ignorable meaning: –
Signal: XY
Updated I-language: X→ A (2, 14)
Y→ B (4, 14)
XY→ ABC (1, 14)
The example shows an excerpt of an agent’s grammar after the 13th usage event
the agent has participated in. One of the shown constructions, which maps form
X onto meaning A, has been used only once so far, namely in usage event no. 12.
The other construction, mapping Y onto B, has been used 3 times, the last time
in usage event no. 10. This is the grammar which the agent uses to convey the in-
tended message ABC in usage event no. 14, which follows: the first construction
is used to encode A and the second to encode B; meaning component C can be
left underspecified in the given context. The agent thus produces XY as a signal
and thereby communicates utterance meaning ABC. After this usage event, both
extant constructions have been used once more and the respective values are in-
creased by one. The value that indicates in which usage event the constructions
have been used last is set to 14, the number of the current iteration. Addition-
ally, the agent’s I-language is enhancedwith a new construction, namely one that
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associates the produced signal XY with the communicated meaning ABC. This
new construction has only been used once, in usage event no. 14.
The degree of entrenchment of a form-meaning association can be calculated as
the number of times the said association has been used, divided by the time
for which it has not been used anymore. The entrenchment of a construction
is thus the deeper, the more frequently and the more recently that construction
has been used. Formula (18) summarises how entrenchment is measured in the
computational model.
(18) ec,t =
nc,t
it − lc,t
The entrenchment e of a construction c at a time t is the number of usages of
that construction at the given time (nc,t), divided by the number of consecutive
iterations in which it has not been used anymore—the latter being the difference
between the total number of iterations at the time it and the number of the itera-
tion in which the construction was used for the last time lc,t.
4.1.3.2 Decay and loss
The entrenchment of a construction not only increases when it is used, it also de-
creases when the construction is not used. “Entrenchment is reinforced through
use [...] and decays through lack of use (as any rusty second language learner can
attest)” (Croft 2000:73). The phenomenon of decay is the reason why entrench-
ment cannot simply be represented as frequency of use in the model. Only by
applying formula (18) do we get the effect that the entrenchment of a construc-
tion not only increases through use but also decreases through lack of use.
The current computational model allows the experimenter to define an entrench-
ment threshold. A construction is kept in the agent’s memory as long as its en-
trenchment is above this threshold and is lost (“forgotten”) otherwise. After each
iteration, constructions that are not sufficiently entrenched anymore are removed
from the agent’s I-language. The entrenchment threshold can be set to any value
between 0 and 1. If the threshold is set to 1, no construction is remembered at all;
if the threshold is set to 0, none is ever forgotten. Thus, with the entrenchment
threshold set to 0.5, a construction that has been used only once will be lost af-
ter it has not been used for two consecutive iterations. Likewise, a construction
that has been used five times in total will be lost after it has not been used in ten
consecutive usage events. This example is illustrated in (19).
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(19) Entrenchment threshold: 0.5
Last usage event: 40
I-language before loss: X→ A (1, 38) Entrenchment: 0.5
Y→ B (5, 30) 0.5
Z→ C (3, 36) 0.75
I-language after loss: Z→ C (3, 36)
The process of loss can either be understood as an actual decay of the entrench-
ment of constructions in an individual’s memory, or it can be seen as a simulation
of the effects that a generation turn-over would have. In a two-agent popula-
tion, a generation turn-over would remove one agent and introduce a new one
instead. The I-language of this new agent naturally differs from that of the re-
maining “old” agent: at the moment of its “birth,” it is empty. The new agent’s I-
language will thus only ever contain constructions that were used after the point
of its introduction into the simulation, and once the remaining old agent is re-
moved in another generation turn-over, any constructions that have not been
used since will be lost (see e.g. the discussions in Hurford 2002; Kirby 2002a). In
the long run, the “survival” of a construction therefore depends on its frequency
of use. This is exactly the same effect that loss has too: constructions that are not
used frequently enough disappear from the language over time. There is no ex-
plicit generation turn-over in the model introduced in this chapter, but one can
say that the mechanism of loss simulates the effects it would have. The func-
tion of the entrenchment threshold is roughly equivalent to that of the size of the
learning bottleneck assumed in other models, that is, the number of usage events
between one generation turn-over and the next (cf. Kirby 2002a).
4.1.3.3 Entrenchment as exemplar-based learning
It seems appropriate to briefly consider where the learning method employed
in the described usage-based model is positioned within the field of learning
theory. Learning through usage memorisation has been suggested in the liter-
ature under various names. In psychology, approaches to categorisation that
incorporate it are known as exemplar-based models (Smith and Medin 1981;
Barsalou 1990). Such models have been introduced to artificial intelligence in
the form of case-based reasoning (CBR) systems (Stanfill and Waltz 1986; Bareiss
et al. 1987; Koton 1988; Rissland et al. 1989) and have come to be known in the
field of machine learning as instance-based learning methods (Aha et al. 1991;
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Mitchell 1997). Memory-based approaches to natural language processing (Dael-
mans 1999; De Pauw 2003) are another instantiation of exemplar-based mod-
els. Memory-based learning is built on both instance-based methods of machine
learning as well as the so-called analogical model of language developed by Sk-
ousen (1989, 1992).
Exemplar-based learning, as opposed to other models of learning, has two main
characteristics. First, the learning process is simple: all that it does is store experi-
enced usage events in the memory. No generalisations are made and no rules are
induced during the learning process. De Pauw (2003:150) states that the knowl-
edge acquisition phase of such models is trivial in comparison to other machine
learning methods such as, for example, neural networks or probabilistic models:
“no further knowledge in the form of induction rules, decision trees, etc. needs to
be induced from the data, nor does the probabilistic distribution of the data need
to be computed during or after the knowledge acquisition phase.” The storage
of exemplars in the memory is the minimum of which learning can consist. Aha
(1997) consequently refers to this most simple type of learning as “lazy learning.”
The second characteristic of exemplar-based models follows from this first one.
Because they only store experienced usage events, “[i]nstance-based learning al-
gorithms do not maintain a set of abstractions derived from specific instances”
(Aha et al. 1991:1, emphasis in the original). Categorisation happens ad hoc in
the process of use and not during learning. New usage situations are classified
by finding the most similar exemplar in the memory and extrapolating its solution
(De Pauw 2003:150). Batali (2002:116, emphasis in the original) summarises these
two main characteristics of exemplar-based models as follows:
[L]earners simply store all of their analyzed observations as exemplars.
No rules or principles are induced from them. Instead, exemplars
may be used intact, to express the exact meaning, or to interpret the
signal, recorded in the exemplar. Exemplars may also be modified to
construct new analyses of the mapping between a signal and a mean-
ing.
Batali, in the above quote, mentions two types of use: conventional (“intact”)
and innovative (“modified”) use. In conventional use, the new event is identi-
cal to a stored exemplar; in innovative use, the new event is only similar to a
stored exemplar. As I have described in section 4.1.2, both types of use are also
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implemented in the introduced computational model. Exemplars are modified
when they exhibit pragmatic plasticity, that is, when they come to under- and/or
overspecify the communicated meaning in a specific context.
Examples (20) and (21) illustrate the difference between exemplar-based models
and other models of learning. The sequence represented in (20) shows a learning
method which generalises from the experienced data X → AB and X → AC to
a new category X → A.10 In a second step, the knowledge thus acquired is then
put to use without any change. In contrast, example (21) illustrates the exemplar-
based paradigm. An experienced item X→ AB is stored in the memory without
any change. However, it is then used in a later situation in an overspecified way
to express a more general concept. This new exemplar is stored again without
any modification. Generalisation is the product of overspecified use here, and
not something the learning algorithm does during knowledge acquisition. The
more general concept X → A is then later used in an underspecified way and
gives thus rise to a category that is more specific again: X→ AC.
(20) E-language: X→ AB
X→ AC
↓ Learning (generalisation)
I-language: X→ A
↓ Use (exact specification)
E-language: X→ A
(21) E-language: X→ AB
↓ Learning (storage)
I-language: X→ AB
↓ Use (overspecification)
E-language: X→ A
↓ Learning (storage)
I-language: X→ AB
X→ A
↓ Use (underspecification)
E-language: X→ AC
10The experienced data X → AB and X → AC could also be stored during learning beside
the newly generalised concept. They are not shown in the example I-language for the sake of
simplicity.
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The key point is this. In exemplar-based learning models, learning is faithful
and use is innovative, whereas in other learning models, use is faithful—a mere
one-to-one application of what has been learnt—and learning is innovative. This
representation makes it evident that one can draw a direct line from learning the-
ory to the study of cultural evolution. The different theoretical models of learn-
ing are reflected in the different views about the locus of innovation in models
of cultural evolution which I have discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis and in
section 4.1.1 above.
Given its much defended psychological plausibility (Medin and Schaffer 1978;
Brooks 1978; Hintzman 1986; Nosofsky 1986; Skousen 1989; Chandler 1993),
exemplar-based learning has been applied surprisingly sparsely in computa-
tional models that simulate the evolution of language. Most of them employ
alternative learning methods, such as rule-based learning (e.g. Kirby 2001, 2002a;
Zuidema 2003; Hoefler 2006b), Bayesian learning (Briscoe 2005; Kirby et al. 2007),
MDL-learning (Teal and Taylor 2000; Brighton and Kirby 2001; Roberts et al.
2005), or neural networks and connectionist learning (Christiansen and Devlin
1997; Batali 1998; Livingstone 2002; Smith 2003c). Batali (2002) presents the
rare example of a model that applies an exemplar-based learning algorithm.
Using an exemplar-based computational model, Batali studies how recursive
grammars can emerge when agents negotiate a communication system. His
model is evaluated and extended in Eddy (2005). The use of exemplar-based
models in evolutionary linguistics gains further theoretical support by some
linguistic evidence presented in Wray (2005). Wray argues, mainly on the basis
of evidence from idiomatic or formulaic language, that exemplar-based models
are more accurate descriptions of linguistic knowledge acquisition than models
based on the induction of rules. A similar conclusion has been reached, on the
basis of psycholinguistic evidence, by Chandler (1993). I conclude that a strong
case has to be made for the consideration of exemplar-based learning models in
the study of language evolution—be it computational or theoretical—because of
the high psychological plausibility of such models. The computational model
introduced in this chapter makes a contribution to this direction of research.
4.2 Integrating non-symbolic communication
So far, I have described a computational model that simulates iterated symbolic
communication. But, as I have pointed out before, a model of language evolu-
tion ideally starts from a non-linguistic (and therefore non-symbolic) state. The
164
question I therefore want to address now is how non-symbolic communication—
and the transition from non-symbolic to symbolic communication—can be added
to the computational model. To this aim, one must first be clear about (i) what
properties symbolic and non-symbolic communication share, and (ii) what dis-
tinguishes the two forms of communication.
In chapter 3, I have shown that both symbolic and non-symbolic communica-
tion are ostensive-inferential. In ostensive-inferential communication, a signal
provides information (the signal meaning) which is used as a clue to infer the in-
tended speaker meaning from the context. The hypothesis I have established is
that the processes of ostensive-inferential communication are the same in both
symbolic and non-symbolic communication. This would entail, as a derived hy-
pothesis, that one should be able to represent non-symbolic communication in
the introduced computational model without having to modify the mechanisms
of use and learning that the model employs for symbolic communication. In the
remainder of this chapter, I will show how (and why) this can be done.
But what, then, is the difference between symbolic and non-symbolic communi-
cation? In short, as opposed to symbolic communication, non-symbolic commu-
nication employs as signals forms that are not conventionally associated with a
meaning (yet)—or at least does not allude to such conventions if they exist. The
problem now is that the introduced mechanisms of use depend on the notion of
a signal meaning being provided, namely in the form of a meaning that is con-
ventionally associated with the produced signal. If we do not want to modify the
employed mechanisms of use and learning, our proposal of how non-symbolic
communication (and the transition to symbolic communication) can be repre-
sented must therefore answer the following question: what signal meaning is
provided by forms that are not conventionally associated with a meaning—and
how can they be represented in the introduced computational model? I will be-
gin to answer this question by asking what forms are in the first place.
4.2.1 What are forms?
The thesis I want to put forward here is one that may at first sound paradoxical,
namely that forms are meanings. To this aim, I will briefly review what meanings
are and then continue to explain why forms are meanings.
The representation of I-language in the present model is compatible with the way
it is described by construction-based approaches to grammar. There are various
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versions of construction grammar (see e.g. Croft and Cruse 2004:ch. 10 for an
overview) but they all share the basic characteristics I have worked out in 2.2.3.2.
In the following discussion, I will mainly use the terminology and concepts sug-
gested by Langacker (1987:ch. 2) for his instantiation of a construction grammar:
Cognitive Grammar. Langacker’s account is particularly appealing for several
reasons. First, it constitutes one of the foundational and most influential ap-
proaches to language within the framework of cognitive-functional linguistics.
Second, Langacker addresses an extensive range of fundamental issues relevant
to the modelling of grammar in a particularly accessible way—if one is ready to
acquire his terminology and concepts, that is. Third, and probably most impor-
tantly, he makes a great effort to ground the concepts used in Cognitive Gram-
mar in domain-general cognitive capacities; his descriptions are thus particularly
apt to contribute to bridging the gap between no language and language, which
must remain the ultimate goal of any study of language evolution.
4.2.1.1 Meanings
The first thing to be said about meanings is that they are conceptual. Meanings
are conceptualisations of certain states of affairs in the world, for example, the
concept of a unicorn, or the concept of a horn, or the concept of something be-
ing white, or the idea of somebody running, or the information that something
is on top of something else, that a goal has been achieved by means of a certain
behaviour, or the knowledge that something has a certain property. Langacker
(1987:76) describes semantic space, that is, the space of all possible meanings, as
“the multifaceted field of conceptual potential within which thought and con-
ceptualization unfold” and concludes that “a semantic structure [i.e. a meaning]
can then be characterized as a location or a configuration in semantic space.”
The way in which meanings have been represented in existing computational
models is determined by two factors. One is the aim of the model. Depend-
ing on what phenomena the model is designed to investigate, different levels of
abstraction make sense in the representation of its meanings. If a level of ab-
straction is chosen that does not simply treat meanings as atomic units or black
boxes but assigns them some internal structure, the researcher’s theoretical as-
sumptions about linguistic meaning might come to bear as a second influencing
factor. Existing computational models have represented structured meanings in
some variant of first-order logic (Hurford 2000; Kirby 2000, 2002a; Batali 2002),
as vector matrices (Steels 1996a; Kirby 2001; Brighton and Kirby 2001; Brighton
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2002; Smith 2003c) or as discrimination trees (Steels 1996b, 1997, 1999; Steels and
Kaplan 2002; Smith 2003b, 2005a). Other models have not specified any semantic
structure and treated their meanings as atomic (Smith 2004).11 The general aim
of any computational model must be to employ a representation that is kept as
abstract as possible and is only as specific as necessary.
For the purposes of the current model, meanings could not be represented as
atomic entities: we have seen that the processes of under- and overspecification,
which are at the heart of the model, require the recognition of individual mean-
ing components. On the other hand, it is not necessary to specify what these
components are any further. The representation of meaning employed in the
model reflects the fact that meanings can be composed of smaller semantic units
but does not build in any further assumptions about the nature of these semantic
units. As we have already seen, semantic units are simply represented as upper-
case characters (A, B, C, ...), and meanings are modelled as sets of such units.
The set of all semantic units that are available in a simulation thus defines the
semantic space in which the agent’s conceptualisations can unfold.
The psychological underpinnings for the conception of meanings employed in
the computational model are again provided by Langacker (1987:ch. 2). Lan-
gacker points out that meanings are semantic units, and that a unit can itself
contain further semantic units. He understands a unit in psychological terms as
“a structure that a speaker has mastered quite thoroughly, to the extent that he
can employ it in largely automatic fashion, without having to focus his attention
specifically on its individual parts” (Langacker 1987:57). Semantic units can thus
be conceived as established concepts. Langacker (1987:58) provides the following
example of how an assembly of semantic units can itself attain the status of a
unit:
In learning what a unicorn is, for example, a person pays explicit at-
tention to its horselike character, to the fact that it has just a single
horn, and to the location of this horn on its head. Once the notion has
the status of a unit, he evokes these specifications as a familiar gestalt,
and need not attend to them individually.
It is crucial for our undertaking that even though meanings can be seen as se-
mantic units, their components can still remain accessible. Langacker (1987:59)
11Models which do not incorporate meanings at all exist too (Teal and Taylor 2000; Roberts
et al. 2005; Hoefler 2006b).
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emphasises that “[i]t is important to observe that when a complex structure co-
alesces into a unit, its sub-parts do not thereby cease to exist or be identifiable
as substructures [...].” Without this fact, that is, if meanings only appeared as
unanalysable blocks, underspecification and overspecification would not be pos-
sible: as we have seen above, these two mechanisms build on the interlocutors’
ability to recognise individual parts within meanings, such as the recognition of
the inferable parts of an intended speaker meaning or of the ignorable parts of a
signal meaning.
On a similar note, it must be mentioned that the fact that the model works with
elementary semantic units (represented as upper-case characters) does not imply
that the existence of universal semantic primitives, as advocated, for instance, by
Wierzbicka (1972, 1989), is assumed: the model’s elementary semantic units can
simply be understood as representing conceptual units that the agent is capable
of identifying, without claiming that these conceptual units could not be bro-
ken down themselves into even smaller components. Langacker (1987:87) points
out that his conception of meanings as decomposable semantic units makes no
claim as to whether the smallest units of linguistic significance are necessarily
primitives. He rather asserts that units, even though they require no construc-
tive effort, must still be seen as relatively complex entities, and that the decision
to stop decomposing them at a certain level of abstraction is ultimately always
more or less arbitrary:
Semantic units are defined relative to knowledge structures, which
can be extremely complicated, even for units that are minimal for
most linguistic purposes (e.g. in one of its senses balk presupposes
extensive knowledge of baseball, but it is a minimal unit from the
standpoint of symbolic relationships). Analysis of knowledge struc-
tures can be carried out to whatever delicacy is required by linguis-
tic considerations, but the fundamental units uncovered in this way
need not be specifically linguistic, nor is it necessary to assume that
they ultimately reduce to a specified list of primitives. (Langacker
1987:87)
In summary, three general properties of meanings have been worked out here:
(i) meanings are conceptualisations, (ii) psychologically, they have the status of
units, and (iii) they are potentially decomposable into smaller units. The question
we have to answer now is whether these characteristics also apply to forms.
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4.2.1.2 Why forms are meanings
Forms are conceptualisations of certain types of producible behaviours (signals).
One is easily tempted to think of a form-meaning association as a mapping be-
tween something external or physical (a signal) onto something internal or psy-
chological (a meaning)—or vice versa. But in reality, a symbol maps the con-
ceptualisation of one external entity (a form) onto the conceptualisation of an-
other external entity (a meaning)—as Saussure (1916) pointed out, both forms
and meanings are psychological. Producible complex sound waves, for instance,
are conceptualised as phonemes. Gestures, in turn, can be conceptualised as
combinations of notions such as ‘up’, ‘down’, ‘fist’, ‘flat’, etc. (cf. e.g. Stokoe 1960,
1978). And, as I have already pointed out in section 3.3.1, a form can also be the
concept that a behaviour X is carried out before a behaviour Y, which can be
found in schematic constructions. In principle, there is no difference between
(i) a meaning being associated with another meaning and (ii) a meaning being
associated with a form. Take, for instance, the knowledge that movement often
implies intention and the knowledge that the word apple conventionally denotes
an apple. In both cases, the respective individual associates one concept with
another concept; the difference only lies in the type of relationship that holds
between the two associated concepts.
Langacker (1987:78) too makes the “seemingly contradictory but ultimately
rather obvious proposition that sounds (at least for many linguistic purposes)
are really concepts.” He points out that “sounds are like other concepts, which
normally involve coordinated specifications in various domains of semantic
space” (Langacker 1987:78). In the same way in which the concept of an apple
is derived from various perceptual inputs, sounds (or any other modification of
the physical environment that serves as a signal) are conceptualised on the basis
of respective perceptual inputs:
Because language is a cognitive entity, the speech signal must be re-
garded not just in physical but in psychological terms; the cognitive
representation of linguistic expressions derivesmost directly from au-
ditory impressions, and only indirectly from the sound waves that
give rise to these impressions. (Langacker 1987:78, emphasis in the
original)
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Langacker (1987:80) summarises the argument in the followingway: “[m]eanings
are conceptual entities, so the conceptualization of a sound can be considered a
meaning.” In other words: forms are meanings too.
Like other concepts, forms are psychological units: if they are sufficiently en-
trenched, they can be identified and produced without constructional effort. A
person, for instance, whose native tongue distinguishes between voiced and
voiceless fricatives will be able to identify the two respective classes of sounds
effortlessly because for this person, each of them has the psychological status
of a unit. In contrast, a person whose native tongue does not make this dis-
tinction will have to put constructive effort into recognising it because here, the
two sounds do not constitute distinct psychological units. (Langacker 1987:57
provides an analogue example with the capacity of a French and an English
speaker of producing an [u¨] sound.) Many phenomena of sound change (es-
pecially phonological reduction) can be seen as a result of the respective form
having come to be treated more as a unit and less as a composition of individual
components.
Like other concepts too, forms are decomposable into smaller units. While I may
treat voiced and voiceless fricatives as two distinct units that can be identified
and produced in an automatised fashion, I will still be able to recognise that the
two units have a common property (being a fricative) and a property that distin-
guishes them (being voiced or voiceless respectively). A gesture, even though it
may be carried out effortlessly, can still be analysed, for instance, in terms of the
type of movement it performed, the shape of the hand at the beginning, during
and at the end of the gesture, or whether it was carried out fast or slowly.
In summary, we can state that forms are meanings in the sense that they are
conceptual units that are potentially decomposable into smaller conceptual units.
From this fact, one must conclude that any concept (meaning) for which direct
evidence can be produced can theoretically become a form, and, conversely, that
any concept that is used as a form can possibly also be the information that is
“meant” in a communicative exchange. The phonological space, that is, the space
of all possible forms, is thus not distinct from the semantic space but rather a sub-
region of it. Langacker (1987:78) consequently defines a linguistic symbol as “a
correspondence between two structures in semantic space (broadly conceived),
where one of the two occupies the phonological subregion in particular.” In the
computational model, forms are thus represented just like meanings as sets of
upper-case characters that stand for elementary semantic units.
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4.2.1.3 Iconicity
Models of language evolution usually do not acknowledge the fact that forms
and meanings are “made of the same stuff:” different forms of representation
are chosen for forms on the one side and meanings on the other side. One con-
sequence of this design decision is that such models cannot represent the phe-
nomenon of iconicity, that is, they cannot model situations in which the form
resembles the meaning it is associated with. Iconicity is not only very frequent
in language (see e.g. Haiman 1980b, 1983, 2008; Givo´n 1990; Simone 1995; Keller
1998; Na¨nny and Fischer 1999) but can also be assumed to have played a vital,
albeit not exclusive, role in the emergence of many linguistic conventions (cf.
section 3.2.2; Keller 1998). It therefore seems appropriate that a computational
model that simulates language evolution can deal with this phenomenon. This
is the case for themodel introduced in this chapter—precisely because it properly
reflects the fact that forms are conceptual entities just like meanings too.
If we want to know what it means for a form and a meaning to resemble each
other, which is how iconicity is defined, we must ask how the similarity between
two concepts can be described. Two concepts are similar if some but not all of
their properties are the same. If all properties were the same, we would speak
of identity; if none were shared, the two concepts would be distinct. A form-
meaning association is therefore iconic if some semantic unit(s) contained in the
meaning also occurs in the form. Example (22) shows such an iconic relationship
between a form and a meaning as it may occur in the simulations: the semantic
unit X is contained in the form on the left-hand side as well as in the meaning on
the right-hand side.
(22) XY→ AXB
The representation employed in the present computational model can be used
to capture any sort of iconicity at an abstract level. Imagine, for example, that
someone paints a small yellow circle to signify the sun. The relation between
the sign and the signified object is iconic: the two resemble each other. Example
(23) shows how this scenario can be represented in the notation employed by the
computational model. Some of the properties are shared by both the drawing
and the sun (both are round and both are yellow-ish), others are specific to the
icon’s form (that it is a drawing or that it is small) or the icon’s meaning (that the
signified object is a celestial body or that it is hot).
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(23) a. C = celestial body(x)
D = drawing(x)
H = hot(x)
R = round(x)
S = small(x)
Y = yellow(x)
b. Icon: DRSY→ CHRY
Similar examples could be constructed for other instances of iconicity. The point
to remember is that the possibility to represent such phenomena in a compu-
tational model is a consequence of recognising that forms are meanings too.
This insight about the nature of forms can now be applied to our main problem,
namely how non-symbolic communication can be modelled.
4.2.2 Forms as signal meanings
In returning to the question of how non-symbolic communication can be in-
tegrated in the introduced computational model, it is important to remember
that both symbolic and non-symbolic communication are forms of ostensive-
inferential communication and that a unified model would thus only apply
one set of mechanisms of use and learning for both of them. The introduced
model simulates use as the process by which a signal meaning develops into
a speaker meaning—possibly by adding additional inferable information to
the signal meaning and/or by removing ignorable aspects of it. In symbolic
communication, the role of the signal meaning is played by a meaning that is
conventionally associated with the produced form. Non-symbolic communi-
cation by definition does not make use of conventions. Thus, if we want to
retain the developed mechanisms of use, we have to determine where the signal
meaning in non-symbolic communication comes from.
4.2.2.1 Representing the information contained in cues
We can define signal meaning as the information that the production of a cue
adds to the common ground of the interlocutors. In section 3.1.3, I have shown
that it is the addition of this information that consequently triggers and enables
the inference of the speaker meaning from the context. The computational model
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Figure 4.7: Modelling symbolic communication. The two figures depict the mechanisms of sym-
bolic communication at different levels of abstraction. (a) Symbolic communication as consisting
of two processes: coding and inference. This is the level of abstraction implemented in the com-
putational model. (b) Symbolic communication as a special case of ostensive-inferential com-
munication. This lower level of abstraction reflects the fact that coding is an inferential process
too.
is formulated at the level of abstraction represented by Fig. 4.7(a), which I origi-
nally introduced in section 3.1.4. The information that a form F adds to the con-
text is its conventional meaning M. At this level of abstraction, we can therefore
interpret the implication F→M as a function that tells us that the production
of F adds the information (i.e. signal meaning) M to the context. However, I
also argued in section 3.1.4 that, at a lower level of abstraction, the processes de-
scribed by Fig. 4.7(a) actually need to be understood as represented in Fig. 4.7(b).
By producing a form F as a cue, the communicator adds information to the com-
mon ground she shares with the addressee. The addressee uses this information
to draw inferences from context until he arrives at a relevant interpretation of
the communicator’s informative intention. (His recognition of her communica-
tive intention is presupposed here.) To arrive at an interpretation, the addressee
173
Context
relevant(CB)
C ! B
Ostension Cue
C
Inference
Message
CB
Addressee
Message
CB
Communicator
(a)
Context
relevant(CB)
C ! B
“Encoding” Signal
C
Inference
Cue
C
Message
CB
Addressee
“Code”
C ! C
Message
CB
Communicator
“Code”
C ! C
“Decoding”
(b)
Figure 4.8: Modelling non-symbolic communication. The two figures depict the mechanisms of
non-symbolic communication at different levels of abstraction. (a) Non-symbolic communica-
tion as described by the ostensive-inferential model of communication. The example shows the
production of a coin (C) as a cue to communicate that one has the money for the bus (B). (b) This
second figure shows how non-symbolic communication as depicted in (a) can be represented
by the introduced computational model without any change to the mechanisms of use that this
model employs, namely be equipping the agent with the knowledge that the production of any
producible cue (in the example, the produced cue is C) will add the information that that cue has
been produced to the common ground.
makes use of any sort of contextual knowledge, both symbolic (F→M) and non-
symbolic (M→N). This process remains the same if no symbolic conventions are
made use of in the interpretation of the provided cue. Fig. 4.8(a) represents such
a case of non-symbolic communication. It shows the example, described in sec-
tion 3.1.3, where a communicator produces a coin (C) as a cue to communicate
that he has the money he needs for the bus (B). No conventional form-meaning
association is made use of in this case of ostensive-inferential communication.
The question now is how we can represent this example at the level of abstrac-
tion assumed in the computational model.
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The solution can be found in our interpretation of the implication F→M as a
function that tells us that the production of F adds the information (i.e. signal
meaning) M to the context. In Fig. 4.8(a), the information that the cue C adds to
the context is C itself. We can consequently represent this fact as C→C: the pro-
duction of C adds the information (i.e. signal meaning) C to the context. At first,
this notation may appear tautological. However, we must be aware of the fact
that the left-hand side of the implication stands for the produced cue whereas
the right-hand side denotes the information that the production of the cue adds
to the interlocutors’ common ground. Any form F, upon production (and per-
ception), always adds at least information F to the common ground—after all,
this is the reason for producing it in the first place (cf. section 3.1.3). The im-
mediate information that an addressee recovers when a communicator produces
some form F as a communicative stimulus is the information that the respec-
tive form has been produced. On the basis of this first bit of information, he
might infer other information—for example, if he knows that the produced form
is associated with a conventional meaning. However, even in the absence of a
convention, he will still employ the information that F was produced as the ba-
sis for the inference of the speaker meaning from context. This fact is what the
implication F→ F expresses.
By adopting this notation, we gain the means to represent the example of non-
symbolic communication depicted in Fig.4.8(a) at the level of abstraction as-
sumed in the computational model without having to change the involvedmech-
anisms of use and learning, namely as shown in Fig. 4.8(b). The minimal “knowl-
edge” that a communicator will always have is the knowledge that any pro-
ducible behaviour will add the information that the respective behaviour was
produced to the common ground he shares with a potential addressee. In the
depicted example, the agent knows that (i) he can produce C, and that (ii) if he
does produce C, this information will be added to the context.12
4.2.2.2 Self-symbolisation
The introduced notion of F→ F can be seen as a limiting case of iconicity, where
not only some but all properties of a form and a meaning associated with it are
the same. Langacker (1987) states that in cases which I have analysed as a form
12Note that I only label this knowledge as “code” (NB in scare quotes) to indicate that it is
stored in the same way as symbolic conventions in the computational model.
175
serving as signal meaning, the form is used as a symbol for itself.13 He explains
that from a theoretical point of view, such cases are nothing else than “an ex-
pected limiting case in the spectrum of conceivable symbolic relationships” and
justifies his analysis by pointing out that “nothing in the definition of a linguis-
tic symbol—a correspondence between two structures in semantic space, one of
them phonological—inherently rules out the possibility that the two structures
might happen to be identical, i.e. that a phonological structure might symbolize
itself” (Langacker 1987:79ff.). To illustrate his claim, Langacker (1987:80) pro-
vides an example that contains both symbolic and non-symbolic aspects:
(24) The boy went [NOISE].
In sentence (24), the signal meaning is made up of the conventional meaning of
the form the boy went X as well as the conceptual properties of the form [NOISE].
Instead of providing a symbolic description of the noise that the boy produced,
the speaker makes a noise that has similar (or possibly identical) conceptual
properties. The linguistic part of the sentence thus represents a symbolic clue (the
form’s conventional meaning functions as signal meaning), whereas the non-
linguistic part constitutes a non-symbolic clue (the form itself serves as signal
meaning).
4.2.2.3 Simulating non-symbolic communication
In summary, the idea of self-symbolisation provides us with the notational pos-
sibility to represent a form alone just like a conventional form-meaning associ-
ation. It allows us to simulate non-symbolic communication in the introduced
computational model without having to modify the employed processes of use
and learning. The mechanisms of use implemented in the computational model
will treat the right-hand sides of these mappings as the signal meanings elicited
by the forms on the left-hand side, irrespective of whether form and meaning
are identical or not. Example (25) illustrates how non-symbolic communication
is simulated in themodel. It shows a situation where the agent does not have any
conventional form-meaning associations in his I-language: he only possesses the
capacity to produce a signal AC which is not associated with any conventional
meaning (yet).
13Note that Langacker uses the term “symbolise” in a more general sense than I have in this
chapter. My definition includes the notion of conventionality whereas his seems to be roughly
equivalent to the more general concepts of signifying or denoting. In this sense, the term “self-
symbolisation” may be somewhat misleading and should rather be “self-signification.”
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(25) Non-symbolic communication
Input: I-language: AC→ AC
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: B
Ignorable meaning: C
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AB, AC, ABC
Expressible signal meaning: AC
Output: Signal: AC
Updated I-language: AC→ AC
AC→ AB (new)
In the example, the agent needs to express a speaker meaningAB. He also knows
that the semantic unit B can be inferred from the context once A is given, and that
the semantic unit C would be ignored if it was part of the signal meaning. The
agent can convey the intended speaker meaning by producing the signal AC,
which provides direct evidence (cf. section 3.1.3.2) for one of the possible signal
meanings. This signal meaning at the same time under- and overspecifies the
speaker meaning: B needs to be inferred from context and C can be ignored.
After this usage event, a new association between the employed signal (AC) and
the communicated meaning (AB) is added to the agent’s I-language. This is the
first conventional form-meaning mapping that the agent comes to possess, and
it can later be re-used in an instance of symbolic communication. The under-
and overspecified use of a non-symbolic signal thus initiates the transition from
non-symbolic to symbolic communication. Note that this addition of the conven-
tional form-meaning mapping also introduces a first situation of polysemy: the
form AC can now be used to signify either itself (AC) or a conventional mean-
ing (AB) that is different from it. One can thus make the general statement that
every form, every concept for which direct evidence can be produced, has the
capacity to signify at least (i) itself, and potentially (ii) one or more conventional
meanings.
4.2.2.4 The initial state of a simulation
In the initial state of a simulation, the agent does not possess any conventional
form-meaning association in his I-language. All he is equipped with is a set of
producible forms. The sum of these forms constitutes the phonological space
177
available to the agent, which is itself a subset of the semantic space, the sum of
all concepts that the agent could possibly “mean” in communicative situations.
Such an initial state of a simulation is exemplified in (26). Note that the semantic
space and the phonological space within which a simulation can unfold are de-
fined by the experimenter: the former explicitly by providing a set of elementary
semantic units (fromwhich speaker meanings and context are randomly selected
in every iteration; see appendix A), the latter implicitly by equipping the agent
with an initial set of producible forms.
(26) Initial state of a simulation
Semantic space: all subsets of {A, B, C, ..., X, Y, Z}
Initial I-language
(producible forms): X→ X
Y→ Y
AZ→ AZ
Phonological space: all subsets of {X, Y, AZ}
What are the conditions under which an agent will be able to use such an initial
set of producible forms to convey some speaker meaning? One possibility is that
some of the available forms provide direct evidence for the speaker meaning the
agent needs to convey—a process which I have discussed in section 3.1.3.2. In
such a case, the agent can express the full speaker meaning explicitly by produc-
ing some of the available forms, as illustrated in example (27).14 Speaker mean-
ing (X), signal meaning (X) and the form of the signal (X) are identical. However,
non-symbolic communication by provision of direct evidence does not yield a
new, conventional form-meaning association (i.e. one where form and meaning
are not identical); it only entrenches existing forms as units.
14Note again that the recognition of the produced behaviour as a communicative stimulus is
presupposed by the model.
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(27) Production of direct evidence
Input: I-language: X→ X
Y→ Y
AZ→ AZ
Speaker meaning: X
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: –
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: X
Expressible signal meaning: X
Output: Signal: X
Updated I-language: X→ X
Y→ Y
AZ→ AZ
A transition from non-symbolic to symbolic communication can only occur in the
model if some initially available form exhibits pragmatic plasticity in use. Like
this, the model simulates both iconic as well as non-iconic cases of non-symbolic
communication. An iconic form-meaning association arises if the produced form
is not identical with the conveyed speaker meaning (as it is the case when direct
evidence is provided) but only resembles it. Such a situation occurs if some (but
not all) elements of the speaker meaning are inferred and/or if some (but not
all) elements of the signal are ignored, that is, in cases where the produced form
partially under- and/or overspecifies the speaker meaning. An example of such
a case is shown in (28). The new, conventional form-meaning association that
emerges from the depicted instance of non-symbolic communication (AZ→ AB)
is iconic: both form and meaning contain the semantic unit A.
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(28) Partial under- and overspecification
Input: I-language: X→ X
Y→ Y
AZ→ AZ
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: B
Ignorable meaning: Z
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AB, AZ, ABZ
Expressible signal meaning: AZ
Output: Signal: AZ
Updated I-language: X→ X
Y→ Y
AZ→ AZ
AZ→ AB (new)
However, the model also simulates cases where the relationship between an em-
ployed signal and the communicatedmeaning is not iconic. Themodel simulates
such cases of non-symbolic communication as shown in example (29). In the de-
picted situation, the whole speaker meaning (B) can be inferred once the speaker
has mademanifest his communicative intention by producing a stimulus (Y) that
is recognised as such in the present context. The whole signal meaning (Y) of the
signal itself is ignored. The signal meaning Y thus completely under- and over-
specifies the speaker meaning B. The result is the addition of a conventional
form-meaning association where form and meaning do not resemble each other,
that is, where the relationship between the two is not iconic.
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(29) Complete under- and overspecification
Input: I-language: X→ X
Y→ Y
AZ→ AZ
Speaker meaning: B
Inferable meaning: B
Ignorable meaning: Y
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: B, Y, BY
Expressible signal meaning: Y
Output: Signal: Y
Updated I-language: X→ X
Y→ Y
AZ→ AZ
Y→ B (new)
In summary, one can state the following points. While the production of di-
rect evidence does only further entrench an existing signal, any use of under-
and/or overspecification, any case in which the employed signal exhibits prag-
matic plasticity, results in the addition of a conventional form-meaning associ-
ation, a mapping where a form is associated with a meaning that is different
from its own conceptual properties. Symbolic communication, communication
that employs conventional meanings as clues, will thus emerge in the simulation
if situations occur where the form of an available non-symbolic signal is used
to under- and/or overspecify an intended speaker meaning. Note that the em-
ployed processes of under- and/or overspecification do not distinguish between
a non-symbolic signal (i.e. a form that is used to convey its own conceptual prop-
erties) and a symbol (i.e. a conventional form-meaning mapping). Non-symbolic
signals will continue to be employed if they help convey a speaker meaning even
when symbols are already available in other cases. The computational model in-
troduced in this chapter can therefore not only simulate the transition from non-
symbolic to symbolic communication but also the co-existence and combined use
of both these two forms of ostensive-inferential communication.
4.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced a computational model that is based on the
theoretical considerations presented in the previous chapters of the thesis. While
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most current computational models of language evolution study the effect of im-
perfect learning and represent use as a faithful process, this model is designed
to investigate the effect of innovative use and consequently makes the idealising
assumption that learning is faithful. In general, the model simulates an individ-
ual’s iterated involvement in communicative interactions and is aimed at study-
ing the evolution of that individual’s I-language in the course of this process.
One of the main questions addressed is how innovative use can be simulated.
To this aim, I have made the following points. In order to represent innova-
tive use, the model needs to reflect the distinction between signal meaning and
speaker meaning. This has not been done in existing computational models of
language evolution. I have argued that use is conventional if signal meaning
and speaker meaning are the same; it is innovative if they differ. In the latter
case, the signal exhibits pragmatic plasticity: the signal meaning under- and/or
overspecifies the speaker meaning. In each iteration of a simulation, the agent is
therefore presented with a randomly generated speaker meaning which he has
to convey in an also randomly generated context. This context determines if and
how the signal he employs can under- and/or overspecify the intended speaker
meaning. In summary, I have modelled innovative use as pragmatic plasticity, as
context-specific under- and/or overspecification of the speaker meaning. These
mechanisms are kept at an abstract level, so that the introduced computational
model can capture a wide range of innovative linguistic phenomena such as the
ones listed in the introductory chapter of this thesis.
The model employs a maximally simple form of learning, exemplar-based learn-
ing, to simulate the mechanism of entrenchment. Although exemplar-based
learning has a high psychological plausibility, it has only been applied very
sparsely in existing computational models. This form of learning only stores
observed data—in the case of the model the signal used and the communicated
meaning—without making any generalisations. The model simulates the en-
trenchment of form-meaning associations so that it is enforced through use and
decays through lack of use. Like this, infrequently used associations eventually
get lost, which creates an effect similar to the one caused by the learning bot-
tlenecks of models that, in contrast to this one, assume use to be faithful and
learning to be innovative.
Unlike many other models, the computational model introduced here can simu-
late symbolic as well as non-symbolic communication. I have argued that forms
andmeanings are reallymade of the same stuff: both are conceptual entities. This
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fact is reflected in the way forms and meanings are represented in the model,
namely as sets of elementary semantic units. One advantage of this representa-
tion is that iconicity can be modelled. Another one is that it allows the model to
reflect the fact that forms themselves can serve as meanings and thus to simulate
non-symbolic communication in the same fashion in which it simulates sym-
bolic communication. I have argued that in symbolic communication, the con-
ventional meaning of the signal serves as a clue (signal meaning) that triggers
the inference of the speaker meaning from the context, whereas in non-symbolic
communication, it is the form of the signal itself that performs this function. The
same mechanisms of use can be employed in both cases because these mech-
anisms apply to any form-meaning association, be it the association between a
form and its conventional meaning or the association between a form and its own
conceptual properties (self-symbolisation). The computational model thus not
only is capable of simulating the emergence of symbolic communication from
an initial state where only non-symbolic communication is available but also
accurately reflects the fact that symbolic and non-symbolic communication are
both instances of ostensive-inferential communication and employ the same set
of cognitive mechanisms.
In the next chapter, the computational model introduced here will be used to
address certain aspects of the design puzzle.
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CHAPTER 5
The design puzzle
The observation that language has the appearance of design for communica-
tion has proven defining for the course that the study of language evolution has
taken. Besides the emergence puzzle, the design puzzle has become the main
explanandum of evolutionary linguistics: how come language looks as if it had
been designed for the purpose of communication? As I have already mentioned
in the introduction to this thesis, the answers given to this question vary depend-
ing on whether language (or at least some core component of it) is assumed to
be a specific innate module of the mind or not, and I will only briefly recapitu-
late the main points here. The former position yields a biological explanation for
the design puzzle, the latter does not. Advocates of the innateness assumption, if
they do acknowledge that language has the appearance of design (note that some
very influential figures in the field, e.g. Chomsky, do not entertain this view) typ-
ically invoke natural selection as the only biological process that can bring about
complex adaptive structures and therefore the appearance of design. This is the
position advocated by Pinker and Bloom (1990) in their ground-breaking paper
on Natural language and natural selection. If, as is the aim of this thesis, we do
not want to make the innateness assumption, namely that the core of language
is a genetically determined, domain-specific biological module of the mind, but
rather presuppose that language is exclusively based on domain-general cogni-
tive capacities, we cannot resort to biological explanations. As detailed in chap-
ters 1 and 2, the processes of cultural evolution have been suggested as an alter-
native.
However, while models of the cultural evolution of language have shown that
these processes can indeed yield complex design, they have typically focused on
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design for acquisition rather than design for communication (cf. sections 1.1.2,
2.3.2.1 and 4.1.1). The objective of this thesis is consequently to devise a model of
linguistic cultural evolution in which the specifics of communication are made
more explicit. To capture these specifics, I have proposed the notion of pragmatic
plasticity. In chapter 3, I investigated the role of pragmatic plasticity with respect
to the emergence puzzle. In this chapter, I will do the same for the design puzzle,
and argue that pragmatic plasticity is one of the reasons why and how language
has come to exhibit the appearance of design for communication. I will first ad-
dress the question of what it actually means for something to exhibit design for
communication (section 5.1). I will then look at two specific “design require-
ments” for a communication system such as language: expressivity (section 5.2)
and signal economy (section 5.3). Finally, I will investigate what role pragmatic
plasticity plays with regard to a putatively dysfunctional property of language:
ambiguity (section 5.4). For each of these issues related to design for communi-
cation, I will provide a theoretical discussion as well as a set of simulations on
the basis of the computational model introduced in the last chapter.
5.1 Design for communication
Before I can discuss the role of pragmatic plasticity with regard to the emergence
of the appearance of design for communication, it is appropriate to define the
concepts in question. The aim of this section is hence to work out what it actually
means for something to have the appearance of design for communication. What
conditions does a symbolic communication system need to fulfil, what charac-
teristics does it have to exhibit, in order to have the appearance of design for
communication? I will tackle this question in two steps. First, I will discuss the
notion of design in general. I will ask what design is and how it can come about.
In a second step, I will then apply the gained insights to communication and
work out, at a general level, what design requirements a communication system
needs to meet.
5.1.1 What is design?
The notion of design refers to the relationship between the form or properties
of a cultural artefact or a biological trait and its function.1 It describes the fact
that, because of its properties, an artefact or trait is able to perform a certain
1The use of the term “form” in the sense of the totality of the properties of a cultural artefact
or biological trait is not to be confused with its use to denote one half of a symbol.
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function.2 Design can thus only be understood in relation to a goal that needs to
be achieved in a particular environment, and in relation to specific problems that
the environment poses to achieving the goal. An artefact or trait exhibits design
if its properties are functional, that is, if they provide a way of overcoming these
problems. We can thus only judge if an entity exhibits design, or the appearance
of design, if we are clear about what this design is for, that is, what goal it is meant
to achieve and what environment-inflicted obstacles it overcomes to do so.
The two-fold definition of design or functionality that I have suggested here cor-
responds to a similar account provided by Hurford (1990:96). Hurford points
out that for a tool—he mentions a spade and human language as examples—to
exhibit design, it must accommodate a purpose as well as a user. The former cor-
responds to what I have referred to as goal or function; the latter is included in
what I have described as the environment in which the goal needs to be achieved
and which may pose specific problems to doing so. In this context, I agree with
Kirby (1999:12f.), who, with regard to Hurford’s distinction, emphasises that de-
sign can only be understood properly if both aspects are considered in a unified
manner. Neither the goal alone nor the environment alone can define if an entity
exhibits design.
Design, or the appearance of design, can be brought about by three processes:
(i) biological evolution through natural selection, (ii) deliberate engineering, (iii)
cultural evolution. In biology, the appearance of design is used as an indicator
that a specific trait is an adaptation, that is, that it has been brought about by
natural selection. Natural selection is viewed as the only biological process that
can elicit complex design for some function. Therefore, if we acknowledge that
language exhibits complex design and if we assume that it is a specific, geneti-
cally determined capacity, we must conclude that it is the product of (biological)
evolution by natural selection (e.g. Pinker and Bloom 1990). It seems to me, how-
ever, that over the fascination that natural selection can bring about the appear-
ance of design, the obvious is sometimes almost forgotten. Actual design, in its
non-metaphorical sense, is the product of deliberate engineering. It is the result
of a conscious, purpose-driven problem-solving process. Recent developments
in genetic engineering aside, deliberate engineering does, of course, not produce
biological entities but cultural artefacts. However, and this is the second obvi-
ous fact that is often overseen, most artefacts of our culture are the result not
2Kirby (1999:1), citing Cziko (1995), characterises the appearance of design as a “fit” of form
and function and consequently interprets the design puzzle as a “puzzle of fit.”
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of a single, overarching problem-solving act of one individual but an accumu-
lation of a myriad of much smaller problem-solving acts performed over a long
period of time, that is, they are the product of cumulative cultural evolution as
described in chapter 2 of this thesis. The solving of many small problems may
eventually lead to an artefact that looks as if it had been designed to solve a
much bigger problem. Only through such cumulative cultural evolution could
artefacts of the complexity of aeroplanes, democratic institutions, computers, or
language, which each, as a whole, exceed the innovative capacities of a single
individual, have come about. However, it is not necessary—and probably not
even possible—that the agents involved in the individual steps leading up to the
cultural evolution of such an artefact are aware of the overarching problem the
artefact is eventually going to solve. Theymay simply focus on providing ad-hoc
fixes in the pursuit of smaller, momentary goals. After this brief characterisation
of the notion of design and the processes by which it can be brought about, we
can now turn to asking what it means for an entity to exhibit the appearance of
design for communication.
5.1.2 What is design for communication?
In order to determine what constitutes design for communication, we first have
to be clear about what communication is, in particular, what goal it has and what
obstacles have to be overcome to achieve this goal. I have already discussed the
foundations of communication in section 3.1, but it makes sense to recapitulate
the main points of this discussion here from the point of view of design. The goal
of communication is to transfer information from one individual’s knowledge to
another individual’s knowledge—ultimately to manipulate that other individ-
ual’s behaviour. An ideal communication system would thus allow humans
1. to communicate successfully
2. whenever they want (i.e. independently of the specific context)
3. whatever they want (i.e. all information that needs to be transferred)
4. at minimal cost (energy, time).
Note that I address the question of design for communication on a more general
level than Pinker and Bloom (1990). They base their analysis on very specific
assumptions about the nature of the transmitted information. I, on the other
side, ask what design for communication means in general, independent of the
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assumed structure of the communicated information. From this perspective, de-
sign for communication seems to come down to the four requirements listed
above.
The first problem that human communication needs to overcome is the fact that
humans are not telepathic and that information cannot be transmitted from one
mind to another directly. As I have already explained in section 3.1, the solution
to this obstacle is for the communicator to modify the physical environment of
the addressee in such a way that the addressee can infer the information the com-
municator wants to transmit. Ostensive-inferential communication, that is, the
use of ostensive stimuli or cues, thus meets the first design requirement listed
above. It ensures successful communication by providing a method of overcom-
ing the problem, caused by the environment in which human communication is
meant to happen, that one cannot directly manipulate one’s conspecifics’ minds.
However, the use of ostensive stimuli brings with it some restrictions: they do
not allow for humans to transmit information “whenever they want.” Rather,
the use of ostensive cues is only possible in specific contexts, as the interpreta-
tion of such communicative stimuli crucially depends on the availability of infer-
ence from context. A better-designed communication system would therefore be
one that allows for the transfer of information independently of (situation-specific)
context. As I have already shown in section 3.2.1, the use of conventionalised
form-meaning associations provides an answer to this design requirement. The
emergence of conventions thus also brings about a further level in the appear-
ance of design for communication.3 At this point, we can further specify the
original question and now ask by what properties a well-designed convention-
alised communication system can be characterised.
A communication system that uses conventionalised form-meaning associations
meets the first two requirements from the list above—it thus already exhibits the
appearance of basic design for communication. However, such a system fulfils
its communicative function better the closer it gets to meeting the second pair of
requirements too. To achieve the first of these two remaining requirements, the
expressivity of the conventionalised communication system must be maximised.
3A further aspect of the second design requirement, that communication be context-
independent, which I will not further discuss here, is the medium chosen for the ostensive stim-
uli. In general, sound may be better designed to meet this requirement than gesture. Bickerton
(2003:81) speculates that “[t]he original mixture of isolated grunts and gestures may have even-
tually settled on the vocal mode merely through the exigencies of communicating at night, over
distance, or in dense vegetation.” For an alternative approach, see Goldin-Meadow (2008).
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The second remaining requirement, namely that cost must be minimised—Croft
(2000:235) speaks of “the principle that speakers minimize the effort involved
in their linguistic expression (Keller 1994)”—has given rise to several notions of
economy or simplicity. We can distinguish between at least code simplicity, pro-
cessing economy and signal economy. Code simplicity, which is sometimes also
referred to as “grammar simplicity” or “representational economy”—has been
given some attention in recent computational studies of language evolution (e.g.
Brighton and Kirby 2001; Brighton 2003, 2005; Zuidema 2003; Roberts et al. 2005;
Hoefler 2006b). Langacker (1977:23) specifies that “code simplicity pertains to
the number of different fixed expressions, patterns, and locutions that a speaker
must learn, remember, and manipulate in use.” In this sense, a grammar that
exhibits code simplicity appears to be particularly well designed for acquisition.
Despite the fact that there may be certain empirical problems with the concept
(I have pointed them out in section 2.3.3.1), code simplicity is central to many
acquisition-driven models of language change and evolution (cf. section 2.3.2.1).
However, since code simplicity seems to constitute a form of economy that is
more closely linked to design for acquisition (and thus to notions such as the
poverty of the stimulus and the learning bottleneck, which I do not deal with in
this thesis) than to design for communication, I will not pursue it any further in
this chapter. Processing economy has usually been interpreted in terms of parsing
efficiency (e.g. Hawkins 1994, 2004; Kirby 1999) and has mainly been applied to
syntactic phenomena and therefore been grounded, at least to some extent, in
specific (generative) syntactic theories. In the introduced computational model,
a grammar exhibits higher processing economy the deeper the average entrench-
ment of its conventions are (relative to the frequency with which they are used).
This aspect of design for communication is maximised in the model if the agent
consistently selects (and thus also further entrenches) the most entrenched con-
structions. However, the aspect of cost minimisation that I will look at more
closely in this chapter is that of signal economy, that is, “economy in regard to
production of the physical speech signal” (Langacker 1977:102f.). This aspect
of simplicity, even though it is frequently invoked as a motivation for language
change, has as yet been given surprisingly little consideration in studies of lan-
guage evolution.
The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to a discussion of how these
two aspects of appearance of design for communication, expressivity and signal
economy, can come about in the course of linguistic cultural evolution. I will
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show that pragmatic plasticity plays a central role in this process just as it is re-
sponsible for the emergence of symbolic communication, that is, communication
by means of conventionalised form-meaning associations, in the first place.
Finally, the claim that language exhibits the appearance of design for commu-
nication is often countered by listing putatively dysfunctional4 features (e.g.
Chomsky 2002:106ff.). Pinker and Bloom (1990) deal with some of them5, but
they do not address the puzzle posed by ambiguity. My account of how expres-
sivity and signal economy come about, in contrast, will be complemented by a
discussion of the role that ambiguity plays in it. I will address this question in
the last part of the chapter.
5.2 Expressivity
One of the most defining features of human language, as opposed to the commu-
nication systems of other animals, is its vast expressive power. Pinker (2003:16)
calls it “[t]he most remarkable aspect of language.” Similarly, Hurford (2004:554)
speaks of a “huge quantitative gap” from non-human to human communication
systems. He mentions the sheer difference in size between “the inventory of
arbitrary symbols used by animals (up to about 30 distinct calls used by wild
chimpanzees) and the vocabulary of human languages, which contain many
tens of thousands of items.” Hurford goes on to point out that there is not just
a quantitative but also a qualitative difference: human vocabularies are learnt
whereas animal calls are innate. Curiously, a lot of consideration has been given
in evolutionary linguistics to the question of how humans can acquire such huge
symbolic systems, and why other animals cannot, but little has been said about
how such systems come about in the first place. The latter issue, it seems to
me, deserves to be much more at the forefront of evolutionary linguists’ inter-
ests. Wemust assume that a symbolic communication system started out small—
ultimately with a (hypothetical) “first symbol.” The question which arises then
is how we can get from a small initial symbolic communication system (or even
4In accordance with what has become convention in linguistics (see e.g. Kirby 1999:9–13 for an
overview), I will use the terms “functional,” “non-functional” and “dysfunctional” as referring
exclusively to the function of language in communication as opposed to any other function which
certain properties of language may serve.
5They show, for example, that the relative arbitrariness of many features of a language merely
constitutes a non-functional rather than dysfunctional property as long as the respective features
are shared in a community of speakers.
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a single symbol) to one as expressive and complex as language. This is the prob-
lem I will address in the following paragraphs, first theoretically and then by
means of computer simulations.
5.2.1 Pragmatic plasticity as an “expressivity-enhancement tool”
The crucial difference between human language and the communication systems
of other animals is not only (i) that the former is much more expressive than the
latter, and (ii) that the former is learnt while the latter are innate, but also (iii) that
the former is creative while the latter are not. Hockett (1960:8ff.) consequently
mentions linguistic creativity, which he refers to as “productivity,”6 alongside
displacement, duality of patterning and traditional transmission (i.e. the fact that
language is learnt rather than innate) as one of the defining design features of
human language. In short, linguistic creativity describes the processes by which
meanings which have never been expressed before come to be expressed. It is, of
course, closely related to the emergence puzzle discussed in chapter 3. Linguistic
creativity provides an explanation for why language is so highly adaptive to the
ever-changing communicative needs of human societies: humans have a way of
expressing novel meanings. And, as I will show in section 5.2.2 below, it thus
also accounts for how a small symbolic communication system can grow bigger
and become more expressive.
At some point, most computational models of language evolution face the prob-
lem of incorporating a process of linguistic creativity by means of which new
meanings can be expressed. Hurford (2002) compares a set of computational
models and points out that, in situations where their agents face the task of
having to express a meaning for which they have no form available in their I-
language, they resort to a process of invention by which they create a random
new form for that meaning. This is not to say that the respective models make
any theoretical claim about the role (or even presence) of invention in real lan-
guage use. Supposedly, invention is merely used as a maximally abstract repre-
sentation of other processes of linguistic creativity that are not further specified.
Models that employ invention thus resort to somewhat of a deus-ex-machina
6So-called combinatorial productivity, “in the sense that one can coin new utterances by
putting together pieces of familiar utterances, assembling them by patterns of arrangement also
familiar in old utterances” (Hockett 1960:6), is often singled out from linguistic creativity in gen-
eral. In this context, I refer to sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.3, where I have described how combinatorial
productivity can be seen as a special case of pragmatic plasticity.
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solution, which may be justifiable depending on the aim and focus of the respec-
tive model. Real invention, however, is relatively rare in language use; Trask
(2000:369), for instance, only mentions a handful of examples, such as blurb,
quark and googol and trademarks like Teflon and Kodak. Invention also presup-
poses that the innovating individual possesses some meta-linguistic knowledge
about the nature of symbols. Having to assume such meta-linguistic knowledge
is, of course, not ideal for an account of language evolution that aims to be rooted
in pre-linguistic (i.e. pre-symbolic) cognitive capacities. As part of an explana-
tion of how language became more expressive, invention can thus at best play
a marginal role: while we cannot exclude the possibility that cases of invention
have happened, it hardly seems to be the main process of linguistic creativity
that was at work in the evolution of linguistic communication.
In combination with the process of conventionalisation, pragmatic plasticity con-
stitutes an alternative form of linguistic creativity that does not have the prob-
lems that accompany the concept of invention. Pragmatic plasticity provides a
method of expressing a new meaning by means of an extant symbol in contexts
where it can be inferred that the conventional meaning of the produced form
only serves as a clue that leads to the actually intended meaning. The mecha-
nisms involved in this process, namely that conventional meanings can under-
and/or overspecify the meanings they communicate, have been introduced in
chapter 3, and how these mechanisms can be implemented in a computational
model has been demonstrated in chapter 4. Pragmatic plasticity uses extant sym-
bols as stepping stones to reach newmeanings that could not have been expressed
otherwise. When these new meanings become conventionalised, as explained
in section 3.2.1, they can themselves serve as stepping stones to reach yet an-
other set of previously inaccessible meanings. This process of iterated under-
and/or overspecified use and subsequent conventionalisation can bring about
the “ratchet effect” that Tomasello et al. (1993) describe for cultural evolution in
general (see chapter 2). Pragmatic plasticity thus allows the users of a symbolic
communication system to cumulatively explore new meaning spaces. I argue
that it is like this that an initially small system of symbols can expand its expres-
sivity and ultimately grow to the size of present-day human languages.
If we compare the two discussed forms of linguistic creativity, invention and
pragmatic plasticity, we find that pragmatic plasticity has a greater explanatory
potential and psychological plausibility with regard to language evolution. First,
it is more frequent in present-day language use. Second, as I have argued in
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chapter 3, pragmatic plasticity is not specific to symbolic communication but
constitutes a much older and more basic property that pertains to any form of
ostensive-inferential communication. It does not presuppose the existence of
symbolism nor the knowledge of what symbols are and how they work. Third,
because of the way pragmatic plasticity works as an integral part of ostensive-
inferential communication and because it only gradually turns into a new con-
vention, it is a less conscious (but also slower) process of linguistic creativity than
the purpose-driven invention of new symbols.
An issue that needs to be mentioned once more at this point (cf. section 4.1.2.2) is
that of communicative success. The computational models discussed in Hurford
(2002) employ invention to deal with cases where their agents would otherwise
not be able to express a desired meaning. Pragmatic plasticity may reduce the
number of such situations, but unlike the deus-ex-machina solution of invention,
it cannot totally prevent the occurrence of conditions in which an agent does not
have the means to express what he wants to say. However, I do not think that
the fact that communication is not always feasible constitutes a problem in the
first place. One can hypothesise, though, that the number of instances in which
such conditions occur decreases as the expressivity of the developed symbolic
communication system increases. This is a claim to be tested in the simulations
to be introduced below.
In summary, I propose that pragmatic plasticity provides humans with a “tool”
to enhance the expressivity of their symbolic communication systems. The intro-
duced conceptual model of the cultural evolution of language suggests that the
same processes that make ostensive-inferential communication possible and lead
to the emergence of symbolic conventions also allow such systems to adapt their
expressive power to the ever-changing communicative needs of human societies.
I now turn to exploring this hypothesis by means of computer simulations.
5.2.2 The development of expressivity in the model
In chapter 4, I introduced a computational model that can be used to study the
impact of pragmatic plasticity on the cultural evolution of language. By running
various simulations, I will now investigate how expressivity evolves in the pro-
posed model. I will apply the model in two main fashions. First, I will test the
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hypothesis that through iterated under- and/or overspecified use, the expres-
sivity of a symbolic communication system continuously adapts to the commu-
nicative needs of its user. Second, I will employ the model as a laboratory-like
environment to explore by what factors and how the development of the expres-
sivity of a symbolic communication system is influenced. I define expressivity as
the number of meanings a grammar can express, with the individual meanings
being weighted according to their probability of occurrence. A detailed account
of how the expressivity of a grammar is measured in the simulations is given in
appendix B.1.
5.2.2.1 Behaviour under idealised conditions
I begin my investigation by describing the general behaviour of the model with
respect to expressivity under simple, idealised conditions. Afterwards, I will dis-
cuss how that behaviour changes if individual parameters are altered. The setup
I use as a starting point is the following. I assume that the agent can discern four
semantic units A, B, X, Y, and that speaker meanings can contain up to two such
units. This means that the semantic space in which he operates consists of the
meanings A, B, X, Y, AB, AX, AY, BX, BY, XY.7 The agent is given the capacity to
produce two signals, X and Y, which are stored as self-symbolisations (X → X
and Y→ Y) in his initial “grammar.” The available phonological space thus con-
sists of X, Y and XY. In each generation, a maximum of one semantic unit will be
available as either inferable or ignorable information (refer to section 4.1.2.1 for
the definitions of these two types of contextual information).8 In this basic setup,
I will work with the idealisation that once-acquired constructions are not lost
even if their entrenchment has decayed considerably: the entrenchment thresh-
old t is set to 0. In the case of synonymy, the agent chooses a signal at random:
no specific synonym-selection strategy is assumed. The described conditions are
summarised in (1).
7Note that meanings are sets of semantic units: the order in which the units occur is thus not
relevant.
8I will use the term “context size” to refer to the amount of inferable and ignorable information
that is available in an iteration.
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Figure 5.1: The development of the expressivity of an agent’s grammar under idealised condi-
tions. The solid line represents the average expressivity over 100 independent runs. The dashed
line represents an individual run. The x-axis stands for the number of iterations the agent has
been exposed to and the y-axis for the expressivity of his grammar. The parameter set underlying
the simulation runs is specified in (1).
(1) Semantic units: A, B, X, Y
Maximal meaning complexity: 2 semantic units
Initial grammar: X→ X
Y→ Y
Maximal context size: 1 semantic unit
Entrenchment threshold: t = 0.0
Selection strategy: random
Fig. 5.1 illustrates the way the expressivity of the agent’s grammar develops un-
der such simple, idealised conditions. It presents expressivity as a function of
time or rather, more specifically, the number of iterations the agent has been
exposed to. The first observation that can be made from Fig. 5.1 is that the ex-
pressivity of the agent’s grammar rises steadily. There is no point in its devel-
opment where expressivity decreases. This illustrates the cumulative effect of
cultural evolution: if nothing is lost, the “ratchet” does not slip back. The second
observation that can be made is that the agent’s grammar eventually achieves
maximal expressivity. It reaches a state where every possible speaker meaning
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Figure 5.2: The development of communicative success. Both lines represent the average of the
respective value over 100 simulation runs under the conditions given in (1).
is represented as a conventional meaning in one of its constructions. In the pre-
sented setup, the expressivity of the agent’s grammar thus rises continuously
until it finally reaches its maximum.
Fig. 5.2 plots the average communicative success in each iteration (an iteration
is successful if the agent is able to produce an appropriate signal for the in-
tended speaker meaning) and compares the development of this number over
the course of the simulation with the development of the expressivity of the
agent’s grammar.9 This figure not only shows how much of the semantic space
the agent’s grammar covers but also how successful that grammar is in address-
ing the agent’s communicative needs. It can be observed that initially, the agent
is less likely to encounter an iteration where he is able to communicate the given
speaker meaning. However, as the expressivity of his grammar grows, this prob-
ability increases, until eventually, the agent can deal with every communicative
9Note that the term “communicative success” is used in a purely speaker-oriented sense here:
the agent’s communicative act is considered successful if he is able to produce a signal that con-
veys the given speaker meaning in the given context according to the procedures defined in the
production algorithm detailed in appendix A. The hearer’s role in successful communication
is only implied; the model rather makes the idealising assumption that a signal that meets the
requirements of the given context will successfully convey the intended speaker meaning.
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situation he is exposed to. We find here again the fact that the conventionalisa-
tion of form-meaning associations leads to increased context-independence. As
long as the agent does not possess a conventionalised construction for every pos-
sible meaning, the success of his communicative efforts depends on the specifics
of the contexts in which he attempts to convey his message. Once the agent’s
grammar has reachedmaximal expressivity, that context does not have an impact
anymore on whether the agent will be able to communicate the intended speaker
meaning or not. While he still may employ under- and/or overspecification, he
can always resort to fully specifying the intended meaning if necessary.
What Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 show is how the expressivity of a symbolic communication
system adapts to a static environment. I work with a static environment, that is,
with the idealised assumption that the communicative needs of the agent remain
the same over time, because it allows us to study the adaptive behaviour of the
system more clearly: a communication system is the better adapted to the com-
municative needs of its user the more expressive it is and the less frequently the
user is incapable of conveying an intended message. We have seen that under
the described idealised conditions, the communication system fully adapts to its
environment through iterated under- and/or overspecified use. However, the
real environment in which human language evolves is dynamic: human commu-
nicative needs change over time as new concepts need to be expressed and old
concepts are not referred to anymore. We can infer that a communication system
would maintain the observed general behaviour, that is, that it would continu-
ously move toward maximising its adaptation to the communicative needs of its
user, even in circumstances where the environment in which it unfolded were
dynamic, but that because the communicative needs would keep changing, it
would never quite reach maximal expressivity or would not maintain that state
for a long time.
5.2.2.2 Influencing factors
I will now investigate how the development of the expressivity of the agent’s
grammar changes if individual parameters are modified. To this end, I will take
the basic setup given in (1), modify its parameters and compare the behaviour of
themodel under themodified conditions with that under the original conditions.
The factors I will look at include the size of the semantic and the phonological
space, the complexity of the speaker meaning, the amount of inferable and ig-
norable information available in the context, the degree of loss, the employed
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Figure 5.3: The development of expressivity with semantic spaces of different size. Each line
represents the average development of expressivity over 100 independent simulation runs. |S|
indicates the size of the semantic space; the numbers in parentheses indicate the number of el-
ementary semantic units that occur in the semantic space. All other parameters are as in setup
(1).
selection strategy, and the structure of the semantic space. The aim is to explore
if certain conditions facilitate the adaptation of a symbolic communication sys-
tem to the communicative needs of its user, that is, if expressivity rises more
quickly and reaches higher levels under some conditions than under others.
The size of the semantic space. In the original setup, the semantic space is defined
by the four semantic units A, B, X, Y and the fact that individual speaker mean-
ings consist of maximally two such semantic units. I now describe what hap-
pens if one increases the number of identifiable semantic units while retaining
the meaning complexity. The conditions listed in (2), for instance, are identical to
those in (1) with the exception that twice as many semantic units can be identi-
fied by the agent: instead of the original four semantic units A, B, X, Y, the agent
can now discern eight, namely A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y, which increases the size of
the semantic space from 10 to 36 possible speaker meanings.
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(2) Semantic units: A, B, C, D, E, F, X, Y
Maximal meaning complexity: 2 semantic units
Initial grammar: X→ X
Y→ Y
Maximal context size: 1 semantic unit
Entrenchment threshold: t = 0.0
Selection strategy: : random
Fig. 5.3 illustrates the development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar
relative to the size of the meaning space. It shows that, other conditions being
equal, a symbolic communication system adaptsmore quickly to a smaller mean-
ing space than to a larger one: where the semantic space contains only 10 mean-
ings, maximal expressivity is achieved within 100 successful iterations, whereas
with a semantic space of size 36, this state is only reached after 500 successful
iterations; and it takes even longer for semantic spaces of size 55 and 78. Because
the agent’s grammar expands cumulatively over time, a smaller semantic space
is covered more quickly than a larger one if the starting point is the same.
The size of the phonological space. A higher number of semantic units also pro-
vides for more possibilities to modify the phonological space. In (3) below, I
have taken the conditions given in (2) but extended the agent’s initial grammar:
he is now capable of producing not only X and Y but also W and Z. The sub-
region of the semantic space that constitutes the phonological space has therefore
been extended from 3 possible meanings (X, Y, XY) to 10 (W, X, Y, Z, WX, WY,
WZ, XY, XZ, YZ).
(3) Semantic units: A, B, C, D, W, X, Y, Z
Maximal meaning complexity: 2 semantic units
Initial grammar: W→W
X→ X
Y→ Y
Z→ Z
Maximal context size: 1 semantic unit
Entrenchment threshold: t = 0.0
Selection strategy: : random
Fig. 5.4 illustrates what impact the size of the phonological space has on the de-
velopment of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar. It can be observed that a
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Figure 5.4: Development of expressivity with phonological spaces of different size. Either line
represents the average development of expressivity over 100 independent simulation runs. The
dashed line depicts the situation where the size of the phonological space P is 10, the solid line
where it is only 3. All other parameters are as in setup (2).
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Figure 5.5: Development of communicative success with phonological spaces of different size.
The depicted conditions are the same as in Fig. 5.4. Either line represents the average commu-
nicative success in a particular iteration over 100 independent simulation runs.
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Figure 5.6: Development of expressivity with different maximal meaning complexities. The solid
line plots the average development of expressivity over 100 independent simulation runs with
maximal meaning complexity |M|max=2 (i.e. a speaker meaning consists of maximally two se-
mantic units). The dashed line represents the average development of expressivity over 100 in-
dependent runs with maximal meaning complexity |M|max=3. In both cases, all other conditions
are as in (2).
larger phonological space gives the agent a “head start”: because more meanings
can be expressed independently of the specific context by producing direct evi-
dence for them, the agent’s communication system is initially more successful at
conveying the intended messages, and its expressivity consequently grows more
rapidly during that phase. This explanation for the difference between the two
cases depicted in Fig. 5.4 is confirmed by Fig. 5.5, which shows the development
of communicative success under the same conditions. The figure demonstrates
that a larger phonological space, or rather a larger initial grammar, means that
more iterations are successful right from the beginning, whereas with a smaller
initial grammar, iterations are only successful very rarely as long as not many
form-meaning associations have become conventionalised yet.
Meaning complexity. The size of the semantic space can be modulated not only
by the number of semantic units that an agent is capable of discerning but also
by the maximal complexity assumed for meanings. In the simulations discussed
so far, this complexity was set to 2: speaker meanings consisted of up to two
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Figure 5.7: Development of expressivity with different context sizes. The dotted line plots the
average development of expressivity over 100 independent simulation runs with maximal con-
text size |C|max=3, the dashed line represents the same for maximal context size |C|max=2, and
the solid line for maximal context size |C|max=1. All other conditions are as in (2).
semantic units. An increase of this number also means that a greater variety
of meanings can occur, so that we have to expect an effect similar to that of an
increase of the number of semantic units discussed above. This hypothesis is
confirmed by Fig. 5.6, which illustrates the development of the expressivity of
the agent’s grammar relative to different maximal meaning complexities. As
expected, it can be observed that, on average, expressivity rises slower and takes
more time to reach its maximum if speaker meanings are more complex.
The amount of inferable and ignorable information (context size). Fig. 5.7 illustrates
the effect that an increased context size has on the development of the expres-
sivity of the agent’s grammar: the more contextual information is available, the
more quickly expressivity rises on average. This makes sense from a theoretical
perspective too: the more material can be used to under- and overspecify the
intended speaker meaning, the larger will the degree to which pragmatic plas-
ticity is employed be. And since it is through the use of pragmatic plasticity that
new form-meaning associations become conventionalised, more possibilities for
pragmatic plasticity would have to lead to a faster increase in the expressivity
of the respective symbolic communication system. At the same time, the agent
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Figure 5.8: Development of communicative success with different context sizes. The depicted
conditions are the same as in Fig. 5.7. Either line represents the average communicative success
in a particular iteration over 100 independent simulation runs.
encounters fewer iterations in which he is not capable of producing an appro-
priate signal if he can make use of under- and/or overspecification more often
because, on average, larger amounts of inferable and ignorable information are
available. This observation is illustrated in Fig. 5.8, which plots the development
of communicative success for the three different maximal context sizes.
In summary, it can be observed that an increase in the complexity of speaker
meanings and an increase in the amount of inferable and ignorable information
that is available in an iteration have opposite effects. The more sophisticated
the meanings that the agent needs to express are, the more slowly the expres-
sivity of his communication system rises; but the more contextual information
he can make use of in individual communicative acts, the faster the expressivity
of his communication system grows. This observation is summarised in Fig. 5.9.
Increasing the maximal context size raises the curve that represents the develop-
ment of expressivity; increasing the maximal meaning complexity lowers it. An
increasedmaximal context size can thus cancel the effect of an increasedmaximal
meaning complexity, and vice versa. This is the important insight here: the effect
of an individual factor, as clear as it may appear in isolation, can be mitigated by
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of the opposite effects of meaning size and context size on expressivity.
Each line plots the average development of expressivity over 100 independent simulation runs
under the conditions given in (2). The solid line represents a “neutral” case with maximal mean-
ing complexity |M|max=2 and the maximal context size |C|max=1. In comparison to the solid line,
the dashed line shows the effect of increasing the maximal context size (from 1 to 3), and the
dotted line shows the effect of increasing the maximal meaning complexity (from 2 to 3).
the effect of another factor that occurs together with it. A large semantic space
may take long to explore if only little contextual information is made use of but
can be covered quickly if large amounts of inferable and ignorable information
are available.
The rate of loss. The development of the expressivity of an agent’s grammar
changes if loss is introduced into the simulation. Remember that the compu-
tational model provides the option to define an entrenchment threshold: any
form-meaning association whose entrenchment falls below that threshold will
be lost (i.e. “forgotten”) by the agent (cf. section 4.1.3.2). The threshold can be set
to any value between 0 and 1. If the threshold is set to 0, as it was in all simula-
tion runs discussed so far, no form-meaning pair is ever lost; if it is set to 1, none
is ever remembered. The entrenchment of a construction is enforced through use
and decays through lack of use.
Figs. 5.10(a) and 5.10(b) illustrate the effect that the introduction of loss has on
the development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar. Both figures show
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Figure 5.10: Development of expressivity with and without loss. In both figures, the solid line
represents the average over 100 independent simulation runs and the dashed line represents an
individual run. (a) The development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar without loss.
(b) The development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar with loss: any form-meaning
mapping whose entrenchment fell below the threshold t = 0.5 was removed from the agent’s
grammar. All other parameters are as specified in setup (1).
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Figure 5.11: Development of expressivity with different loss rates. Each line represents the aver-
age over 100 independent simulation runs. The degree of loss (determined by the entrenchment
threshold t) varies between the lines; all other parameters are those listed in (1).
simulations run under the conditions given in (1) above, with the only difference
that Fig. 5.10(a) renders the situation as it is if there is no loss whereas Fig. 5.10(b)
plots the development if there is loss. A first observation to be made is that if loss
is introduced to a simulation, the expressivity of the agent’s grammar does not
rise steadily anymore: it experiences frequent setbacks. While in Fig. 5.10(a), ex-
pressivity increases continuously, in Fig. 5.10(b), it often falls back to lower levels
again—even though an overall rise of expressivity can still be observed. This pic-
ture complies with the claimsmade by the ratchet model of cultural evolution (cf.
section 2.1.2.2): for the ratchet effect to be most effective, cultural artefacts have
to be preserved as faithfully as possible over time; the more loss occurs, the more
often the ratchet “slips back.”
A second observation that can be made is that, as a consequence of the slippage
introduced by loss, expressivity rises more slowly if loss occurs. This fact is
documented in Fig. 5.11, which shows the development of the expressivity of the
agent’s grammar for different rates of loss. The general rule that becomes evident
from this figure is that the higher the rate of loss, the more slowly expressivity
increases. The question arises whether expressivity also stabilises at lower levels
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Figure 5.12: Development of expressivity with different loss rates over longer time. These two
figures plot the average development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar under the con-
ditions shown in Fig. 5.11 over the course of (a) 1,000 iterations and (b) 10,000 iterations.
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and does not reach its maximum if the agent’s grammar is exposed to a relatively
high degree of loss. Fig. 5.11 does not suffice to answer this question: while the
expressivity curves for the cases with loss do not reach the theoretical maximum
within the represented number of transmissions and flatten much earlier than
the curve of the case without loss, they continue to rise—if ever so slightly—till
the end of the timespan shown. Fig. 5.12(a) represents the same set of simulations
but plots the development of expressivity over not just 100 but 1,000 iterations.
We recognise that all curves exhibit much higher levels of expressivity: one of
them even reaches the maximum, and none of them has completely flattened by
the end of 1,000 iterations. This trend is repeated in Fig. 5.12(b), which represents
the development over 10,000 iterations. Within this timespan, another curve has
all but reached the maximum (t = 0.5), and even the grammars with the highest
represented entrenchment threshold (t = 0.75) have reached an expressivity of
more than three quarters. We can conclude that even though grammars that are
exposed to higher rates of loss grow much more slowly, they still seem to come
to exhibit high expressivity after a sufficient amount of time.
The simulations provide us with two interesting insights about the evolution of
the expressivity of a symbolic communication system. First, memory is impor-
tant. The more past usage events are remembered, and thus available for re-use
in future usage situations, and the longer they are remembered, the more likely
a system is to get “off the ground” within a relatively short timespan. Second,
time and the frequency with which communicative interactions happen are also
important. Reduced memory does not necessarily mean that a symbolic com-
munication system does not evolve at all—it simply takes much more time, or
rather a much higher number of communicative interactions. Even with a rela-
tively small percentage of past usage events being remembered, such a system
can eventually become as expressive as one that grew in conditions where every-
thing is remembered. These insights allow us to speculate about some of the rea-
sons why humans have evolved language but other apes have not: an increased
memory and a drive (or need) for more frequent communicative interaction may
be part of what made the difference.
The synonym-selection strategy In section 4.1.2.3, I have explained that the agent
sometimes faces situations in which more than one signal meets the requirement
of being able to convey the intended speaker meaning. In such situations, the
agent has to choose one of the possible signals. I have also pointed out that
humans select signals for a variety of reasons—many of them sociolinguistic or
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register-related—and that therefore the neutral way of modelling this process is
to have the agent choose one of the possible signals at random. On the other
hand, pragmatic theories suggest that such sociolinguistic reasons only come
to work after a number of more fundamental pragmatic principles have been
applied. In the model, these principles correspond to the agent choosing either
(i) the signal whose signal meaning underspecifies the speaker meaning most
or (ii) the signal where the constructions involved in producing the signal are
most entrenched. I will therefore compare simulation runs in which one of these
two strategies has been applied consistently by the agent with simulation runs
in which the agent has chosen randomly.
The first observation to be made is that if there is no loss, the employed selec-
tion strategy does not have an impact on the development of the expressivity
of the agent’s grammar. This is illustrated by Fig. 5.13(a). The figure shows no
variation in the behaviour of the model: no matter what selection strategy the
agent applies, the expressivity of his grammar evolves in the same way. The
picture changes once loss is introduced into the simulations. Like Fig. 5.13(a)
before, Fig. 5.13(b) plots the development of the expressivity of the agent’s gram-
mar under the employment of various selection strategies—but now under the
condition that there is a certain degree of loss. A comparison of the two figures
shows that the presence of loss entails that the choice of a selection strategy has
an impact on the development of expressivity. In general, we can observe an
increased variation between the plotted lines.
Themost conspicuous effect can be observed if the agent consistently chooses the
most entrenched signal. This strategy performs worse than the other two: the ex-
pressivity of the agent’s grammar increases slower under this condition. At first,
this finding may seem surprising. It can, however, be explained. By producing
a signal, an agent also further entrenches the form-meaning mappings involved
in the production of that signal. If in any situation where more than one signal is
possible, the signal that is most entrenched is selected, the differences between
the entrenchment of individual mappings become more prominent. Over time,
the result is a grammar that contains a number of highly entrenched construc-
tions and a number of scarcely entrenched constructions. Whenever a case of
synonymy occurs, this dichotomy is further enforced: some already highly en-
trenched form-meaning associations are entrenched further and the only weakly
entrenched ones experience further decay. The result of this dynamic is that more
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Figure 5.13: Development of expressivity with different selection strategies being employed.
Both figures plot the development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar if specific strategies
are employed to select among synonyms. Each line represents the average over 100 simulation
runs. The assumed conditions are those listed in (2). (a) Without loss (entrenchment threshold
t = 0.0): the choice of selection strategy has no impact on the development of expressivity. (b)
With loss (entrenchment threshold t = 0.5): the impact of the chosen selection strategy shows
more variation. The strategy of selecting the most entrenched signal performs worse than the
other strategies because it amplifies the negative effect that loss has on the growth of expressiv-
ity.
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loss occurs because there are more constructions with only minimal entrench-
ment. And, as we have already seen above, a higher degree of loss means that
the expressivity of the agent’s grammar cannot rise as fast as it would other-
wise. The psychologically most plausible selection strategy (cf. section 4.1.2.3),
namely to choose the most entrenched signal, thus performs worst if exposed to
loss because it amplifies the effect that loss has on the evolution of a grammar’s
expressivity.
The structure of the semantic space. Cross-linguistic studies, in particular of gram-
maticalisation, show that there is a certain regularity to semantic change (e.g.
Heine and Kuteva 2002; Traugott and Dasher 2005). One consequence of this is
the relative uni-directionality of grammaticalisation (see e.g. Hopper and Trau-
gott 2003:ch. 5). As I have shown in chapter 3, what becomes conventionalised,
and therefore how a linguistic code changes semantically, crucially depends on
the specific types of inferences that can be drawn in individual usage situations.
A large part of how the English expression be going to became grammaticalised,
for instance, depends on the fact that an act of spatial motion frequently involves
intention. Here we have a case of two concepts co-occurring in the world in a
way that the one can often be inferred from the presence of the other. Semantic
space is thus not totally random but exhibits some structure: in general, certain
concepts are communicated by agents more frequently than others, and some
concepts often occur in the company of others.
Since such environmental structure appears to play a crucial role in many known
phenomena of semantic change, it makes sense to look at the impact that pat-
terns in the semantic space may have on the development of the expressivity of
the agent’s grammar. Up to this point, the semantic space of the simulations run
had a flat structure: all semantic units were equally likely to occur in speaker
meanings, and all semantic units were equally likely to occur as part of the con-
textual information. I will now compare the behaviour of the model under such
circumstances with its behaviour in cases where its semantic space does not have
a flat structure, that is, with cases where not all semantic units occur with equal
probability.
I hypothesise that especially two aspects of the probability structure of a seman-
tic space have an impact on how the expressivity of an emerging communication
system develops: (i) the likelihood for producible semantic units (i.e. semantic
units that are part of the agent’s phonological space and can thus directly be
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Semantic Converse Parallel Frequency of
unit structure structure producible and
non-producible units
PM PC PM PC
Pattern 1 Pattern 2
A 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.49 Non-producible units
frequent
B 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.49
X 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.01 Producible units
infrequent
Y 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.01
Pattern 3 Pattern 4
A 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.01 Non-producible units
infrequent
B 0.01 0.49 0.01 0.01
X 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.49 Producible units
frequent
Y 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.49
Table 5.1: Four probability patterns for the semantic space of the basic setup. The semantic units
X and Y are directly producible (i.e. they are part of the agent’s phonological space), the semantic
units A and B are not directly producible.
produced as units of form) to occur in the speaker meaning, and (ii) the likeli-
hood of non-producible semantic units to be inferable from context. The intuitive
assumption would be that a system “kicks off” more easily if the available pro-
ducible units frequently occur in the meaning the agent needs to communicate.
Likewise, we can hypothesise that the expressivity of a grammar is more likely
to expand substantially if non-producible meanings can frequently be inferred
from the context.
To study these two hypotheses, I have devised the four different probability pat-
terns listed in Table 5.1. Each pattern represents the probability distributions of
a semantic space that is made up of four elementary semantic units (A, B, X,
Y) as in setup (1). Two of these units (X and Y) can directly be produced by
the agent—they constitute units of form; the other two units (A and B) are not
directly producible. Every unit is assigned two probability values: (i) the prob-
ability with which it occurs as part of the speaker meaning that the agent needs
to communicate in an iteration, and (ii) the probability with which it occurs as
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Value for PM Value for PC Effect
high high likely to occur in the speaker meaning
and likely to be inferable
high low likely to occur in the speaker meaning
but unlikely to be inferable
low high unlikely to occur in the speaker meaning
but likely to be ignorable
low low unlikely to occur in the speaker meaning
but also unlikely to be ignorable
Table 5.2: The effect of specific probability combinations on the occurrence of individual semantic
units.
part of the contextual information, that is, the probability with which it consti-
tutes inferable or ignorable information in a particular usage situation. I refer to
the former as PM and to the latter as PC. The distributions of PM and PC do not
necessarily need to stand in any relation to each other. However, to study the ef-
fects of the structure of the semantic space, I will focus on two limiting cases that
deviate most clearly from the flat structure applied so far. The first case, found in
patterns 2 and 4, is one where the two probability distributions are parallel: PM
and PC are the same for any semantic unit. In the second case, found in patterns
1 and 3, the two distributions are converse: PM is high where PC is low, and vice
versa.
To understand what it means for a semantic unit to have high or low values for
PM and PC, we need to have a brief look at the specifics of the algorithm that gen-
erates the contextual information (i.e. inferable and ignorable meaning) for each
iteration.10 This algorithm works as follows. It first randomly selects a number
of semantic units according to their probabilities of occurrence. Then, the algo-
rithm determines for each selected unit whether it is meant to be inferable or
ignorable in the present context. Units that have also been selected to be part of
the speaker meaning are turned into inferable meaning, units that do not at the
same time occur in the speaker meaning constitute ignorable meaning. Table 5.2
lists the effects that the combination of specific values for PM and PC can have on
10The details of the algorithm are given in appendix A.3.
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the occurrence of individual semantic units. A semantic unit with high values
for both PM and PC is likely to occur in a speaker meaning and to be inferable
at the same time: it can frequently be left underspecified. A semantic unit with
a high value for PM but a low value for PC, on the other hand, is likely to occur
in a speaker meaning but unlikely to be inferable: it will frequently have to be
specified explicitly. If, on the other hand, a semantic unit has a low value for PM,
it is unlikely to occur in a speaker meaning—but if, at the same time, its value
for PC is high, it will be likely to constitute ignorable meaning and thus often be
available for use in overspecification.
The four patterns in Table 5.1 are also different from one another with regard to
whether the producible units X and Y frequently occur as part of the speaker
meaning. In patterns 1 and 2, they only seldom constitute part of the meaning
that the agent needs to communicate, whereas they are frequently part of the
speaker meaning in patterns 3 and 4. In summary, the four patterns can be de-
scribed as follows:
• Pattern 1: The speaker meaning frequently consists of semantic units that
are not directly producible as forms. However, these units are rarely infer-
able from the context. Producible units, on the other hand, often constitute
ignorable information but seldom occur as part of the meaning that the
agent needs to communicate.
• Pattern 2: The speaker meaning frequently consists of semantic units that
are not directly producible as forms. These units are also often inferable
from the context. Producible semantic units rarely occur at all, whether in
the speaker meaning or as inferable or ignorable information.
• Pattern 3: The speaker meaning frequently consists of units that are directly
producible as forms. Non-producible units rarely occur in the speaker
meaning, but if they do, they are likely to be inferable from context. They
also often constitute ignorable information.
• Pattern 4: The speaker meaning frequently consists of directly producible
units, which are often inferable from the context at the same time. Non-
producible units, on the other hand, rarely occur at all, whether as part of
the speaker meaning or as inferable or ignorable information.
Fig. 5.14 plots the development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar for
the four patterns as well as for a semantic space with a flat probability distribu-
tion. It confirms the two formulated hypotheses. First, the system gets off the
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Figure 5.14: Development of expressivity for semantic spaces with different probability patterns.
Each line plots the average development of the expressivity of the agent’s grammar over 100
independent simulation runs. The conditions are as in setup (1); only the probability structure of
the semantic space varies between the lines. The individual probability patterns are detailed in
Table 5.1.
ground faster if the speaker meaning frequently consists of producible seman-
tic units: the initial increase of expressivity is substantially steeper for patterns
3 and 4, where this is the case, than for the flat distribution. Where the occur-
rence of producible units in the speaker meaning is rare (patterns 1 and 2), the
initial rise of expressivity is even slower. The second hypothesis stated that sys-
tems growmore expressive if non-producible units are frequently inferable from
context. This hypothesis is confirmed in the development for patterns 2 and 3
compared to patterns 1 and 4 respectively. Pattern 1 cannot get its expressiv-
ity off the ground: producible units rarely occur in the speaker meaning and
non-producible meanings are seldom inferable. Pattern 2, in contrast, also rarely
encounters producible units as part of the speaker meaning. However, after a
certain delay, it still manages to reach maximal expressivity because, once the
groundwork has been laid, the frequently occurring non-producible meanings
can be inferred from the context. Patterns 3 and 4 are both very successful ini-
tially because producible units often constitute part the speaker meaning. But, in
contrast to pattern 3, pattern 4 fails to reach maximal expressivity (at least within
the displayed 1,000 iterations) because the remaining non-producible meanings
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are only rarely inferable from the context. The analysed simulations thus suggest
that the expressivity of a symbolic communication system grows the faster the
more likely the communicated meanings are to contain semantic units that are
directly producible as forms and the more frequently non-producible semantic
units can be inferred from the context.
5.2.2.3 Summary and interpretation
With the described simulation runs I have shown that the developed conceptual
and computational model of cultural evolution has the explanatory capacity to
account for how, over time, the expressivity of a grammar adapts to the commu-
nicative needs of its users. The simulations have all been run in a static environ-
ment: the semantic space did not change over time. But since the mechanisms
by which the grammar adapts to its environment remain the same whether or
not that environment is static, we must assume that even in the fast-changing
environment of human societies, language continuously adapts to whatever its
environment looks like at the moment. Its adaptive processes are blind to the
fact that the semantic space might have changed since the last usage event. The
core point that the simulations illustrate, however, is how the expressivity of a
grammar can grow from “nothing,” and how the number of situations in which
the agent is not capable of communicating what he wants to goes down as the
expressivity of his grammar increases.
The simulation runs discussed here have also shown that the degree to which
a symbolic communication system comes to be adapted to the communicative
needs of its users, and the time it takes to get there, can be facilitated or hindered
by a variety of factors, such as (i) the degree of loss, (ii) the size of the semantic
space, (iii) the relative size of the phonological space, (iv) the complexities both of
the available contextual information and of the speaker meanings to be commu-
nicated, (v) the employed strategy to choose from among synonyms, and (vi) the
probability structure of the semantic space. Under the conditions I have looked
at, the following factors have proven to be advantageous to the adaptive process:
(i) a smaller semantic space, (ii) a larger phonological space, and, within the same
semantic and phonological space, (iii) larger amounts of available contextual in-
formation, (iv) less complex speaker meanings, and (v) a minimised amount of
loss. Especially in the initial phase of the evolution of a symbolic communication
system it seems to be helpful if either producible semantic units occur frequently
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in the speaker meaning or otherwise non-producible semantic units are at least
frequently inferable from the context.
It could also be observed that the impact of some factors only comes to bear if
there is a certain degree of loss: which strategy the agent employs to choose from
a set of synonyms, for instance, has no bearing on how well a communication
system adapts as long as there is no loss, but if there is loss, its negative effect
is even amplified if the agent always chooses to produce the most entrenched
signal. The simulations illustrate that language evolution is a complex adaptive
system. Some parameters in this system have a very clear effect (the absence of
loss, for instance, is always advantageous) whereas the impact of others varies
depending on what other parameters they co-occur with. This fact demands that
any generalisation derived from the simulations must come with the caveat that,
ultimately, all observations may be specific to the particular conditions under
which they have been made.
5.3 Signal economy
Signal economy is another aspect of language that can convey the appearance of
design for communication. Historical linguists have documented that the forms
of individual constructions are often reduced in the course of language change.
From this observation, they infer that there is a pressure for signal economy in
language use—which is frequently identified as one of the prime causes or “mo-
tivations” for language change besides expressivity (e.g. by Zipf 1935; Langacker
1977; Keller 1994; Hopper and Traugott 2003; Croft 2000; Levinson 2000) and is
often related to routinisation and frequency of use (e.g. Givo´n 1979; Bybee 1985,
2002; Haiman 1983, 1994)
The bias of language users towards signal economy can be explained by the fact
that articulation constitutes a bottleneck for communication: it slows down the
transmission of information. I have explained before that the transfer of informa-
tion from one individual’s mind to another’s is only possible indirectly by means
of modifying the shared physical environment (cf. section 3.1.1). I will refer to
this process of modifying the physical environment as articulation—which is to
be understood in the broadest sense here, including the production of speech sig-
nals just as well as the production of gestures or any other behaviour that serves
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as an ostensive stimulus. Levinson (1995:95f.) characterises articulation as a “rel-
atively slow and inefficient process, which acts as a bottleneck in the entire com-
municative procedure.” He claims that we can think faster than we can speak.
As evidence, Levinson lists the observations that (i) we can perform complex
planning tasks while we speak, (ii) we have no problems understanding pitch-
corrected speech at double speed, and (iii) we are able to scan a printed page far
faster than we could read it aloud. He concludes that “[p]sycholinguistic evi-
dence [Levinson refers to Wheeldon and Levelt (1995) and Mehler et al. (1993)]
seems to suggest that all the other processes in the entire complex chain of pro-
duction and comprehension systems could run three or four times faster than the
normal pace dictated by the articulation process” and that therefore “[t]he artic-
ulation bottleneck in human communication raises interesting questions from a
design perspective: any trade-off from coded content to inferential meaning may
greatly increase the speed of communication.” (Levinson 1995:96).
However, the question this argumentation does not answer yet is why less time-
consuming articulation should be advantageous to the goal of transferring in-
formation and therefore constitute an aspect of design for communication in the
first place. If we want to say that a communication system that employs shorter
signals is better designed for communication than an equally expressive one that
uses longer signals because, on average, the former takes less time to transfer the
same information than the latter, then we first have to explain why the speed at
which some information can be transferred matters at all. What can be gained
from being able to communicate faster? Two answers can be given to this ques-
tion: a functional one and a non-functional one.
For one, the longer communication takes, the more likely it is to fail to achieve
its goal. This may be due to three reasons. First, the environment may make it
necessary that the respective information be available as quickly as possible. If
we are hunting together, and I happen to see a gazelle that I want you to shoot,
then I need to convey this information to you as long as the gazelle is still there.
Or if I want to warn you of an approaching danger, I also need to make that
danger manifest to you in time so that you can still escape it. If I communicate
too slowly, I will not achieve my goal of making you shoot the gazelle or making
you flee the impending danger. To use Austin’s (1962) terms, my speech act will
fail to have the intended perlocutionary effect. Second, by employing long and
cumbersome signals, the communicator may be faced with the addressee’s pro-
cessing and memory limitations. Due to this, communication will, at least partly,
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fail. Third, if the transmission of information takes too much time, the communi-
cator may loose the addressee’s attention. As Sperber and Wilson (1995:vi) point
out, “[t]o communicate is to claim an individual’s attention.” As a speaker, I have
a very selfish interest in being fast because I want to convey some information to
manipulate your behaviour, and I can only do so while I have your attention—
which might fade quickly. In summary, all three mentioned points imply that
the goal of a communicative act is more likely to be achieved the less time the
communicative act consumes.
In addition, speakers (and hearers) may have an interest in shorter signals be-
cause they come at a lower cost. The fewer signals I need to produce, and the
shorter they are, the less energy (and time) I will spend to achieve my goal. For
the same reason, the addressee’s attention span may be limited: paying attention
comes with some cost, which the respective individual may attempt to minimise.
The argument from cost is not functional with regard to communication: its mo-
tivation has nothing to dowith the goal or perlocutionary effect that communica-
tion attempts to achieve—but minimising cost may itself be seen as a component
of that goal (and in fact, as part of any goal envisaged by human behaviour).
The conclusion is this. A communication system whose average signal length
is smaller is better adapted to the articulation bottleneck than one whose aver-
age signal length is higher. Because articulation is the slowest part of the com-
municative process, having shorter signals increases the speed at which speaker
meanings can be transferred, which in turn makes it more likely that the respec-
tive communicative act is successful and at the same time minimises the cost at
which the goal of the communicative act is achieved. A relatively low average
signal length therefore adds to the appearance of design for communication.
I will now investigate the explanatory potential of the introduced model of lan-
guage evolution with regard to this aspect of the appearance of design for com-
munication. In particular, I will look at the role that pragmatic plasticity plays
in the emergence of grammars that are better adapted to the articulation bottle-
neck. To this aim, I will first discuss how pragmatic plasticity can be conceived
as offering “tools” to reduce signals and then study with the help of simulations
how the average signal length of a grammar develops in the model and what
role pragmatic plasticity plays in this process.
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5.3.1 Pragmatic plasticity as a “signal-reduction tool”
I suggest that it is helpful to approach the role of pragmatic plasticity in the
emergence of signal economy from a perspective informed by information the-
ory: language users face a typical data-compression problem (Sayood 2006 offers
a comprehensive exhibition of issues related to data compression and constitutes
the standard text of this technical domain). Because of the articulation bottleneck,
it is advantageous (for communication) to minimise the length of the employed
signals in individual speech acts. The question is how a language user can reduce
the length of the signal that his grammarmakes available for an intended speaker
meaning.
A first way to reduce the length of a signal is to drop some of its phonological
material. That speakers do this has frequently been documented in studies of
language change. Such behaviour has often been “fossilised” in a language: it
then led to an erosion of the form and the permanent loss of the temporarily
dropped phonological material, for example in cases of aphaeresis (the loss of
a word-initial vowel as in opossum > possum), apocope (the loss of a word-final
vowel or any word-final segment as in Old Spanish pane > modern Spanish pan
‘bread’) or syncope (the loss of an unstressed syllable between consonants as in
Latin septimana > Spanish semana ‘week’).11 A more complex example of such
phonological loss, which we have already encountered in chapter 3, is the change
of the English expression going to into gonna.
Phonological change is not part of the topic of this thesis and has consequently
not been included in the introduced computational model. However, as a possi-
ble avenue for future research, I want to point out here that phonological change
too can be interpreted as being initiated by pragmatic plasticity: not by an under-
and/or overspecification of the meaning but by an under- and/or overspecifica-
tion of the form. A speaker may underspecify the conventional linguistic form
he is using by only producing as much phonological material as is necessary for
the hearer to be able to identify it. Similarly, he may overspecify a conventional
linguistic form by inserting ignorable phonological material where convenient.
Such additional phonological material is ignorable as long as it does not turn the
signal into some other conventional form. Such an analysis has the potential to
identify a common cognitive base for both phonological and semantic change
11The examples stem from Trask (2000).
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and complies with the argument that forms are meanings just as well, which I
have presented in section 4.2.1.
This observation also points to the role that pragmatic plasticity, as the under-
and/or overspecification of the speaker meaning, can play in theminimisation of
the signal. Pragmatic plasticity offers “tools” to reduce signals in specific contexts.
Underspecification allows a user to omit parts of the signal that can be inferred
from the context. In example (4), for instance, the signal whose conventional
meaning underspecifies the speaker meaning by leaving the second old out, (4a)
is shorter than the signal whose conventional meaning fully specifies the speaker
meaning (4b). Overspecification, on the other hand, allows for the use of shorter
expressionswith extra information that will be ignored in the given context. Such
a case is illustrated in example (5): the metaphorical expression in (5a) is shorter
than the literal description in (5b), even though it contains more semantic aspects
than the latter.
(4) a. Most hearing aids are sold to old men and women.
b. Most hearing aids are sold to old men and old women.
(5) a. Sally is a chameleon.
b. Sally frequently changes her appearance.
In technical terms, the context-specific signal reduction provided by pragmatic
plasticity constitutes so-called lossy data compression. Lossy compression tech-
niques are used, for instance, to transmit audio and video signals (e.g. the MPEG
compression format) or graphical information (e.g. the JPEG compression for-
mat). Data compression techniques are called lossy if the data that can be re-
constructed from the signal they produce differ from the original data (Sayood
2006:5). This is the case for cases of under- and/or overspecification: the mean-
ing recovered from the signal, the signal meaning, differs from the original mes-
sage, the speaker meaning. Such a distortion is acceptable as long as it is not
relevant to the environment or application for which the data compression has
been carried out. The loss of some colour information in a picture, for instance,
may not be relevant as long as the recipient can still recognise what the picture
shows. Similarly, the distortion of speaker meaning through under- and/or over-
specification is acceptable if the addressee is not confused ormisled by the lack of
information in underspecification or the extra information in overspecification,
that is, as long as he is still able infer the intended speaker meaning on the basis
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of the encoded signal meaning. The important point about lossy data compres-
sion is that “[i]n return for accepting this distortion in the reconstruction, we can
generally obtain much higher compression ratios than is possible with lossless
compression” (Sayood 2006:5). Pragmatic plasticity thus equips language users
with a set of particularly powerful methods of signal reduction.
In specific contexts, pragmatic plasticity offers tools to reduce signals; but note
that this fact does not entail that the employment of pragmatic plasticity always
results in signal minimisation. Expressions that under- and/or overspecify the
speaker meaning are not in all cases shorter than their literal and fully specific
counterparts. This fact can be illustrated with the following hypothetical exam-
ples, such as may occur in the introduced computational model. In the situation
depicted in (6), underspecifying the intended speaker meaning AB by only pro-
ducing the signal for A and having the addressee infer B from the context does
not reduce but rather increases the length of the signal. In the situation shown
in (7), overspecifying the intended speaker meaning A by producing the signal
for AB does not reduce the signal either but also increases its length. Under-
and overspecification do therefore not in all cases automatically lead to signal
minimisation—their effect with respect to signal economy depends on the length
of the available alternatives.
(6) Underspecification without signal minimisation
Input: I-language: X→ AB
YZ→ A
Speaker meaning: AB
Inferable meaning: B
Ignorable meaning: –
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AB
Possible signals: YZ, X
YZ (underspecification) > X (no underspecification)
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(7) Overspecification without signal minimisation
Input: I-language: XY→ AB
X→ A
Speaker meaning: A
Inferable meaning: –
Ignorable meaning: B
Calculations: Possible signal meanings: A, AB
Possible signals: X, XY
XY (overspecification) > X (no overspecification)
What I am interested in now is the link between the fact that pragmatic plasticity
provides tools for signal reduction in individual usage situations and the degree
to which a whole grammar comes to be adapted to the articulation bottleneck.
Through conventionalisation, individual usages enter the system and change it.
Newly added form-meaning pairs may thereby reduce the average signal length
of a grammar and thus increase the degree to which it exhibits the appearance of
design for communication. I therefore formulate the general hypothesis that, be-
cause of pragmatic plasticity and conventionalisation, a communication system
like language resembles an evolving lossy compression algorithm that constantly
adapts to its environment. With this hypothesis, I explicate a less specific state-
ment by Langacker (1977:106; cited also in Hopper and Traugott 2003:72), who
says that “[i]t would not be entirely inappropriate to regard languages in their
diachronic aspects as gigantic expression-compacting machines.” It needs to be
stressed, however, that the availability and use of pragmatic plasticity does not
per se lead to a lower average signal length in a grammar since, as I have shown
above, under- and overspecification do not always minimise the length of the
produced signal. I will therefore employ computer simulations to investigate
under what conditions the formulated hypothesis holds.
5.3.2 The development of signal economy in the model
To study the role of pragmatic plasticity in how, and to what degree, symbolic
communication systems come to adapt to the articulation bottleneck, I will com-
pare the behaviour of the computational model with regard to signal economy in
two series of simulations, one in which pragmatic plasticity is available and one
in which the agent cannot employ pragmatic plasticity. Under the first condition,
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the agent is able to combine symbols and to use under- and/or overspecification
to convey the intended signal meaning. Under the second condition, the agent
will only be able to use extant symbols literally and to combine them but will not
have access to under- and/or overspecification. First, I will look at the impact
that the presence or absence of pragmatic plasticity has on the development of
an already established grammar and then compare these observations with what
happens when a grammar emerges anew from a non-symbolic starting point. A
detailed description of how the average signal length of a grammar is measured
in the simulations is provided in appendix B.2.
5.3.2.1 Impact on already established grammars
In order to investigate how the presence or absence of pragmatic plasticity can
change the average signal length of an already established grammar, I employ
simulations that start in a state where the agent already possesses a fully expres-
sive grammar. Every potential speaker meaning can be expressed by the agent
no matter whether pragmatic plasticity is available or not. The agent needs to be
provided with a fully expressive grammar in these simulations so that the aspect
of average signal length can be studied in isolation and the expressivity of the
agent’s grammar is prevented from influencing the result.
I start my investigation with a simple, idealised setup similar to the one used
previously to study expressivity. The details of this setup are given in (8). The
agent’s semantic space is made up of the four semantic units A, B, C and D
(which all occur with equal probability), meanings maximally consist of two se-
mantic units, contexts contain zero or one inferable or ignorable semantic unit,
there is no loss (i.e. the entrenchment threshold is set to 0). I will vary the strat-
egy the agent employs to select synonyms because this factor has a direct impact
on the length of the signals in individual usage situations and can therefore also
be hypothesised to influence the way in which the average signal length of the
whole grammar develops over time.
(8) Semantic units: A, B, C, D
Maximal meaning complexity: 2 semantic units
Maximal context size: 1 semantic unit
Entrenchment threshold: t = 0.0
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Figure 5.15: Development of the average signal length of an already established grammar (syn-
onym selection: random). Each line represents the average over 100 independent simulation
runs under the conditions listed in (8) and with the initial grammar given in (9). If signals are
selected from synonyms at random, pragmatic plasticity (with both under- and overspecification
being available) is not advantageous with regard to the development of the signal economy of
the agent’s grammar.
In (9), I provide the grammar the agent is equipped with at the beginning of
the simulation runs. This grammar is fully expressive, that is, it can express all
combinations of semantic units that are possible.
(9) Initial grammar: W→ A
X→ B
Y→ C
Z→ D
WX→ AB
WY→ AC
WZ→ AD
XY→ BC
XZ→ BD
ZY→ CD
Synonym selection: random. Fig. 5.15(a) compares the development of the aver-
age signal length of the agent’s grammar with and without the availability of
pragmatic plasticity—the latter serving as theNULL-hypothesis—under the con-
dition that the agent always selects randomly if more than one signal is possible
in a situation. What Fig. 5.15(a) shows is that the occasional use of pragmatic
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plasticity leads to a higher average signal length than the continuous literal use
of extant conventions. If the agent does not use pragmatic plasticity, the average
signal length remains stable at its original level. But if the agent uses pragmatic
plasticity, the average signal length of the agent’s grammar is increased and sta-
bilises at a higher level. Under these conditions, the availability of pragmatic
plasticity is thus not advantageous with regard to signal economy—which runs
contrary to our hypothesis.
The reason for this result becomes more evident if the impact of underspecifi-
cation and overspecification are analysed separately. Fig. 5.15(b) represents the
same as 5.15(a) but additionally plots the development of the average signal
length of the agent’s grammar under the conditions that (i) the agent can make
use of underspecification but not of overspecification, and (ii) that he only has
overspecification but not underspecification available. It can be observed that if
only underspecification is used occasionally but not overspecification, the aver-
age signal length of the agent’s grammar decreases over time and stabilises at a
level that is lower than the one at which it remains if no pragmatic plasticity is
employed at all. In contrast, if the agent only uses overspecification but never
underspecification, the average signal length of the grammar stabilises at a level
that is even higher than if he makes use of both. It can thus be said that, un-
der the given conditions, underspecification tends to reduce the average signal
length while overspecification increases it. In the example, the occasional use
of overspecification is enough to undo the positive effect that underspecification
has on the average signal length of the grammar.
Synonym selection: most entrenched. The same phenomenon can be observed in
simulation runs where the agent consistently chooses the most entrenched avail-
able signal. Figs. 5.16(a) and 5.16(b) plot the results for this case. The overall
behaviour of the model is the same as for the cases where synonyms are chosen
at random. The availability of pragmatic plasticity is not advantageous with re-
spect to the average signal length of the agent’s grammar because the positive ef-
fect of underspecification is outweighed by the negative impact of the occurring
cases of overspecification. The only difference between the results produced by
the two selection strategies is that if the most entrenched synonyms are chosen,
the impact of overspecification is somewhat less than if synonyms are selected
at random. While the use of pragmatic plasticity still leads to an increase of the
average signal length of the grammar, that increase is not as big as in simulation
runs with random synonym selection.
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Figure 5.16: Development of the average signal length of an already established grammar (syn-
onym selection: most entrenched). Each line represents the average over 100 independent sim-
ulation runs under the conditions listed in (8) and with the initial grammar given in (9). If the
most entrenched synonym is chosen, pragmatic plasticity (with both under- and overspecifica-
tion being available) is not advantageous with regard to the development of the signal economy
of the agent’s grammar.
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Figure 5.17: Development of the average signal length of an already established grammar (syn-
onym selection: most underspecified). Each line represents the average over 100 independent
simulation runs under the conditions listed in (8) and with the initial grammar given in (9). If
the most underspecified synonym is chosen, pragmatic plasticity (with both under- and over-
specification being available) is not advantageous with regard to the development of the signal
economy of the agent’s grammar.
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Figure 5.18: Development of the average signal length of an already established grammar (syn-
onym selection: shortest). Each line represents the average over 100 independent simulation
runs under the conditions listed in (8) and with the initial grammar given in (9). If the shortest
synonym is chosen, pragmatic plasticity (with both under- and overspecification being available)
is advantageous with regard to the development of the signal economy of the agent’s grammar.
Synonym selection: most underspecified. Even if the agent consistently chooses
the most underspecified signal, as some pragmatic theories might suggest (cf.
section 4.1.2.3), pragmatic plasticity is still not advantageous with regard to the
degree in which the grammar comes to be adapted to the articulation bottleneck.
Fig. 5.17 plots the development of the average signal length under this condi-
tion. Although the agent constantly chooses the most underspecified signal, the
negative effect of the occurring cases of overspecification, which apparently re-
sult in longer signals, cannot be undone. Its impact even seems to be somewhat
stronger than in the earlier simulations. The strategy to choose the signal that
underspecifies the speaker meaning most does therefore not reliably lead to a
decreased average signal length.
Synonym selection: shortest. The picture is different if the agent consequently
chooses the shortest available signal—which is what the presence of the articu-
lation bottleneck would suggest in the first place. Fig. 5.18 shows that under this
condition, pragmatic plasticity is advantageous and that its occasional employ-
ment leads to a decrease of the average signal length of the agent’s grammar.
Pragmatic plasticity is now only used if it really results in a reduction of the
signal length in the given usage situation: it thus unfolds its positive potential
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without being hindered by the negative impact of cases of under- or overspecifi-
cation that produce signals that are longer than the ones that already existed.12
In summary, the simulations discussed suggest that the strategy employed to
choose a signal from a range of available synonyms can have a substantial impact
on whether the availability of pragmatic plasticity is advantageous with regard
to the overall signal economy of a symbolic communication system. Under the
simulated simple and idealised conditions, the occasional use of pragmatic plas-
ticity reduces the average signal length of an already established grammar—and
thus increases the degree to which that grammar is adapted to the articulation
bottleneck—only if the agent chooses the shortest signal whenever he faces a sit-
uation in which more than one option is possible. In all other cases (i.e. where
the agent chooses at random or the most entrenched signal or the signal that
underspecifies the speaker meaning the most), the occasional positive effect of
underspecification is outweighed by the occasional negative effect of overspeci-
fication. It remains to be tested if the picture is the same if the agent starts from a
non-symbolic state, that is, if he is not given an already established grammar at
the beginning of the simulation run.
5.3.2.2 Impact on emerging grammars
I will now address the question of whether the nature of the initial state has an
impact on the development of signal economy. Specifically, I will ask how prag-
matic plasticity influences the average signal length of a communication system
that emerges from “nothing,” that is, from a state where no conventional form-
meaning association has been established yet. Because I want to be able to com-
pare the results to those found for the development of signal economy in an
already established grammar, I will use the same basic parameter set as before.
Even though the agent is now not equipped with an established grammar at the
beginning of the simulation runs, we have to make sure that full expressivity
can be reached both if pragmatic plasticity is available and if it is not available.
This means that the agent needs to be able to express all possible semantic units
by means of producing direct evidence. Otherwise, the agent could not cover
12Note that in the given example, overspecification appears to lead to longer signals in practi-
cally all cases in which it occurs. If the agent constantly chooses the shortest signal, simulations
in which overspecification but not underspecification is available lead to the same result as those
in which pragmatic plasticity is not available at all. Under the simulated conditions, literal use
therefore always produces shorter signals than an alternative which overspecifies the speaker
meaning.
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the whole semantic space in the condition without pragmatic plasticity. At the
beginning of a simulation run, the agent thus possesses the set of producible
cues listed in (10). With these cues, the agent can communicate every possible
meaning either by producing a single cue or by combining two or more of the
cues—pragmatic plasticity does not need to be resorted to.
(10) Initial “grammar”: A → A
B → B
C → C
D → D
We can now compare how pragmatic plasticity influences the signal economy
of a newly emerging grammar with how it influenced the signal economy of an
already established grammar. Fig. 5.19(a) shows again the development of the
average signal length of an established grammar; Fig. 5.19(b) gives the respective
development for a newly emerging grammar. In both sets of simulations, the
agent chose synonyms at random. We can observe that in both cases, signal
economy stabilises at about the same level. The only noticeable difference is that
where the agent has to start without a grammar, signal economy has to start from
the bottom.
We get roughly the same picture if the agent chooses the most underspecified
signal, as shown in Figs. 5.19(c) and 5.19(d) respectively, and if he chooses the
shortest signal, as shown in Figs. 5.19(e) and 5.19(f). In all these cases, the aver-
age signal length of the newly emerging grammar stabilises more or less at the
same level as it does for an already established grammar. More precisely, we can
distinguish between quantitative differences and qualitative differences. We can
speak of a quantitative difference if the average signal length is higher in one
case than in another and of qualitative difference if the availability of pragmatic
plasticity is an advantage with regard to signal economy in one case but a disad-
vantage in the other. While there are minor quantitative differences, there is no
qualitative difference in the three pairs of figures: both for established as well as
for newly emerging grammars, the availability of pragmatic plasticity is advan-
tageous if the agent consistently chooses the shortest signal but not if he chooses
at random or always selects the signal that underspecifies the speaker meaning
most.
The situation is different, however, if the agent selects the most entrenched sig-
nal. Under this condition, we do get a qualitative difference: Fig. 5.20 shows that
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Figure 5.19: Development of the average signal length of a newly emerging grammar with syn-
onym selection strategies: (a–b) random; (c–d) most underspecified; (e–f) shortest. The figures
in the left-hand column plot the development of an already established grammar; the figures
in the right-hand column the development of a newly emerging grammar. Each line represents
the average over 100 independent simulation runs under the conditions listed in (8) and with
the initial grammars given in (9) and (10) respectively. Both for established as well as for newly
emerging grammars, pragmatic plasticity is advantageous with selection strategy “shortest” and
disadvantageous with selection strategies “random” or “most underspecified.”
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Figure 5.20: Development of the average signal length of a newly emerging grammar (synonym
selection: most entrenched): (a) development of an already established grammar; (b) develop-
ment of a newly emerging grammar. Each line represents the average over 100 independent
simulation runs under the conditions listed in (8) and with the initial grammars given in (9) and
(10) respectively. Pragmatic plasticity is disadvantageous with regard to signal length if the sim-
ulation starts with an already established grammar but is advantageous if it begins in a state
where the agent does not possess conventionalised form-meaning pairings yet.
the occasional use of pragmatic plasticity is a disadvantage for signal economy
in an established grammar but it leads to a decreased average signal length in a
newly emerging grammar. It thus depends on the initial grammar whether prag-
matic plasticity proves to be advantageous to the development of signal econ-
omy or not. What is relevant for our purposes is that in the typical evolutionary
situation, that is, where users start without any form of symbolic communica-
tion system, the strategy of always choosing the most entrenched signal proves
to yield a better adaptation to the articulation bottleneck if pragmatic plasticity
is available than if it is not. Note that under the described circumstances (i.e. a
non-symbolic initial state and the availability of pragmatic plasticity), the aver-
age signal length of a grammar remains low even though the user does not strive
to minimise signals in individual usage events but simply exhibits whatever be-
haviour is triggered first.13
13The impact of loss, meaning complexity and the probability structure of the semantic space
on signal economywere investigated too. However, under the described conditions, these factors
only yielded quantitative but no qualitative differences.
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5.3.2.3 Summary and interpretation
With the help of the simulations discussed, I have shed some light on the role
that pragmatic plasticity plays in how, and to what degree, a symbolic commu-
nication system adapts to the articulation bottleneck. Language does not ex-
hibit pragmatic plasticity because of the pressure for signal economy in language
use, it rather exhibits pragmatic plasticity because linguistic communication is
ostensive-inferential. However, the simulations discussed here have illustrated
that the fact that pragmatic plasticity is available can, under the right conditions,
help a language adapt to the articulation bottleneck by providing it with tools
for context-specific signal minimisation. Specifically, the use of pragmatic plas-
ticity reduces the average signal length of a communication system (i) if users are
biased towards choosing the shortest signal, and, in case the system starts from
zero, also (ii) if they are biased towards choosing the most entrenched signal.
It is particularly relevant that pragmatic plasticity proves to be advantageous
with regard to signal economy specifically with these two selection strategies
since these two strategies are most plausible from a psychological perspective
and accommodate the bias for an economy of effort that can be assumed for any
behaviour.
5.4 Ambiguity
In the last part of this chapter, I will turn to a putatively dysfunctional property
of language: ambiguity. Ambiguity describes any state where a linguistic code
contains forms that are conventionally associated with more than one meaning.
The perception that ambiguity is a dysfunctional feature, and that its ubiquity
in language therefore constitutes an evolutionary puzzle, is based on the idea
that an optimal code must be transparent. According to Langacker (1977:110),
transparency denotes a type of linguistic optimality that is “based on the notion
that the ideal or optimal linguistic code, other things being equal, will be one in
which every surface unit (typically a morpheme) will have associated with it a
clear, salient, and reasonably consistent meaning or function, and every semantic
element in a sentence will be associated with a distinct and recognizable surface
form.” Langacker (1977:110) further specifies that “[l]anguages are thus optimal
along this parameter to the extent that they show a one-to-one correspondence
between units of expression and units of form” and concedes that “[o]bviously,
though, natural languages routinely and massively fail to achieve this state.”
These statements exemplify the wide-spread notion that ambiguity constitutes a
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dysfunctional feature in the sense that a non-ambiguous code would be better
suited for communication. I will question this assumption.
It is often overlooked that the putative presence of a dysfunctional feature al-
lows for more than one possible conclusion. First, it may be an indicator that
the respective entity does not exhibit design for the assumed function, that is,
that the wrong function has been assumed. According to this reasoning, the fact
that language is ambiguous, and that ambiguity is dysfunctional with regard to
communication, implies that language is not the product of an adaptation to its
use for communication. This is the line of argumentation advocated by Chom-
sky. In defence of his non-selectionist account of language evolution, he argues
explicitly that ambiguity constitutes a serious problem to the assumption that
language exhibits design for communication:
The natural approach has always been: is it [i.e. language] well de-
signed for use, understood typically as use for communication? I
think that’s the wrong question. The use for communication might
turn out to be a kind of epiphenomenon. I mean, the system devel-
oped however it did, we really don’t know. And then we can ask:
how do people use it? It might turn out that it is not optimal for some
of the ways in which we want to use it. If you want to make sure
that we never misunderstand one another, for that purpose language
is not well designed, because you have such properties as ambiguity.
(Chomsky 2002:107)
Chomsky’s conclusion is consequently that language is not well designed for its
communicative function but that it is well designed “with regard to the inter-
nal system with which it must interact” (2002:108). However, he fails to specify
in what way ambiguity fits into this picture. But, more fundamentally, the ar-
gument that the presence of a dysfunctional feature indicates that the entity in
question does not exhibit design for the assumed function is fallacious for a basic
reason: it is based on the wrong assumption that adaptations are perfect. Design
does not equal perfection (e.g. Dawkins 1999:ch. 3, Kinsella in press:ch. 2). An
engineer, for instance, may design a tool to perform a specific task but he may
not have found the best possible solution to the problem posed by the task yet.
Nevertheless, the tool will exhibit design for the respective function, at least a
certain degree of it. The same holds for biological systems. Futuyma (1998:356–
361), for instance, emphasises that, while design is one means of recognising an
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adaptation brought about by natural selection, one thing not to expect of natu-
ral selection and adaptation is perfection. We can presume that this is also true
for entities that are the product of cultural evolution. Therefore, the presence of
ambiguity in language does not mean that language does not exhibit design for
communication.
A second way of explaining the presence of an apparently dysfunctional feature
is to assume that the entity adapts to more than one function, and that the feature
in question is a product of this second adaptive process. Some studies carried out
within the framework of the iterated learning model, for instance, argue that cer-
tain linguistic structures can be explained by assuming that language appears
to be designed to be learnable (e.g. Kirby 2002a; Kirby and Hurford 2002; Smith
2003c; Brighton et al. 2005). Within this line of research, I have shown that syn-
tactic ambiguity can emerge from iterated grammar induction and can thus be
interpreted as a side-effect of a grammar’s adaptation to the learning bottleneck
(Hoefler 2006b).
In this chapter, however, I want to pursue a third possibility, namely the one that
the feature in questionmay only appear to be dysfunctional and that rather the as-
sumptions about how the respective function is fulfilled are faulty or incomplete.
I argue that ambiguity only constitutes a dysfunctional property of language if
one works with an over-simplified model of communication: the so-called code
model (cf. section 3.1.2). Ambiguity is only detrimental to successful commu-
nication if disambiguation in context is not possible. But as soon as one recog-
nises that the process of encoding and decoding is enhanced with inference from
context—or even assumes an ostensive-inferential model of communication in
the first place, as I have done in chapter 3—ambiguity does not pose an insur-
mountable problem to communication anymore. Coding then only represents
one component of the production and comprehension process, and even though
at some stage the produced form may have the potential to lead to more than
one signal meaning, only one speaker meaning will result in the end (that is, if the
provided clue is sufficient). In light of the fact that in order to establish commu-
nication, two individuals have to recognise common-ground knowledge of what
information is relevant in the given context, ambiguity thus merely appears as
non-functional rather than dysfunctional: it neither facilitates nor seriously hinders
communication. This analysis is supported by the fact that ambiguity is ubiqui-
tous in language and humans do not even seem to notice its presence for most
of the time. Traugott and Dasher (2005:12), for instance, point out that there is
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no evidence that speakers actually strive for a minimisation of ambiguity in the
linguistic code:
While the demands of an increasingly technological society favor the
development of rigidly specified lexical distinctions, for example,
among diseases, legal rulings, or linguistic terminologies, very few, if
any, words in ordinary language have only one interpretation.
The perception of ambiguity as a dysfunctional feature seems to be based on a
failure to distinguish between signal meaning and speaker meaning. An am-
biguous code leads at times to more than one signal meaning. However, this
fact does not mean that communication needs to fail as the context in which the
respective usage event happens may still allow for only one speaker meaning to
be inferred. Ambiguity in the signal meaning does not necessarily lead to am-
biguity in the speaker meaning. Pinker and Bloom (1990:713, emphasis added)
consequently note that language exhibits design for communication because it
allows for “minimising ambiguity in context” (as opposed to a minimisation of
ambiguity in the code). In summary, we can therefore state that if one assumes
an ostensive-inferential model of communication, ambiguity in the code (within
limits; I will return to the problem of massive ambiguity below) appears merely
as a non-functional rather than a dysfunctional feature.
The analysis just presented takes a synchronic perspective on the question of
design for communication. I will now look at the problem from a diachronic
perspective, and go a step further and argue that, from a diachronic perspective,
ambiguity even appears as a positively functional feature.
5.4.1 Ambiguity as a functional feature
While ambiguity may not directly contribute to the successful establishment of
communication in individual usage situations, I will show that ambiguity plays
a crucial role in the adaptability of a code to its communicative function in the
course of its cultural evolution. In order to make a case for ambiguity as a func-
tional feature, I will argue that a code that allows for ambiguity has a higher
adaptability to the functional pressures for (i) maximised expressivity and (ii)
minimised average signal length. Ambiguity thus directly contributes to the two
aspects of the appearance of design for communication that I have discussed in
the previous parts of this chapter.
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5.4.1.1 Its relevance for expressivity
To understand the role that ambiguity plays with regard to the expressivity of a
code, we need to re-examine how meanings change in the course of iterated lan-
guage use. As I have detailed in chapter 3, extant signals are used in novel (i.e.
under- and/or overspecified) ways, and these novel usages become associated
with the employed signal: the signal acquires a newmeaning. This meaning was
potentially not expressible by the user’s grammar before. Traugott and Dasher
(2005:11) accurately summarise the role that ambiguity comes to play in this pro-
cess:
Semantic change cannot be studied without drawing on a theory of
polysemy because of the nature of change. Every change, at any level
in a grammar, involves not “A > B,” i.e. the simple replacement of
one item by another, but rather “A > A ∼ B” and then sometimes
“> B” alone.
Thus, when an extant symbol is used in a way in which it either under- and/or
overspecifies the actually communicated meaning, and, as a consequence of this,
a new association between the form of that symbol and the meaning it conveyed
is established, the association between that form and its original meaning does
not automatically disappear.14 What emerges is rather a situation that historical
linguistics refer to as layering: the co-existence of two variants of a symbol, an
older and a newer one. Layering can designate a situation where two symbols
have the same meaning but their form varies, or it can, as in our case, denote a
situation of polysemy, where the form is the same but the meaning varies. The
older meaning may eventually fall out of use, and this is usually the moment
where the result of the process is perceived as semantic change rather than sim-
ple variation. However, as Traugott and Dasher (2005:11f.) point out “despite
14Traugott and Dasher’s schema “A > A ∼ B (> B)” does not specify individual types of
semantic change. In section 3.2.2, I have described that pragmatic plasticity can bring about
(i) semantic narrowing or specialisation through underspecification, (ii) semantic broadening or
generalisation through overspecification, or (iii) a combination of the two if an extant symbol is
used in a way that both under- and overspecifies the speaker meaning. These three general cases
can be represented as instantiations of Traugott and Dasher’s schema if the structure of the in-
volved meanings is made explicit. In the following sub-schemata, which instantiate the general
schema “A > A ∼ B (> B),” meanings A and B are represented as combinations of one or more
conceptual units C: (i) underspecification and narrowing: “C1 > C1 ∼ C1C2 (> C1C2)”; (ii) over-
specification and broadening: “C1C2 > C1C2 ∼ C2 (> C2)”; (iii) under- and overspecification
combined: “C1C2 > C1C2 ∼ C1C3 (> C1C3).” A fourth, limiting case is represented by situations
of maximal under- and overspecification (cf. section 3.1.3): “C1 > C1 ∼ C2 (> C2).”
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what is often thought, the loss of an earlier meaning is relatively rare. What is
typical is the accretion of more and more meanings over time, hence the paren-
thetical status of the lone survivor B in the schema A > A ∼ B (> B).” It is, of
course, exactly this “accretion” of meanings resulting from polysemy that leads
to the cumulative expansion of expressivity—and thus ultimately to better de-
sign for communication. Moreover, if there was no polysemy, that is, if newer
meaning did replace older meanings, there would be semantic change but in
effect no increase in expressivity: every time a new meaning would become ex-
pressible, an old meaning could not be expressed anymore. In conclusion, it can
therefore be stated that ambiguity is not only not dysfunctional but it actually
contributes to the emergence of better design for communication.
Without any differentiation in the forms of polysemous symbols, the scenario
that has been introduced so far could be taken ad absurdum: it would, in its
most extreme case, allow for one form to become associated with all possible
meanings—or at least with all meanings that can be reached from it by means of
pragmatic plasticity over time. However, the more meanings such a form would
come to express, the less likely it would actually be that disambiguation would
still be possible in context: the codewould reach a degree of ambiguity that would
indeed be dysfunctional. This problem is prevented by two processes. First,
not only one pre-linguistic cue can become conventionalised. It is very likely
that, even though there is one hypothetical “first symbol,” other pre-symbolic
cues would also become associated with the meanings they conveyed, so that
very quickly, there would be a whole number of symbols—each with a different
form—that could be used as stepping stones to explore new meaning spaces.
However, even this fact does not account for the extreme diversity of form that
can be found in human language. A second process must therefore be taken into
account: phonological change. In section 3.3, I argued that we need to assume the
causal chain of change represented in (11) for phenomena of grammaticalisation.
(11) semantic change⇒ change in frequency (and environment) of use⇒
phonological change
This process can, in general, bring about a diversification not only of the mean-
ings that a symbolic communication system can express but also of the forms it
employs to do so. It can be applied to any form of semantic diversification, not
just to those linguistic cases usually classified as grammaticalisation phenomena.
I thus extend Traugott and Dasher’s abstract schema as shown in (12).
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(12) X→ A









9
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
99
semantic diversification
X→ A

∼ X→ B

polysemy
phonological change
X→ A Y→ B no polysemy
A form X is originally associated with a meaning A. Through under- and/or
overspecified use and subsequent conventionalisation, a situation of polysemy
emerges: X is now associated with the original meaning A as well as with a new
meaning B. Because B differs in frequency of occurrence from A, and because
it is also used in different linguistic environments, the form that signifies B un-
dergoes phonological change but the form that denotes A does not. The effect of
this process is that the earlier instance of polysemy disappears.15
It needs to be noted, however, that phonological change happens according to
the same schema that Traugott and Dasher (2005:11) apply to semantic change:
phonological change too involves not “X > Y,” that is, the replacement of one
form with another, but rather “X > X ∼ Y (> Y).” McMahon (1994:50), for
instance, provides the following scenario for sound change:
If we assume for the moment an abstract change of some phoneme
X to some other phoneme Y, certain morphemes will undergo the
change directly, but in others, pronunciation will fluctuate for a time,
for individuals and/or for the community. This period of variation
is characterised by the existence of doublets, morphemes with two
pronunciations.
We can thus entertain the possibility of layering for phonological change too: that
the old and the new form co-exist beside each other until one falls out of use. This
15Note, however, that phonological change can also introduce new instances of ambiguity,
namely if the new form happens to coincide with an already existing form. Ambiguity that
emerges through such coincidences is referred to as “homonymy.” An example are the two En-
glishwords that have the form pen, one denoting an enclosure and originating from the respective
Old English word penn, the other referring to a writing utensil and being derived from an Old
French word for ‘feather’, penne.
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is the reason why in schema (12), the line connecting X → B and Y → B is only
dotted: it indicates that only the result of this two-step process is shown, namely
X in effect having turned into Y, but not the intermediate step of layering where
X and Y co-exist alongside each other.
To illustrate how layering can occur as a result of semantic as well as phonologi-
cal diversification, I refer once more to the example of the grammaticalisation of
be going to. The state that this expression currently has in many English dialects
exhibits semantic layering (be going to can be used to express motion as well as
intention) as well as phonological layering (one of its meanings, ‘intention’, can
be expressed by the older form be going to as well as the newer variant gonna).
The already introduced examples (13) and (14) document this point.
(13) a. Are you going to church now?
b. ∗ Are you gonna church now?
(14) a. No, I am going to stay here.
b. No, I am gonna stay here.
Schema (15) visualises the development of be going to.
(15) going to→‘motion’
xxppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
pp
&&NN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
NNN
going to→‘motion’

∼ going to→‘intention’
xxppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
ppp
pp
going to→‘motion’

gonna→‘intention’

going to→‘intention’
*(going to→‘motion’ gonna→‘intention’)
An initial semantic diversification leads to a state of polysemy (‘motion’ vs. ‘in-
tention’; refer to section 3.3.2 for a detailed discussion of this step). Due to its
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altered frequency and environment of use, the new form-meaning pair subse-
quently develops an alternative form (gonna). The last part of the schema, plot-
ted with dotted lines, represents a hypothetical future stage at which polysemy
has disappeared because ‘intention’ has come to be expressed exclusively by the
new form gonna.
As I have already pointed out in section 5.3.1 above, phonological change is not
dealt with in any further detail in this thesis. For the present purposes, it will
suffice to state that it plays a vital role in a model of how symbolic commu-
nication systems grow more expressive because it provides a solution to the
described problem of massive ambiguity. It is, however, important to empha-
sise that phonological change is not goal-directed in the sense that users would
change forms to be able to distinguish between the individual meanings of an
otherwise polysemous form. Under the circumstances considered here, forms
change because their frequency of use and the environment in which they are
used have changed as a result of a preceding semantic change. Phonological
change of this type is linked to processes of automatisation (Givo´n 1979; Haiman
1994; Bybee 1998; Bybee and Thompson 2000).
The bottom line of the discussion that I have presented here is this: ambiguity is
a necessary prerequisite for the expressivity of a symbolic communication sys-
tem to increase in the course of cumulative cultural evolution through iterated
under- and/or overspecified use. Without the possibility for ambiguity in the
form of layering, pragmatic plasticity could not unfold its adaptive potential:
extant conventions could not be used as stepping stones to incorporate neigh-
bouringmeaning spaces into the linguistic code and language would not become
as well designed to meet the communicative needs of its users as it is.
5.4.1.2 Its relevance for signal economy
The advantage that ambiguity bears with regard to signal economy can be ex-
plained by a specific information-theoretic observation: the minimal average
codeword length of a code that allows for ambiguity is smaller than the mini-
mal average codeword length of a code that needs to express the same number
of meanings with the same number of phonological units available but does not
allow for ambiguity. This information-theoretic fact can be illustrated with the
example codes shown in Table 5.3. Each of these codes needs to express three
meanings (a, b and c) by means of two units of form (0 and 1) under the condi-
tion that only a specific degree of ambiguity is allowed. Underneath each code,
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Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4
a 0 0 0 0
b 10 10 1 1
c 11 01 01 1
ACLmin 1.67 1.67 1.33 1.00
Table 5.3: Ambiguous codes have a lower average codeword length. The table shows four types
of codes of minimal average codeword length that express the meanings a, b, c with only two
units of forms (0 and 1). Code 1: prefix code; Code 2: non-ambiguous non-prefix code; Code 3:
ambiguous non-prefix code (individual codewords distinct); Code 4: ambiguous non-prefix code
(individual codewords not distinct). The minimal average codeword length (ACLmin) decreases
the more clearly a code allows for ambiguity.
the table gives the minimal average codeword length that can be achieved under
the respective condition. Code 1 is a non-ambiguous code of minimal average
codeword length. Codes of this type are also referred to as “prefix codes.” For
a code to be a prefix code, no codeword must occur as the first part of another,
longer codeword. Code 2 is a non-prefix code: its codeword for meaning a (0) is
also the initial part of the codeword for c (01). This code is still non-ambiguous
but a parser may face a temporary situation of ambiguity: after processing 0 as
the first unit of form of a longer sequence, one cannot know yet whether this
denotes a or the first half of the codeword for c. Sequences that contain such
temporal ambiguity occur in language in the form of so-called garden-path sen-
tences like (16).
(16) The horse chased past the barn fell.
Code 3 exhibits ambiguity. No two codewords are the same but the codeword
for c (01) cannot be distinguished from a sequence encoding ab. Structural ambi-
guity like this is ubiquitous in language—one example for it is attachment ambi-
guity as in (17).
(17) The policeman saw the spy with the telescope.
[The policeman saw the spy, who had a telescope.]
[The policeman, who used a telescope, saw the spy.]
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The advantage of this condition, as opposed to the non-ambiguous variants in
codes 1 and 2, is that its minimal average codeword length is lower. Code 4,
finally, exhibits ambiguity to the degree that even individual codewords are the
same: the codeword for b (1) is the same as the codeword for c. Under this
condition, the minimally possible average codeword length is again lower and
can be reduced to 1.
In summary, the presented examples illustrate the following fact: if the number
of meanings that a code needs to express (here a, b, c) is higher than the number
of the available units of form (here 0 and 1), then the average codeword length
that is minimally necessary can be lowered by allowing for ambiguity. Given
the high number of meanings humans want to express and the comparatively
low number of units of form they can use, their signals would be considerably
longer if language did not allow for ambiguity. Ambiguity facilitates greater
signal economy and therefore constitutes a feature that is advantageous to the
communicative function of language.
We can conclude that ambiguity as a feature is functional: its availability is ad-
vantageous to the degree to which the expressivity and the signal economy of a
code can adapt to its environment in the course of its cultural evolution. It is only
the degree of ambiguity that can potentially be dysfunctional if it is too high. The
introduced computational model does not provide a way of determining at what
degree ambiguity becomes dysfunctional. However, what we can study with the
help of the model is if there are circumstances under which the emerging degrees
of ambiguity are generally lower and thus less likely to be dysfunctional.
5.4.2 The development of ambiguity in the model
The lower the degree of ambiguity in a grammar is the less likely we are to face
the problem of massive ambiguity that can be detrimental to successful commu-
nication. I have already pointed out in section 5.4.1.1 that the degree of ambi-
guity may be reduced by phonological change. With the following computer
simulations, I study what other factors can lower the degree of ambiguity in an
emerging and evolving symbolic communication system. I will first discuss the
general behaviour of the model in idealised conditions. On the basis of the ob-
servations made, I will then formulate a number of hypotheses about the factors
influencing the development of ambiguity in the course of cultural evolution,
and I will test these hypotheses in subsequent simulation runs.
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In appendix B.3, I provide a detailed description of how the ambiguity of the
agent’s grammar is measured in the simulations. Here, it will suffice to state
that the applied definition of ambiguity takes into account the following aspects:
(i) the proportion of constructions in a grammar that are ambiguous, and, for
each ambiguous construction, (ii) the number of meanings that the same form
is associated with (a form with three meanings is more ambiguous than a form
with only two meanings) and (iii) the relative entrenchment of the individual
meanings of an ambiguous form (a form is more ambiguous if both its meanings
are equally entrenched and less ambiguous if one of its meanings is very salient
while the other one is hardly entrenched at all).
5.4.2.1 General behaviour of the model
To test the general development of the ambiguity of the agent’s grammar, I em-
ploy the same basic conditions that I have already used to study the development
of expressivity in the model. These conditions are repeated in (18) below. In this
setup, a simple semantic space made up of four conceptual units (A, B, X, Y), two
of which are producible as signals and thus constitute the phonological space, is
used. Meanings contain a maximum of two semantic units, and individual con-
texts provide one inferable or ignorable semantic unit. In this basic setup, no loss
occurs, and the agent chooses randomly if he faces a situation of synonymy.
(18) Semantic units: A, B, X, Y
Maximal meaning complexity: 2 semantic units
Initial grammar: X→ X
Y→ Y
Maximal context size: 1 semantic unit
Entrenchment threshold: t = 0.0
Selection strategy: random
Fig.5.21 documents the development of the ambiguity of the agent’s grammar
under these basic conditions. The dotted line represents the development of am-
biguity in an individual simulation run, the solid line shows the average over
100 independent simulation runs. The latter is plotted against the corresponding
average development of expressivity in Fig. 5.22, where the horizontal dashed
line indicates the maximal level of expressivity, and the vertical dashed line indi-
cates the point at which the agent’s grammar reaches this level. The two figures
show that ambiguity initially rises relatively steeply while the expressivity of
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Figure 5.21: Development of the ambiguity of an agent’s grammar under the idealised conditions
listed in (18). The solid line represents the average ambiguity over 100 independent runs. The
dotted line represents an individual run.
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Figure 5.22: Development of expressivity and ambiguity under idealised conditions. Both lines
represent the average of the respective value over 100 simulation runs under the conditions given
in (18). The horizontal dashed line indicates the maximal level of expressivity, the vertical dashed
line indicates the point at which the agent’s grammar reaches this level.
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Figure 5.23: Development of ambiguity under different loss rates. Each line represents the aver-
age over 100 simulation runs. Apart from the entrenchment threshold t, which defines the rate
of loss, all parameters are the same as in (18).
the agent’s grammar is also increasing. Once the agent’s grammar has reached
maximal expressivity, its ambiguity continues to increase but to a more moder-
ate degree. The reason why ambiguity continues to rise even after the grammar
has become fully expressive has to be sought in the two facts that there is no
loss and that the agent selects a signal at random if he has more than one op-
tion in a particular situation. The agent therefore does not necessarily choose
extant conventions but continues to add ever new form-meaning associations to
the grammar even though he would not need to if it simply was for communica-
tive needs. Without loss, such new constructions continue to add ambiguity to
the grammar. On the basis of this tentative explanation, we can thus formulate
two hypotheses: (i) loss reduces ambiguity, and (ii) re-using extant conventions
reduces ambiguity. These two hypotheses will be tested now.
5.4.2.2 Loss and re-use
The simulations confirm the first hypothesis: the introduction of loss reduces the
degree of ambiguity that the agent’s grammar reaches over the course of its cul-
tural evolution. This observation is illustrated by Fig. 5.23. The figure plots the
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development of ambiguity under the same conditions as above but with different
rates of loss. It is evident that in simulations where the agent’s grammar faces
higher rates of loss, the degree of ambiguity it reaches is lower than in simula-
tions with lower loss rates. Loss reduces the amount of ambiguity that emerges
in a grammar: the more constructions are lost in the course of the cultural evolu-
tion of a symbolic communication system, the lower is the degree of ambiguity
which that system comes to exhibit.
The second hypothesis, which postulates that the re-using of extant forms re-
duces ambiguity, can be studied by varying the strategies that the agent applies
for synonym selection. Fig. 5.24 plots the development of the ambiguity of the
agent’s grammar with various different strategies being employed. It shows that
the level of ambiguity is by far the lowest if the agent consistently chooses the
most entrenched signal. The other two consistent strategies (to choose the most
underspecified signal and to choose the shortest signal) initially perform worse
than if the agent selects a signal at random. However, after about 300 iterations,
this trend is reversed and the level of ambiguity ceases to rise and stabilises at
a comparatively moderate level where the agent applies the former strategies,
whereas ambiguity continues to increase in the case where he chooses at ran-
dom.
These observations comply with our hypothesis. An agent who consistently
chooses the most entrenched form will introduce fewer new form-meaning as-
sociations to his grammar as he is biased towards re-using the ones that already
exist. The other two consistent synonym selection strategies first have to estab-
lish a certain range of constructions, during which period ambiguity rises. But
once such a range of form-meaning associations has been created, they can also
start to re-use extant conventions. As an illustration of this two-stage process,
imagine the following situation. An agent consistently chooses the most under-
specified signal. In a first iteration, he possesses only a construction X → A.
However, he needs to communicate a meaning AB, and in the present context, B
is inferable. The agent cannot but add a new construction X → AB to his code
and thus increases its ambiguity. The next time the agent needs to convey AB in
a situation where B is inferable, the agent will make use of the construction X
→ A again, even though a literal expression would now also be available. The
agent chooses the most underspecified signal. However, this time, no new con-
struction X → AB is added to the grammar anymore: after all, this construction
already exists. Ambiguity is therefore not increased any further.
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Figure 5.24: Development of ambiguity with different synonym-selection strategies and no loss.
Each line represents the average over 100 simulation runs. All parameters other than the used
synonym-selection strategy are as in (18).
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Figure 5.25: Development of ambiguity with different synonym-selection strategies and loss.
Each line represents the average over 100 simulation runs. The entrenchment threshold t, which
defines the rate of loss, is set to 0.5. All parameters other than the used synonym-selection strat-
egy and the entrenchment threshold are as in (18)
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The fact that consistent synonym-selection strategies other than the one that al-
ways chooses the most entrenched signal depend on a certain base of established
form-meaning associations for ambiguity to stabilise suggests that loss would be
detrimental, as it would constantly damage that base. It would be much more
difficult for the agent’s grammar to reach a stage where no new ambiguity would
be added. This hypothesis is corroborated by Fig. 5.25. The figure plots the de-
velopment of the ambiguity of the agent’s grammar under the same conditions
as in Fig. 5.24 before, with the one exception that now, loss has been introduced
by setting the entrenchment threshold t to 0.5. While ambiguity continues to be
low if the agent consistently picks the most entrenched signals, the other two
consistent synonym-selection strategies now lead to degrees of ambiguity that
are considerably higher than that yielded under the condition of random selec-
tion.
In summary, the presented simulation results corroborate the two initially for-
mulated hypotheses that loss and the re-use of extant conventions each reduce
the degree of ambiguity that emerges in an evolving symbolic communication
system. The condition under which ambiguity is lowest is one in which loss
is high and the agent consistently chooses the most entrenched signal. How-
ever, these conditions have previously proven to be detrimental to the develop-
ment of the expressivity of a grammar (cf. section 5.2.2.2). We must therefore
conclude that symbolic communication systems come to exhibit a certain trade-
off between these two aspects of design: they become particularly expressive if
the conditions in which they evolve allow for an increase in expressivity that is
high but not high enough for the resulting degree of ambiguity to become dys-
functional.16
That human language indeed exhibits such trade-offs between competing func-
tional pressures has been extensively documented, and especially typologists in-
voke such competing motivations as an explanation for language change and
cross-linguistic variation (e.g. Langacker 1977; Givo´n 1979; Haiman 1985; DuBois
1987; Hall 1992; Kirby 1997; Croft 2000; Hopper and Traugott 2003). Langacker
(1977:102), for instance, postulates that “[l]anguage change reflects the pressure
to achieve linguistic optimality, but linguistic optimality has numerous dimen-
sions reflecting the multi-faceted character of language, and the tendencies to
16At the same time, however, it needs to be emphasised again that linguistic evidence suggests
that even relatively high levels of ambiguity are still not dysfunctional for communication: refer
again to Traugott and Dasher’s (2005) statement, which I have cited in the introduction to section
5.4.
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achieve these different kinds of optimality are often in opposition to one an-
other.” Langacker (1977:128f.) observes that signal simplicity conflicts with ex-
pressivity (to which he refers as “perceptual optimality”), and that transparency
(the absence of ambiguity and synonymy) conflicts with both code simplicity
and signal simplicity—the latter being consistent with my argument that am-
biguity allows for a higher degree of signal economy. The presented simula-
tion has made another such conflict manifest: the conflict between transparency
and expressivity. Note, however, that the discussed computer simulations show
that the emergence of a trade-off between two competing pressures can be much
less purpose-driven than the typologists’ “competing-motivations” explanations
would appear to suggest: in the simulations, a trade-off between a maximisation
of expressivity and a minimisation of ambiguity can simply emerge due to envi-
ronmental conditions of cultural evolution (the rate of loss and the employed
synonym selection strategy)—the agent himself does not (and in fact cannot)
“pull” toward either more expressivity or less ambiguity.
5.4.2.3 Ambiguity vs. expressivity?
In the last part of this section, I explore if other parameters of the model yield
similar conflicts between expressivity and ambiguity. To this aim, I employ some
of the test conditions that I have already used in section 5.2.2 to study the devel-
opment of expressivity. This will allowme to compare the impact that the respec-
tive factors have on expressivity with their impact on ambiguity. Figs. 5.26–5.29
compare the effect that the size of the semantic space, the complexity of mean-
ings, the size of the context and the probability structure of the semantic space
have on the development of the expressivity of a grammar (shown in the respec-
tive left-hand side sub-figure) with their effect on its ambiguity (shown in the
respective right-hand side sub-figure).
It can be observed that a bigger semantic space (Fig. 5.26) is disadvantageous
to both the development of the expressivity as well as the degree of ambigu-
ity of a grammar: expressivity rises more slowly while ambiguity stabilises at a
higher level if the size of the semantic space is increased. The same negative ef-
fect on both expressivity and ambiguity can be observed if the complexity of the
meanings is increased (Fig. 5.27). These two parameters thus do not produce any
tension between the pressure for increased expressivity and the ideal of low am-
biguity: both come about if the semantic space is small and meanings relatively
simple.
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Figure 5.26: Impact of the size of the semantic space on expressivity and ambiguity. Each line
represents the average over 100 simulation runs. All parameters other than the size of the seman-
tic space are as in (18). |S| indicates the number of meanings in the semantic space. The number
of elementary semantic units is given in parentheses.
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Figure 5.27: Impact of the meaning complexity on expressivity and ambiguity. Each line rep-
resents the average over 100 simulation runs. All parameters other than the maximal meaning
complexity and the size of the semantic space, which is set to 36, are as in (18).
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The case is different when it comes to the size of the context (i.e. the amount of
inferable and ignorable information available in individual usage situations).
Fig. 5.28(a) shows that the expressivity of the agent’s grammar rises faster
the more contextual material he can make use of when producing a signal.
Fig. 5.28(b), on the other hand, illustrates that the more information the context
contains, the more ambiguous the emerging grammar is going to be. Here, we
therefore do have a conflict between the two pressures: with more inferences
being drawn, codes end up more expressive but also more ambiguous.
A final aspect that needs to be looked at is the probability structure of the seman-
tic space. In section 5.2.2.2, I illustrated how non-flat probability distributions
in the semantic space can have a substantial impact on the development of the
expressivity of a grammar. Fig. 5.29(a) repeats this finding. It shows that of the
four patterns introduced in Table 5.1, only one (pattern 1) is detrimental to the
development of expressivity. In contrast, Fig. 5.29(b) shows that with regard to
ambiguity, it suffices to have any sort of non-flat probability distribution: all four
investigated patterns result in lower degrees of ambiguity than a semantic space
with a flat structure. Pronounced probability distributions in the semantic space
lead to reduced ambiguity in the grammar.
5.4.2.4 Summary and interpretation
The discussed computer simulations have been employed to study if there are
factors other than phonological change and conscious avoidance of ambiguity
that keep the degree of ambiguity that a grammar comes to exhibit in the course
of its cultural evolution low and thus help to reduce the risk of massive ambi-
guity reaching a level where it can obstruct communication. We have seen that
ambiguity is lower if (i) there is loss, (ii) if the agent uses a consistent synonym-
selection strategy, in particular if he always chooses the most entrenched signal,
(iii) if the semantic space is small, (iv) if meanings have low complexity, (v) if only
little contextual information is available in specific usage situations, and finally
(vi) if the semantic space exhibits a non-flat probability structure. In summary,
we can say that the conditions under which the cultural evolution of a symbolic
communication system happens also influence the degree to which it comes to
exhibit ambiguity. It appears very likely that the cultural evolution of human
language has been accompanied by both loss and a bias of its users to re-use
the most entrenched constructions. The discussed simulations suggest that both
these factors have kept the amount of ambiguity at a manageable level.
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Figure 5.28: Impact of the context size on expressivity and ambiguity. Each line represents the
average over 100 simulation runs. All parameters other than the context size and the size of the
semantic space, which is set to 36, are as in (18).
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have addressed the design puzzle: how does language come
to exhibit the appearance of design for communication? In particular, I have
looked at (i) how a symbolic communication system adapts its expressivity to the
communicative needs of its users, and (ii) how it accommodates the fact that ar-
ticulation constitutes a bottleneck in the communicative process by maintaining
signal economy. The theoretical arguments and computer simulations provided
have shown that a model of the cultural evolution of language that incorporates
the concept of pragmatic plasticity is capable of accounting for how these two
aspects of design for communication emerge over time.
Specifically, I have argued that pragmatic plasticity (in combinationwith conven-
tionalisation) equips the users of symbolic communication systems with “tools”
(i) to enhance the expressivity of those systems, and (ii) to perform context-
specific data-compression on their signals. With the help of computer simula-
tions, I have demonstrated how, and under which conditions, the iterated em-
ployment of pragmatic plasticity in individual usage situations eventually leads
to conventionalised communication systems that are adapted both to the com-
municative needs of their users and to the articulation bottleneck. I conclude
that the same set of cognitive mechanisms that can give rise to symbolism and
grammar (cf. chapter 3) also lead, in the course of cultural evolution, to the emer-
gence of core aspects of design for communication.
I have also addressed the role that ambiguity, a feature that is often characterised
as dysfunctional, plays with regard to the design puzzle. I have argued that,
contrary to the customary view, the availability of ambiguity in a symbolic com-
munication system is not only not dysfunctional but actually contributes to a
maximisation of the two aforementioned aspects of design for communication:
expressivity and signal economy. In the form of layering, ambiguity is neces-
sary for pragmatic plasticity to unfold its expressivity-enhancing power, and the
availability of ambiguity allows codes to reach levels of signal economy that
could not be achieved otherwise. It is only the degree of ambiguity in an indi-
vidual grammar, not ambiguity as a feature itself, that can potentially become an
impediment for communication. The computer simulations employed here have
shown that certain environmental conditions keep the degree of ambiguity that
a grammar develops in the course of its cultural evolution low and thus reduce
the risk of it reaching a level at which it becomes dysfunctional.
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In summary, the simulation results suggest that for a conventionalised commu-
nication system to become as expressive as human language, the individuals that
develop it must have good memory capacities, so that little of what they observe
is ever lost, and at the same time, they need to be able to make use of exten-
sive amounts of contextual information. On the other hand, it seems that the
presence of mechanisms of automatisation (in the form of re-using entrenched
signal-meaning pairs) contributes to an adaptation of the system to the articula-
tion bottleneck and to keeping its ambiguity at a level where it does not consti-
tute an impediment for communication. The availability of refined capacities of
both memorisation and automatisation may therefore be a part of the explana-
tion of why humans have language but other animals do not.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
In the absence of observable evidence, how can we formulate theories of the evo-
lution of language?1 I have based this thesis on the following answer: we must
assume the uniformitarian principle and postulate that the processes at work in
the past are the same that can be observed in the present. The mechanisms in-
voked to account for the emergence and initial evolution of language must thus
be consistent with those of present-day language use and change. Additionally,
the enterprise to explain language as a cultural entity that is based on domain-
general cognitive mechanisms suggests that the processes at work in the evolu-
tion of language are not in principle different from those identified for general
cultural evolution. The account of language evolution developed in this thesis
has therefore aimed to be consistent with models of cultural evolution in general
and with models of language use and change in particular.
My discussion of such models has shown that there are two loci at which inno-
vation can be introduced in the course of cultural evolution: use and cultural
transmission. It can and must be assumed that both have played their part in
the evolution of language. However, contemporary studies have mainly focused
on the role of imperfect cultural transmission. To isolate the effect of this locus
of innovation, they have consequently assumed an idealised representation of
language use. In particular, they have failed to recognise the distinction between
signal meaning and speaker meaning and ignored the fact that language use
exhibits pragmatic plasticity. I have argued that such models of language evo-
lution, while they have provided compelling explanations for the emergence of
specific linguistic properties, fail to account for two basic evolutionary puzzles:
1A short version of this chapter appears as Hoefler (2008).
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they cannot—and also do not claim to—explain (i) how language has emerged
from no language and (ii) how it has come to exhibit the appearance of design for
communication, which I have labelled the “emergence puzzle” and the “design
puzzle” respectively.
To account for these two puzzles, my thesis has turned its focus to the role that
innovative use plays in linguistic cultural evolution. Specifically, I have aimed
(i) to develop a mechanistic model of the cultural evolution of language that ac-
knowledges and incorporates the fact that language use exhibits pragmatic plas-
ticity and (ii) to explore the explanatory potential of this fact with regard to the
emergence puzzle and the design puzzle. In what follows, I summarise the con-
tributions that the thesis has made to these two objectives, assess the significance
of its findings for the study of language evolution and point to the possibilities it
offers for future research.
6.1 Key elements of the proposed model
The mechanistic model of the cultural evolution of language that I have both
introduced conceptually and implemented computationally is based on the fol-
lowing key elements.
• Innovative use. I have argued that innovations come about when language
use exhibits pragmatic plasticity, that is, when, in a specific context, a
signal comes to communicate a speaker meaning that differs from its
conventional signal meaning. I have modelled the relationship between
signal meaning and speaker meaning in terms of underspecification and
overspecification.
• Faithful learning. To isolate the effect of innovative use, a maximally sim-
ple form of learning has been assumed: the mere storage of observed co-
occurrences of produced forms and communicated meanings. This form of
exemplar-based learning is psychologically particularly plausible and of-
fers a way of modelling the process of conventionalisation through usage-
memorisation and entrenchment.
Conceptually, the introduced model is built on a number of original arguments
that call for the dissolution of traditionally assumed dichotomies and for the
recognition of a number of continua:
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• Code-context continuum. Code has been analysed as a special type of
common-ground knowledge contained in the context of an utterance:
the knowledge of a conventional association of a producible form with a
specific meaning.
• Coding-inference continuum. Consequently, the process of coding has been
re-analysed as a special case of inference from context that is only different
from other forms of inference from context by its making use of the afore-
mentioned special type of common-ground knowledge.
• Form-meaning continuum. Furthermore, I have pointed out that forms, be-
cause they are conceptual too, can themselves serve as signal meanings if
they are not conventionally associated with any other meaning yet. Forms
represent a special type of meanings, namely meanings for which direct
evidence in form of a producible signal can be provided. I have shown
that the recognition of this fact allows for the modelling of iconicity as well
as the simulation of the transition from non-symbolic communication to
symbolic communication.
• Semantics-pragmatics continuum. In the introduced model, linguistic forms
acquire conventional (semantic) meaning gradually when users remember
and further entrench their association with the meanings whose inference
from context they have triggered. There is thus no clear-cut borderline
between pragmatically inferred and semantically encoded meaning—even
less so if one also takes the postulated code-context and coding-inference
continua into account.
The introduced model also recognises the so-called symbolic thesis postulated
by construction-based approaches to grammar, which dissolves the dichotomy
between lexicon and syntax:
• Syntax-lexicon continuum. Syntactic constructions are conceived as symbolic
associations between a form and meaning. In this sense, they are not dif-
ferent from lexical items. The two only differ in their degree of specificity,
with syntactic constructions being more schematic than lexical ones. Be-
cause syntactic constructions are conventional form-meaning associations,
they can also exhibit pragmatic plasticity in specific contexts of use.
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6.2 The explanatory potential of pragmatic plasticity
The key contribution of this thesis to the study of language evolution is its ex-
ploration of the explanatory potential of pragmatic plasticity with regard to the
emergence puzzle and the design puzzle.
6.2.1 Explaining the emergence puzzle
The thesis has shown that a model of the cultural evolution of language that
incorporates the notion of pragmatic plasticity has the potential to account for
the following aspects of the emergence puzzle:
• The link between linguistic and non-linguistic communication. Pragmatic plas-
ticity points to the ostensive-inferential nature of linguistic communication
and therefore to the origin of language in this pre-symbolic form of com-
munication. This thesis has bridged the evolutionary gap between no
language and language by identifying ostensive-inferential communica-
tion as the continual aspect that is present in both stages, and suggested
that the cognitive mechanisms involved in ostensive-inferential communi-
cation may be sufficient for the transition from one stage to the other.
• The emergence of symbolism. In particular, it has shown how the pragmatic
plasticity exhibited by pre-symbolic communicative cues, and the con-
ventionalisation of the usages of such cues, can lead to the emergence of
symbolism. Through iterated usage-induced semantic change, the relation-
ship between a form and its conventional meaning can become obscured,
and eventually appear arbitrary. Such semantic change is initiated by
under- and/or overspecified re-use, that is, when extant conventions come
to exhibit pragmatic plasticity in specific contexts of use.
• The emergence of grammar. I have sketched how the same set of cognitive
mechanisms can also be applied to account for the processes of syntacicisa-
tion and grammaticalisation. Firstly, I suggested that pragmatic plasticity
can explain why abstract schemata, for instance the order in which two
symbols are produced, become conventionalised: the schemata themselves
serve as communicative cues that lead to the inference of meaning from
context. Secondly, I argued that through pragmatic plasticity in re-use,
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extant conventions, both specific and schematic, can undergo further se-
mantic change and eventually become more “functional.”
• The protolanguage issue. I have consequently argued that the assumption
of two distinct stages in the evolution of language, one with symbolism
but without grammar (“protolanguage”) and one with both symbolism
and grammar, would not be warranted if the same set of cognitive mecha-
nisms were to lead to both the emergence of symbolism and the emergence
of grammar. A model that incorporates pragmatic plasticity would then
present a scenario of language evolution in which both symbolism and
grammar gradually co-evolve from iterated ostensive-inferential commu-
nication.
6.2.2 Explaining the design puzzle
The thesis has also shown that a model that incorporates pragmatic plasticity has
the potential to account for the presence of the following aspects of the appear-
ance of design for communication in language.
• Expressivity. Pragmatic plasticity constitutes a “tool” to enhance the expres-
sivity of a symbolic communication system and can therefore account for
how language has come to adapt to the communicative needs of its user(s).
Because language use exhibits pragmatic plasticity, extant conventions can
be used as stepping stones to reach novel, previously inexpressible mean-
ings. When such new usages are conventionalised, they can themselves
serve as stepping stones in subsequent usage events. Pragmatic plasticity
thus allows for the cumulative exploration of ever new meaning spaces.
This process has been studied with the help of computer simulations in
this thesis.
• Signal economy. In the form of under- and overspecification, pragmatic
plasticity provides two “tools” for context-specific signal reduction and
can thus account for how language has come to adapt to the fact that
articulation constitutes a bottleneck that slows down the communicative
process. I have shown with the help of computer simulations that under
the right conditions the iterated use of under- and overspecification can
help to keep the average signal length of a symbolic communication sys-
tem low. Pragmatic plasticity enables language to function like an evolving
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lossy compression algorithm that adapts to its environment in the course
of its cultural evolution.
• Ambiguity. Pragmatic plasticity also explains the ubiquity of the appar-
ently dysfunctional feature of ambiguity in language. Because linguistic
signals are interpreted in context anyway, ambiguous code does not con-
stitute a problem for communication. However, ambiguity is even posi-
tively functional: a code that does not allow for ambiguity in the form of
layering cannot make use of the expressivity-enhancing capacities of prag-
matic plasticity. Furthermore, I have argued from an information-theoretic
perspective that ambiguous codes allow for greater signal economy than
non-ambiguous codes, which again adds to the appearance of design for
communication.
6.3 Assessment and future research
As its main contribution to the study of language evolution, the presented thesis
has suggested that a model of the cultural evolution of language that incorpo-
rates the notion of pragmatic plasticity has the capacity to account for (i) how
language emerged from no language, and (ii) how language has come to exhibit
the appearance of design for communication. With regard to explaining these
two puzzles, a model that locates innovation in use and treats cultural transmis-
sion as faithful seems to be superior to one that locates innovation in imperfect
cultural transmission and assumes use to be faithful.
This observation leads to a final hypothesis. Could it be that the mechanisms
available to models that locate innovation in use are indeed sufficient for the
emergence of language? This is not to suggest that the processes studied by
transmission-basedmodels did not occur in the course of language evolution but
to open up the possibility that a complex symbolic communication system like
language could have emerged and evolved just as well if they had not. If this
was indeed the case, the following to factors would have played a crucial part
in the emergence of langauge: (i) extended use of pragmatic plasticity, which in
turn is based on a highly developed ability to recognise common ground, and
(ii) an increased fidelity of learning, both individual and social.
It must be left to future research to test this hypothesis. The model that I have
proposed provides (but also only provides) a framework in which such testing
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can be carried out. Among other things, the following questions remain to be
addressed:
• Can phonological change be described in terms of under- and overspeci-
fication and thus a common cognitive basis for both phonological and se-
mantic change be identified?
• Do the findings gained from the presented computer simulations scale up?
That is, do they still hold if we run simulations that work with semantic
and phonological spaces that are much larger than the ones assumed for
the cases discussed?
• Canwe simulate the emergence of complex syntactic phenomena by replac-
ing the abstract forms and meanings used in the introduced computational
model with more specific representations?
• What information can be gained from the computer simulations about com-
munication systems potentially shifting from more to less iconicity in the
course of their cultural evolution?
• Can the developed conceptual model be applied to describe experimental
data such as that provided by Galantucci (2005) or Garrod et al. (2007)?
In summary, this thesis makes a case for the formulation of mechanistic models,
both conceptual and computational, that describe the processes involved in the
cultural evolution of language at a high level of abstraction. Such models allow
us to gain an understanding of the mechanisms at work by generalising over
established analyses of individual linguistic phenomena. After all, the origin of
language cannot be explained at a level of description that is specific to language:
rather, it needs to be accounted for in terms of more basic, domain-general mech-
anisms. If we want to be able to identify the minimal set of cognitive capacities
that must have been in place for language to emerge, we must abstract away
from merely linguistic descriptions and classifications and thereby separate the
explanandum, language, from its explanans. The present thesis contributes to
this goal.
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APPENDIX A
Algorithms
This appendix gives a more thorough treatment of the algorithms that the com-
putational model discussed in chapters 4 and 5 applies to generate speakermean-
ings (section A.1), to calculate the probabilities of individual meanings (section
A.2), to generate the contextual information that is made available to the agent
in each iteration (section A.3), and to produce a signal in light of a given speaker
meaning and context (section A.4).
In the implementation, the semantic space is determined by two program pa-
rameters:
1. the set of all semantic units discernible by the agent
2. the maximal number of such units that a meaning can contain (henceforth
referred to as the maximal meaning length)
Each semantic unit is assigned two weights: one indicates the probability by
which the semantic unit occurs in a generated meaning and one the probability
by which it occurs in the context.
A.1 Generating a meaning
In each iteration of the simulation, a meaning for the agent to communicate is
generated by the algorithm performing the following steps:
1. Randomly choose a number between 1 and the pre-definedmaximal mean-
ing length. This number indicates the length of the meaning to be gener-
ated.
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2. Randomly choose a semantic unit according to the probability distribution
of the semantic units.
3. Add the chosen semantic unit to the meaning to be generated.
4. Randomly choose another semantic unit. If the chosen unit is already part
of the meaning to be generated, discard it. If it is not, add it.
5. Repeat step 4 until the meaning has reached the length determined in
step 1.
A.2 Calculating the probability of a meaning
Because of the way meanings are generated (see A.1 above), each permutation of
a meaning can occur with a different probability. The probability that a meaning
occurs is thus the sum of the probabilities of its permutations:
(1) P(M) =
|M|!
∑
i=1
P(Mi) where Mi is a permutation of M
The probability that a particular permutation of a meaning occurs is captured by
the following formula:
(2) P(Mi) =
1
lmax
·
|M|
∏
j=1
P(cj)
1−∑j−1k=0 P(ck)
where c ∈ Mi
Formula (2) is best explained by working through an example. Let us assume
that the experimenter has set the program parameters as given in (3):
(3) Discernible semantic units: A, B,C
Probability of occurrence
in the speaker meaning: P(A) = 0.5
P(B) = 0.25
P(C) = 0.25
Maximal meaning length: 3
The parameters in (3) yield the following semantic space:
(4) Semantic space: { {A}, {B}, {C}, {A, B}, {A,C}, {B,C}, {A, B,C} }
The probability that, for instance, meaning {A, B,C} occurs is then the sum of
the probabilities by which its permutations [A, B,C], [A,C, B], [B, A,C], [B,C, A],
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[C, A, B], [C, B, A] occur. In correspondence with formula (2), the following pro-
cedure is applied to calculate the probability of an individual permutation, e.g.
[B, A,C]:
1. Calculate the probability by which the given meaning length occurs (in our
example, meanings can contain one, two or three units. The probability
that a meaning has a length of 3 is therefore 13 ).
2. For each unit contained in the permutation, calculate the probability by
which it would have been selected at the respective position in the permu-
tation:
(a) Calculate the probability that B is selected first. (This is P(B) = 0.25.)
(b) Calculate the probability that A is selected second. (Because B cannot
be selected anymore, the choice is only between A and C now. The
probability that A is chosen under these conditions is thus P(A)1−P(B) =
0.5
0.75 ).
(c) Calculate the probability that C is selected third. (Because B and A
cannot be selected anymore, the choice is down to C now. The proba-
bility that C is chosen under these conditions is thus P(C)1−(P(B)+P(A)) =
0.25
0.25 = 1).
3. The probability of the considered permutation is the product of the proba-
bility calculated in step 1 and all probabilities calculated in step 2. (In our
example, this means that P([B, A,C]) = 13 · 0.25 · 0.50.75 · 1 = 132 .)
To get the probability by which meaning {A, B,C} occurs, the probabilities of
all its permutations need to be summed up, as stated in formula (1). This yields
P({A, B,C}) = 13 (whichmakes sense because only onemeaningwith three units
is possible and each of the three possible meaning lengths is equally probable).
A.3 Generating a context
In each generation, a context is generated. This context can contain two types of
information: semantic units that are inferable and semantic units that are ignor-
able. The former constitute semantic units that are part of the speaker meaning
but do not need to be expressed explicitly because, in the present context, they
can be inferred. The latter are semantic units that are not part of the speaker
meaning but can nevertheless be part of the signal meaning since they consti-
tute irrelevant information in the present context and will thus be ignored (cf.
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section 4.1.2.1). The maximal number of semantic units that the context of an it-
eration can contain (henceforth referred to as the “maximal context size”) needs
to be pre-defined by the experimenter.
The algorithm that generates the contextual information functions as follows:
1. Randomly choose a number between 1 and the pre-defined maximal con-
text size. This number indicates the number of semantic units to be gener-
ated for the given context.
2. Randomly choose a semantic unit according to the probability distribution
of the semantic units.
3. If the chosen semantic unit already occurs in the generated speaker mean-
ing, thenmark it with a plus sign: it constitutes inferable information. If the
the chosen semantic unit does not occur in the generated speaker meaning,
mark it with a minus sign: it constitutes ignorable information.
4. Add the signed semantic unit to the context to be generated.
5. Randomly choose another semantic unit. If the chosen unit is already part
of the context to be generated, discard it. If it is not, repeat steps 3 and 4.
6. Repeat step 5 until the context has reached the size determined in step 1.
A.4 Producing a signal
After a speaker meaning and a context have been generated, the agent applies his
I-language to produce an appropriate signal. The process of signal production
or use is described in informally in section 4.1.2. Here I provide the algorithm
that the agent applies to produce a signal in the context of a given iteration. This
algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Generate all possible signal meanings for the given speaker meaning in the
given context.
A possible signal meaning Pi is defined as the union of the given speaker
meaning S and a (potentially empty) subset Ii of all semantic units that are
inferable in the given context, minus a (potentially empty) subset Ni of all
semantic units that are ignorable in the given context:
Pi = (S ∪ Ii) \ Ni
268
Legend: Pi a possible signal meaning
S the given speaker meaning
I the given set of all inferable semantic units
Ii a (potentially empty) subset of I: Ii ⊆ I
N the given set of all ignorable semantic units
Ni a (potentially empty) subset of N: Ni ⊆ N
2. Generate all possible signals:
(a) For each possible signal meaning, generate all signals that the agent’s
I-language maps it onto.
(b) From the resulting set of signals exclude those that the agent’s I-
language also maps onto a meaning that contains semantic units that
are neither part of the given speaker meaning nor constitute ignorable
information in the given context. (This step is not implemented in the
current model; see comments below.)
3. From the resulting list of signals, choose those signals that meet best the
criteria given by the applied synonym selection strategy:
(a) If the strategy is to choose the most entrenched signal, calculate for
each signal the average entrenchment of the constructions that would
be involved in its production and choose the signal(s) with the highest
value.
(b) If the strategy is to choose the most underspecified signal, count
for each signal the number of semantic units that occur in the given
speaker meaning but not in the signal meaning of that signal and
choose the signal(s) with the highest value.
(c) If the strategy is to choose the shortest signal, count the number of
units contained in the signal and choose the signal(s) with the lowest
value.
(d) If the strategy is to choose a signal at random, do nothing.
4. If there is still more than one signal left, choose one at random.
Note that without step 2(b), which is not included in the current implementa-
tion of the model, the described algorithm can result in a situation of pragmatic
ambiguity: the produced signal may be mapped to more than one signal mean-
ing by the agent’s grammar, and these signal meanings may identify different
speaker meanings from the set of meanings that are potentially relevant in the
given situation (cf. section 4.1.2.1).
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As an example, imagine that in a given situation both A and B consitute relevant
information, that the agent needs to communicate speaker meaning A, and that
his grammar consists of the constructions X→A and X→B. Without the addition
of step 2(b), the algorithm described above would result in the agent producing
signal X. From the perspective of the hearer (which is not modelled here), this
would however lead to pragmatic plasticity: in the given context,X could denote
A as well as B. The produced cue would thus not be sufficient for the hearer to
work out which of the relevant meanings the agent wants to convey.
By adding step 2(b) to the algorithm, the occurrence of such a case can be pre-
vented: the agent would now not be able to produce any signal for the intended
speaker meaning under the described circumstances, and the simulation would
move on to the next iteration (as described at the end of section 4.1.2.2). This
function is, however, not included in the simulations discussed in the present
thesis.
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APPENDIX B
Measurements
This appendix provides detailled descriptions of the definitions and methods
that have been used to measure expressivity, signal economy and ambiguity in
the computer simulations discussed in chapter 5.
B.1 Measuring expressivity
I define the expressivity of a grammar as the proportion of the agent’s semantic
space that is covered by the conventionalised meanings which the grammar as-
sociates with forms. A preliminary way of measuring expressivity in the model
is thus to divide the number of meanings expressible by the grammar by the
number of possible meanings contained in the semantic space. This provisional
definition of expressivity is summarised in formula (1) below—where expr stands
for expressivity, G for the grammar, S(G) for the semantic space covered by the
grammar and S(A) for the total semantic space available to the agent.
(1) expr(G) =
|S(G)|
|S(A)| (provisional definition)
In example (2) below, I apply this preliminary method of measuring expressivity.
The example shows a grammar that covers two thirds of the semantic space: of
the three meanings that the agent can possibly want to convey in a usage event
(A, B, AB), two occur as conventionalised meanings in a construction contained
in the grammar (A and B).
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(2) Semantic space: A, B, AB
Grammar: X→ A
Y→ B
Expressivity: 2/3 = 0.67
In contrast, example (3) depicts a situation where the agent’s grammar exhibits
full expressivity because it contains a construction for every meaning in the se-
mantic space. In summary, a grammar has maximal expressivity (expressivity =
1) if it covers the whole semantic space, and minimal or no expressivity (expres-
sivity = 0) if it cannot express any meaning contained in the semantic space.
(3) Semantic space: A, B, AB
Grammar: X→ A
Y→ B
XY→ AB
Expressivity: 3/3 = 1
However, formula (1) provides only a very sketchy description of expressivity.
A more precise definition must also take into account that not all meanings con-
tained in the semantic space necessarily occur with the same probability: some
meanings may have to be communicated more often than others. In the compu-
tational model, this phenomenon can be simulated by assigning weights to the
meanings contained in the semantic space of the agent which determine with
what probability individual meanings are randomly selected to constitute the
speaker meaning the agent needs to convey. This fact makes it necessary for
expressivity to be calculated in a more sophisticated way.
Example (4) illustrates what impact the probabilities with which individual
meanings occur must have on the expressivity measured in a grammar. Suppose
a semantic space contains two meanings, A and B, and the former occurs with a
probability of 0.9 as the agent’s speaker meaning whereas the latter occurs only
with a probability of 0.1. In such a semantic space, a grammar that contains both
a construction for A and a construction for B, as shown in G3 below, has maximal
expressivity. The other limiting case is a grammar without any constructions at
all, as represented by G0. The expressivity value of such a grammar would be
zero. The interesting distinction, however, is that between a grammar that only
has a construction for A (like grammar G1) and one that only has a construction
for B (like grammar G2). Even though both these grammars contain the same
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number of meanings, our intuitive notion is that G1 is more expressive than G2
because A occurs more frequently than B. We thus need a formula to measure
expressivity that takes this goal into account.
(4) Semantic space: A, B
Probabilities: P(A) = 0.9
P(B) = 0.1
Grammar G0: –
Grammar G1: X→ A
Grammar G2: Y→ B
Grammar G3: X→ A
Y→ B
Limiting cases: expr(G0) = 0
expr(G3) = 1
Goal: expr(G1) > expr(G2)
I therefore provide a definition of expressivity that weights each meaning con-
tained in the grammar according to its probability of occurrence. This goal is
realised in formula (5), which calculates the expressivity of a grammar G as the
sum of the probabilities P of all meanings M contained in the semantic space
S(G) covered by the grammar.1
(5) expr(G) =
|S(G)|
∑
i=1
P(Mi) where M ∈ S(G) (final definition)
According to formula (5), the expressivity of grammar G1 in (4) is 0.9, whereas
the expressivity of grammar G2 is only 0.1.
B.2 Measuring signal economy
To measure a grammar’s adaptation to the articulation bottleneck, I have
adapted an information-theoretic method to the specifics of the computational
model. In the domain of data compression, the degree to which a code exhibits
signal economy is determined by calculating the average codeword length of that
code.2 The term “codeword” denotes the form side of a form-meaning mapping.
1Refer to appendix A.2 for a detailed account of how the probability of occurrence of a mean-
ing is determined in the computational model.
2The same concept is at times also referred to as the “average length” of the code or the “rate”
of the code (cf. Sayood 2006:6, 28).
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The concept of average codeword length can be applied to the introduced com-
putational model: it corresponds to the average length of the meaning-bearing
forms in the agent’s grammar, which I have referred to as the grammar’s average
signal length in chapter 5. The simplest definition of the average signal length of
a grammar is given in formula (6).
(6) asl(G) =
∑|G|i=1 |Fi|
|G| where Fi → Mi ∈ G (first provisional definition)
By this definition, the average signal length asl of a grammar G is the sum of
the lengths of all forms F that occur in the grammar, divided by the number of
forms (or rather the number of all form-meaning mappings F → M) contained
in the grammar. The average signal length of the grammar in (7) would thus be
1+2
2 = 1.5.
(7) X→ A
YZ→ B
However, definition (6) does not take into consideration the fact that not all
meanings necessarily occur with equal probability. Consider, for instance, the
two grammars given in example (8).
(8) Probabilities: P(A) = 0.9
P(B) = 0.1
Grammar G1: X→ A
YZ→ B
Grammar G2: XZ→ A
Y→ B
Goal: asl(G1) < asl(G2)
Both grammar G1 and grammar G2 have a construction for meaning A and a con-
struction for meaning B. If formula (6) were to be applied, both grammars would
exhibit the same average signal length since both contain one constructionwhose
form consists of one semantic unit and one construction whose form is made up
of two semantic units. However, example (8) also provides the probability of
occurrence of the meanings encoded by the grammar (refer to appendix A.2 for
a detailed account of how the probability of occurrence of a meaning can be de-
termined in the model): meaning A is very frequent whereas meaning B is rare.
In this situation, it makes sense to say that grammar G1, where the signal for the
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more frequent meaning is shorter than that for the less frequent one, has a lower
average signal length than grammar G2, where the signal for the more frequent
meaning is longer than that for the less frequent one. This goal is taken into
account in the revised formula shown in (9), which defines the average signal
length of a grammar as the sum of the length of each form, times the probability
of occurrence of the meaning associated with that form.
(9) asl(G) =
|G|
∑
i=1
P(Mi)|Fi| where Fi → Mi ∈ G (second provisional definition)
If it is determined according to formula (9), the average signal length of grammar
G1 in example (8) amounts to 1.1, whereas the average signal length of grammar
G2 is 1.9. The revised definition thus meets our goal.
Further complication is introduced by the fact that not all grammars exhibit
maximal expressivity. If a grammar is not fully expressive, its average signal
length would be distorted if it was calculated according to definition (9). In ex-
ample (10), for instance, grammar G3 covers only two out of three possible mean-
ings, and its average signal length would consequently appear to be 0.75 instead
of 1.5.
(10) Probabilities: P(A) = 0.25
P(B) = 0.25
P(AB) = 0.5
Grammar G3: X→ A
YZ→ B
Goal: asl(G3) = 1.5
To fix this problem, one must modify the definition of the average signal length
of a grammar as given in formula (11). This formula divides the sum of indi-
vidual signal lengths and meaning probabilities by the total expressivity of the
grammar.
(11) asl(G) =
∑|G|i=1 P(Mi)|Fi|
expr(G)
where Fi → Mi ∈ G (third provisional definition)
A final issue that needs to be addressed is exemplified in (12): how do we deal
with synonymous form-meaning mappings, that is, with constructions that ex-
press the samemeaning? In grammar G4, meaning AB constitutes the right-hand
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side of two constructions, one mapping it onto form XY, the other one mapping
it onto form Z.
(12) Probabilities: P(A) = 0.25
P(B) = 0.25
P(C) = 0.5
Grammar G4: X→ A
Y→ B
XY→ AB
Z→ AB
Goal: asl(G4) = 1.25
If formula (11) were to be applied to determine the average signal length of this
grammar, the result would again be distorted. As a solution, I therefore devise
the final definition of average signal length given in (13) below. To prevent the
described problem, each time the probability of the meaning M of a construction
is used, it is divided by the number n of constructions in grammar G whose
right-hand side that meaning constitutes.
(13) asl(G) =
∑|G|i=1
P(Mi)
n(Mi)
|Fi|
expr(G)
where Fi → Mi ∈ G (final definition)
B.3 Measuring ambiguity
In a first instance, the ambiguity of a grammar can be defined as the number
of ambiguous forms (i.e. the number of forms associated with more than one
meaning) which that grammar contains. According to this notion of ambiguity,
grammar G1 in (14) contains one instance of ambiguity (the form X) and gram-
mar G2 two (the forms X and Z):
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(14) Grammar G1: X→ A
X→ B
Y→ C
Z→ D
Grammar G2: X→ A
X→ B
Y→ C
Z→ D
Z→ E
Goal: amb(G1) < amb(G2)
Consider now the two grammars in (15). Both grammars contain just one am-
bigous form, X. According to the described simple notion of ambiguity they
would thus be equally ambiguous. However, the fact a definition of ambiguity
needs to capture in this case is that a form with three meanings is more ambigu-
ous than a form with two meanings. To this aim, I devise the revised definition
of ambiguity given in (16).
(15) Grammar G1: X→ A
X→ B
Grammar G2: X→ A
X→ B
X→ C
Goal: amb(G1) < amb(G2)
(16) a. amb(G) = ∑ amb(F)
b. amb(F) = |CF| − 1 (provisional definition)
Legend: G a grammar
F a form occuring in G
CF the set of all constructions x ∈ G with form F
Definition (16a) describes the ambiguity of a grammar G as the sum of the am-
biguity of all forms F occuring in G. In (16b), the ambiguity of a form F is then
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defined as the number of constructions in G that have that form, minus 1. By
subtracting 1 from the number of constructions with the same form, we achieve a
more intuitive notion of ambiguity: a form with only one meaning has ambiguiy
0, a form with two meanings has ambiguity 1, a form with three meanings has
ambiguity 2, and so on.
We also have to consider the fact that form-meaning associations can be en-
trenched to different degrees. To this aim, compare the two grammars in (17),
in which the relative entrenchment of each construction is given in parentheses.3
(17) Grammar G1: X→ A (0.5)
X→ B (0.5)
Grammar G2: X→ A (0.9)
X→ B (0.1)
Goal: amb(G1) > amb(G2)
Both grammars in (17) consist of just one form that is associated with two mean-
ings. According to definition (16), they would thus exhibit the same degree of
ambiguity. However, there is a difference in the two grammars with regard to
the ease with which the two meanings of the respective form can or will be re-
covered. In grammar G1, both meanings of form X are equally entrenched and
thus equally accessible. This is not the case for grammar G2. Here, the use of
form F is much more likely to elicit meaning A than meaning B because the as-
socation between F and A is much more entrenched than the assocation between
F and B. Grammar G1 is thus more ambiguous than grammar G2. This fact is
captured in the revised definition of ambiguity presented in (18).
(18) amb(F) =
|CF| − 1
1+∑|CF|i=1 ∆(ci)
(provisional definition)
3The relative entrenchment of a construction is obtained by dividing its absolute entrench-
ment by the sum of the entrenchment of all constructions occurring in the respective grammar.
Like this, a normalisation of the entrenchment values of the individual constructions in a gram-
mar can be achieved.
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Legend: G a grammar
F a form occuring in G
CF the set of all constructions x ∈ G with form F
c a construction ∈ CF
∆(c) the deviation of the relative entrenchment of c
from the average relative entrenchment of CF
Definition (18) makes sure that constructions with the same form whose en-
trenchment differs a lot are considered less ambiguous than constructions with
the same form whose entrenchment is very similar. To this end, the deviation
of the entrenchment of each construction from the average entrenchment of all
constructions is calculated.4 The ambiguity value determined by formula (16b)
is then divided by the sum of all these deviations. To prevent division by zero,
this sum is increased by 1.
In grammar G1 of example (17), the deviation of the entrenchment of either con-
struction from the average entrenchment of the two constructions is 0. The ear-
lier ambiguity value 1 is thus divided by 1: the ambiguity of G1 remains 1. In
constrast, the entrenchment of either construction in grammar G2 deviates by
0.4 from the average entrenchment (0.5). The original ambiguity value 1 is thus
divided by 1+ ∆(X) = 1.8 (i.e. 1+ 0.4+ 0.4), and definition (18) yields an ambi-
guity value of only 0.56 for the form X in grammar G2. As intended, the revised
definition of ambiguity acknowledges that grammar G2 is less ambiguous than
grammar G1.
The last shortcoming of our definition of the ambiguity of a grammar is that it
does not take into account how many non-ambiguous forms the grammar con-
tains. According to the formula devised so far, both grammars in example (19)
are equally ambiguous, even though grammar G1 consists of only two construc-
tions with the same form, whereas grammar G2 additionally contains two (much
more entrenched) non-ambiguous constructions. An ideal definition of ambigu-
ity would conceive G1 as more ambiguous than G2.
4Remember that the relative entrenchment of the constructions is used: the sum of the en-
trenchment of all constructions in a grammar always amounts to 1.
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(19) Grammar G1: X→ A (0.5)
X→ B (0.5)
Grammar G2: X→ A (0.1)
X→ B (0.1)
Y→ C (0.4)
Z→ D (0.4)
Goal: amb(G1) > amb(G2)
To ensure that grammar G1 is rated as more ambiguous than grammar G2, the
calculated ambiguity value must be put in relation to the proportion of the gram-
mar that is ambiguous in the first place. This proportion can be obtained by
adding up the relative entrenchment of all constructions in the grammar whose
forms are associated with more than one meaning. I therefore devise the final
definition of ambiguity stated in (20).
(20) a. amb(G) = ∑ amb(F)
b. amb(F) =
|CF| − 1
1+∑|CF|i=1 ∆(ci)
·∑|CF|j=1 R(cj) (final definition)
Legend: G a grammar
F a form occuring in G
CF the set of all constructions x ∈ G with form F
c a construction ∈ CF
∆(c) the deviation of the relative entrenchment of c
from the average relative entrenchment of CF
R(c) the relative entrenchment of construction c
in grammar G
Formula (20) multiplies the ambiguity value calculated for a specific form Fwith
the sum of the relative entrenchments R of all constructions c containing that
form. In grammar G1 of example (19) above, the ambiguity value for X is thus
multiplied by a factor 1 (i.e. the sum of 0.5 and 0.5). The resulting ambiguity of
grammar G1 is consequently 1. In grammar G2, however, the calculated ambigu-
ity value of form X is multiplied by a factor 0.2 (i.e. the sum of 0.1 and 0.1). The
ambiguity of grammar G2 therefore only amounts to 0.2. The definition of ambi-
guity that I have devised thus acknowledges that grammar G2 is less ambiguous
than grammar G1.
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APPENDIX C
Publications
This appendix contains three articles published prior to the completion of this
thesis:
Hoefler, S. (2008). Pragmatic plasticity: A pivotal design feature? In Smith, A.
D. M., Smith, K., and Ferrer i Cancho, R., editors, The Evolution of Language:
Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Evolution of Language, pages
427–428, Barcelona. World Scientific Press.
Hoefler, S., and Smith, A. D.M. (2008). Reanalysis vs. metaphor? What grammat-
icalisation can tell us about language evolution. In Smith, A. D. M., Smith, K.,
and Ferrer i Cancho, R., editors, The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on the Evolution of Language, pages 427–428, Barcelona.
World Scientific Press.
Hoefler, S., and Smith, A. D. M. (in press). The pre-linguistic basis of grammati-
calisation: A unified approach to metaphor and renalysis. To appear in Studies
in Language.
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Hoefler, S. (2008). Pragmatic plasticity: A pivotal design feature? In Smith, A. D. M., Smith, K.,
and Ferrer i Cancho, R., editors, The Evolution of Language: Proceedings of the 7th International
Conference on the Evolution of Language, pages 427–428, Barcelona. World Scientific Press.
PRAGMATIC PLASTICITY: A PIVOTAL DESIGN FEATURE?
STEFAN HOEFLER
Language Evolution and Computation Research Unit, Linguistics and English Language
The University of Edinburgh, 40 George Square, Edinburgh EH8 9LL, Scotland, UK
stefan@ling.ed.ac.uk
Models developed to study the origins of language—both theoretical and
computational—often tacitly assume that linguistic signals fully specify the mean-
ings they communicate. They imply that ignoring the fact that this is not the case
in actual language use is a justified simplification which can be made without sig-
nificant consequences. By making this simplification, however, we miss out on the
extensive explanatory potential of an empirically attested property of language: its
pragmatic plasticity. In this short paper, I argue that pragmatic plasticity plays a
substantial role in the evolution of language and discuss some of the key contri-
butions this “design feature of language” (Hockett, 1960) has made to the success
of linguistic communication.
Language exhibits pragmatic plasticity when the meaning a signal comes to
communicate in a specific context differs from its conventional meaning—when
the signal’s conventional meaning under- and/or overspecifies the actually com-
municated meaning. Pragmatic plasticity may not be a feature pertaining to human
language only, but I claim that, due to their highly developed ability to recognise
common ground (Clark, 1996), it is employed by humans to a degree which can-
not be found in animal communication. The same holds for conventionalisation,
the process by means of which the meaning constructed in a specific context on
the basis of a signal’s pragmatic plasticity becomes enshrined as a new linguistic
convention. The following aspects and consequences of pragmatic plasticity and
its conventionalisation are thus particularly significant to language evolution:
1. Creativity. In effect, pragmatic plasticity is creative language use. It consti-
tutes the major source of linguistic innovation. Theoretically, the presence
of pragmatic plasticity is sufficient for language to be able to meet new
communicative needs. Resorting to invention is not necessary.
2. Adaptability. Through pragmatic plasticity, linguistic conventions are
adapted to novel contexts. This allows language to function as a commu-
nication system in the fast-changing dynamic environment of human so-
cieties. Frequently needed usages become more readily accessible—and
language thus more efficient—through their conventionalisation.
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3. Expressivity. Pragmatic plasticity means that novel meanings are expressed
by using extant conventions in an under- and/or overspecified way. Once
these novel usages become conventions themselves, they can exhibit prag-
matic plasticity too, and thus make available yet another set of meanings
not accessible before. This “ratchet-effect” (Tomasello, 1999) allows for
the cumulative exploitation of ever new meaning spaces, and thus leads to
a gradual increase of the number of meanings that can be expressed.
4. Compression. Articulation constitutes a bottleneck for linguistic communi-
cation (Levinson, 1995): meanings are transmitted via relatively slow phys-
ical channels (speech or gestures). Pragmatic plasticity accommodates this
constraint by facilitating so-called lossy data compression: only informa-
tion which cannot be inferred from context needs to be encoded in the lin-
guistic signal—the rest can be left underspecified. Because we reason faster
than we articulate, this increases the efficiency of linguistic communication.
5. Symbolism. A signal exhibits pragmatic plasticity even if it is not conven-
tionally associated with a meaning (yet) and merely triggers the inference
of meaning from the context. The conventionalisation of such maximally
underspecified usage can lead to the emergence of symbolic associations.
6. Grammaticalisation. Pragmatic plasticity and conventionalisation are the
origin of the semantic change found in grammaticalisation (Traugott &
Dasher, 2005), the set of processes involved in the emergence of grammar.
7. Ambiguity. As it seems to be dysfunctional, ambiguity is often considered
to pose an evolutionary puzzle (Hoefler, 2006). But only if we allow for
ambiguity, novel usages can become conventionalised. Ambiguity is thus a
crucial prerequisite for pragmatic plasticity to unfold its potential.
I conclude from these considerations that pragmatic plasticity and convention-
alisation are pivotal to the emergence and evolution of language. They should
therefore occupy a more central position in evolutionary linguists’ models.
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We argue that studying grammaticalisation is useful to evolutionary linguists, if we abstract
away from linguistic description to the underlying cognitive mechanisms. We set out a unified
approach to grammaticalisation that allows us to identify these mechanisms, and argue that they
could indeed be sufficient for the initial emergence of linguistic signal-meaning associations.
1. Introduction
Language evolution has a notorious data problem: its object of study is simply
too far remote in the pre-historic past for any direct observation to be possible.
In such situations, Ockham’s razor recommends the assumption of the uniformity
of process: that the mechanisms operating in the past are the ones still operating
in the present. This would lead to the assumption that we should be able to learn
something about the evolution of language from the study of language change, and
in particular of semantic change leading to grammaticalisation (Heine & Kuteva,
2002a; Hurford, 2003). Grammaticalisation denotes the (unidirectional) process
by which a discourse strategy, syntactic construction, or word, loses some of its
independence of use and becomes more functional. It is usually accompanied by
phonetic reduction and semantic bleaching and generalisation.
There is disagreement over whether the study of grammaticalisation can give
useful insights into language evolution. Newmeyer (2006), for instance, criticises
the assumption that the unidirectionality of grammaticalisation provides sufficient
evidence that early human language contained only nouns and verbs. We argue
that grammaticalisation is indeed worthy of evolutionary linguists’ study, if one
abstracts away from linguistic descriptions of individual phenomena to underlying
psychological mechanisms. We thus support calls for a more cognition-oriented
study of grammaticalisation (Heine, 1997; Kuteva, 2001; Tomasello, 2003):
Exactly how grammaticalization and syntacticization happen in the
concrete interactions of individual human beings and groups of hu-
man beings, and how these processes might relate to the other pro-
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cesses of sociogenesis by means of which human social interaction
ratchets up the complexity of cultural artefacts, requires more psycho-
logically based linguistic research into processes of linguistic com-
munication and language change. (Tomasello, 2003, p. 103)
The remainder of this paper falls into three sections. We first provide a unified
approach to grammaticalisation, allowing us to identify the underlying cognitive
mechanisms. We project these to study the emergence of a non-linguistic code,
before exploring the implications of our approach for evolutionary linguistics.
2. Metaphor vs. reanalysis
Two competing kinds of accounts of grammaticalisation phenomena can be identi-
fied in the literature: those which emphasise metaphorical use (Heine, 1997), and
those which emphasise reanalysis (Hopper & Traugott, 2003). We propose a uni-
fied approach based on an ostensive-inferential model of communication (Sperber
& Wilson, 1995). Such a model emphasises the fact that in a given situation,
a speaker and hearer assume common ground (Clark, 1996). Common ground
includes, among other shared knowledge, the awareness of shared linguistic con-
ventions and the recognition of what is relevant in a given situation, which allows
the hearer to infer what the speaker intends to communicate on the basis of an
ostensive stimulus provided by the speaker.
The grammaticalisation of the English construction be going to, which origi-
nally stood for SPATIAL MOTION, and then came to express INTENTION, as shown
in Example 1, is one of the most cited examples in the grammaticalisation liter-
ature (Heine, Claudi, & Hu¨nnemeyer, 1991; Kuteva, 2001; Hopper & Traugott,
2003), and is also a particular instance of grammaticalisation which is very com-
mon, both historically and cross-linguistically (Heine & Kuteva, 2002b).
(1) a. We are going to Windsor to see the King. (MOTION)
b. We are going to get married in June. (INTENTION, not MOTION)
(examples from Bybee (2003, p.147)).
We illustrate our approach by presenting the underlying psychological mecha-
nisms, for both speaker and hearer, of metaphor- and reanalysis-based accounts of
this change. In the metaphor-based scenario, detailed in Example 2, a speaker
intends to express INTENTION (2a). She uses the form for SPATIAL MOTION
metaphoricallya, assuming that the hearer will realise that (i) spatial motion is
irrelevant in the current context, and (ii) spatial motion often implies intention,
which in turn is relevant (2b–f). The hearer realises that the literal meaning of the
aThere are many reasons for ad-hoc metaphorical use; these could be sociolinguistic (e.g. for
prestige), or the speaker could simply not have a convention for the intended meaning in her code.
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signal is irrelevant in the current context, and falls back on INTENTION, which he
associates—and knows the speaker associates—with SPATIAL MOTION (2g–m).
(2) Detail of the metaphor-based scenario.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express INTENTION.
(b) I have a construction which expresses SPATIAL MOTION, and the
hearer shares this convention.
(c) SPATIAL MOTION is associated with INTENTION.
(d) SPATIAL MOTION is not relevant in the given context.
(e) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be aware of
(b)–(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use the construction for SPATIAL MOTION
metaphorically to convey INTENTION.
Hearer:
(g) The speaker has expressed SPATIAL MOTION.
(h) SPATIAL MOTION is not relevant in the given context.
(i) SPATIAL MOTION often implies INTENTION.
(j) INTENTION would be relevant in the given context.
(k) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(l) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I know (g)–(k),
and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (g)–(l), I conclude that the speaker intends to convey
INTENTION.
Both speaker and hearer remember that be going to has been used success-
fully to express INTENTION; the more frequently be going to is used in this
sense, the more deeply this new association will become entrenched (Langacker,
1987) in their knowledge. Such entrenchment eventually leads to the phenomenon
of context-absorption, where a pragmatically inferred meaning becomes part of
the lexical item’s conventional, semantic meaning (Croft, 2000; Levinson, 2000;
Kuteva, 2001; Traugott & Dasher, 2005). The entrenched meaning no longer
needs to be inferred from its relevance in the given context, but can be retrieved
instead from the shared conventions which make up part of language users’ ency-
clopaedic knowledge.
In the reanalysis-based scenario, detailed in Example 3, the speaker uses be
going to in its conventional sense to express SPATIAL MOTION—the expression
of which she deems relevant in the given context (3a–e) The hearer, however,
perceives things differently; he does not think that SPATIAL MOTION is relevant in
the present situation but does believe that information about INTENTION would be
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(3f). From the hearer’s perspective, this appears to be exactly the same scenario
as the metaphor-based scenario in Example 2. This time, the interlocutors make
different adjustments to their codes: the speaker will further entrench the conven-
tion that maps be going to onto SPATIAL MOTION, whereas the hearer establishes
a new, additional association between be going to and INTENTION.
(3) Detail of the renalysis-based scenario.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express SPATIAL MOTION.
(b) I have a construction for the expression of SPATIAL MOTION in
my linguistic code, and the hearer shares this convention.
(c) SPATIAL MOTION is relevant in the given context.
(d) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be aware of
(b)–(c) and realise that I am aware of it too.
(e) Because of (d), I can use the construction to communicate
SPATIAL MOTION.
Hearer:
(f) performs the same reasoning as in (2g)–(2m) above.
A special case of the reanalysis-based scenario is one where the hearer, in the
role of a language learner, does not have any existing mapping for be going to in
his linguistic code. However, because he can work out from the context that the
speaker intends to express INTENTION, he will create an association between that
meaning and be going to. In contrast to the previous two scenarios, layering (the
co-existence of an old and a new mapping, which yields polysemy) does not arise
in the hearer’s linguistic code in this case.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of the metaphor-
and reanalysis-based explanations of the grammaticalisation of be going to. First,
both scenarios are based on the same cognitive processes: (i) those involved in
ostensive-inferential communication—in particular the assumption of common
ground, including knowledge of shared linguistic conventions and the recogni-
tion of what is relevant in the given context; (ii) the automatisation-based process
of entrenchment. Second, the difference between the scenarios is not that only
one of them uses metaphor, but rather that the (infelicitiously named) metaphor-
based scenario relies on common ground having been successfully established
between speaker and hearer, whereas the reanalysis-based scenario describes a
situation where, although common ground is assumed by the interlocutors, there
is actually amismatch between their respective discourse contexts (Kuteva, 2001).
The metaphor-based scenario is thus speaker-oriented, focusing on the speaker as
the source of linguistic innovation, while the reanalysis-based account is hearer-
oriented. Depending on which of the two perspectives one takes, however, either
scenario can be regarded as a special case of the other.
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3. Reconstructible meanings
How can we project these scenarios to language evolution? First, we step back to
see how ostensive-inferential communication works—independent of language.
We note that communication is inherently task-oriented; humans do not commu-
nicate “just so,” but to do something, to achieve a goal or solve a task (Austin,
1962). The task-orientedness of communication entails that once a speaker has
made manifest her intention to communicate, the hearer will have certain expecta-
tions as to what are plausible things to communicate in the given situation. In this
way, a hearer discerns what is relevant from what is irrelevant in a given situation
(as in the scenarios for the grammaticalisation of going to above), and the speaker
can likewise anticipate what the hearer is likely to infer.
In the simplest case, in Fig. 1(a), making manifest one’s communicative in-
tention may suffice for the hearer to be able to infer the information one wants
to communicate. The hearer’s reasoning may go as follows: my conspecific ex-
hibits behaviour that does not make sense unless she intends to communicate;
therefore she intends to communicate something; in the current situation, the only
thing that would make sense for her to communicate is that there is some danger
around; therefore, she is communicating that there is some danger around. Note
that the speaker’s and hearer’s assumptions can be different (i.e. there can be a
contextual mismatch): if the perlocutionary effect does not differ, this may go
unnoticed, and speaker and hearer will map the produced stimulus onto different
utterance meanings. In Fig 1(b), for example, as long as the hearer runs and hides,
it does not matter that the speaker thought she was communicating the presence
of lion, while the hearer assumed that hyena were around.
Of course it is not always possible to reduce the set of plausible utterance
meanings to a single one; in such cases, the hearer needs some assistance in se-
lecting the right one, namely a clue. The hearer’s reasoning might run along the
following lines (see Fig. 1(c)). Because it does not make sense otherwise, I must
interpret the speaker’s behaviour as an attempt to communicate. In this situation,
the only things that would make sense for her to communicate are to tell me that
there is danger and to specify whether this danger is a lion or an eagle. She is
communicating, so there is danger, but how can I decide if it is a lion or an eagle?
The speaker must realise my dilemma, and so her ostensive stimulus will contain
a clue. She is growling: lions growl, eagles don’t (hyenas growl too, but this is
irrelevant as there are no hyenas around at this time of year); therefore, she is
communicating that there is a lion.
The cognitive mechanisms underlying these instances of communication are
identical to those described in section 2 for grammaticalisation. This equivalence
also extends to the entrenchment of the signal-meaning association and thus to the
emergence of a convention. In all cases, the meanings which come to be associ-
ated with signals are those which can be reconstructed from the stimuli in context.
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Figure 1. The reconstruction of meaning in ostensive-inferential communication, where ℘ is the set
of plausible intended perlocutionary effects in a given situation. (a) If only one thing makes sense to
be communicated, e.g. that there is some danger around (A), then the recognition of a conspecific’s
intention to communicate suffices to infer what she attempts to convey. (b) Contextual mismatch: the
speaker means A (e.g. that there is a lion), the hearer infers C (e.g. that there is a hyena). Because
both have the same perlocutionary effect p1 (e.g. climbing a tree), the hearer’s misinterpretation goes
unnoticed and communication does not fail. (c) In situations where more than one thing is plausible,
the speaker must additionally provide a clue. For instance, it might make sense to communicate that
there is a lion (A) or an eagle (B): if there is a lion, one must climb (p1); if there is an eagle, one must
hide (p2). Growling (S) serves as a clue: it is the sound made by lions (S → A)—and by hyenas
(S → C), but this is irrelevant in the given context.
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Every speaker innovation can only be propagated through hearer reconstruction;
semantic reconstructibility therefore constrains the types of form-meaning map-
pings which can persist over time (Smith, 2008).
3.1. Burling’s scenario revisited
Burling (2000) makes a case for a scenario of the emergence of linguistic symbols
that is reminiscent of the reanalysis-based explanation of the grammaticalisation
be going towe have given above. He suggests that symbols arise from situations in
which one individual erroneously interprets a conspecific’s behaviour as an osten-
sive stimulus. In our model, this would be represented as an extreme, but never-
theless ordinary, case of contextual mismatch: the hearer interprets the interaction
as communicative but the speaker does not. Because the supposed ostensive stim-
ulus will not have the properties of a proper clue, the hearer will only be able to
infer a plausible meaning if there is only one relevant thing that would make sense
to be communicated in the given context, and if their reaction does not expose the
misunderstanding. Burling concludes that comprehension runs ahead of produc-
tion: “[C]ommunication does not begin when someone makes a sign, but when
someone interprets another’s behaviour as a sign” (Burling, 2000, p.30). This in-
terpretation must be rejected on the basis of our analysis of the psychological un-
derpinnings of the equivalent reanalysis-based scenario of grammaticalisation in
section 2. Although in Burling’s scenario, the hearer does indeed infer something
not implied by the speaker, he does so not on a whim, but under the assumption
that the speaker is inviting him to make those very inferences. Rather than one be-
ing prior to the other, therefore, production and comprehension mirror each other:
whatever a hearer can infer, a speaker can imply. Communication is inherently
co-operative (Grice, 1975; Clark, 1996; Tomasello, 2003), and while Burling’s
“reanalysis-based” account cannot be ruled out, its “metaphor-based” counterpart
is equally possible. Both should be seen as instances of the same set of underlying
cognitive mechanisms: ostensive-inferential communication and entrenchment.
4. Conclusion
We have shown that grammaticalisation can indeed answer questions relevant to
evolutionary linguists, if one moves away from linguistic classification to inves-
tigating its underlying psychological mechanisms. We have argued that the same
cognitive processes that lead to grammaticalisation phenomena could also have
been sufficient for the initial emergence of linguistic signal-meaning associations.
We thus neither endorse nor attempt to disprove Newmeyer (2006)’s specific
criticism of the use of grammaticalisation as a source of information about lan-
guage evolution. Our approach is different from both his approach and the ap-
proaches of those he criticises. We claim that the merit of studying grammatical-
isation, and in fact any semantic change (Traugott & Dasher, 2005), for insights
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into language evolution, lies in the underlying cognitive processes it makes visi-
ble, which can be applied to investigate the origins of language.
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Abstract
Traditionally, grammaticalisation has been described as being based
on phenomena specific to language such as metaphorical extension or
reanalysis. This characterisation is somewhat in contrast to claims
that grammaticalisation is involved in the much more general process
of the initial emergence of language. In this article, we provide a uni-
fied analysis of both the metaphor-based and the reanalysis-based ac-
count of grammaticalisation which is grounded in the cognitive mech-
anisms underlying ostensive-inferential communication. We are thus
able to show that the process of grammaticalisation is an instantiation
of a domain-general pre-linguistic phenomenon.
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1 Introduction
The way grammaticalisation has been dealt with in historical linguis-
tics and in evolutionary linguistics is somewhat paradoxical. In his-
torical linguistics, it is usually described as a highly specific linguistic
process (Givo´n 1979; Bybee et al. 1994; Haspelmath 1998; Hopper &
Traugott 2003), whereas in evolutionary linguistics, it is frequently
invoked as an explanation for the emergence of language in general
(Heine & Kuteva 2002a, 2007; Hurford 2003; Tallerman 2007). But
an account of the origins of language must necessarily transcend its
explanandum and provide explanations that are based on mechanisms
more basic than language.
Grammaticalisation denotes the (unidirectional) process by which
a discourse strategy, syntactic construction, word or morpheme loses
some of its independence of use and becomes more functional in its
meaning. It can be characterised as a process of semantic bleaching
and generalisation accompanied by phonological reduction. Two ma-
jor types of explanations have been suggested for this process in the
literature: one identifies metaphorical extension as the origin of gram-
maticalisation (Heine et al. 1991), the other one the phenomenon of
reanalysis (Hopper & Traugott 2003). Common to both approaches,
however, is that they describe grammaticalisation as a relatively high-
level, language-specific process. The claim that grammaticalisation
constitutes one of the sources of the emergence of language in the first
place (Heine & Kuteva 2002a; Hurford 2003) therefore presents some-
what of a contrast to the way it has been described in historical linguis-
tics. Recently, it has thus even been questioned whether the process of
grammaticalisation can really live up to this claim (Newmeyer 2006;
see Heine & Kuteva 2007: 49–53 for a response).
In this article, we provide a unified analysis of both the metaphor-
based and the reanalysis-based accounts of grammaticalisation; this
unified analysis is grounded in the general cognitive mechanisms in-
volved in ostensive-inferential communication. We are thus able to
show that the process of grammaticalisation constitutes—contrary to
how it has traditionally been characterised in historical linguistics—a
domain-general pre-linguistic phenomenon. Our account is thereby
in line with the recent shift of focus to the cognitive underpinnings
of language change (for an overview of this line of research, see e.g.
Evans & Green 2006) and calls for a more cognition-oriented study of
grammaticalisation (Heine 1997; Kuteva 2001; Tomasello 2003) :
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“Exactly how grammaticalization and syntacticization hap-
pen in the concrete interactions of individual human beings
and groups of human beings, and how these processes might
relate to the other processes of sociogenesis by means of
which human social interaction ratchets up the complexity
of cultural artefacts, requires more psychologically based
linguistic research into processes of linguistic communica-
tion and language change.” (Tomasello 2003: 103)
By providing a cognition-oriented analysis of grammaticalisation, this
article also relates to a number of more recent studies that explore
the links between language change and language evolution (see e.g.
Eckardt et al. 2008; Cooper & Kempson 2008).
The remainder of this paper falls into two main parts. We first
identify the cognitive underpinnings of both the metaphor-based and
the renalysis-based approaches to grammaticalisation. In the second
part of the article, we then project these cognitive mechanisms to
instances of pre-linguistic ostensive-inferential communication. We
conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our approach to
both the study of grammaticalisation and language evolution research.
2 A unified approach
In the following discussion of the cognitive foundations of the metaphor-
based and the reanalysis-based account of grammaticalisation, we
use the example of the English construction be going to to illustrate
our analysis. The grammaticalisation of be going to is one of the
most cited examples in the grammaticalisation literature (Heine et al.
1991; Kuteva 2001; Hopper & Traugott 2003; Evans & Green 2006),
and is also a particular instance of grammaticalisation which is very
common, both historically and cross-linguistically (Heine & Kuteva
2002b). Originally, be going to stood for spatial motion but later it
came to express intention and futurity, as shown in example (1).
(1) a. We are going to Windsor to see the King. (motion)
b. We are going to get married in June.
(intention/futurity, not motion)
(examples from Bybee 2003: 147).
However, before we can move on to discuss the accounts of the gram-
maticalisation of be going to proposed by the metaphor-based and the
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reanalysis-based approach respectively, it is necessary that we provide
a brief introduction of the notion of ostensive-inferential communica-
tion and its cognitive underpinnings, on which our analysis will be
based.
2.1 Ostensive-inferential communication
Ostensive-inferential communication builds on the awareness of com-
mon ground. Common ground is knowledge which two interlocutors
recognise as being shared in a given situation1. It implies (i) that the
interlocutors recognise the said knowledge as shared, (ii) that they
are aware that the other interlocutor recognises it as shared too, and
(iii) that they realise that the other interlocutor also knows that they
are aware of this (Lewis 1969; Clark 1996; Sperber & Wilson 1995).
On the basis of common ground, communication can be established
through an ostensive act performed by the communicator (a modifica-
tion of the physical environment which constitutes an enhancement of
the interlocutors’ common ground)2 and an inferential act performed
by the addressee but predicted and invited by the communicator (the
inference of some new information on the basis of the now altered con-
text). The ostensive act communicates the speaker’s communicative
intention, by being recognised as unusual, and triggers the inferential
act, in which the addressee attempts to infer the speaker’s informative
intention, as described by LaPolla (2006) and others.
Two special types of common ground deserve to be mentioned ex-
plicitly here. First, it is essential, for ostensive-inferential communica-
tion to be possible, that the interlocutors find a shared understanding
of the assumed goal of a given interaction—which in turn builds on
some understanding of each other’s intentions (Tomasello et al. 2005).
Such knowledge of the interactional goal enables the interlocutors to
determine what is relevant in the context of that interaction; a piece
of information is relevant if communicating it to the addressee would
contribute to achieving the assumed goal of the interaction. Second,
linguistic communication additionally makes use of yet another special
type of common ground knowledge: the awareness of shared linguis-
tic conventions. In accordance with construction-based approaches to
1Sperber & Wilson (1995) refer to this as mutually manifest information.
2An example of a basic ostensive act would be pointing at an object in order to ori-
entate the hearer’s attention to it. Diessel (1999) argues that words used exophorically,
accompanying such acts, develop into demonstratives through grammaticalisation.
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grammar, we understand such conventions as symbolic associations
between forms and meanings (e.g. Langacker 1987; Croft 2001).
2.2 The metaphor-based scenario
Before we sketch the metaphor-based scenario of grammaticalisation,
it seems appropriate to specify how we conceive the notion of ‘metaphor’.
What most definitions developed by metaphor theorists have in com-
mon is the core idea that metaphorical language use denotes situa-
tions where an extant linguistic form is used (“transferred” in the
sense of the original Greek metaphe´rein) to express a meaning (its
“metaphorical meaning”) which is similar, but not identical, to the
one that form is conventionally associated with (its “literal meaning”)
(Ko¨vecses 2002). Metaphor is thus a form of analogy (see e.g. Hop-
per & Traugott (2003: 93), Fischer (2007: 122), Itkonen (2005: 41)).
Lakoff & Johnson (1980) refer to the conventional meaning involved
in a metaphor as its ‘source’, and to the the novel meaning it is used
for as the ‘target’. The metaphorical use of a source is possible if the
semantic components that pertain only to the source but not to the
intended target are irrelevant in the respective usage situation. Not
all metaphors are thereby easily recognised as such. A metaphor is
more conspicuous if the source shares only very few conceptual prop-
erties with the target, and less conspicuous if source and target are
almost identical. Example (2) shows a very obvious case of metaphor-
ical language use. The source (the ‘chameleon’) has only very few
properties that also occur in the target: Sally and chameleons share
their habit of frequently changing their appearance. Other features of
the source, like e.g. the property of having a long tongue or the fact
that chameleons are reptiles, are ignored if it is evident that they do
not contribute to what the speaker plausibly wants to communicate
in the given context.
(2) a. Sally is a chameleon. (source)
b. Sally frequently changes her appearance. (target)
We hold that there is no clear-cut distinction between literal use and
metaphorical use but that the two rather form a continuum. Instances
of literal or metaphorical use only differ in the degree of similarity be-
tween the conventional meaning of the used linguistic form and the
meaning it is used to express. This view that literal use and metaphor-
ical use—in fact any figurative language use—constitute a continuum,
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is advocated, for example, by Langacker (1987: 69f.), Sperber & Wil-
son (1995: 231–37), Carston (1997), Croft (2000: 99–114) and Wilson
& Carston (2007). Metaphorical use is thus not only the basis of
what we perceive as poetic language but also occurs in the small-scale
deviances from convention that are ubiquitous in ordinary every-day
talk (Deutscher 2005: 117ff.). It denotes any case of language use
where parts of the conventional meaning of the expressed linguistic
form are ignored by the interlocutors because they are not relevant in
the given context. The more obviously these dismissed parts of the
conventional meaning would conflict with the actually communicated
meaning, the more figurative appears the respective instance of lan-
guage use to be. Therefore, when we talk about metaphorical use,
we refer not to any arbitrary degree of deviance from convention but
to the underlying cognitive mechanism defining continuum of “loose
talk” (Sperber & Wilson 1995) or “partial sanction” (Langacker 1987)
that extends between literalness and poetic metaphor.
Likewise, we speak of individual instances of metaphorical ex-
tension and not of the metaphor-complexes (also called “conceptual
metaphors”) that e.g. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) focus on. Such ex-
tended metaphor-complexes may emerge as the cumulative effect of
the repeated creation of individual metaphorical extensions that al-
lude to already established metaphors. This statement also contains
a last distinction we want to clarify: that between the ad hoc creation
of a metaphor and so-called dead metaphors present in a language
(Deutscher 2005). When we speak of metaphorical use, we refer to
the former, namely the cognitive process by means of which a speaker
uses an extant linguistic convention in a novel, metaphorical way in a
particular usage event, and not to metaphors that are already estab-
lished in a language and have themselves become conventional.
The reasons why speakers use extant conventions metaphorically
are manifold. They may want to attract attention, establish pres-
tige, avoid committing themselves the way they would if they used
a literal expression (Pinker et al. 2008), or a metaphor may simply
be shorter than a cumbersome literal circumlocution. A crucial as-
pect of metaphorical language use, however, is its creative potential:
a metaphor may allow a speaker to express a meaning for which no
extant convention exists yet. This was obviously not the case for be go-
ing to—English contained ways of expressing intention already before
the grammaticalisation of be going to. But this aspect of metaphorical
use will play a vital role in the examples discussed later in this article.
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Along these lines, example (3) illustrates what we will call the
metaphor-based scenario of grammaticalisation. A speaker intends
to express intention (3a). She uses the form for spatial motion
metaphorically, assuming that the hearer will realise that (i) spatial
motion is irrelevant in the current context, and (ii) spatial motion
often implies intention which in turn is relevant (3b–f)3 The hearer
realises that the literal meaning of the signal is irrelevant in the current
context, and falls back on intention, which he associates—and knows
the speaker associates—with spatial motion (3g–m).
(3) Detail of the metaphor-based scenario.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express intention.
(b) I have a construction which expresses spatial
motion, and the hearer shares this convention.
(c) spatial motion is associated with intention.
(d) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(e) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be
aware of (b)–(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use the construction for spatial
motion metaphorically to convey intention.
[Speaker expresses spatial motion]
Hearer:
(g) The speaker has expressed spatial motion.
(h) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(i) spatial motion often implies intention.
(j) intention would be relevant in the given context.
(k) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(l) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I
know (f)–(j), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (f)–(k), I conclude that the speaker intends to
convey intention.
3Of course, this implication is one of many which could be used; whether or not it is
used depends on what is relevant in the current context.
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2.3 Conventionalisation
The scenario described above illustrates how the original linguistic
convention associated with be going to could have been used in a spe-
cific situation to communicate the meaning which be going to would
later become to stand for. However, such an instance of ostensive-
inferential communication is only the first step on the way to gram-
maticalisation. A second step needs to follow it for the process of
grammaticalisation to be complete: the conveyed utterance meaning
needs to become a new linguistic convention itself. This additional
cognitive process of conventionalisation is initiated when the speaker
and the hearer memorise the particular usage of an expression which
they have just experienced. In the case described in (3), they may
remember that be going to was used to convey intention, while at
the same time maintaining their knowledge that it conventionally ex-
presses spatial motion. The memorisation of the usage of an expression
therefore has two effects: the entrenchment of a new form-meaning as-
sociation, and the establishment of new common ground between the
involved individuals.
The more frequently a particular expression like be going to is used
to convey the same meaning, the more deeply the association between
that form and the meaning will become entrenched in the knowledge
of the user. Such entrenchment is a form of automatisation where an
experienced association between a form and a meaning turns into a
psychological unit and that unit becomes enforced (Langacker 1987) in
the user’s encyclopedic knowledge. The more deeply a form-meaning
association is entrenched, the more readily it is accessible: if, for in-
stance, the association between be going to and intention is sufficiently
entrenched, it may be activated without the complex reasoning that
was necessary to invoke it when that entrenchement had not yet hap-
pened. Through entrenchment, a form-meaning association can thus
gain a certain degree of independence from its context of use. The
depth of entrenchment is related to frequency of usage, because with
each usage event, the association between the used linguistic form and
the communicated meaning is further entrenched in both the speaker
and the hearer, that is, in all individuals involved in the communica-
tive episode (Croft 2000: 73).
While entrenchment affects each user individually, the memorisa-
tion of usages also has a more social component: it adds to the com-
mon ground that two individuals share. The awareness that be going
9
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to has in previous contexts been used successfully to convey intention,
and that the hearer shares this knowledge, will allow the speaker to
re-use be going to in the same sense in later communicative situations
with the same hearer even when the context would not allow for the
reasoning detailed in (3). Like entrenchment, the establishment of new
common ground thus lets an association between a linguistic form and
the meaning that form has been used to communicate become more
context-independent. Once it has become common ground, an asso-
ciation between a form and a meaning can itself serve as background
knowledge on the basis of which novel utterance meanings can be con-
veyed in future acts of ostensive-inferential communication.
The simple cognitive mechanism of usage memorisation can thus
lead to the conventionalisation of a form-meaning association because
it results in entrenchment and the establishment of new common
ground. Ultimately, conventionalisation describes the phenomenon
sometimes referred to as context-absorption (Kuteva 2001): an ut-
terance meaning turns into a conventional meaning, that is, a prag-
matically inferred meaning becomes the semantically encoded mean-
ing associated with the used expression. The process of context-
absorption—or rather its results—has been referred to frequently in
both the grammaticalisation and the historical pragmatics literature
(see e.g. Levinson 2000: 262–264; Kuteva 2001: 150f.; Traugott &
Dasher 2005: 35).
Note that usage memorisation can bring about a situation of lay-
ering in an individual’s linguistic knowledge, if the employed linguistic
form is newly associated with a meaning that is different from its con-
ventional meaning. The memorisation of the usage event described
in (3) above, for instance, will lead to the speaker and the hearer en-
tertaining two linguistic conventions involving be going to: one that
associates it with spatial motion and another one that associates
it with intention. However, the old and the new convention might
exhibit different degrees of entrenchment. If they are both sufficiently
entrenched, the impression of polysemy arises, and the expression is
conceived as having multiple meanings.
2.4 The reanalysis-based scenario
As above, before we present the reanalysis-based scenario of grammat-
icalisation, we first explain our conception of reanalysis. Whenever a
hearer interprets an utterance, he creates a set of mappings between
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the form and the meaning which he assumes the speaker intends to
convey with her utterance. Such mappings can be of arbitrary com-
plexity, including not only a mapping between the whole form and the
whole meaning, but also mappings between individual components of
the form and their semantic counterparts, as interpreted in the con-
text of use. Every set of form-meaning mappings is thus an analysis
of the way in which the form represents the meaning associated with
it. Each independent interpretation of a form therefore yields its own
analysis; if two such analyses differ in any way, then we can say that
a re-analysis of the relationship between form and meaning has taken
place.
Our notion of reanalysis is similar to, but broader than, that pro-
posed by Hopper & Traugott (2003), who suggest that reanalysis oc-
curs whenever “the hearer understands a form to have a structure
and a meaning that are different from those of the speaker” (Hopper
& Traugott 2003: 50). We concur with this, but note that reanaly-
sis is not just restricted to comparisons between a speaker’s analysis
and a hearer’s analysis; the comparisons can be either diachronic or
synchronic, and the analyses themselves can be either by different in-
dividuals or by the same individual at different times. This view of
reanalysis as a comparison is firmly based in the inference of meaning
from context, and encompasses any difference in analysis, whether it
be a difference in the meanings associated with the utterance as whole,
in whether particular components of the meaning are pragmatically
inferred or semantically encoded (Traugott & Dasher 2005: 35), or in
how the components of the form are mapped to components of the
meaning (Croft 2001: 21), including both sides of the traditional di-
vision between morphological and syntactic change (see Trask 2000,
Harris & Campbell 1995, Haspelmath 1998 and McDaniels 2003 for
different, more restrictive definitions of the kinds of linguistic change
which count as reanalysis).
Reanalysis can also be seen as the process through which the two
different analyses arise, and we agree with Detges & Waltereit (2002)’s
argument that this process is an inevitable consequence of the cogni-
tive mechanisms underlying ostensive-inferential communication. The
context of a particular situation can be modelled, in principle, to arbi-
trarily complex levels, and therefore the contexts of any two situations
will almost inevitably be different. In this respect, therefore, reanal-
ysis is almost ubiquitous in communicative discourse: every time an
utterance is interpreted, there will be some (possibly small) differ-
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ence between the speaker’s context and the hearer’s context, which
may lead to a mismatch between the meaning the speaker intended to
communicate and that which is inferred by the hearer (Kuteva 2001:
ch. 6), and thereby to differences in how the connections between
components of form and components of meaning are understood.
It is important to note that because the mappings between form
and meaning are internal to every linguistic individual, both they,
and therefore also reanalysis itself, can never be directly observed.
Differences between two sets of mappings can therefore only be un-
covered through actualisation (Trask 2000), when utterances are pro-
duced which are consistent with only one of the analyses. An ac-
tualisation of the analysis of be going to as a marker of intention or
futurity but not motion is shown in example (4): the utterance in 4(a)
can be happily interpreted as either intention or motion, with no
change in the communicative effect, while the utterance in 4(b) cannot
be intrepreted as motion, because this clashes with the meaning of
stay. This clash forces the intention interpretation as the only one
which is communicatively plausible, and this thereby makes clear, or
actualises, the analysis which maps be going to to intention.
(4) a. I am going to play football this evening.
b. I am going to stay here this evening.
Given this notion of reanalysis, therefore, we now set out the details of
our reanalysis-based scenario in example (5), in which the speaker uses
be going to in its conventional sense to express spatial motion—the
expression of which she deems relevant in the given context (5a–e)
The hearer, however, perceives things differently; he does not think
that spatial motion is relevant in the present situation but does
believe that information about intention would be (5f-l). From the
hearer’s perspective, this appears to be exactly the same scenario as
the metaphor-based scenario in example (3). This time, the inter-
locutors make different adjustments to their codes: the speaker will
further entrench the convention that maps be going to onto spatial
motion, whereas the hearer establishes a new, additional association
between be going to and intention4.
4Note that the emerging asymmetry in the interlocutors’ codes can easily go unnoticed
and does not necessarily lead to miscommunication. Evans & Wilkins (2000: 549f.),
for instance, point out that semantic change typically occurs in what they call “bridging
contexts,” where “speech participants do not detect any problem of different assignments of
12
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(5) Detail of the renalysis-based scenario5.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express spatial motion.
(b) I have a construction for the expression of spatial
motion in my linguistic code, and the hearer shares
this convention.
(c) spatial motion is relevant in the given context.
(d) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be
aware of (b)–(c) and realise that I am aware of it too.
(e) Because of (d), I can use the construction to
communicate spatial motion.
[Speaker expresses spatial motion]
Hearer:
(f) The speaker has expressed spatial motion.
(g) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context6.
(h) spatial motion often implies intention.
(i) intention would be relevant in the given context.
(j) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(k) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I
know (f)–(j), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(l) From (f)–(k), I conclude that the speaker intends to
convey intention.
A special case of the reanalysis-based scenario is one where the
hearer, in the role of a language learner, has no existing mapping for
be going to in his lexicon. However, because he can work out from the
context that the speaker intends to express intention, he will create
an association between that meaning and be going to. In contrast
to the previous two scenarios, layering does not arise in the hearer’s
linguistic knowledge in this case.
meaning to the forms because both speaker and addressee interpretations of the utterance
in context are functionally equivalent, even if the relative contributions of lexical content
and pragmatic enrichment differ” (Evans & Wilkins 2000: 550).
5See Kuteva (2001: ch. 5–6) for a similar description of the reanalysis-based scenario.
6Again, this analysis is somewhat simplified, as relevance is a continuum, not a binary-
valued function. It might be more accurate to state that spatial motion is not the most
relevant interpretation possible in the given context.
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2.5 Comparing the two scenarios
We conclude from the analyses presented above that the two scenarios
of grammaticalisation, which we have called metaphor- and reanalysis-
based respectively, do not invoke different processes but merely de-
scribe different circumstances. In both scenarios, exactly the same
cognitive mechanisms are at work: (i) the psychological underpin-
nings of ostensive-inferential communication, namely the assumption
of common ground, including the knowledge of shared linguistic con-
ventions and the recognition of what is relevant in the given context;
(ii) the memorisation of usages and their subsequent entrenchment,
which can lead to conventionalisation because it also involves the es-
tablishment of new common ground between the individuals partici-
pating in the communicative act.
Probably the most striking observation that arises from the com-
parison of the two scenarios as we have analysed them is that the
hearer’s part is exactly the same in the metaphor-based and in the
reanalysis-based account. In both cases, the hearer assumes that the
speaker has used be going to in a metaphorical sense. What distin-
guishes the two scenarios in our example is the speaker’s reasoning. In
the metaphor-based scenario, the speaker intends to express intention
and considers it to be common ground that information about spatial
motion is irrelevant in the current situation. In the reanalysis-based
scenario, the speaker intends to express spatial motion—which she
deems relevant in the given context. However, while in the metaphor-
based scenario, speaker and hearer entertain the same assumptions
about what constitutes common ground, in the reanalysis-based sce-
nario, the hearer’s assumptions on common ground are different from
the speaker’s. The interlocutors therefore have different beliefs (albeit
ever so slightly so) about the content of the interchange, yet commu-
nication does not conspicuously fail. This is because the success of a
communicative episode is determined not by comparing the inaccessi-
ble internal meanings understood by the interlocutors, but by checking
whether the resulting perlocutionary effect satisfies the speaker’s ex-
pectations; as long as the meaning reconstructed by the hearer has
the same effect as the meaning which was intended, the difference in
assumptions will pass unnoticed. To summarise, common ground is
successfully established in the metaphor-based scenario, while a mis-
match between the respective discourse contexts of the interlocutors
occurs in the reanalysis-based scenario (for the latter, see also Kuteva
14
305
2001: ch. 6).
However, this difference between the two scenarios is not caused
by different underlying cognitive processes but merely by different cir-
cumstances. Both scenarios are based on the interlocutors’ capacities
to entertain assumptions about what constitutes common ground in
a given situation: it is only that their assumptions happen to differ
in the reanalysis-based scenario. And even these two cases have to
be seen as points on a continuum, namely one that ranges from situ-
ations where the interlocutors entertain identical assumptions about
their common ground to situations where their assumptions are com-
pletely different. These, of course, are hypothetical limiting cases:
the former condition is unlikely to occur (Sperber 1996: 101), and the
latter would prevent ostensive-inferential communication from being
established.
Who, then, is the innovator? In the metaphor-based scenario, both
speaker and hearer end up with a novel form-meaning association: the
speaker because she has used an extant convention in an innovative
way, and the hearer because he has picked up the speaker’s innovation.
In the reanalysis-based scenario, only the hearer extends his linguis-
tic conventions. The speaker does not use language innovatively but,
because of an existing contextual mismatch, the hearer misinterprets
her utterance as the innovative use of an extant convention. The two
scenarios have thus merely different foci with respect to the source of
innovation: one is speaker-oriented, the other one is hearer-oriented.
Each of them can be seen as a special, more constrained case of the
other. The reanalysis-based scenario can be interpreted as a speaker-
oriented scenario where the speaker and the hearer happen to make
different assumptions about what constitutes common ground and the
hearer thus interprets the communicative event as innovative, when it
was not intended to be. The metaphor-based scenario, on the other
hand, can be understood as a hearer-oriented scenario where the in-
terlocutors’ assumptions of common ground happen to coincide and
both speaker and hearer interpret the usage event they attend to as in-
novative. We can therefore draw the following conclusions. Language
use can be either conventional or innovative—both in production and
in comprehension. The scenarios of grammaticalisation we have dis-
cussed here merely represent different combinations of conventional
and innovative use in the interlocutors: one and the same innovation
can occur in the speaker, or in the hearer, or in both interlocutors, or
in neither. This finding is summarised in Table 1. In order to com-
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plete the picture, we have also included in the table the two conditions
which do not contribute to grammaticalisation: when a speaker uses
language in its conventional sense and the hearer interprets it likewise
(shown in the first row of the table), and when a speaker uses language
innovatively but the hearer interprets it as an instance of conventional
use (shown in the last row of the table). The latter could, of course,
initiate grammaticalisation in the speaker’s grammar, but for this in-
novation to spread, it would later have to occur under one of the other
three sets of conditions.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Table 1 represents a single communicative episode (e1), of course,
and in both our grammaticalisation scenarios the hearer’s internalised
innovation is not immediately visible in linguistic usage. Imagine a
later episode (e2) in which the hearer from e1 acts as the speaker,
and uses the innovation from the first episode; it is only during the
second episode that the innovation becomes observable. The usage
in the second episode is now a conventional usage from the speaker’s
viewpoint (who was the hearer in e1), but innovative to the new hearer,
and different from that used by the original speaker from e1. We
note that this process is equivalent to the two-stage actualisation of
reanalysis, when a new analysis becomes observable through analogy
Hopper & Traugott (2003: 69, 93).
Finally, we consider a condition which combines aspects of both
the metaphor-based and the reanalysis-based scenarios: the speaker
and hearer are both innovative in their usage, yet there is also a con-
textual mismatch, because they make different innovations, and thus
different adjustments to their internal linguistic representations. In
(6), the speaker intends to express intention, and so uses the form
for spatial motion metaphorically, assuming that the hearer will
realise that spatial motion is irrelevant, but that it often implies in-
tention, which is relevant (6a-f). The hearer recognises that spa-
tial motion is irrelevant, but assumes that the form is being used
metaphorically to express futurity, not intention. This scenario
clearly illustrates the fundamentally approximate and uncertain na-
ture of ostensive-inferential communication (Hurford 2007: 21); nei-
16
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ther interlocutor ever knows the exact details of the other’s knowledge,
but must form, and act upon, assumptions made on the basis of their
shared experiences.
(6) Detail of a scenario combining both metaphor-based and
reanalysis-based aspects.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express intention.
(b) I have a construction which expresses spatial
motion, and the hearer shares this convention.
(c) spatial motion is associated with intention.
(d) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(e) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be
aware of (b)–(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use the construction for spatial
motion metaphorically to convey intention.
[Speaker expresses spatial motion]
Hearer:
(g) The speaker has expressed spatial motion.
(h) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(i) spatial motion often implies futurity.
(j) futurity would be relevant in the given context.
(k) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(l) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I
know (g)–(k), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (g)–(l), I conclude that the speaker intends to
convey futurity.
2.6 Multi-step scenarios
So far, we have done two things: we have sketched possible metaphor-
and reanalysis-based pathways for the grammaticalisation of be going
to, and we have shown that in both cases, the same cognitive mecha-
nisms are at work. The two scenarios we have discussed illustrate un-
der what circumstances spatial motion could have come to express
intention in one step. Note that we are not claiming that motion
verbs must unavoidably change into intention verbs, but rather that
17
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the specifics of the context is important as to the future development
of a construction (see also Heine (2002); Diewald (2002)).
We show now that the same development can also have happened
in more than one step, with still exactly the same set of cognitive
mechanisms underlying. In fact, historical evidence suggests that this
was indeed the case for the specific example of the English expression
be going to. We must assume that the development from spatial mo-
tion to intention must have included an intermediary stage where
be going to had come to be associated with intentional (or purposive)
spatial motion, thus having assumed the notion of intention while at
the same time retaining its aspect of spatial motion. Kuteva (2001:
117–121), referring to Perez (1990), points out that this development
was facilitated by the intrinsically purposive nature of human spatial
motion. Consequently, as Bybee et al. (1994) have shown, be going
to (in imperfective aspect) lent itself to being complemented with a
purposive clause, which solidified the conventionalisation of the aspect
of intention together with the original meaning spatial motion.
In examples (7–10), we demonstrate that the individual stages of
the historically attested grammaticalisation chain of be going to can be
analysed as being initiated by exactly the same set of cognitive mech-
anisms that we have identified above. The stages correspond to those
outlined by Kuteva (2001: 117–121). The first step, detailed in exam-
ple (7), describes the addition of the aspect of intention to spatial
motion7. The second step, detailed in example (8), illustrates the fur-
ther addition of prediction (futurity). Both these developments
describe a process of increasing semantic narrowing (spatial motion
> spatial motion & intention > spatial motion & intention
& prediction).
(7) Detail of step I of a multi-step scenario.
Speaker: Henry is going to town.
Hearer:
(a) The speaker has expressed spatial motion.
(b) spatial motion alone is not relevant in the given
context.
7We only explicate the hearer’s reasoning here, which is the same in both the metaphor-
based and the reanalysis-based scenario. It is understood that, depending on which sce-
nario one assumes for each individual step, the speaker’s reasoning amounts to innovative
or conventional use respectively.
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(c) spatial motion often implies intention.
(d) spatial motion together with intention would be
relevant in the given context.
(e) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(f) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I
know (a)–(e), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(g) From (a)–(f), I conclude that the speaker intends to
convey spatial motion and intention.
(8) Detail of step II of a multi-step scenario.
Speaker: I am going to win.
Hearer:
(a) The speaker has expressed spatial motion and
intention.
(b) spatial motion and intention alone is not relevant
in the given context.
(c) intention often amounts to prediction.
(d) spatial motion and intention together with
prediction would be relevant in the given context.
(e) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(f) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I
know (a)–(e), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(g) From (a)–(f), I conclude that the speaker intends to
convey spatial motion, intention and prediction.
In a third and fourth step, we can observe the type of semantic
broadening or bleaching that is often described as characteristic of
grammaticalisation. Example (9) details a situation that initiates the
use of be going to without the aspect of spatial motion, and example
(10) details one in which be going to is subsequently used without the
aspect of intention. The conventionalisation of the latter leads to the
conventional usage of be going to to express (predictive) future tense.
This second part of the grammaticalisation chain thus includes the fol-
lowing steps of semantic broadening: spatial motion & intention
& prediction > intention & prediction > prediction.
(9) Detail of step III of a multi-step scenario.
Speaker: I am going to do my best to make you happy.
Hearer:
19
310
(a) The speaker has expressed spatial motion,
intention and prediction.
(b) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(c) intention and prediction would be relevant in the
given context.
(d) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(e) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I
know (a)–(d), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(f) From (a)–(e), I conclude that the speaker intends to
convey intention and prediction only.
(10) Detail of step IV of a multi-step scenario.
Speaker: The rain is going to come.
Hearer:
(a) The speaker has expressed intention and
prediction.
(b) intention is not relevant in the given context.
(c) prediction would be relevant in the given context.
(d) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(e) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I
know (a)–(d), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(f) From (a)–(e), I conclude that the speaker intends to
convey prediction only.
The scenarios introduced in (3) and (5) above, which did not con-
sider the aspect of prediction, deliberately conflated the two steps of
semantic narrowing and semantic broadening into one step of seman-
tic shift (motion > intention), whereas the scenarios here illustrate
a multi-step pathway that corresponds more closely to what we know
about the specific example of be going to from historical evidence.
The crucial point for us, however, is this. With regard to the un-
derlying cognitive mechanisms that we need to assume, not only does
it not matter whether we adopt a metaphor-based or a reanalysis-
based scenario, but it is also irrelevant how many intermediate stages
we postulate: in all cases it is exactly the same set of cognitive mecha-
nisms which are at work, with only the specifics of the circumstances
in which a certain change is assumed to have been initiated being
different.
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3 The pre-linguistic basis
We now turn to the question of how our unified analysis of the pro-
cess of grammaticalisation relates to the origin of language. We claim
that early human pre-linguistic communication must have exhibited
the same structure as the linguistic scenarios we have described. In
the following paragraphs, we discuss a typical approach to language
evolution in light of the above analysis of the mechanisms involved
in ostensive-inferential communication. The crucial point here is to
notice that ostensive-inferential communication does not need to be
linguistic. Even in present-day human communication, non-linguistic
ostensive-inferential communication is frequently applied where lan-
guage is not available, not suitable, or not needed because there is
sufficient common ground between the interlocutors (LaPolla 2006).
Non-linguistic cues can be sounds, gestures or other types of behaviour
that will be interpreted by an observer as communicative because they
would not otherwise be plausible or relevant in a given context.
3.1 Burling’s scenario revisited
One of the main questions that evolutionary linguistics has to address
is how certain forms of behaviour become associated with meanings in
the first place. Burling (2000, 2005) makes a case for a scenario that
emphasises the role of comprehension in this process. He suggests that
form-meaning associations arise when an individual erroneously inter-
prets a conspecific’s behaviour as communicative. Burling concludes
that comprehension runs ahead of production in the evolution of lan-
guage: “communication does not begin when someone makes a sign,
but when someone interprets another’s behaviour as a sign” (Burling
2000: 30). Burling’s scenario is compatible with our approach—it
effectively constitutes an extreme case of reanalysis—but for the fol-
lowing reasons, we do not find his conclusion warranted.
The central question is to identify the reasoning which Burling’s
scenario demands on the part of the individual who mistakenly in-
terprets another individual’s behaviour as a meaningful signal. To
investigate this, we provide below the details of the comprehension
process of a possible instantiation of Burling’s scenario. In the inter-
action illustrated in example (11), one individual growls, and another
individual erroneously interprets ths as a warning about the presence
of a lion.
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(11) Burling’s reanalysis-like scenario for the origin of a
pre-linguistic communicative convention.
[Individual A expresses growling.]
Individual B:
(a) Individual A has expressed growling.
(b) growling itself is not relevant in the given context.
(c) growling often implies lion.
(d) lion would be relevant in the given context.
(e) I must assume that individual A is co-operative.
(f) I must also assume that individual A is aware that I
know (a)–(e), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(g) From (a)–(f), I conclude that individual A intends to
convey lion.
In order to interpret the first individual’s behaviour as a communica-
tive cue, the second individual needs the set of assumptions detailed
in (11a–f). These assumptions are equivalent to the hearer’s reasoning
in the two scenarios for grammaticalisation sketched above. We have
explained above that such reasoning involves the capacity to recognise
common ground (even though, as in the shown case, the respective as-
sumptions may be misguided) and, specifically, a recognition of what
information would be relevant in the given situation. Both capacities
are based on the ability to interpret the intentions of other individuals.
But these cognitive capacities are at the same time sufficient for an
individual to be capable of not only comprehending, but also produc-
ing an ostensive cue. It thus seems hardly plausible to assume a state
where individuals were capable of comprehension but not of produc-
tion, since both activities require the same minimal cognitive endow-
ment. On the contrary, although Burling’s reanalysis-like scenario is
of course possible, given the mechanisms of ostensive-inferential com-
munication and the possibility for a contextual mismatch despite the
assumption of common ground, the corresponding metaphor-like sce-
nario must be considered equally likely. In example (12), we have de-
tailed an example of what such a scenario would look like in this case.
In contrast to Burling’s assumptions, our analysis suggests that the
capacities to produce and comprehend ostensive cues do not emerge
at different moments in human evolution. They are rather both based
on the same set of more basic cognitive abilities, and once these are
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in place, both production and comprehension are available to an indi-
vidual.
(12) Detail of a metaphor-like scenario for the origin of a
pre-linguistic communicative convention.
Individual A:
(a) I want to express lion.
(b) I can express growling.
(c) growling is associated with lion.
(d) growling is not relevant in the given context.
(e) Because we share common ground, individual B will be
aware of (b)–(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use growling (quasi
“metaphorically”) to convey lion.
[Individual A expresses growling.]
Individual B:
(g) Individual A has expressed growling.
(h) growling is not relevant in the given context.
(i) growling often implies lion.
(j) lion would be relevant in the given context.
(k) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(l) I must also assume that individual A is aware that I
know (g)–(k), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (g)–(l), I conclude that individual A intends to
convey lion.
3.2 Semantic Reconstruction
To complete the parallel with the linguistic analysis above, we present
a scenario containing aspects of both metaphor-like and renalysis-like
scenarios, in which both interlocutors are innovative, but they make
different innovations. In example (13), one individual growls in or-
der to warn another of the presence of a lion (13a-f), but the latter
erroneously interprets it as a warning about a jackal (13g-m). Both
interpretations may have the same perlocutionary effect (for instance,
that both individuals climb into the trees to escape), and so the mis-
match in understanding remains unnoticed.
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(13) Detail of a pre-linguistic scenario that combines both
metaphor-like and reanalysis-like aspects.
Individual A:
(a) I want to express lion.
(b) I can express growling.
(c) growling is associated with lion and with jackal.
(d) growling and jackal are not relevant in the given
context.
(e) Because we share common ground, individual B will be
aware of (b)–(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use growling (quasi
“metaphorically”) to convey lion.
[Individual A expresses growling.]
Individual B:
(g) Individual A has expressed growling.
(h) growling is not relevant in the given context.
(i) growling often implies lion or jackal.
(j) jackal would be relevant in the given context, lion
not.
(k) I must assume that individual A is co-operative.
(l) I must also assume that individual A is aware that I
know (g)–(k), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (g)–(l), I conclude that individual A intends to
convey jackal.
In all versions of Burling’s scenario, the observed form and the
inferred meaning are associated, memorised and subsequently con-
ventionalised in the individuals’ encyclopaedic knowledge bases. In
the scenarios characterised by mismatches in the individuals’ assump-
tions, however, these developing conventions also differ: in (11) only
the “hearer” in fact memorises the usage and assumes that it is com-
mon ground, while in (13) both individuals memorise different usages.
Because these new associations have been made by no-one else, an
individual can only re-use them successfully in future situations if the
context provides enough clues for the meaning to be reconstructed.
The inferential reconstruction of meaning is the mechanism through
which form-meaning mappings persist and survive over time; those
mappings whose meanings can be easily and repeatedly reconstructed
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will be preferentially replicated, while those which are difficult to re-
construct will quickly perish (Smith 2008).
From the analyses presented in this section, we can see that the
same general cognitive reasoning processes underpin all ostensive-
inferential communication, both linguistic and pre-linguistic. These
same mechanisms, which we have shown to be fundamental to the
process of grammaticalisation in modern languages, could therefore
also have been behind the emergence of communicative conventions,
both linguistic and pre-linguistic.
There remains, of course, a big gap to be bridged between the
discussed pre-linguistic forms of communication and the emergence of
grammatical material in human language. Even though it is not the
aim of this article to account for how this “problem of linkage,” as
Kirby (1999: 20) refers to this type of evolutionary puzzle, can be
solved,we make a contribution toward a solution nonetheless by iden-
tifying the continual element in both the state before and the state
after the transition to language. We agree with Tomasello’s (2003)
description of human language as the product of cumulative cultural
evolution. According to this account, the human capacity to recog-
nise common ground and in particular to understand conspecifics as
intentional beings has given rise to symbolism, and once symbolic
conventions were available, grammar emerged as gradually as the cu-
mulative result of grammaticalisation and syntacticisation processes
as they have been described by Givo´n (1979), Hopper (1987) and
many others since. What this article adds to Tomasello’s scenario is
the recognition that the emergence of pre-linguistic symbolic conven-
tions and the process of grammaticalisation are in fact not distinct
phenomena but rather constitute instances of one and the same set
of cognitive mechanisms. This analysis suggests that human language
has emerged from pre-linguistic communication through iterated acts
of ostensive-inferential communication, which, in the course of cumu-
lative cultural evolution, have given rise to both symbolic conventions
as well as grammatical material. Our account has the advantage that
it upholds the principle of uniformity of process, which is particularly
important in the light of the absence of any directly observable data
on language evolution: it analyses the cognitive process underlying
documented cases of grammaticalisation and projects them back to
explain for the emergence of symbolic conventions.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the metaphor-based and reanalysis-
based approaches to grammaticalisation in detail, and have provided
a unified account based not on their linguistic properties, but on the
cognitive mechanisms underlying ostensive-inferential communication,
such as the assumption of common ground between interlocutors, and
the memorisation of communicative experiences. Moreover, we have
shown that these mechanisms are not specific to language, but are
instead instances of much more fundamental, domain-general cogni-
tive properties. Having characterised grammaticalisation in terms of
domain-general mechanisms which are more basic and ancient than
language, we then explored the emergence of pre-linguistic conven-
tions using the same framework, and concluded that the same cog-
nitive processes were also at work in this case. We therefore claim
that acknowledging the cognitive mechanisms underlying ostensive-
inferential communication will not only allow us to shed new light on
the linguistic study of grammaticalisation, but will also provide the
foundation for a unified explanation of historical language change and
the origin and evolution of language.
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